简体繁体

100%

(1977——2003)

（附：2004 年股东会议记录）

● 一九七七年

● 保险公司所提供标准化的保单是很容易同业模仿的，其惟一的差异在于信誉。(1977)

● 在美国取得保险公司执照并不困难，所有的费率皆是公开的，商标、专利、地点、公司设

立时间长短、原料来源这些皆不重要。(1977)

● 依我们过去的经验显示，从公开市场所买进部份股权的价格远比整笔购并所谈的价格要低

的许多。因此，就算在无法取得控制权的情况下，我们仍愿意进行投资取得少数股权，只

要该公司能长期稳健地获利并反映在其市值与每年分配的股利之上。(1977)

● 一九七八年

● 我不认为包含我自己本身在内能够「成功」地预测股市短期间的波动。(1978)

● 纺织业低资产周转率与低毛利无可避免的造成低股东权益报酬率。(1978)

● 当市场竞争激烈时，产品价格会随直接营运成本而非投入资金作变动。(1978)

● 迟未退出纺织业的原因: (1978)

(1)该公司为当地非常重要的雇主

(2)管理当局坦诚面对困境并努力解决问题

(3)劳工体认困境并极力配合

(4)尚能产生稳定现金收入

● 依我们过去的经验显示，要「找到」一家好的保险公司并不容易，但要「创立」一家更

难。(1978)

● 投资评断标准: (1978)

(1)我们熟悉了解(understand)的产业

(2)具有长期性的远景

(3)由正直且具能力者所经营

(4)吸引人的价格(这点很重要，很多个案便是因为这项因素，而无法成功)

● 我们的政策是集中持股(Concentrate Holdings)。当我们决定了后便买进「一大笔」，而非

这也买一点、那也买点，但事后却漠不关心。(1978)

● 虽然我们某些部份的投资在会计上因采成本法，使得我们依比例应认列的收益，除实际分

配的现金股利外，无法完显现出来，但这一点也不影响它们的「真实性」。(1978)

● 我们可以接受被投资公司保留盈余而不分配，但前提是公司必须将之用在「更有利」的用

途上，否则便应分配给股东或是用来买回公司股份。(1978)

● 依我们过去的经验显示，一家高成本结购公司的经营者，永远找得到增加公司开支的理由;

而相对的，一家低成本结购公司的经营者，永远找得到节省公司开支的方法，即使后者的

成本早已远低于前者。(1978)

● 与这群「乐在其中」并以像老板一样心态经营公司的专业经理人在一起工作真是一种享

受。(1978)

● 一九七九年

● 就短期间而言，我们一直认为营业利益(不含出售证券损益)除以股东权益(所有投资须以原

始成本计算，否则若以市价计，将使得分母每年大幅波动而失去比较意义)所得的比率，为

衡量单一年度经营成果的最佳方式。(1979)

● 就长期间而言，我们则认为公司纯益(包含已实现、未实现资本利得与非常损益)除以股东

权益(所有投资以公平市价计算)所得的比率，为衡量永续经营成果的最佳方式。(1979)

● 我们判断一家公司经营的好坏，取决于其股东权益报酬率(排除不当的财务杠杆或会计作

帐)，而非每股盈余的成长与否，因为即使是把钱固定存在银行不动，也能达到像后者一样

的目的。(1979)

● 自接掌公司至今(1964-1979)的十五年来，公司每股净值以20.5%的年复合成长率由19.46美

元成长至335.85美元。而这其中，我们极少运用财务杠杆(负债比低，保费与资本比低)，亦

很少发行新股筹资，基本上我们是利用原有的资金，总计前后购并了十三家公司，另外也

成立了六家公司。(1979)

● 我必须提醒各位的是，虽然20%的年复合成长率看似很风光，但我们仍须把通货膨胀率与

个人所得税率(两者合称为投资者痛苦指数)列入考量，在极端的状况下，公司股东的购买

力甚至可能不增反减。(1979)

● 随着保险事业规模与盈余快速的成长，纺织业与零售业整个事业体的比重日益下降，然而

尽管如此，这些部门的管理阶层仍不断地化腐朽为神奇，即使产业面临停滞不前的窘境，

却能利用有限的资本创造可观的盈余，且大多是现金而非尽是增加一些应收款或存货。

(1979)

● 我们在纺织业也曾经过数度挣扎，你们的主席也就是本人，在数年前买下Waumbec Mills

以扩大我们在纺织业的投资，虽然价格相当划算，也取得一些价美物廉的机器设备与不动

产，但即使我们再怎么努力，整个决策事后证明却是个错误。我们得到的结论是，所谓有

「转机」(Turn-arounds)的公司，最后显少有成功的案例，与其把时间与精力花在购买价

廉的烂公司上，还不如以公道的价格投资一些物美的企业。(1979)

● 去年我们曾预估保险业的综合承保比率(Combined Underwriting Ratio)会上升几个百分

点，有可能使得整体保险业界发生承保损失的状况，结果一如我们所预期，从97.4%上升

到100.7%。我们也预期在1979年我们本身的承保表现会比同业平均好一点，事实证明从

98.2%降至97.1%。展望1980年，一方面在整个业界表现将如去年一般将持续恶化，但另一

方面，我们却无法像去年般表现优于同业。(但请大家放心，我们绝不会故意放松，以使得

本人的预测成真)。(1979)

● 再一次要感谢我们National Indemnity公司经理人Phil Liesche的杰出表现，为我们创造八

百多万美金的获利与八千多万美金的保费收入，这在同业间并不多见，而或许你可能会发

现这比去年的数字少了些，虽然我们常听到同业提及宁愿少接点保单也不愿亏钱作生意，

然真正能贯策执行的并不多，但Phil却能真正作到，若保单合理他便签，否则一慨拒绝。

我们不愿因为生意时好时坏而必须常常裁员，相对地，我们宁愿保持一点宽松的弹性，而

不是让大家忙的要死，到头来却发现作的是亏本的生意，公司在创办时便立下此一理念，

而Phil 从未放弃保持此一优良传统，我们也认为这是经营一家一流的产险公司必备的条

件。(1979)

● 由George Young 领军的再保部门，在将投资收益并入考量后，持续地给予我们满意的成

绩，惟承保部份仍须改进。事实上，由于大笔资金持续投入这一行业，使得竞争相当激

烈，保费水准一再下降，但新进者却勇于承担着极高风险而不自知，直到真正出事时早已

为时已晚，因此预料在竞争激烈仍会维持一阵子的情况下，我们将暂时退场观望。(1979)

● 从前大家认为承保比率通常会一年好、一年坏，1979年若差一点，则1980年便会好转。但

我们却不这么认为，现在的低利率使得的业者会倾向牺牲一点承保损失，而试图在投资收

益上弥补回来，这在过去高利率的时代是不可能发生的。因此我们判断，同业忍受承保损

失的限度将较过去提高，这使得竞争更加激烈，预估未来五年此比率将提高至105%左右的

水准。尽管如此我们认为保险业仍大有可为，而管理人员的素质良囿将是一大关键。

(1979)

● 最近这几年，我们花了蛮大的篇幅谈到集团保险业的相关投资，主要是因为它们的表现实

在是相当优异。我们深深地相信，这些事业的经理人将会好好地运用其所赚的每一分钱，

以创造更多的盈余。以下所列出的是我们市值超过五百万美元的股权投资，包括ABC美国

广播公司、GEICO保险、华盛顿邮报等公司。最近我们相信1980整体的股票市场将会是最

近这几年来头一次表现的比我们的投资组合好，但尽管如此，我们对持有的主要投资标的

仍然感到非常满意，也不会因为某一特定年度股市异常的表现而作改变。(1979)

● 谈了那么多股票投资哲学，我想应该换个话题，谈谈债券投资，尤其是因为从去年底以来

发生了那么多的事。整个保险业界，因投资债券而蒙受了金额相当庞大的损失，虽然依照

会计原则，允许保险公司以摊销成本来记录其债券投资而非已严重受损的市场价值。而事

实上，这种会计方法却是导致更大损失的元凶，因为若是保险公司被迫以市场价格来认列

损失，那他们将早一点注意到问题的严重性。更讽刺的是，有些产物保险公司因为通货膨

胀的关系，决定将原本一年期的保单更换为以半年为一期，他们认为实在是无法衡量未来

的十二个月内，医疗成本、汽车零件价格会是多少?而认为无法在通膨高涨的当时订定一年

期的保费，结果主观地将期间缩短为六个月，但最荒谬的是，一转身他们却将刚收到的保

费，拿去购买以三、四十年为期固定利率的债券，我们实在很怀疑，为什么长期固定利率

的债券还能在市场上存在，当我们确信美金的购买力几乎每天都在变小。(1979)

● 最近这几年来，我们的保险公司几乎未增加在那些单纯的长期债券方面的部位(Straight

long-term Bond)(即不含转换权或任何可提供额外获利可能性的债券)，即使有买进也是因

为先前有到期或出售的情况，而甚至在此之前，我们也从未投资那些长达三、四十年的债

券，顶多是较短期且备有偿债基金或是因市场缺乏效率而使得价格被低估的债券。然而，

虽然我们较之同业稍具警觉心，却仍是不够的。「虽然半梦半醒，要比熟睡要好得多，但

却不能保证你不会被熊吃掉。」若买四十年期的债券是个大错，那买十五年期的也好不到

那里去，很遗憾的是，我们属于后者，更惨的是，我们也没有适时地把它卖掉，而眼睁睁

的看着它们的价值日益缩水。(当然，事后回想起来，会觉得真是笨得可以，而或许你会认

为要是去年我就看透这点那就好了)。(1979)

● 所幸，最近几年我们所买进的债券大多附有转换权，使得这些债券实际发行的时间比其到

期日要短得多，因为在到期前，我们可以要求转换为股份，使得实际损失要比一些产险或

意外险的同业来的轻了许多。而且，由于对股权投资的偏好，也让我们在债券投资的部

位，相对偏低。尤其部份的可转换债券，跟我们投资组合中的股权投资一样吸引着我们，

我们预计可从中赚不少钱(而事实上，有些个案已开始获利)，同时亦期盼这部份的获利能

补足我们在单纯债券上的损失。(1979)

● 当然，我们对债券的看法可能保守了些，低通膨的机率也不是没有，毕竟通货膨涨多是人

为因素所造成的，也或许人们有一天真能有效地控制它，立法当局及有力团体应该也已注

意到这个警讯，而采取必要的措施。此外，现今的利率已反应较高的预期通货膨胀率，使

得新发行的债券投资者较有保障，这使我们可能错过债券价格反弹而获利的机会，然而就

像我们不愿意以一个固定的价格预先出售公元2010年或2020年一磅喜斯糖果或一呎波克夏

制造的布料一样，我们也不愿意以一个固定的价格预先出售我们未来四十年金钱的使用

权，这如同莎士比亚笔下的Polonius 所说的一样: 「不要作一个短期的借钱者，也不要当

长期的借款人」。(1979)

● 今年将会是我们最后一次报告Illinois National Bank，而我们也很开心的向各位宣布在

Gene Abegg优秀的领导下，银行的获利打破历年来的记录，去年的资产报酬率高达2.3%，

约是同业平均的三倍，对于如此优异的表现，实在值得所有波克夏的股东给予Gene Abegg

热烈的掌声，感谢他们自1969年成为波克夏一员以来所作的贡献。而如同各位所知，1969

年银行控股公司法要求我们必须在1980年结束以前将之处份，事实上我们曾试图以分割

(spin-off)的方式处理，但联邦准备局却坚持若是如此，则波克夏不能有任何一位董事或经

理人在分割后的银行担任任何职务，即使以我们这个个案而言，没有任何一个人同时拥有

两家公司40% 以上的股份也是如此。在这种情况下，我们只能探询出售该公司80%-100%

股权的可能性，但请相信，我们绝对会严格地挑选买主，而价格也不是惟一考量的重点，

这家银行与其经营阶层待我们实在不薄，所以即使要卖，我们也要确定能以相同态度回报

之。同时大家应该明了我们从出售这家银行所得的资金将来如果再转投资，其为波克夏创

造盈余的能力可能永远无法与前者比拟。(1979)

● 1979年波克夏在那斯达克上市，这表示在每天的华尔街日报证券版将可以看得到波克夏的

报价，而在此之前，不管是华尔街日报或是道琼工业指数皆不会报导我们获利情况，即使

我们的获利数百倍于它们常常提及的一些公司。而现在当我们按季公布获利状况后，华尔

街日报会立即报导，这帮我们解决了一直困扰着我们的发布消息的难题。(1979)

● 在某些方面，我们的股东是蛮特别的一群，而这也影响了我撰写年报的方式。举例来说，

每年结束，约有98% 股份的股东会保留他们在波克夏的持股，因此每年年报皆延续前一年

度，避免重复叙述一堆相同的东西，从而你们可获得一些有用的东西，而我也不会觉得厌

烦。此外，约有90% 股份的股东其最大的持股为波克夏，所以许多股东愿意花相当的时间

在每年年报之上，而我们也努力提供所有我们认为有用的信息给各位股东。相对的，每季

季报我们并未花太多时间加以着墨，因为所有股东与经营者，皆以长期的眼光来看待这份

事业，所以并不是每季都有新的或有意义的事需要报告。但当你们真得收到某些讯息时，

是因为你们付费雇用的董事长-也就是我本人认为一个股东-亦即是公司老板，应该从经理

人那边听到有关公司的状况与其如何评估此事。你在合伙企业所得的待遇，在波克夏这家

公开公司一点也不会少。我们认为每年一度的年报，不应该交给底下员工或公关顾问处理

便了事，而是应该以经理人对老板报告的方式去作才对，也就是像我们希望旗下被投资公

司应该跟我们报告的一样。当然，详细的程度不一样，以免竞争者窥视，但大方向与诚挚

的态度却是一致的。而事实上，一家公司是会吸引同类型的人成为其股东，若公司注重的

是短期的成果或是公司股价的波动，则具有这种特色的投资人自会上门成为其股东，而若

公司对其股东采取轻蔑的态度，最后投资大众亦会以相同的态度回报之。(1979)

● 费雪(Phil Fisher)一位令人尊敬的投资专家与作者，曾比喻一家公司吸引股东的方式，就

好比一家餐厅招揽客户的方法一样，餐厅可标榜其特色，如便利的快餐店、优雅的西餐厅

或特别的东方食物等，以吸引同一性质的客户群，若服务好、菜色佳、价钱公道，相信客

户会一再上门。然而餐厅却不能时常变换其所强调的特色，一下是法国美食、一下又是外

带披萨，最后可能导致顾客的忿怒与失望。相同的一家公司亦不可能同时迎合所有投资大

众的口味。所以我们对于一些公司总是希望自家公司的股票保持高周转率感到疑惑不解，

感觉上这些公司好象希望原有的股东赶快厌倦而琵琶别抱、另结新欢，以使得新的股东能

够抱着新希望、新幻想可以赶快加入。相反的，我们希望原有股东一直喜欢我们的服务、

我们的菜单，而且常常来光顾，我们很难找到比原来的股东更好的新股东来加入我们的行

列，因此我们期待公司的股份保持极低的周转率，这表示我们的股东了解并认同公司经营

的方向与期待的未来。(1979)

● 去年我曾说过公司的盈余会成长但股东权益报酬率可能会下降，结果正如我所预期，而展

望1980年亦是如此，而若我预测错误，那表示可能会更惨。具体而言，公司营业利益三千

六百万除以最近股东权益2.36亿美元(股权投资以原始成本计)的报酬率将会从1979年的

18.6%向下修正，而营业利益本身很有可能也会较去年减少，其结果取决于处份银行的情

况、保险承保获利的好坏和储贷业亏损的严重性。(1979)

● 我们对保险事业持有的股权投资一直非常看好，在往后的数年内，我们预期这些部份投资

股权将会持续贡献获利给母公司，大部份的个案皆属绩优公司且由优秀的人才所管理，而

投资的成本更是价美物廉。(1979)

● 本公司有关财务规划一向是属于中央集权，且决策集中于最高当局。由于极端授权管理权

限予集团子公司或事业体的专业经理人，我们的集团总部占地仅1,500平方呎，约合42坪左

右)总共只有十二人，刚好可以组一只篮球队，也因此管理上难免会出点差错，但同时扁平

化的组织却能降低成本并加速决策时程。因为每个人都有很多事可做，所以每个人做的事

也很多。更重要的是这使得我们能请到最优秀的人才来为我们工作，这是一般企业无法作

到的，因为这些人就像是经营自己的事业般努力着。我们给予他们最大的信任，而他们所

给的回报更是远大于此。(1979)

● 一九八0年

● 今年的营业利益为四千二百万美元，较从去年1979年的三千六百万成长，但期初股东权益报

酬率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)却从去年的18.6%滑落至17.8%。我们认为这个比率最能够

作为衡量公司管理当局单一年度的经营绩效的最好指针。当然要运用这项指针，还必须对所

谓会计原则、资产取得历史成本、财务杠杆与产业状况有一定程度的了解才行。而在你判断

我们公司的经营绩效时，有两个因素是你必须特别注意的，一项是对公司营运有利的，而另

一项则相对上较不利。让我们先从好的那一面看起:

无控制权之盈余(Non-controlled Ownership Earnings)

当一家公司拥有另一家公司部份股权时，在会计上通常有三种方式来代表投资公司在被投资

公司所拥有的权益，而其所持有的股权多寡将决定公司采用何种方式。一般公认会计原则规

定若持有股权比例超过百分之五十(除了少数例外，像我们先前持有的银行股份)，则投资公

司须完全合并该被投资公司所有会计项目，包含营收、费用、所得税与盈余。像波克夏持有

60%股权的Blue Chips Stamps，便属这一类，而其它40%的股份在财务报表上则以少数股权

列示。而若是持有股权比例介于20%-50% 之间，像Wesco Financial 系由波克夏所控制但只

有48%的股权，则在投资公司的帐上仅记录一个分录(one-line entry)，承认对被投资公司依

股权比例所认列的投资损失或利益。最后若持有比例低于20%，则依照会计原则，投资公司

仅能认列被投资公司实际发放的股利部份，至于保留而不发放的部份盈余则不予理会，举例

来说若我们持有一家X 公司10%的股份，而假设该公司在1980 年共计赚了一千万美金，若X

公司全部发放则我们可认列一百万的利益，反之若X公司决定保留而不予发放则我们一毛钱

也不能认列。我们强迫大家上了堂简短或者说稍微简单的会计课是因为波克夏的保险事业将

其资源集中投注于第三类的股权投资(即小于20%持股比例)之上，这类投资近年来因为保险

事业蓬勃发展加上股票市场出现许多不错的投资机会而大幅增加，而我们许多的被投资公司

仅将它们所赚的盈余分配一小部份出来并反映在我们的帐面之上，但就经济实质面来说，那

只是冰山的一角而已，以去年来说，光是保留在这些公司而未分配给波克夏的盈余，便比波

克夏整年度的帐面盈余还高，而这在一般企业界并不常见，但我们预期这种情况在波克夏将

会持续出现。 (1980)

● 我们本身对投资盈余如何认列的定义与一般公认会计原则并不尽相同，尤其在通货膨胀高涨

之时更是如此，(但话说回来批评要比修改这套原则简单多了，有些问题早已是根深蒂固

了)，我们有些100%持股的转投资公司帐面上所赚的钱，实质上并不足那个数，即使我们可

以完全地控制它，(理论上我们具控制权，但实际上我们却必须被迫把所赚的每一分钱，继

续投注在更新资产设备上，以维持原有生产力)，相反的我们也有一些仅持有少数股份而其

所赚的盈余远超过帐面列示之数。因此对波克夏而言对盈余的认定并非取决于持股比例是

100%、50%、20%、5% 或是1%，盈余的真正价值在于其将来再投资所能产生的效益，这与

由我们或专业经理人决定并不相关，也与我们认列或不认列利益不相关。假设公司拥有一片

山林，即使财务报表无法反映这些树木的成长，也无法掩盖我们拥有一片成长中的山林这项

事实。我必须提醒诸位，我们的论点是突破传统的，我们宁愿将所赚的盈余继续交由不受我

们控制的人好好发挥，也不希望转由我们自己来浪掷(讲到这理，忍不住休息一下顺便来段

广告，若被投资公司将其所赚的盈余用于买回自家的股票，我们通常会报以热烈的掌声，理

由很简单:若一家好公司其股票价格远低于其内含价值(Intrinsic Value)，还有什么投资会比

前者来的更稳当、更有赚头、更能促进原有股东权益的呢?企业购并的竞争性通常使得购并

整家公司的实际价格高于取得企业的实际价值，而股票市场的拍卖性质，往往可以让我们以

相对低廉的价格取得一家公司的部份股权。(1980)

● 长期企业绩效(Long-Term Corporate Results)

如先前所提的，我们以比较营业利益除以股东权益(股权投资以原使成本计)来评估企业单一

年度的绩效，至于长期评量的标准则须加计所有已实现或未实现的资本利得或损失，而一直

以来后者会比前者历年来的平均还要好，最主要的原因是前面所提那些无控制权的公司盈余

持续增加而反映在其市值之上，当然市值的变化是起起伏伏且无法预测，更无法真正去量化

到底数字是多少，有时一个错误甚至可能把公司十几年来的努力抵销掉，但只要市场回复理

性，市价便会反映公司累积盈余的能力，有时甚至会在你的蛋糕上多得到一点糖霜呢。

(1980)

● 在现有经营阶层接掌波克夏的十六年来，公司每股的帐面净值(其中保险事业的股权投资以

市价计)已由原先的19.46美元成长至 400.8 美元，相当于年复合成长率 20.5% (事实上你「本

身」作得也不错，过去十年来人体内所含矿物质成份之价值以年复合成长率 22% 增加)，值

得鼓励的是虽然我们也犯了不少错但仍能达到这样的记录。(1980)

● 我们的保险资金会持续地将资金投资在一些经营良好但不具控制权且保留大部份盈余的公司

之上，依照这个政策，可预期的长期的报酬率将持续的大于每年帐面盈余的报酬率，而我们

对此理念的坚信不移是很容易用数字来说明的，虽然只要我们把手上的股权投资卖掉然后转

进免税的长期债券，公司每年帐面盈余马上就能净增加三千万美金，但我们从来就没想过要

那么去作。(1980)

● 很不幸的，公司财务报表所记载的盈余已不再表示是股东们实际上所赚的。假设当初你放弃

享受十个汉堡以进行投资，后来公司分配的股利足够让你买两个汉堡，而最后你处分投资可

换八个汉堡，你会发现事实上不管你拿到是多少钱，你的这项投资并无所得，你可能觉得更

有钱了，但不表示你能吃的更饱。高通货膨胀率等于是对资本额外课了一次税，如此一来使

得大部份的投资变得有点愚蠢，而近几年来这个基本门槛，即企业投资所须最基本的报酬率

以使得整件投资报酬为正可说是日益提高，每个纳”税”人就好象是在一个向下滑的电扶梯

上拼命往上跑一样，最后的结过却是愈跑愈往后退。举例来说，假设一位投资人的年报酬率

为20%(这已是一般人很难达到的成绩了)而当年度的通膨为12%，又若其不幸适用50% 高所得

税级距，则我们会发现该位投资人的实质报酬率可能是负的。总之若只有外在的所得税而无

隐性的通货膨胀税，则不管如何正的投资报酬永远不会变成负的(即使所得税率高达90%)，

但通货膨胀却不管公司帐面到底赚不赚钱，只要像最近这几年的通膨就会使得大部份公司的

实质投资报酬由正转为负，即使有些公司不必缴所得税也是一样，当然这两者是交相存在在

现实社会中。而以目前的通货膨胀率来看，相信以适用中高级距所得税率的投资人而言，将

无法从投资一般美国公司获得任何实质的资本利得，即使他们把分配到的股利一再重复地投

资下去也一样，因为其获利早已被隐藏的通货膨胀与直接的所得税吸收殆尽，而如同去年我

们所说的一样，对于这个问题我们目前无解(明年我们的回答很可能也是如此)，通货膨涨对

我们股权投资的报酬实在是一点帮助也没有。(1980)

● 编制指数(Indexing)是一般认为对抗通膨的一种方法，但大部份的企业资本却从未这样做，

当然帐面每股盈余与股利通常会渐渐增加，若公司把所赚的钱再投资下去，即使是无通膨也

是一样，就像是一个勤俭的薪水阶级，只要固定把他所赚薪水中的一半存入银行，就算是从

来没有获得加薪，他每年的收入也会慢慢的增加。理论上，企业盈余(当然不包括由额外投

入的资本所产生的盈余)会稳定地随着物价指数持续增加而不必增加任何资金，包含营运资

金在内，但只有极少数的公司具有此种能力，而波克夏并不在其中。当然本公司在-盈余再

投资以求成长、多角化、卓壮的企业政策，碰巧也有减轻股东外在所得税负的效果，只要你

不将所持有的波克夏股份转做其它投资，但隐藏的通货膨胀税却是每天你醒来就必须面对的

问题。(1980)

● 下表显示波克夏依照各个公司持股比例来列示帐面盈余的主要来源，而各个公司资本利得损

失并不包含在内而是汇总于下表最后「已实现出售证券利得」一栏，虽然本表列示的方式与

一般公认会计原则不尽相同但最后的损益数字却是一致的: 其中波克夏拥有Blue Chips

Stamps 60%的股权，而后者又拥有 Wesco 财务公司 80% 的股权。

1980 Unit:US'000

Earnings Before Income Tax After

Income Tax

Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

Underwriting 100.0% 6,738 6,737 3,637

Net Investment Income 100.0% 30,939 30,927 25,607

Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles 100.0% (508) (508) 202

Associated Retail Stores 100.0% 2,440 2,440 1,169

See's Candies 59.6% 15,031 8,958 4,212

Buffalio Evening News 59.6% (2,805) (1,672) (816)

Blue Chip Stamps-Parent 59.6% 7,699 4,588 3,060

Illinois National Bank 97.7% 5,324 5,200 4,731

Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent 47.7% 2,916 1,392 1,044

Mutual Savings and Loan 47.7% 5,814 2,775 1,974

Presion Steel 47.7% 2,833 1,352 656

Interest on Debt (12,230) (9,390) (4,809)

Other 2,170 1,590 1,255

66,361 54,389 41,922

Realized Securities Gain 19,584 15,757 11,200

Total Earnings-all entities 85,945 70,146 53,122

● 会计上因购并公司所产生的无形资产摊销(例如See’s Candies ; Mutual and Buffalo

Evening News) 系以其它(Other)项目列示。

●

● Blue Chip 及Wesco 两家公司因为本身是公开发行公司以规定编有自己的年报，我建议大家

仔细阅读，尤其是有关Louie Vincenti 和 Charlie Munger对联合储贷所作的改造。

● 就像先前我们所提到的，不具控制权的股权投资其已分配的盈余以列示于保险事业的投资收

益之中，但未分配盈余占本公司的重要性已不下于前面表列的帐面盈余，下表列示的是那些

我们不具控制权的股权投资的持股:

Shares Cost Market Unrealized

Gain

Affiliated Publications, Inc. (a) 434,550 2,821 12,222 9,401

Aluminum Company of America (a) 464,317 25,577 27,685 2,108

Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company (b) 475,217 12,942 15,894 2,952

General Foods, Inc (b) 1,983,812 62,507 59,889 (2,618)

GEIGO Corporation (a) 7,200,000 47,138 105,300 58,162

Handy & Harman (a) 2,015,000 21,825 58,435 36,610

Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc (a) 711,180 4,531 22,135 17,604

Kaiser Alumnium & Chemical Corp. (a) 1,211,834 20,629 27,569 6,940

Media General (a) 282,500 4,545 8,334 3,789

National Detroit Corporation (b) 247,039 5,930 6,299 369

National Student Marketing (a) 881,500 5,128 5,895 767

Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc (a) 391,400 3,709 9,981 6,272

Pinkerton, Inc. (b) 370,088 12,144 16,489 4,345

R.J. Reynolds Industries (b) 245,700 8,702 11,228 2,526

SAFECO Corporation (b) 1,250,525 32,062 45,177 13,115

The Time Mirror Company (b) 151,104 4,447 6,271 1,824

The Washington Post Company (a) 1,868,600 10,628 42,277 31,649

EW Woolworth Company (b) 667,124 13,583 16,511 2,928

All Other Common Stock 26,313 32,096 5,783

Total Common Stock 325,161 529,687 204,526

● (a) 代表全部股权由波克夏及其子公司所持有

(b) 代表由波克夏子公司Blue Chip与Wesco 所持有，依波克夏持股比例换算得来

从本表你会发现本公司背后的创造盈余的动力系来自于各行各业，所以我们只能约略地看个

大概，譬如保险子公司约持有Kaiser Alumnium 3%和 Aloca 1 1/4 %的股份，在1980年我们光是

从这些公司依持股比例可得约一千三百万美金(当然若将这些盈余实际转为资本利得或股

利，则大约会被课以25%的税负)，因此单单在制铝这门行业，我们的经济利益就大于其它那

些我们可以直接控制且须详尽报告的公司。

● GEIGO CORP.

我们在不具控制权的股权投资最大的部位便是持有该公司33%，约七百二十万股的GEIGO，

通常若持有一家公司股权达到这样的比例，便必须采用权益法每年依比例认列其投资损益，

但由于波克夏当初系依照政府部门一特别命令购买该公司股份，其中规定须将此投票权交由

一公正第三人管理，故波克夏对其不具实质控制权。(Pinkerton 的情况也类似)然而认不认

列损益对波克夏及其股东而言，并不影响其实质的经济利益，这些盈余的真正价值系来自于

运用它们的GEIGO 经营阶层能力的高低。而关于这一点，我们再满意不过了，难以模仿的

产业优势加上资金配置高超的技巧，GEIGO 可说是投资业界的最佳典范，如同你所看到

的，我们的持股成本约四千七百万美元，分别在1976与1980年分两次投入，依实际配息情

况，我们每年约从GEIGO 认列三百万元的利益，但每年实际可分配的盈余却达到二千万

元，换言之，光是我们在该公司未分配的盈余就达波克夏帐面盈余的四成左右。另外我们必

须强调的是我们完全赞同GEIGO经营阶层将其余属于我们的一千七百万保留起来未予分配

的作法，因为在此同时GEIGO 于近两年内陆续买回自家股票使得在外流通股份由三千四百

万股缩减至二千一百万股，大大增进了原有股东的权益，如此对待股东的方式实在是无话可

说。(1980)

● 透过购并方式想要买下一家类似具经济特质与光明前景，且每年可创造二千万盈余的企业，

至少得花二亿美金(有些产业可能还更高)，而百分之百的持股更可使所有人掌握公司的生杀

大权，而我们从未对保险业规定我们只能拥有绩优企业少数的股权(代表我们不能更换经营

阶层、无法对资金做重新配置甚至处份公司)感到任何不妥。(1980)

● 过去几年我们一再提到对于购买具有转机题材的公司感到失望的看法，这些年我们大约接触

了数百家这样的公司，最后不管是真正投入与否，皆持续追踪其后续发展，而最后所得结论

是除了极少数例外，当一个经历辉煌的经营阶层遇到一个逐渐没落的夕阳工业，往往是后者

占了上风。GEIGO却是一个例外，自1976年几乎破产的边缘东山再起，从经营阶层Jack

Byrne上任的第一天起优异的表现，正是它获得重生的最大因素。当然GEIGO即使身陷于财

务与经营危机当中，仍享有其最重要的产业竞争优势也是重要关键，身处于广大市场(汽车

保险) ，不同于大部份行销组织僵化的同业，GEIGO一直以来将自己定位为低营运成本的公

司，所以在为客户创造价值的同时也为自己赚进大把钞票，而即使七0年代中期发生危机，

也从未减损其在此点的经济竞争优势，GEIGO的问题与1964年美国运通所爆发的色拉油丑

闻事件类似，两者皆为一方之霸，一时的打击并未毁掉原本的经济实力，就像是一个局部而

可切除的肿瘤，只要遇到一位经验丰富的医生，就能化险为夷。(1980)

● 保险产业的情况持续依我们先前所预期般地发展，Combined Ratio 从1979年的100.6 升高到

1980年估计的103.5，可预期的是未来1981到1982年这个趋势将继续持续下去，业界的承保

损失将向上攀升，想要了解个中原因我建议你读读Chubb Corp 的年报对产险业竞争态势所

作精譬的分析，虽然报告不见得令人振奋，但绝对中肯。而不幸的是，保险业的阵痛将持

续，事情的起因在于债券价格下跌，而会计原则允许保险业以摊销成本而非市价列示其帐面

价值，结果导致许多业者以摊销成本记录其所持有二、三倍于其净值的长期债券，所以只要

债券价格下跌超过三分之一便很有可能把公司的净值吃光，其中包括好几家知名的大公司在

内，当然债券价格也有会回升，使得其净值回复，但同时却也有可能继续下跌。(我们深信

对股票或债券价格所作的短期预测根本是没有用的，预测本身能够让你更了解预测者，但对

于了解未来却是一点帮助也没有..)，有点吊诡的是若持有的股票投资组合下跌有可能会影

响到保险业的生存，但若换作是债券价格下跌却是一点事都没有，保险业者所持的理由可能

是不管现在的市价是多少，反正只要到期日前不卖出，便能按照票面赎回，所以短期价格波

动无太大影响。但真正的情况却是，业者很可能为避免认列损失因不敢出售债券而错失其它

更好的投资机会，更严重的是，由于保险公司资金主要是来自于保户所缴的保费，由于产险

的投保期间较短，一但保户规模缩减，资金流动不足时，将被迫出售部份债券使得损失浮上

台面，更惨得是有些公司采取出售较有价值的股票或是不管保费水准有多低，照单全收以维

持现有保费收入水准，这两种作法无异是杀鸡取卵，对于公司与产业长远的发展皆会产生重

大的伤害。相对上，波克夏所属的保险事业，财务操作明显地较为稳当，债券部位相对较低

(虽然资产与负债到期日仍不相称)，充足的资金与弹性的投资操作，使得我们同样面对不当

定价(Inadequate Pricing)的恶性竞争还环境时，仍能生存下去。(1980)

● 今年由Phil Liesche 所领导的National Indemnity 公司不断地超越自我，虽然保费收入持

平，承保的利润却创同业新高，但预期明年保费收入将减少，而我们不会有任何的抱怨而他

们的薪资考绩也不会受影响，对于公司创办人所定下的承保准则我们信奉不渝，并切实执

行。家庭与汽车险部份则小有进展，我们将较不具竞争力的小额一般责任险转为金额较大的

汽车保险。再保部份由于进入障碍较小，事前可先收取钜额保费但灾害发生与理赔时程却拉

得很长，这种感觉有点像青少年第一次拥有自己的信用卡一样，致命的吸引力使得大笔的资

金拥入这个行业，导致的结果是若某一年未发生大灾难，则往后几年的承保绩效便会变得很

差，相反的，若有大灾难发生，则更大的灾难将会降临在保险公司身上，因为可能会有些同

业无法履行与客户当初签订的合约，而George Young 在这一行的表现一向是一流的，在加

计投资收益后，仍有所获利，我们将继续留在这个市场，但在可预见的未来，将很难有成长

的表现。在家计保险(Homestate) 我们面临重大的问题，除了Kansas 的Floyd Taylor 外，其

余的承保表现均在同业水准之下，其中Iowa 自1973年成立以来，每年皆发生钜额损失，直

到去年我们决定结束该州的业务，家计保险概念其实也很大的潜力，但还需要很多努力才有

办法实现它。我们的工人退休金部门(Worker’s Compensation)痛失英才，37岁的Frank 不

幸去世，他天生就是个保险人，积极进取，努力上进，在短短时间内便改正在National

Indemnity 该部门的缺失，当初介绍Frank加入的Dan立即接手其原有工作，而由Milt 所领导

的Cypress 保险公司是我们在这项业务的主力，且表现一直相当优异，广为同业所仰慕与模

仿，但其优秀的表现却是同业无法比拟的。总之保险业务量在1981年将大幅下滑，整体承保

表现也不会太好。(1980)

● 去年我们缩减在纺织业的规模，虽然不愿意但却不得不结束Waumbec Mill，除了少数设备

转移至New Bedford 外，其余连同房地产均处份掉，你们的董事长由于无法早点面对事实而

犯了重大的错误，而在New Bedford 也淘汰了约三分之一的织布机，保留适合少量多样型的

机器，而即使都不发生差错(这种情况很少)，这些生产线仍不具投资效益，就产业循环而言

甚至很有可能会产生损失。剩余的纺织事业，将划分为制造与销售两部门，各自独立运作，

两者才不致于绑在一起，由于新购进中古130吋针式织布机，将使得我们最具获利能力产品

的产能增加一倍，情势告诉我们纺织业又将面临艰困的一年，但我们在这一行所投入的资本

将大幅减少。(1980)

● Ben 在Associated Retail Store 的表现持续让我们惊艳，在零售业表现惨淡的一年，该公司

盈余仍佳，且大部份皆为现金收入，而明年将将迈入第五十个年头，而Ben也经营这家公司

整整有五十年了。(1980)

● 1980年底，我们完成了以波克夏约当的股份交换41,086股Rockford Bancorp(其持有97.7%

Illinois National Bank股份)的动作，交换的方式准许波克夏股东维持其在该银行的权益(除

了本人仅能维持80%)，也可增加其在该银行的权益(相对地，其在波克夏的权益将减少)，其

中间的差额则由本人承受，最后的结果，本人在该银行的权益稍微减少，而在波克夏的权益

则稍微增加，银行的经营阶层对这样的结果相当满意，Bancorp将成为一个只有65位股东，

组织简单且不复杂的控股公司。(1980)

● 今年八月我们发行了12.75%，25年期(2005年到期)，六千万美元的的债券，须于1991年起提

拨偿债基金，这项融资案的主要的承销商自始至终皆提供我们一流的服务，不像大部份的公

司，波克夏并不会为了一些特定的短期资金需求而去融资，反而我们借钱是因为当我们觉得

在一定期间内(约略短于融资年限)将有许多好的投资机会出现，最佳的投资机会大多是出现

在市场银根最紧的时后，那时候你一定希望拥有庞大的火力。(1980)

● 对于购并的对象，我们偏爱那些会「产生现金」而非「消化现金」的公司。由于高通货膨胀

的影响，越来越多的公司发现它们必须将所赚得的每一块钱再投入才能维持其原有的生产

力，就算这些公司帐面数字再好看，除非看到白花花的现金，我们对之仍保持高度警戒。符

合我们标准的公司并不容易发现，(每年我们研就上百件的购并案，其中仅有少数能吸引我

们的兴趣)所以对于我们现有规模合理的扩充并不易落实，但我们仍将持续多方尝试以保持

波克夏的成长。(1980)

● 不论如何，我们皆期望保持适当的流动性，负债比例与结构适当并保留充裕的资本实力，虽

然我们的投资报酬率可能因此保守的态度而打了点折扣，但这也是我们惟一能感到安心的一

种方式。(1980)

● Gene Abegg 我们长期持有的Rockford 银行创办人，于七月二日逝世，享年八十二岁，身为

一位挚友、银行家与杰出公民，他是无可超越的。(1980)

● 你对于一个人将会有更多的了解，当你向他买下一家公司并请他以伙计而非老板的身份继续

经营这家公司。在买卖开始前，他对这家公司了若指掌，而你却一无所知，卖方有太多机会

可以欺骗买方，而当交易完成后，态度微妙的改变而模糊的认知会发酵，就像是求婚的过程

一般，失望总是难免的。而当我们第一次碰面，Gene 百分之百坦诚，就像是其为人一般，

谈判的开始，他把公司所有负面的因素摊开在桌上，另一方面，在交易完成数年后，他还会

定期地告知你当初交易时未讨论到的地方。而就算是当他把银行卖给我们时已高龄71岁，

Gene 仍兴勤工作更甚于以往，虽然极少发生问题，但一有问题便立刻报告毫不迟疑，你还

能对这样的人多要求些什么(早在1933年该银行所持有的现金便足以立即清还所有存款) 他永

远记得他是在处理别人的钱财，虽然这种正直不阿的态度将永远安息，但他杰出的管理能力

将使银行在全美获利能力的表现上一直名列前茅。许多Rockford的居民告诉我这些年来

Gene 给他们很多帮助，有时是金钱上的，但有时却是包含更多智能、同情与友谊，而我本

身也从他身上获得许多，因为个别年纪与工作上的关系，我们益师益友，不论如何，这种关

系相当特殊，我永远怀念他。(1980)

● 一九八一年

● 今年的营业利益约为四千万美元，较从去年1979年的四千二百万减少，期初股东权益报酬

率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)亦从去年的17.8%滑落至15.2%。我们的新计划是让所有股

东皆能指定各自所要捐赠的机关单位，(详如后述) ，今年度盈余减少90万美元，往后将视

我们公司所得税负状况决定金额。

● 无控制权之盈余(Non-controlled Ownership Earnings)

● 去年我们曾详细的讨论无控制权盈余的观念，亦即那些我们无法控制或影响其盈余分配的

一些被投资公司(我们很乐意与新股东或潜在股东讨论这项话题)，而这部份的盈余完全未

显现在波克夏的帐面之上，然而我们深信未分配且未记录的盈余仍将与那些我们控制的公

司所赚的盈余一样转化成波克夏的价值，虽然它们是以波克夏不规则的已实现或未实现利

得的方式呈现，但就长期而言，市场价格终将会与企业价值同步发展。整体而言，我们在

无控制权公司的经济竞争力反而比具控制权公司的公司来得佳，可能的原因是在股票市场

上我们可以合理的价格买到部份优秀企业的股权，而若要透过购并谈判的方式买下整家公

司，其平均价格可能远高于市价。(1981)

● 我们的历史显示，我们对于拥有整家公司或仅持有部份股权，并无特殊偏好，而事实上我

们持续投资大笔资金于其上(我们尽量避免小额投资，因为若一件事一点也不值得去作，那

就算是把它作得再好也没有用)，而经营保险公司与礼券事业也必须保持流动性。我们购并

的决策着重于把实质的经济利益而非管理版图或会计数字极大化，(长期而言，若管理当局

过度注重会计数字而乎略经济实质的话，通常最后两者都顾不好)，不管对帐面盈余有何影

响，我们宁愿以X 价格买下一家好公司10% 股权，而非以2X 价格买下那家好公司100% 股

权，但大部份的公司经营阶层偏好后者，而且对此行为总是找得到借口。对于这种行为，

我们归纳出三种动机(通常是心照不宣)

(1)领导阶层很少有缺少动物天性的，且时时散发出过动与战斗的意念。相对地在波克夏，

即使是购并成功在望，你们的管理当局心跳也不会加快一下。

(2)大部份的公司或企业与其经营阶层，多以「规模」而非「获利」，作为衡量自己或别人

的标准(问问那些名列Fortune 500 大企业的负责人，他们可能从来都不知道他们的公司若

以获利能力来排的话，会落在第几位)

(3)大部份的经营阶层很明显的过度沉浸于小时候所听到的，一个变成蟾蜍的王子因美丽的

公主深深一吻而被救的童话故事，而认为只要被他们优异的管理能力一吻，被购并的公司

便能脱胎换骨。

如此的乐观是必要的，否则公司的股东怎么会甘心以二倍的价钱买下那家好公司，而非以

一倍的价格自己从市场上买进。换言之，投资人永远可以以蟾蜍的价格买到蟾蜍，而若投

资人愿意用双倍的代价资助公主去亲吻蟾蜍的话，最好保佑奇迹会发生，许多公主依然坚

信她们的吻有使蟾蜍变成王子的魔力，即使在她的后院早已养满了一大堆的蟾蜍。尽管如

此，平心而论仍然有两种情况的购并是会成功的:

(1)第一类是你买到的(不管是有意或无意的)是那种特别能够适应通货膨胀的公司，通常它

们又具备了两种特征，一是很容易去调涨价格 (即使是当产品需求平缓而产能未充份利用

也一样)且不怕会失去市场占有率或销货量;一种是只要增加额外少量的资本支出，便可以

使营业额大幅增加(虽然增加的原因大部份是因为通货膨胀而非实际增加产出的缘故)，近

十几年来，只要符合以上两种条件，虽然这种情况不多，即使是能力普通的经理人也能使

这项购并案圆满成功。

(2)第二类是那些经营奇才，他们具有洞悉少数裹着蟾蜍外衣的王子，并且有能力让它们脱

去伪装，我们尤其要向Capital City 的Tom Murphy致敬，他是那种能将购并目标锁定在

第一类的公司，而本身具有的管理长才又使他成为第二类的佼佼者。直接或间接的经验使

我们体认，要达到像他们那样成就的困难性(当然也因为如此，近几年来真正成功的个案并

不多，且会发现到头来利用公司资金买回自家股份是最实在的方法)，而很不幸的，你们的

董事长并不属于第二类的人，且尽管已充份体认到须将重点摆在第一类的公司，但真正命

中的机率却是少之又少，我们讲得比作得好听(我们忘了诺亚的叮咛: 能预测什么时候下大

雨没有用，必须要能建造方舟才算。我们曾用划算的价钱买下不少蟾蜍，过去的报告多已

提及，很明显的我们的吻表现平平，我们有遇到几个王子级的公司，但是早在我们买下时

他们就已是王子了，而至少我们的吻没让他们变回蟾蜍，而最后我们偶尔也曾成功地以蟾

蜍般的价格买到部份王子级公司的部份股权。(1981)

● 我们会持续地以合理的价钱买下整个公司，即使那家公司未来的发展与过去一般;我们也愿

意以不错的价钱买下第一类的公司，若我们可以合理的相信他们就是;但我们通常不会去买

那些我们必须替其作许多改变的公司，因为我们发现我们所作的改变不见得是好的。今年

我们曾经几乎谈成一笔大买卖，那家公司与其经营阶层都是我们所喜爱的，但就是价钱谈

不陇，若坚持买下的结果，股东的利益不见得会比买之前更好。整个波克夏帝国版图可能

会变大，但人民素质反而会变差。尽管1981年我们并没有成功的个案，但我们预计未来仍

能买到100% 符合我们标准的公司，此外我们有期望能有像后面报告所述Pinkerton这样投

资大量无投票权的股权的例子，在身为次要的大股东的我们可获得可观的经济利益的同

时，亦能帮助公司原有的经营阶层实现其长期的目标。我们也发现很容易从市场买到一些

由有能力且正直的人经营的公司的部份股权，而事实上我们也从未打算自己去经营这些公

司，但我们的确想要从这些公司上获利。而我们也预期这些公司的未分配盈余将会百分之

百回报给波克夏及其股东，若最后没有，可能是出了以下几种差错(1)我们所指派的经营阶

层有问题(2)公司的前景有问题(3)我们付的价格有问题，而事实上，我们不论在买进具控制

权或不具控制权的股权时，皆曾犯了许多错误，其中以第二类误判的情况最常见，当然要

翻开我们投资的历史才能找到类似的案例(可能至少要回溯至少二、三个月以上吧.)，例

如去年你们的董事长发表便看好铝业发展的前景，只是到后来陆续经过些微的调整，最后

的结论却是一百八十度的转弯。然而基于个人与客观的原因，通常我们改正在对不具控制

权的股权投资的错误要比对具控制权的来得容易许多，这时候缺少控制权，反而成为一种

优点。而就像去年我曾提到的，我们在不具控制权的股权投资已经大到其依投资比例应分

得之未分配盈余甚至超越公司整体的帐面盈余，且我们预期这种情况将会持续下去，1982

年光是其中四家(GEICO、General Foods、R.J.Reynolds 及华盛顿邮报)加起来就超过三千

五百万美元，由于会计原则使得我们在计算帐面股东权益报酬与单一年度获利表现时，无

法将这些未分配盈余记入。(1981)

● 在衡量一家公司长期的经济表现时，我们保险子公司所持有的股票会以市价(扣除假设真的

实现须付的所得税)，而若我们前面所作的推论正确的话，那些不具控制权的股权其未分配

盈余，虽然不规则但最后终究会找到路反映在我们公司帐上，至少到目前为止确是如此。

当然若严格一点的话，还必须把债券投资及非保险子公司所持的股票以市价计算才更准

确，然而GAAP(一般公认会计原则)并未如此规定，而且这样做对我们来说其实影响不

大，而当其影响大到一定程度时，我一定会向各位报告。在GAAP的基础下，公司的帐面

价值，自现今经营阶层接手的十七年以来，已从19.46美元增加到如今的526.02美元，约以

年复合成长率21.1%增加，只是这个比率在未来将会逐年下滑，但我们期望它至少会高于

一般美国大企业的平均水准。在1981年净值增加的约一亿二千多万美元中，约有一半要归

功于GEICO一家公司，总得来说，今年我们投资股票市值的增加要比其背后实际代表的经

济价值增加数要大得多，而要注意股票市值却不会永远朝好的方向走。(1981)

● 去年我们曾解释通货膨胀是如何使我们的帐面表现比经济实质要好看的多，我们对Fed(联

邦准备理事会)主席 Volcker先生所作的努力使得现在所有的物价指数能温和的成长表示感

谢，尽管如此，我们仍对未来的通膨趋势感到悲观，就像是童真一样，稳定的物价只能维

持现状，却没有办法使其恢复原状。尽管通膨对投资来讲实在是太重要了，但我不会再折

磨你们而把我们的观点在复述一遍，通膨本身对大家的折磨已足够了(若谁有被虐狂可向我

索取复本) ，但由于通膨间断不止的使货币贬值，公司可能尽力的使你的皮夹满满，更胜

于填饱你的肚子。(1981)

● 另外一项因素可能会对公司报酬率的热情再浇上一盆冷水，人们为什么要投资公司股权而

非固定收益债券的理由，系在于公司经营阶层可运用这笔资金来创造比固定利息收入更高

的盈余，故人们会愿意承担万一发生损失的风险，所以额外的风险贴水是理所当然的。但

事实真是如此吗?? 过去数十年来，一家公司的股东权益报酬率只要超过10%，便能被归类

为一家优良企业，所以当我们把一块钱投入到这家公司，其将来能产生的经济效益将会大

于一块钱，(考量到当时长期债券殖利率约为5%，而免税公债则约3%)，即使加计税负的

话，实际到投资人手中仍能有6%-8%。股票市场认同这种道理，在过去的一段时间，一家

股东权益报酬率达到11%的公司，其市价可以涨到约净值的一点五倍，而这些公司所产生

的附加价值相当可观，然而那一切已成过去，但过去所得到的经验法则却很难拋弃，「当

投资大众与经营阶层一脚踏进未来，他们的脑子与神经系统却还深陷于过去。」投资大众

惯于利用历史的本益比而经营阶层则习惯用传统企业评价标准，但却不去深思其前提是否

早已改变，若改变是缓慢的，那么持续的再思考便变得必要，若变化很大，则习于昨日的

假设可能会付出极大的代价，而经济步调的变动是会令人窒息的。去年长期债券殖利率超

过16%，而免税公债则约为14%，而这些收入直接落入投资人的口袋，在此同时，美国企

业的股东权益报酬率约为14%，而且尚未考量落入投资人口袋前所须支付的税负(视被投资

公司的股利政策与投资人适用的所得税率而定)因此以1981年的标准而言，投资一家美国公

司一块钱所产生的经济价值还低于一块钱，(当然若投资人是免税的慈善机构，则情况可能

会好一点)，假设投资人系适用于50%税率，而公司把所有盈余皆发放出来，则股东的投资

报酬率约略等于投资7%的免税债券，而这种情况若一直持续下去，等于是套牢于一长期

7%的免税债券一样，而它真正的价值可能连其原始投资额的一半还不到。但如果把所有盈

余都保留起来，而报酬率维持不变，则盈余每年会以14%的速度增加，又假设本益比不

动，则公司的股价每年也会以14%的比例增加，但增加的部份不算是已落入股东的口袋，

因为收回去的话需要付最高约20%的资本利得税，所以不管怎么说，还是比最基本的免税

公债14%低。除非基本报酬率降低，即使公司盈余每年以14% 成长，却从未能收到半毛钱

股利，对投资人而言，等于是一无所获，这对股东与经营阶层都是不怎么愉快的经验，而

更是后者希望掩饰过去的，但不论如何，事实就是事实。大部份的美国公司把大部份的盈

余分配出去，所以算是介于两个极端的例子之间，而大部份的美国公司的税后投资报酬率

可能比投资免税债券还差，当然也有少数例外，但如今总的来说，美国公司的资本对投资

人来说无任何附加的价值。但要强调的是，我并不是说所有的美国公司表现的比以往差，

事实上，反而是比以前还好一点，只是最低门槛比以前提高了许多，主要的原因(但非惟

一)是过去的通膨经验与对未来通膨的预期，而遗憾的是产业的前景很难提高本身的表现，

而只能转而寄望门槛能够降低一点。而如果对于通膨的形成原因能有效抑制，门槛自然会

降低，而美国企业的经济价值也能大幅改善，由不良的企业转为优良的企业。(1981)

● 当然有人会说若这家公司报酬率相对较高，那么把盈余留在公司继续投资下去有道理，但

若这家公司报酬率差，为何不把赚的盈余分配给股东，让股东自己去寻找其它报酬率较高

投资机会呢??(古经文亦赞同:有个三个仆人的寓言，老天爷让其中二个会赚钱的仆人，保留

他们所赚的钱并鼓励他们扩大营业，而另外一个懒惰不会赚钱的仆人，则被严厉得逞罚并

叫他把钱交给前面二个仆人管理/马修第25章。但通膨就像叫我们透过窥镜看爱丽丝梦游仙

境一样，当通膨恃虐时，不良的企业被迫保留它所有的每一分钱，才能辛苦地维持它过去

拥有的生产能力，实在是情非得已。通膨就像是寄生在企业体内巨大的条虫，不管被它寄

生的主人身体状况如何，还是拼命的从他身上吸取养份，所以不管公司的获利到底有多少

(就算没有也一样)，帐上总是会有越来越多的应收帐款、存货与固定资产以维持以往的生

意规模，主人的身体越差，就表示有越多比例的养份被寄生虫吸走。以目前的情况来讲，

一家公司若只赚到8% 或10% 的话，根本不够拿来用于扩张、还债或发放实在的股利，通

膨这条寄生虫早就把盘子清光光了，(而事实上，通常利用许多方法将无法发放股利的窘境

掩饰住，例如常常提出盈余转投资计划，强迫股东再投资，或是发行新股，拿张三的钱发

放给李四，要小心这种必须要另外找到金主才能发放的股利)。反观波克夏通常会因积极而

非被动的理由而保流盈余再投资，当然我们也不能免除前述通膨的威胁，我们历史累计的

报酬率21%扣除潜在的资本利得税后，持续地跨过那最低的门槛，但只能算是低空掠过，

而只要在出一些差错，便可能使我们面临无法跨过门槛的窘境。(1981)

● 下表显示波克夏依照各个公司持股比例来列示帐面盈余的主要来源，而各个公司资本利得

损失并不包含在内而是汇总于下表最后「已实现出售证券利得」一栏，虽然本表列示的方

式与一般公认会计原则不尽相同但最后的损益数字却是一致的: 其中波克夏拥有Blue

Chips Stamps 60%的股权，而后者又拥有 Wesco 财务公司 80% 的股权。

1981 Unit:US'000

Earnings Before Income Tax After Income Tax

Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

Underwriting 100.0% 1,478 1,478 798

Net Investment Income 100.0% 38,823 38,823 32,401

Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles 100.0% (2,669) (2,669) (1,493)

Associated Retail Stores 100.0% 1,763 1,763 759

See's Candies 59.6% 21,891 13,046 6,289

Buffalio Evening News 59.6% (1,057) (630) (276)

Blue Chip Stamps-Parent 59.6% 3,642 2,171 2,134

Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent 47.7% 4,495 2,145 1,590

Mutual Savings and Loan 47.7% 1,605 766 1,536

Presion Steel 47.7% 3,453 1,648 841

Interest on Debt (14,656) (12,649) (6,671)

Other*1 1,895 1,344 1,513

60,663 47,236 39,421

Realized Securities Gain 37,801 33,150 23,183

Total Earnings-all entities 98,464 80,386 62,604

● *1 包含购并企业商誉的摊销(如See's Candies; Mutual; Buffalio Evening News等)

*2 Illinois National Bank 已于1980.12.31 从波克夏脱离出去

● Blue Chip 及Wesco 两家公司因为本身是公开发行公司以规定编有自己的年报，我建议大

家仔细阅读。(1981)

● 就像先前我们所提到的，不具控制权的股权投资其已分配的盈余已列示于保险事业的投资

收益之中，但未分配盈余占本公司的重要性已不下于前面表列的帐面盈余，下表列示的是

那些我们不具控制权的股权投资的持股:

Company Name Type Shares Cost Market Unrealized

Gain

Affiliated Publications, Inc. (a) 451,650 3,297 14,114 10,817

Aluminum Company of America (a) 703,634 19,359 18,031 (1,328)

Arcata Corporation(Inc. Common Equi) (a) 420,441 14,076 15,136 1,060

Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company (b) 475,217 12,942 14,362 1,420

GATX Corporation (a) 441,522 17,147 13,466 (3,681)

General Foods, Inc (b) 2,101,244 66,277 66,714 437

GEIGO Corporation (a) 7,200,000 47,138 199,800 152,662

Handy & Harman (a) 2,015,000 21,825 36,270 14,445

Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc (a) 711,180 4,531 23,202 18,671

Media General (a) 282,500 4,545 11,088 6,543

Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc (a) 391,400 3,709 12,329 8,620

Pinkerton, Inc. (b) 370,088 12,144 19,675 7,531

R.J. Reynolds Industries (b) 1,764,824 76,668 83,127 6,459

SAFECO Corporation (b) 785,225 21,329 31,016 9,687

The Washington Post Company (a) 1,868,600 10,628 58,160 47,532

All Other Common Stock 16,131 22,739 6,608

Total Common Stock 351,746 639,229 287,483

● (a) 代表全部股权由波克夏及其子公司所持有

(b) 代表由波克夏子公司Blue Chip与Wesco 所持有，依波克夏持股比例换算得来

由于我们具控制权与不具控制权的企业经营遍布各行各业，所以恕我无法在此赘述，但无

论如何，集团的重点一定是摆在产险/意外险之上，所以有必要对其产业未来发展加以说

明。

● 「预测」如同Sam Goldwyn 所说的是相当危险的，尤其是那些有关对未来的预测，(波克

夏的股东在过去几年的年报中读到你们的董事长对纺织业未来的分析后，可能也会深有同

感)，但若预测1982年的保险业承销会很惨，那就不会有什么好怕的了，因为结果已经由目

前同业的杀价行为加上保险契约的先天性质获得了印证。当许多汽车保险保单以六个月为

期来定价并发售，而许多产物保险以三年为期，而意外保险同业一般流通的期间则略低于

十二个月，当然价格在保险有效的期间内是固定的，因此今年销售的合约(业内的说法，称

之为保费收入)大概会决定明年保费收入的一半，而另外一半则由明年签下的保险契约来决

定，因此获利的情况自然而然会递延，也就是说若你在定价上犯了错误，那你所受的痛苦

可能会持续一阵子。注意下表所列为每年保费收入成长率与其对当年与隔年度获利的影

响，而结果正如同你所预期的一样，当保费收入以二位数成长，则当年与隔年的获利数字

就会很好看，但若保费收入仅能以个位数成长，则表示承销结果就会变得很差。(1981)

● 下表反映一般同业所面临的情势，Combined Ratio 表示所有营运成本加上理赔损失占保费

收入的比率，百分之一百以下表示有承保利益，反之则表示有损失:

Yearly Change in Yearly Change in Combined

Ratio

Premiums Written Premiums Earned after Policyholder

Dividends

% % %

1972 10.2% 10.9% 96.2%

1973 8.0% 8.8% 99.2%

1974 6.2% 6.9% 105.4%

1975 11.0% 9.6% 107.9%

1976 21.9% 19.4% 102.4%

1977 19.8% 20.5% 97.2%

1978 12.8% 14.3% 97.5%

1979 10.3% 10.4% 100.6%

1980 6.0% 7.8% 103.1%

1981 3.6% 4.1% 105.7%

● 诚如Pogo 所说:「未来与决不会与过去相同」。现在的订价习惯已注定日后悲惨的结果，

尤其若因近几年无重大灾难所和得的喘息机会结束时。保险承保的情况会因大家运气好(而

非运气坏)而变差，近几年来飓风大多仅停留在海上，同时摩托车骑士较少在路上跑，但他

们不会永远都那么守规矩。当然货币与社会(法院与陪审团对保险投保范围认定超越合约与

判例的扩张)的双重通货膨胀是无法抵档的，财产的修补与人身的医疗等这些被视为保险公

司的当然责任，所引发的成本将会无止尽的扩张。若没遇上什么倒霉事(如大灾难或驾驶行

为增加等)同业保费收入平均至少要增加十个百分点才能使1982年的承销比率不会再恶化

(大部份同业估计承担损失每年以十个百分点成长，当然大家都期望自己公司成长较少)。

(1981)

● 去年年报我们曾经提到许多保险公司因投资不当使得其公司财务变得不健全，迫使他们放

弃原有承保原则，不惜以低价承接保单以维持既有流动性。很明显的帐上持有不合理高估

的债券的同业，为了现金周转而以明显不合理的低价大量卖出保单，他们害怕保单收入的

减少更甚于承保所可能增加的损失。然而不幸的是所有的同业皆因此受波及，因为你的价

格不可能与竞争同业差得太远，这种压力未曾稍减，并迫使愈来愈多的同业跟进，盲目追

求量的成长而非质的增加，害怕失去的市场占有率永远无法回复。即使大家一致认同费率

极不合理，我们认为没有一家保险业者，能够承受现金极度流出的情况下不接任何保单，

而只要这种心态存在，则保单价格将持续面临调降压力。对于专家一再认定保险产业的循

环具规则性且长期而言承销损益接近两平，我们则抱持不同的看法，我们相信承保面临钜

额损失(虽然程度不一)将成为保险业界的常态，未来十年内最好的表现在以往仅能算得上

是普通而已。虽然面临持续恶化的未来，波克夏的保险事业并无任何良方，但我们经营阶

层却已尽力力争上游，虽然承保数量减少了，但承保损益相较于同业仍显优越。展望未

来，波克夏将维持低保单的现状，我们的财务实力使我们能保持最大的弹性，这在同业间

并不多见。而将来总有一天，当同业保单接到怕之时，波克夏财务实力将成为营运发展最

有利的后盾。其中GEICO我们不具控制权的主要股权投资更是个中翘楚，它堪称企业理念

的最佳实践典范(1981)

● 我们让使得所有股东皆能指定其个别捐赠单位的新计划受到广大回响，在932,206张有效股

份中(即在本公司股份系由本人登记者)，有95.6%回复，而在即使不包含本人股份的情况

下，也有超过90%的成绩。此外有3%的股东主动写信来支持本计划，而股东参与的热烈与

提供的意见，也是我们前所未见，这种自动自发的态度说明了本计划成功与否，也可看出

波克夏股东的天性。很明显的，他们不但希望能拥有且能自由掌控其所欲捐赠金钱的去

向，教授父权式的管理学院可能会惊讶的发现，没有一位股东表示希望由波克夏的经营阶

层来帮他们作决定或是依董监事捐赠比例行事 (这是目前一般美国大企业普遍的作法) 除了

由波克夏及其子公司经营阶层决定的捐献外，总计1,783,655美元的股东指定捐赠款共分配

给675个慈善机关团体。往后几年波克夏将会因这项捐款计划获得些许的税负抵减，而每

年十月十日以前，我们将会通知股东每股可捐赠的金额，你有三个礼拜的时间可以作决

定，为免丧失资格，股份须确实由你本人名义登记，对于去年这项计划我们惟一感到遗憾

的是，有些股东虽然不是因为本身的错误，而无法参加，由于税务单位的解释令于十月初

才下来，并规定股份若由代理人或经纪人名义登记者不适用，由于时间紧迫，再加上联络

前述股东仍须透过其代理人，使得部份股东没能参加，在此我们强烈呼吁那些股票经纪人

尽速通知其客户，以免股东的权利被剥夺，其中有家证券经纪商代表六十位股东(约占4%

强股权)很明显地在接到邮件三个礼拜后，才将之转到客户的手上。讽刺的是，该公司并非

所有部门皆如此懒散，转寄邮件的帐单在六天内就送到波克夏公司。我们之所以告诉大家

这件事有两个理由(1)若你希望参加这项股东指定捐赠计划的话，请务必将你的股份在九月

底以前改登记在自己的名下(2)就算你不想参加，最好还是至少将一股登记在自己的名下，

如此才能确保你与其它股东一样在第一时间知道有关公司的重大消息。最后包含这项股东

指定捐赠计划在内的许多很好的idea，都是由波克夏公司的副董事长兼Blue Chip的董事长

Charlie Minger所构思，不管职称为何，Charlie 跟我皆以执行合伙人的心态管理所有事

业，而各位股东就像是我们一般的合伙人一样。(1981)

● 一九八二年

● 今年的营业利益约为三千一百万美元，期初股东权益报酬率(持有股权投资以原始成本计)

仅约9.8%，较去年1979年的15.2%下滑，亦远低于1978年近年度的新高19.4%，主要的原因

包括:

(1)保险承销成绩大幅恶化。

(2)股权资本大幅扩张的同时，由我们直接控制的事业并未同步成长。

(3)我们持续增加对不具控制权股权投资的投入，但我们依比例可分得的盈余照会计原则却

不能认列在帐面上。(1982)

● 几年前我曾经说过营业利益占股权资本的比率(再加上一些调整)是衡量企业单一年度经营

绩效的最佳方法，虽然我们仍坚信这套标准仍适用于绝大部份的企业，但是我必须说明这

套标准对波克夏的适用性却已大不如前，或许你会怀疑这样的说法，认为当数字好看时很

少有人会将标准舍弃，但是将结果变得很糟糕时，经理人通常倾向将衡量标准而非自己给

换掉。当成绩恶化时，自然就会有另一套标准跑出来解释原因，就像是射箭手先将箭射在

空白的标靶上，然后再小心的将红心画在箭的周围一样，但基于前述原因(3)的重要性日益

增加(详如后述)，我们确信移动红心的举动是具有正当理由的。

后附财务报表所反映的帐面盈余一般已将我们持股超过20%的股权投资依持股比例认列其

损益，然而低于20%的股权投资却只能认列实际有收到的现金股利，至于未发放的盈余则

完全不列入计算。(当然也有少数例外，譬如我们持有35%的GEICO保险公司便因为我们已

将投票权委托出去给别人，故在1982年仅能以成本法认列实际收到的现金股利350万美

元，至于剩下的2,300万未分配的部份则完全不列入计算;而假设GEICO当年度赚的比原本

的少但却多发100万，则波克夏的帐面反而变得更好看，很明显的会计原则有时会扭区经

济现实)。所以我们比较认同将所有未分配盈余皆计入而不管持股比例的经济盈余概念，我

们认为一家公司其所赚得的盈余对股东的价值在于公司是否将其在运用于有效的用途之

上，而非分配与否或是持股比例，如果你拥有波克夏万分之一的股权，在过去十几年来你

一定拥有并实际感受到公司盈余的成长，不管你采用的是何种会计原则。同样的，你也可

能100%拥有一家资本密集的公司，即使每年皆能完全认列公司的损益，却毫无得到实质经

济利益成长的喜悦。这不是在批评会计原则，而我们也没有能力再建立一套更好的制度，

只是要告诉所有的经营阶层与投资大众，会计数字只是企业评价的起点而非终点。在大部

份的公司，20%的股权可能不算重大，而前面我们所提到的经济与帐面利益的差异并不

大，但我们的情况却非如此，相反地，他们的重要性与成长性，反而使得我们原来帐列的

盈余数字显得微不足到。(1982)

● 在1981年的年报，我们曾预测我们四个主要不具控制权的股权投资，依持股比例可分得的

未分配盈余高达三千五百万，而今年在其中三个持股比例未变(包括GEICO、General

Foods与Washington Post)，另一家R.J.Reynolds大幅增加的情况下，可分得的未分配盈余

超过四千万美金，这个数字完全未显现在帐上，已超过波克夏帐列盈余数(其中包含前述四

家公司所发放的一千四百万现金股利) ，这还不包括其它未计入的不具控制权的股权投资

部份。我们说明这些数字只是要强调它们的重要性，但基于税务考量却不一定要他们完全

显现出来，而同时这些盈余将透过其本身股价不定期且不规则的反映出来，而这种特性却

提供那些价值型的投资人投资机会，他们可以从各式各样的美国企业中挑选价廉物美的公

司部份股权，并从一群投资行为有如惊慌失措的旅鼠手中捡到便宜货。在这个巨大的拍卖

市场中，我们的工作就是去挑选那些能将所赚的钱再利用并产生大于原本的经济效益的公

司，尽管曾经犯了不少错误，目前为止仍算达成目标，有时某些公司所保留的盈余并未增

加其经济效益，但有时却高达二、三倍，到目前为止，表现好的多过表现差的，若我们能

继续保持下去，不管对帐面盈余有任何影响，将可使波克夏经济盈余极大化。(1982)

● 虽然我们对于买进部份股权的方式感到满意，但真正会令我们雀跃的却是能以合理的价格

100%地买下一家优良企业，我们偶尔会缔造如此佳绩(也希望能够再次做到)，这是一件相

当困难的工作，比买进部份股权要困难得多。当我们在观察1982年的几件大额购并案，我

们的反应并不是忌妒，反而庆幸我们并非其中一员。因为在这些购并案中，管理当局的冲

动战胜其理智，追逐的刺激过程使得追求者变得盲目，Pascal的观察非常恰当:「它使我想

到所有的不幸皆归究于大家无法安静的待在一个房间内」(你们的董事长去年也曾数度离开

那个房间，且差点成为那场闹剧的主角)，回想起来，去年我们最大的成就是试图大幅购买

那些我们先前已投入许多的公司的股权但由于某些无法控制的原因却无法执行，倘若真的

成功了，这宗交易必定会耗尽我们所有的时间与精神，但却不一定会获得回报。若我们将

去年的报告作成图表介绍本公司的发展，你将会发现有两页空白的跨页插图用来描述这宗

告吹的交易。(1982)

● 我们投资部份股权的作法惟有当我们可以以合理的价格买到吸引人的企业才行得通，同时

也需要温和的股票市场作配合，而市场就像老天爷一样，帮助那些自己帮助自己的人，但

与老天爷不一样的地方是祂不会原谅那些不知道自己在做什么的人。对投资人来说，买进

的价格太高将抵销这家绩优企业未来十年亮丽的发展所带来的效应。所以当股票市场涨到

一定的程度，将使我们有效地运用资金买进部份股权的能力大打折扣或甚至完全消失。这

种情况会定期发生，就在十年前当股市到达狂热的高档时(由于高股东权益报酬股被机构投

资人捧上天)，波克夏的保险子公司(不包括在Blue Chip Stamps部份)仅仅持有一千八百万

市值的股票(相较于现在的80%)，仅占保险公司投资总额的15% ，在1972年的当时有跟现在

一样多的好公司，但他们当时的股价实在有点离谱。虽然股价高涨对公司短期的表现有所

助益，但就长期而言却反而会影响企业的前景，而目前我们已观察到一些蛛丝马迹再度出

现。(1982)

● 1982年波克夏净值的成长，(保险子公司持有的股票以市价计，扣除未实现资本利得的潜在

税负)大约是二亿零八百万美金，相较于期初净值五亿一千九百万，约有40%的成长。在现

今经营阶层接掌公司的十八年里，帐面价值由原先的每股19.46美元成长到现在的每股

737.43美元，约当22.0%年复合成长率，可以确定的这个比率在未来将减少。波克夏的经济

目标是希望获得高于一般美国企业的长期报酬率，我们愿意以合理的价格购买全部或部份

具竞争力的企业，有助于我们达成上述目标，再一次的我们不具控制权的股权投资其市值

成长高于其实质经济利益的成长，举例来说，在二亿零八百万当中有七千九百万是由于

GEICO市值的成长，这家公司持续表现优异，我们一再对该公司经营理念的实践与经营阶

层的管理能力感到印象深刻(虽然不是名校出身，但让Jack试看看的结果，证实我们的眼光

并成为我们企业的信念)。然而GEICO 在市值的成长却远超过本身内含价值的成长，虽然

后者一样令人印象深刻，而当投资大众逐渐认清现实状况时，我们相信市值将会反映其真

正价值，而每年的差异变化不会永远都对我们有利，就算我们的部份公司每年都表现很

好，也不一定保证在股市的表现一定很好，而那时波克夏的净值便会大幅缩减，但我们不

会感到沮丧，如果这家公司一直都是那么吸引人而我们手头上又刚好有现金，我们便会再

逢低增加持股。(1982)

● 下表显示波克夏依照各个公司持股比例来列示帐面盈余的主要来源，而各个公司资本利得

损失并不包含在内而是汇总于下表最后「已实现出售证券利得」一栏，虽然本表列示的方

式与一般公认会计原则不尽相同但最后的损益数字却是一致的: 其中波克夏拥有Blue

Chips Stamps 60%的股权，而后者又拥有 Wesco 财务公司 80% 的股权。

1982 Unit:US'000

Earnings Before Income Tax After

Income Tax

Total Berkshire Share Berkshire

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

Underwriting (21,558) (21,558) (11,345)

Net Investment Income 41,620 41,620 35,270

Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (1,545) (1,545) (862)

Associated Retail Stores 914 914 446

See's Candies 23,884 14,235 6,914

Buffalio Evening News (1,215) (724) (226)

Blue Chip Stamps-Parent 4,182 2,492 2,472

Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent 6,156 2,937 2,210

Mutual Savings and Loan (6) (2) 1,524

Presion Steel 1,035 493 265

Interest on Debt (14,996) (12,977) (6,951)

Other*1 2,631 1,857 1,780

41,102 27,742 31,497

Realized Securities Gain 36,651 21,875 14,877

Total Earnings-all entities 77,753 49,617 46,374

● **1 包含购并企业商誉的摊销(如See's Candies; Mutual; Buffalio Evening News等)

● 本报告并附有Blue Chip 及Wesco 两家公司主要经营阶层对其1982 年公司经营作的一番叙

述，其中我相信你会发现有关Blue Chip在Buffalo Evening News 的情况特别有意思，目前

全美大约有十四个城市的日报业者其每周发行量超过Buffalo ，但真正的关键却在于星期

天发行量的成长，六年前也就是在周日版尚未推出之前，原本在Buffalo 发行星期天报纸

的 Courier-Express 约有27万份的发行量，而如今即使该地区家庭户数未见成长单单

Buffalo News在周日便有36万份，约为35%的成长，就我们所知这是在全美其它地区所未

见的，一切都要归功该报的管理阶层为我们所做的努力。(1982)

● 如同我们先前曾说明过的，不具控制权的股权投资未分配的盈余其重要性早以不下于前表

所列公司帐面营业净利。在不具控制权的股权投资中已分配的盈余当然已反映在公司净投

资收益(Net Investment Income)项下，而下表所列系我们在不具控制权的股权投资依持股

比例所应有之权益:

Company Name Shares Cost Market Unrealized

Affiliated Publications, Inc. 460,560 3,516 16,929 13,413

Crum & Forster 908,800 47,144 48,962 1,818

General Foods, Inc 2,101,244 66,277 83,680 17,403

GEIGO Corporation 7,200,000 47,138 309,600 262,462

Handy & Harman 2,379,200 27,318 46,692 19,374

Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc 711,180 4,531 34,314 29,783

Media General 282,500 4,545 12,289 7,744

Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc 391,400 3,709 17,319 13,610

R.J. Reynolds Industries 3,107,675 142,343 158,715 16,372

Time, Inc 1,531,391 45,273 79,824 34,551

The Washington Post Company 1,868,600 10,628 103,240 92,612

All Other Common Stock 21,611 34,058 12,447

Total Common Stock 424,033 945,622 521,589

● (a) 代表全部股权由波克夏及其子公司所持有

(b) 代表由波克夏子公司Blue Chip与Wesco 所持有，依波克夏持股比例换算得来

● 为免你未注意到，本表有个投资经验可与大家分享，念旧(Nostalgia) 在我们投资选股时必

须特别加以重视，我们投资组合中具有最大未实现利益的两家公司GEIGO与Washington

Post，事实上本人早在13岁与20岁时便与它们结缘，但磋跎了二十几年，迟至1970年代我

们才正式成为该公司的股东，但结果证明所谓:「迟到总比未到好。」(1982)

● 由于我们具控制权与不具控制权的股权投资经营的行业实在是相当广泛，若我一一详细介

绍将会使得报告变得冗长，然而这其中不管是现在或是将来最主要的事业经营将会是摆在

产险与意外险领域之上，因此我们有必要对保险产业现状予以详加说明:

下表显示的是去年我们曾引用过，经过更新后的产业统计数字，其所传达的讯息相当明

显，我们将不会对1983年的承保结果感到吃惊，数据正说明了目前整个所面临到的状况，

Combined Ratio系表示经营成本加上理赔损失除以保费收入的比率，若比率小于100%则表

示有承保利益，反之则有承保损失，就如同去年我们所说的一样，若承销保费年增率低于

10%，你就会发现隔年的承保结果恶化，即使像通膨率相对较低的今日也是如此，随着保

单日益成长，医疗费用上涨的速度远高于一般物价，加上保险责任日益扩大的影响，承保

损失将很难压低到10%以下，大家必须有所认知1982年的Combined Ratio 109.5已是相当乐

观的估计，在以前年代保险公司几乎可依自身喜好来调整年度获利，只要(1)承销长期保单

(Long-tail)因为理赔成本多采用估计(2)以前年度提存有适当准备或(3)业务成长快速。

有迹象显示有几家大型保险公司倾向以模糊的会计与挪动准备的方式来掩饰其本业不佳的

情况。保险业，跟其它行业一样，不良的经营阶层对不良的营运通常最直接的反应就是不

良的帐务，俗语说:「你很难让一个空沙包站得直挺挺的」。当然大部份的经营阶层都尽力

正正当当的游戏规则玩，但即使是正直的管理当局在面对获利不佳的情况时，下意识多多

少少也不会愿意完全承认走下坡的窘境，产业统计资料指出在1982年对于提列损失准备方

面有恶化迹象，而实际的Combined Ratio 可能会比表列数更差一点。

一般认为在1983或1984 年会到谷底，然后产业循环会如同过去经验一般缓步稳定地向上，

但由于一项明显的改变(这种改变已许多年未见，而如今却重现)使我们抱持不同的看法。

Yearly Change in Yearly Change in Combined

Ratio

Premiums Written Premiums Earned after

Policyholder

Dividends

% % %

1972 10.2% 10.9% 96.2%

1973 8.0% 8.8% 99.2%

1974 6.2% 6.9% 105.4%

1975 11.0% 9.6% 107.9%

1976 21.9% 19.4% 102.4%

1977 19.8% 20.5% 97.2%

1978 12.8% 14.3% 97.5%

1979 10.3% 10.4% 100.6%

1980 6.0% 7.8% 103.1%

1981 (Rev.) 3.9% 4.1% 106.0%

1982 (Est.) 5.1% 4.6% 109.5%

● 对此我们必须探究几项影响企业获利的重要因素才能了解这种改变，一般来说若企业处在

产业面临供给过剩且为产品一般商品化的情形(在整体表现、外观、售后服务等都无差异

化)时，便极有可能发生获利警讯，当然若价格或成本在某些情况下(例如透过政府立法干

预、非法勾结或国际性联合垄断如OPEC)能获得控制或可稍微免除自由市场竞争。否则若

客户不在乎其所采用的产品或通路服务由谁提供，成本与价格系由完全竞争来决定，如此

产业铁定会面临悲惨的下场，这也是为什么所有的厂商皆努力强调并建立本身产品或服务

的差异性，这种作法在糖果有用(消费者会指明品牌)而砂糖却没有用(难道你听过有人会说:

「我的咖啡要加奶精和某某牌的砂糖」) ，在许多产业就是无法作到差异化，有些生产者

能因具成本优势而表现杰出，然在定义上这种情况极少或甚至不存在，所以对大部份销售

已完全商品化的公司来说，不可避免的结局便是，持续的产能过剩无法控制价格滑落导致

获利不佳，当然产能过剩会因产能缩减或需求增加而自我修正，而不幸的是这种修正的过

程却是缓慢而痛苦的，当产业好不容易面临反弹时，却又是一窝蜂全面扩张的开始，不到

几年又必须面对先前的窘况。而最后决定产业长期获利情况的是供给吃紧与供给过剩年度

的比率，通常这种比率很小，(以我们在纺织业的经验来说，供给吃紧的情况要追溯到许多

年以前，且大约仅维持不到一个早上的时间)。在某一些产业，供给吃紧的情况却可以维持

上好一段期间，有时实际需求的成长甚至超过当初所预期，而要增加产能因涉及复杂的规

划与建厂而须有相当的前置期。

回归正题谈到保险业，供给量能马上提高只要业者增加点资本(有些时候由于州政府立法保

障保户免于保险公司倒闭风险，甚至可不需要增加资本)，在绝大多数的情况下，(除了发

生股市大崩盘或自然界的大天灾)保险业皆处于过度竞争的环境下经营，通常来说尽管勇于

尝试多变化，业者所销售的保单多属于无差异化的一般商品(许多保户包含大公司的经理人

在内，甚至不知道自己所投保的是那一家保险公司)，所以保险业在教科书当中一般被归类

为面临供给过剩且产品一般商品化死胡同的艰困行业。

那么为什么保险业即使在面临这种情况下，数十年来仍能有所获利?(在1950年到1970年间

产业平均的Combined Ratio为99.0，使得公司获利除投资收益外，还外加1%的承销利益，

答案在于传统的规范与行销方式，这个世纪以来整个产业系依照业者所掌控的近乎法定管

制价格机制在运作，虽然竞价行为确实存在，但在大型保险业间却不普遍，主要的竞争系

在争取经纪人方面，且多用各种与价格无关的方式去争取。而大型业者的费率主要系透过

产业公会与州政府管制当局协调(或依照公司所建议)来订定，讨价还价是难免的，但那是

业者与政府间，而不是业者与客户间的行为。当争论结束，公司甲的价格可能与公司乙的

完全一致，而法律也禁止业者或经纪人再杀价竞争。业者与州政府协议订定的价格保障业

者的获利而当资料显示现有价格不敷成本时，政府还会与业者协调共同努力改善损失的状

况，故产业大部份定价的举动皆能确保公司有利可图，最重要的是不同于一般商业社会运

作的习惯，保险公司即使在超额供给的情况下，仍能合法地调整价格以确保公司的获利。

但好景不常，虽然旧有的制度仍在但组织外的资金入续投入市场，迫使所有的参与者，不

论新旧皆被迫响应，新进者利用各种不同的行销管道且毫不犹豫地使用价格作为竞争的工

具，而确实他们也善用这项武器，在过程中消费者了解到保险不再是不二价的行业，而关

于这点他们永远记得。产业未来的获利性取决于现今而非过去竞争的特性，但许多经理人

很难体认到这一点，不是只有将军才会战到最后一兵一卒，大部份的企业与投资分析都是

后知后觉，但我们却看得很透澈，惟有一种情况才能改善保险业承保获利的状况，这和

铝、铜或玉米生产业者相同，就是缩小供给与需求之间的差距，而不幸的是不像铝、铜，

保单的需求不会因市场紧峭而一下子就大幅增加，所以相对的，须从紧缩供给面来下手，

而所谓的供给实际上是偏向心理面而非实质面的，不须要关闭厂房或公司，只要业者克制

一下签下保单的冲动即可。而这种抑制绝不会是因为获利不佳，因为不赚钱虽然会使业者

犹豫再三但却不愿冒着丧失市场占有率与业界地位而放弃大笔的生意。反而是需要自然的

或金融上的大风暴才会使业者大幅缩手，而这种情况或许明天就会发生，也或许要等上好

几年，到时即使把投资收益列入考量，保险业也很难有获利的情况，当供给真正的紧缩

时，大笔的业务将会捧上门给幸存的大型业者，他们有能力也有通路能够吃下所有生意，

而我们的保险子公司已准备好这一天的到来。

在1982年我们的保险部门承销成绩恶化的比同业还严重，从获利优于同业滑落成同业平均

之下，主要的变动在于National Indemnity传统的承保范围，我们以往获利颇佳的部份，

价格下跌到保险公司铁定赔钱的惨况，而展望明年，我们预期表现将与同业水准相当，不

过所谓的水准将会很惨。我们两位明星，Cypress的Milt Thornton 与Kansas的Floyd

Taylor 表现持续看好，维持一惯的积极态度并建立在节省成本与客户至上的企业文化上，

这明白显现在他们的得分记录上，在1982年母公司负责管理保险子公司的责任交给Mike

Goldberg，自从Mike从我手中接棒后，不论在计划、招募与监控上皆也明显进步。(1982)

● GEICO持续以追求效率与客户服务的热诚所管理，而这点也保证公司非凡的成功，Jack

Byrne与 Bill Snyder成就人类最微妙的目标-让事情单纯化并牢记你所欲达成的目标，加上

业界最优秀的投资经理人Lou Simpson，我们很满意这种最佳组合，GEICO是前面我们所

提及过度供给的大众化商品高获利特殊情况的最佳典范，它是一家具有既深且广的成本优

势的公司，我们在该公司35%的权益代表约二亿五千万的保费量，远大于我们直接取得的

数量。(1982)

● 波克夏与Blue Chip目前正考虑在1983年正式合并，若真的实现，将会以一致的评价模式进

行股权的交换，波克夏上一次大量发行新股是在1978年购并Diversified Retailing时。我们

公司发行新股系遵循一项原则，那就是我们不轻易发行新股，除非我们所换得的内含企业

价值与我们所付出的一样多，这种原则看似理所当然，你会问那有人会笨到以一块钱去交

换五毛钱的呢?但不幸的是，有许多企业的经理人恰恰愿意如此作。他们在购并企业的第一

选择是用现金或举债，但通常CEO的欲望超过现金与融资额度所能负担(我个人也是如

此)，尤其是他个人的持股市价远低于内含企业价值时更是如此，但事实仅维持一下子，然

后就像Yogi Berra所说的:「光看你就能观察到许多东西」对股东而言，届时你就会发现公

司经营阶层在乎的到底是企业版图的扩张或是股东权益的维护了。之所以需要在两者之间

作选择的理由很简单，公司在股票市场上的价格通常低于其内含企业价值，但当股东会愿

意将整间公司以协议的方式出售，必定想要且通常会取得相当于企业内含价值的回报，若

收到的是现金，那么计算卖方取得的报酬是再容易不过了，若以买方的股票作交换，计算

卖方取得的报酬还算简单，只要计算所取得的股票之市值即可，同时只要买方所用以交换

的股票其市价接近内含企业价值便无太大问题，问题是假设若其股票市价仅及内含企业价

值的一半，这时买方将会面临用贱卖自家股票的不愉快场面。

讽刺的是，假设当买方变成卖方时，他反而能透过谈判换取相当于本身内含企业价值的代

价，但当买方仅卖出公司部份股权以购并卖方，它将无法以高于市场给它的价格出售之。

最后不论如何，往前冲的买方结果是以本身低估的股票换取价值合理的资产，等于是以一

块钱价值的股票换到仅值五毛钱的东西，在这种情况下，以合理的价格买下不错的公司将

会变成很不划算的买卖，就像是把金或银以锡的价格换到金子一样。当然若购并者对于规

模的渴望配合上积极的行动自然能够找到理由解释这种摧毁公司价值的发行新股行动，亲

切的投资银行家会再三保证其动作的合理性(不要问理发师你是有应该理头发)，通常公司

经营阶层最常采用的理由有下列几项:

(a)我们现在要买下的这家公司未来潜力无穷，(假定他们要换走的原有公司股份可能也是如

此，而未来的远景以企业评价的角度而言是诲暗不明的，若以二倍的东西换取一倍的东

西，即使未来两者的企业价值皆倍增则此种差异将仍然存在)。

(b)我们必须成长(有人或许会问:「所谓的我们是指谁?」对现有的股东而言，事实是现有的

企业价值将因发行新股而遭到稀释，假若明天波克夏要发行新股以购并别人，波克夏或许

将拥有原有企业加上新购并的公司，但各位股东在那些无可取代的企业，诸如See’s

Candy、National Indenmity等公司的权益将马上减少。就像你家里原有120亩的农场，结

果你和拥有60亩农地的邻居合并经营而权益各半，最后虽然你实际管理的面积增加为180

亩，但你实际可分得的权益将永远减少25%，那些想要牺牲老板权益以扩张个人版图的经

营阶层最好考虑到政府机关做事)

(c)我们的股票受到低估，而在此项交易我们已尽量避免动用公司股份，但我们仍须给予卖

方51%的股票与49%的现金，使得他们得以免税(这种论点无异承认买方应尽量少发行新

股，我们认同。但若用100%的股票会损及原有股东权益，那么51%的股票也一样，卖方的

期望并不是决定买方最佳利益的考量因素，若卖方坚持被购并的条件包含换掉公司CEO，

那结果不知会如何?

有三种方法可以避免原有股东的股份价值遭到侵蚀，第一种是以合理的价格对合理的价格

进行购并(就像是波克夏与Blue Chip的合并案一样，试着用对双方都公平的方式进行，大

家都收到与其付出一致的企业内含价值，Kraft与Nabisco的合并案也是如此，但他们是少

数例外，不是因为购并者要回避这类交易，而是实际执行有困难)。

第二种方法发生在公司股票市价高于其实际企业内含价值，在这种情况下发行股票反而增

进原有股东权益，在1965-69年间许多购并案属于这类，结果与1970年后的购并案完全相

反，被购并的公司股东收到膨胀不实的股份(通常藉由可疑的会计与哄托的手法)成为该项

交易的真正输家。而近年来在大型的公司变得相当少见，有些例外主要是那些具有美丽远

景的公司使得市场暂时以高于其企业内含价值的价格予以评价。

第三种方法是购并者照样进行交易，但然后接着从市场买回与因购并所发行的股份数量相

同的股票，如此一来，原本以股换股的交易会转变为以现金换股的交易，买回股份本身是

一种修补损害的动作，正常的读者应该能正确的猜到我们宁愿以买回自家股份的方式直接

增进原有股东权益，而不只是修补原先的损害，得分的达阵会比弥补失误更令人雀跃，但

当失误真得发生了，弥补是很重要的，我们衷心建议弥补错误的买回自家股份动作能将一

项不好的以股换股交易变为公平的以现金换股交易。

购并所用的语言通常会让事情搞混且鼓励经理人作出不合理的举动，例如股权稀释通常须

经过仔细试算对帐面价值与每股获利能力的影响，而后者尤其受到重视，若计算结果对购

并者为负面(即遭到稀释)，则马上有人会提出合理解释说明在未来一定能够改善(实际交易

不一定成功，但计划绝对不会有问题，若老板很明显的对于一项购并案保持高度兴趣，下

面的部属与顾问一定能量身订作一套计划来证明交易价格的合理性)，更别提若是试算结果

为正面(即反稀释)一定不会有人再有任何意见。对于股权稀释与否的关心实在是有点过

度，现在的每股盈余(甚至是未来几年的每股盈余)是企业评价的重要变量，但却不是绝对

惟一的。有许多的合并案，即使未遭稀释，购并者本身的权益却马上遭到损害，而有些案

子虽然现在或未来几年的每股盈余遭到稀释，但原有股东的权益却大大提高，真正重要的

是一件购并案其企业内含价值是否有遭到稀释(而这需要考量许多项变量)，我们坚信从这

个角度去判断是绝对必要的(事实上也很难做到) 。

第二个问题牵涉到交换的比例，若甲公司宣布要发行股票购并乙公司，通常大家都会把它

解读成甲要取得乙或乙要卖给甲，但真正对这件事看得透澈的人却会直接但贴切的形容为

甲卖掉部份股份以取得乙或乙股东得到部份甲的股份以换取乙全部的财产。在交易中，你

给对方的跟对方给你的东西一样重要，即使要经过好一阵子才能知道你所给的是什么。后

续不论是出售普通股或发行可转债以取得交易所需资金或恢复财报实力，皆必须仔细计算

以评估原本这项购并案的影响，(若企业怀胎是企业结合的必然结果，那么在享乐之前便须

面对现实) 。

管理阶层必须仔细想清楚，他们会不会在像卖部份股权一样的情况下，把100%股权卖掉，

若卖掉全部股权的作法不恰当，那么在同一基础下卖掉部份股权就合理吗?管理当局的小错

误会慢慢累积成为一项大错误而非大胜利(拉斯维加斯就是建立在人们从事认为无伤大雅的

资本交易所造成的财富移转之上) 。

取舍之间的因素考量在投资公司间可以很容易的计算，假设投资公司甲其市价仅为其真正

价值的一半，并打算购并投资公司乙，又假设投资公司甲决定发行相当市值的股份以换取

投资公司乙全部的资产，在这种情况下等于是投资公司甲以二块钱的内含价值换取一块钱

的内含价值，而马上会接到甲公司股东与证管会的异议，强调投资公司合并的公平性，所

以这样的交易一定不被允许。然而对制造、服务、金融等公司而言，价值却不像投资公司

那么容易计算，但我们也曾见过有些购并案像前面所提案例一样明显伤害原有股东的权

益，而如果公司经营阶层能注重公平性，愿意用同样的标准来评估两家企业的话，这样的

伤害便绝对不会发生。

最后我们对购并者原有股东因发行稀释股份的祸不单行表示点意见，在这种情况下，第一

项打击是购并案本身所造成对内含价值的损害，第二项打击是在购并案后对企业评价的向

下修正，因为包括现有与未来可能的股东会对管理当局这种损害股东权益的行为感到失

望，而宁愿把钱交给真正重视股东权益的人手上，如此一来公司的本益比将向下修正，不

管管理当局如何再三强调这种行为只是偶发性，就像是客人在餐厅的汤内发现一只蟑螂，

生意马上受到影响，不管你换了厨师也一样，同理可证最高的本/内含价值比将会给那些不

轻易发行股份稀释原有股东权益的经营阶层。

在波克夏或是其它由我们作决策的公司，包括Blue Chip及Wesco，惟有当我们所换得的企

业价值跟我们所付出的一样多时，才考虑发行新股，我们绝不会将企业发展或企业规模与

股东权益划上等号。(1982)

● 由于会有许多不同的读者看到这份报告，其中可能会有人对我们的购并计划有所帮助，我

们对具以下条件的公司有兴趣:

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有五百万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟) ，我

们倾向采现金交易，但若符合先前所提状况也会考虑发行股份。(1982)

● 今年的股东指定捐赠计划再度得到热烈回响，虽然每股仅分配1美元较去年的2美元少，仍

有95.8%的有效票参与，若与Blue Chip的合并案成真，附代的好处是合并报税将使我们可

捐赠的总额大幅增加，每位股东可分配的金额未来也会跟着增加。若你也想参加的话，我

们强烈建议你赶快把股份从经纪人那儿改登记于自己的名下。(1982)

● 在一时冲动之下，我们将企业总部的面积增加252平方呎(约17%)，恰巧碰上重新签订五年

的租约，和我一同工作的五个人-Joan Atherton、Mike Goldberg、Gladys Kaiser、Verne

McKenzie与Bill Scott等其生产力远超过企业集团，精简的组织使我们有更多的时间管理

旗下公司而非互相管理。我的合伙人Charlie Munger将继续留在洛杉矶不管与Blue Chip的

合并成功与否，Charlie 跟我在企业决策上是可以互相替代的，距离一点也不会阻碍我

们，我们总是发现一通电话会比半天冗长的会议更有效率。(1982)

● 今年我们有两位经营明星退休，National Indemnity 65岁的Phil Liesche和Associated

Retail 79岁的Ben Rosner，这两个人都让身为波克夏股东的你更为富有，National

Indemnity是支持波克夏成长的重要力量。Phil和他的继任者Ringwalt是该公司成功主要的

推动者，而Ben Rosner 在1967年将Associated Retail以现金卖给Diversified Retailing后，

原本仅承诺继续待到当年度年底，结果在往后的十五年仍持续表现杰出。他们两人皆为波

克夏尽心尽力管理公司就好象是他们100%拥有这家公司一样，不须订定额外的规则来强迫

他们，这种态度早在波克夏加入前便已深植在他们的人格特质中，他们好的个性成就我们

更多的财富，如果我们能持续吸引到像Ben 和Phil这样的人，你将可不必担心波克夏的未

来。 (1982)

● 一九八三年

去年登记为波克夏的股东人数由1,900人增加到2,900人，主要是由于我们与Blue Chip的合并案，

但也有一部份是因为自然增加的速度，就像几年前我们一举成长突破1,000大关一样。有了这么多

新股东，有必要将有关经营者与所有者间关系方面的主要企业原则加以汇整说明:

尽管我们的组织登记为公司，但我们是以合伙的心态来经营(Although our form is corporate, our

attitude is partnership.) 查理孟格跟我视波克夏的股东为合伙人，而我们两个人则为执行合伙人

(而也由于我们持有股份比例的关系，也算是具控制权的合伙人)我们并不把公司视为企业资产的

最终拥有人，实际上公司只要股东拥有资产的一个媒介而已。

对应前述所有权人导向，我们所有的董事都是波克夏的大股东，五个董事中的四个，其家族财产

有超过一半是波克夏持股，简言之，我们自给自足(We eat our own cooking) 。

我们长远的经济目标(附带后面所述的几个标准)是将每年平均每股内含价值的成长率极大化，我

们不以波克夏规模来作为衡量公司的重要性或表现，由于资本大幅提高，我们确定每股价值的年

增率一定会下滑，但至少不能低于一般美国大企业平均数。

我们最希望能透过直接拥有会产生现金且具有稳定的高资本报酬率的各类公司来达到上述目的，

否则退而求其次，是由我们的保险子公司在公开市场买进类似公司的部份股权，购并对象的价格

与机会，保险公司资金的需求会决定年度资金的配置。

由于这种取得企业所有权的双向手法，及传统会计原则的限制，合并报告盈余无法完全反映公司

的实际经济状况，查理跟我同时身为公司股东与经营者，实际上并不太理会这些数字，然而我们

依旧会向大家报告公司每个主要经营行业的获利状况，那些我们认为重要的，这些数字再加上我

们会提供个别企业的其它信息将有助于你对它们下判断。(1983)

会计数字并不会影响我们经营或资金配置的决策，当购并成本接近时，我们宁愿去买依会计原则

不列示在帐面的两块钱盈余，而非那种完全列示在帐面的一块钱盈余，这也是我们当要购买整家

企业(盈余可完全列示)的价格要比购买部份股权(盈余不可列示)贵上一倍而常常所须面临的选择一

样类似，但就长期而言，我们却可期望这些不可列示的盈余透过长期资本利得反映在公司帐面之

上。

我们很少大幅举债，而当我们真得如此做时，我们倾向把它们定在长期固定利率的基础之上，我

们宁愿避免资产负债表过度融资而放弃许多吸引人的投资机会，虽然如此保守的作法有时使我们

的绩效打了点折扣，但考量到对保户、存款人、借款人与全体股东将大部份财产托付给我们的责

任时，这也是惟一令我们感到安心的作法。

管理当局的心愿不会靠股东的花费来实现，我们不会因为要任意的多角化而随便买下整家公司却

忽略了股东长期的经济利益，我们会把你的钱当作就好象在用自己的钱一般地谨慎，就宛如你直

接透过股票市场分散买进股票具备一样的价值。

我们认为应该定期检验结果，我们测试的标准是衡量保留下来的每一块钱是否能发挥至少一块钱

的市场价值，而到目前为止，尚能达到标准，我们会以每五年一个循环，而随着净值的成长，这

项目标将愈来愈难达成。

惟有在当收到跟付出一样多的经济价值时，我们才有考虑发行库藏股，这项原则适用于各种情

况，不管是购并或公开市场收购，另外债务转股权、选择权与转换权都一样，我们绝不会违背股

东权益的情况下，把公司的一部份卖掉(这正是发行新股背后代表的意义) 。

你必须完全明了有一种查理跟我可能会损及绩效表现的态度，那就是:不论价格高低，我们绝不会

出售波克夏所拥有的好公司，只要我们预期它们能够产生一些现金流入，而我们也对该公司的经

营阶层、劳资关系感到安心。我们希望不要重复犯下资金配置错误导致我们投入次级的产业，同

时也对于那些只要投入大量资本支出便能改善获利状况的建议(预测通常很亮丽，支持的人也很

诚恳，但到最后，额外的重大投资得到的结果就好象是在流沙上挣扎一般)，尽管如此，打牌似

的管理行为(每轮都把最好的牌丢出)并非我们行事风格，我们宁可整体的结果逊色一点也不愿意

花大把银子处理它。

我们会以绝对真诚的态度对待大家，尤其是有关评估企业价值的各种利与弊方面。我们的原则是

假设今天的位置对调时，我们希望你应该告知我们的所有事实，这是我们应该给你的，此外，由

于波克夏是一家具有媒体事业的集团，我们责无旁贷地须以同样客观正确的标准要求自己，就像

是我们要求新闻同仁一般，我们深信坦白对身为经营者的我们来说是有益的，因为一个在对外欺

骗别人的人最后一定会把自己也给骗了。

但坦白的原则也有限度，那就是我们仅在法令规定范围内讨论我们在股票上的进出，就像一件好

产品或商业购并案一样，好的投资机会不多所以珍贵，且很容易被盗用，所以通常我们不会详细

说明投资细节，这甚至包括已经出售的部份(因为我们很有可能会在买回来)与传言我们要买进

的，若我们否认相关报导但说:「不予置评」，有时反而会被认为已经证实。(1983)

● 终于结束教条式的说明，接下来进行到1983年的重点，购并Nebraska Furniture主要股权

以及我们与Rose Blumkin一家的交往过程

去年在提到许多经理人如何前扑后继追求一些愚蠢的购并案时，我们引用Pascal的话:「它

使我想到所有的不幸皆归究于大家无法安静的待在一个房间内」，但今年我要说:「Pascal

也会为了Blumkin太太离开那个房间」大约67年前，当Blumkin太太23岁时，靠她一张嘴说

服边界警卫逃离俄国来到美国，从未接受过正式教育(连小学也没有)，也不懂英文，许多

年后靠着她的女儿每晚教她复习白天在学校所学的每一个字，她学会了英文，而后在卖了

许多年二手衣后，在1937年靠着省吃简用存下的500美金她实现梦想开了一家家具店，参

酌当时全美最大家具交易中心-芝加哥American Furniture Mart，她将之命名为Nebraska

Furniture Mart，尔后她遭遇到你所能预期的各种困难(也包括你想不到的)，以500美金起

家没有任何产品或地缘优势地去对抗资金雄厚、经营已久的同业竞争，在早期当她有限的

资源损耗怠尽时，B太太(这个个人商标在大Omaha地区与可口可乐齐名)甚至把家中所有值

钱的东西变卖一空以维持信誉。

Omaha的零售商在发现到B太太可以给顾客更低的价格时，便联手向家具及地毯工厂施压

不要供货给B太太，但靠着各种不同的方法，她还是取得货源并大幅降价，甚至因而被告

到法院违反公平交易法，但最后不但赢得所有官司更大大打开了知名度，其中有一个案

件，在法庭中为了证明即使以现行市价打一个大折扣后，她仍有所获利，结果她卖了一条

地毯给法官。

今天Nebraska Furniture 一家20万平方呎的店面，年销售额却高达一亿美金，全美没有任

何一家零售家具店可以比得上，它所卖的家具、地毯与家电用品比Omaha所有其它业者加

起来还多。

当我们在评断一家公司的企业价值时，我常常会问自己一个问题:「假设我有足够的资金与

人才时，我愿不愿意和这家公司竞争」，我宁愿和大灰熊摔角也不愿和B太太家族竞争，

他们采购有一套，经营费用低到其竞争对手想都想不到的程度，然后再将所省下的每一分

钱回馈给客人，这是一家理想中的企业，建立在为客户创造价值并转化为对所有者的经济

利益的基础上。

B太太凭借其高瞻远瞩与家族因素考量终于决定于去年出售公司给我们，我对这个家族与

其事业已欣赏了数十年，所以整个交易很快便敲定，但B太太并没有马上回家休息如同她

所说的失去斗志，相反的她仍持续担任公司的负责人，在每周七天都待在卖场，其中销售

地毯更是她的擅长，一个人的业绩便足以打败所有其它零售业者。我们一共买下九成股

权，剩下的一成由原有管理公司的家族成员拥有，另还预留一成的认购权给有潜力的年轻

人。

遗传学家应好好研究Blumkin家族为何皆能成为优秀的经理人?Louie Blumkin- B太太的儿

子担任Nebraska Furniture 的总经理已有好多年且被公认为最精明的家具与家电用品的最

佳采购者，他说因为他有最好的老师，而B太太则说她有最优秀的学生，两者的说法完全

正确，Louie 跟他三个儿子皆继承了Blumkin家族优秀的管理能力、勤奋工作与最重要的

正直的人格特质，他们实在是不错的合伙人，很高兴能与他们一起合作。(1983)

● 1983年公司的净值由原来每股737美元增加成为975美元，约成长32%，但我们从未把单一

年度的数字表现看得太认真，毕竟没有什么道理要把企业反映盈余的期间与地球绕行太阳

公转的周期划上等号，反而我们建议至少以五年为一周期来评断企业整体的表现，若五年

平均利得要比美国企业平均来得差时，便要开始注意了(就像Goethe所观察到的，到时要

注意我们所提出的解释，万一要是失败了，解释的理由可能会有一大堆)

在现有经营阶层过去十九年的任期内，帐面价值由19美元增加成为975美元，约以22.6%年

复合成长率成长，考量到我们现有的规模，未来可能无法支持这么高的成长率，不信的人

最好选择去当业务员而非数学家。我们之所以选择帐面价值(虽然不是所有形况皆如此)是

因为它是衡量内含价值成长(这是真正重要的)的一种保守但合理的替代方式，它的好处是

很容易去计算且不牵涉主观去衡量内含价值，但仍需强调这两者事实上具有截然不同的意

义。

帐面价值是会计名词，系记录资本与累积盈余的财务投入，内含价值则是经济名词，是估

计未来现金流入的折现值，帐面价值能够告诉你已经投入的，内含价值则是预计你能从中

所获得的。类似词能告诉你之间的不同，假设你花相同的钱供二个小孩读到大学，二个小

孩的帐面价值即所花的学费是一样的，但未来所获得的回报(即内含价值)却不一而足，可

能从零到所付出的好几倍，所以也有相同帐面价值的公司，却有截然不同的内含价值。

像波克夏在1965年会计年度刚开始由现有经营阶层接管时，其帐面价值为每股19美金，明

显高于其实际的内含价值，所谓的帐面价值主要系以那些无法赚取合理报酬的纺织设备为

主，就好比是将教育经费摆在不会读书的孩子身上一样。

但如今我们的内含价值早已大幅超越帐面价值，主要的原因有两点:

(1)标准会计原则要求我们保险子公司所持有的股票以市价记录于帐面上，但其它公司部份

却以成本与市价孰低法计算，到1983年底为止，后者的市价超过帐面价值有税前七千万美

金或税后五千万美金之多，超过的部份属于内含价值的一部份，但不包含在计算帐面价值

之内。

(2)更重要的是，我们所拥有的几家企业具有庞大的经济商誉(事实上是包含在内含价值之内

的)且远大于记载在帐上的商誉。

商誉不管是经济上或是会计上的，是一项神秘的课题，实在需要比现在所报告还要更多的

时间解释，本报告书的附录有关商誉及其摊销、规定与现实，将解释为何经济上与会计上

的商誉事实上通常是大不相同。

虽然不用了解商誉及其摊销，你一样可以过得很好，但对于研究投资的学生或经理人也

好，却有必要了解其间些微的不同，我现在的想法与35年前课堂所教要重视实质的资产并

规避那些主要倚靠经济商誉的公司的作法已有明显的转变，当初的偏见虽然使我投入较少

但也犯了许多投资上的疏乎。

凯恩斯发现问题所在，困难的地方不在于要有新观念，而是如何摆脱旧有的窠臼，我的反

应比较慢，一方面是由于教我的老师一直以来皆让我受益良多，但从商的经历，直接或间

接地让我对拥有商誉而仅须运用少量实质资产的公司大有好感。

我建议那些对会计专有名词不会觉得感冒且对商誉的经济价值有兴趣的人读读附录，而不

论你看不看附录，Charlie跟我一致认为波克夏拥有比帐面价值更高经济价值的商誉。

(1983)

● 下表显示波克夏依照各个公司持股比例来列示帐面盈余的主要来源，而各个公司资本利得

损失并不包含在内而是汇总于下表最后「已实现出售证券利得」一栏(我们认为单一年度的

出售证券利得并无太大意义，但每年加总累计的数字却相当重要)，至于商誉的摊销则以单

一字段另行列示，虽然本表列示的方式与一般公认会计原则不尽相同但最后的损益数字却

是一致的: 其中在1982年波克夏拥有Blue Chips Stamps 60%的股权，但到了1983年下半年

这个比例增加到100%，而Blue Chips又拥有 Wesco 财务公司 80% 的股权，故波克夏间接

拥有Wesco的股权亦由48%增加到80%。

1983 Unit:

US'000

Earnings Before Income Tax After

Income

Tax

Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

100.0% (33,872) (33,872) (18,400)

100.0% 43,810 43,810 39,114

Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles 100.0% (100) (100) (63)

Associated Retail Stores 100.0% 697 697 355

Nebraska Furniture Mart 80.0% 3,812 3,049 1,521

See's Candies 89.5% 27,411 24,526 12,212

Buffalio Evening News 85.5% 19,352 16,547 8,832

Blue Chip Stamps-Parent 131.9% (1,422) (1,876) (353)

Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent 64.6% 7,493 4,844 3,448

Mutual Savings and Loan 58.5% (798) (467) 1,917

Presion Steel 64.9% 3,241 2,102 1,136

Amortization of Goodwill (532) (563) (563)

Interest on Debt (15,104) (13,844) (7,346)

Shareholder's Contribution (3,066) (3,066) (1,656)

Other 10,121 9,623 8,490

61,043 51,410 48,644

● 有观Wesco旗下事业会在Charlie的报告中讨论，他在1983年底接替Louie Vincenti成为

Wesco的董事长，Louie由于身体健康的关系以77岁年纪退休，有时健康因素只是借口，

但以Louie这次情况确是事实，他实在是一位杰出的经理人。

GEICO的特别股利系由于该公司自我们及其它股东手中买回自家股票，经过买回后我们持

有的股权比例仍维持不变，整个卖回股权的过程其实等于是发放股利一样，不像个人，由

于企业收到股利的实际联邦税率6.9%较资本利得税率28%低得许多，故前者可让公司股东

获得更多实质收益。而即使把前述特别股利加入计算，我们在1983年从GEICO所收到的现

金股利还是远低于我们依比例所赚到的盈余，因此不论从会计或经济的角度来说，将这项

额外收入计入盈余当中是再适当也不过了，但由于金额过于庞大因此我们必需特别加以说

明。

● 前表告诉大家我们盈余的来源，包括那些不具控制权的股权投资所收到的现金股利，但却

不包括那些未予分配的盈余，就长期而言，这些盈余终将反映在公司的股票市价之上，而

波克夏的内含价值亦会跟随着增加，虽然我们的持股不一定表现一致，有时让我们失望，

但有时却会让我们惊喜，到目前为止，情况比我们当初预期的还要好，总得来说，最后所

产生的市场价值要比当初我们保留的每一块钱还要高。

下表显示在1983年底我们持有不具控制权的股权投资，所有的数字包含波克夏与80%

Wesco的权益，剩下的20%已予以扣除:

Company Name Shares Cost Market Unrealized

Affiliated Publications, Inc. (a) 690,975 3,516 26,603 23,087

General Foods, Inc (b) 4,451,544 163,786 228,698 64,912

GEIGO Corporation (a) 6,850,000 47,138 398,156 351,018

Handy & Harman (a) 2,379,200 27,318 42,231 14,913

Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc (a) 636,310 4,056 33,088 29,032

Media General (a) 197,200 3,191 11,191 8,000

Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc (a) 250,400 2,580 12,833 10,253

R.J. Reynolds Industries (b) 5,618,661 268,918 314,334 45,416

Time, Inc (a) 901,788 27,732 56,860 29,128

The Washington Post Company (a) 1,868,600 10,628 163,875 153,247

All Other Common Stock 7,485 18,044 10,559

Total Common Stock 566,348 1,305,913 739,565

217,976

● 依照目前持股情况与股利发放率(扣除去年GEICO发放特别股利的特例)我们预期在1984年

将收到约三千九百万美金的现金股利，而保留未予发放的盈余估计将达到六千五百万，虽

然这些盈余对公司短期的股价将不会有太大影响，但长期来说终将显现出来。

● 水牛城晚报

首先我要澄清一点，我们公司的名称是水牛城晚报公司，但所发行的报纸名称，自从一年

多以前开始发行早报开始，却是水牛城新闻。

1983年公司约略超过原先设定10%的税后纯益率，主要有两项原因:(1)州的所得税因前期亏

损扣抵而变得很少(2)每吨新闻印刷成本突然降低(不过隔年情况可能完全相反)

虽然水牛城新闻的获利情况在一般新闻来说表现平平，但若考量到水牛城当地的经济与销

售环境，这种表现却是不凡，由于重工业聚集，故最近的不景气确使当地的一部份经济活

动受到重创，且复苏缓慢，一般民众大受其害，当地的报纸也无法幸免，发行量大幅滑

落，许多业者被迫删减版面作为因应，在这种窘况下，水牛城新闻却拥有一项利器-大众对

其的接受程度，即渗透率(指每天每个社区家庭购买该报的比率)，我们的比率相当高，以

1983年九月止的前半年，水牛城新闻高居全美一百份最大报纸的第一位(这项排名系由流通

量调查局依照城市邮政编码所编撰) 。

在解释所谓的排名之前，有一点必须要说明的是有许多大城市同时发行两份报纸，则其渗

透率一定会比只发行一份的城市，如水牛城还低得许多，尽管如此，仍有许多名列一百大

者拥有单一城市，而水牛城不但名列前茅，更远胜于许多全国赫赫有名的日报。

此外在周日版部份，水牛城的渗透率更挤进前三名，比某些大报还高上一到二十个百分

点，而这并不是一开始就如此的，下表列示该报在1977前几年与现在发行量的比较，在水

牛城所发行的周日报原来是Couier-express(当时水牛城日报还未发行周日报)而现在当然是

水牛城日报了:

1970 314,000

1971 306,000

1972 302,000

1973 290,000

1974 278,000

1975 269,000

1976 270,000

1984 (现今) 376,000

● 我们认为一份报纸的渗透率是该事业强弱的一项重要指针，广告主而言若一家报纸能在某

一地区拥有极高渗透率的话，便能发挥极高的经济效益，相对的若渗透率很低则无法吸引

太多的广告主。

而我们认为有三个原因使得水牛城日报广为当地民众所接受，其中第二与第三亦能解释为

何水牛城周日报会比当时同时发行的Couier-express更受欢迎的原因:

(1)第一点与水牛城日报本身无关，水牛城居民的流动率相对较低，稳定的居民对于当地社

区事务抱持着更多的关心，也因此对当地地区性报纸的在地新闻更感兴趣。

(2)该报长期由传奇人物Alfred Kirchhofer领导，以编辑品质与公正客观性著称，并由

Murray Light继承并保存之，这对于我们能够成功战胜Courier-express的激烈竞争极为重

要，若没有周日报，水牛城日报可能无法存活至今。

(3) 水牛城日报就如其名一般，它刊载大量的新闻，在1983年我们的新闻版面(News Hole)

即真正的新闻而非广告，约占超过一半(不包括夹报的部份) ，就我们所知在所有主宰当地

地区的大报之中，只有一家的比例是超越我们的，虽然没有具体明确的数字，但一般估计

的平均比例约为三十几，换言之，我们提供的新闻份量比其它同业还要多上25%，事实上

丰富的新闻内容是经过精心安排的，有些出版业者为了提高获利，大幅删减新闻版面，但

我们却不愿如此做并坚持至今，而我们相信只要好好地撰写与编辑提供丰富的新闻内容，

将是对读者最大的服务，而读者对我们刊物的珍视也将转化成极高的渗透率。

仅管水牛城日报本身极具竞争力，但是ROP (报纸版面上的广告与夹报的广告量的比)却很

难有再增加的空间，虽然我们在1983年有大幅成长，广告则数由九百多万增加为一千六百

多万，营收则由360万成长至810万美元，增加幅度与全美其它地区差异不大，但以我们的

Case来说考量到Courier-express同时关闭则视嫌高估。

平心而论，若广告由报纸版面移到夹报对我们来说有负面的经济影响，夹报的利润较低，

且受限于其它相同传递方式的竞争，更甚者ROP则数的减少连带使的新闻版面亦跟着减少

(因为新闻版面须维持一定比例) ，进而减少对读者的实用性。

Stan Lipsey在年中接替Henry Urban成为水牛城日报的发行人，Henry在日报因发行周日

版而面对诉颂与损失的灰暗时期从未退缩，当时这项决定受到许多当地新闻同业质疑，但

Henry仍受到水牛城日报所有员工，也包含我与 Charlie的敬重，Stan跟Henry从1969年起

便为波克夏工作，它对于水牛城日报从编辑到发行的大小事务亲身参与，他的表现无与伦

比。(1983)

● 喜斯糖果的经营表现依旧亮丽，它拥有可贵而稳固的客户基础与管理阶层，近年来喜斯遇

到两个重大的难题，所幸其中至少有一个已找到解决的方法，这问题与成本有关，不过不

是指原料成本，虽然我们跟竞争同业比原料成本较高，而若这种情况相反的会我们反而会

不高兴，事实上原料成本是我们较无法控制的，因为不管价格如何变化，我们所使用皆属

最上等的的原料，我们视产品品质为最重要的一点。

但在其它成本却是我们所可以控制的，不过问题却出在这身上，我们的成本(以每磅为基本

单位，但不包括原料成本)增加的速度远高于一般物价水准，若要扭转现在的竞争劣势与获

利危机，降低成本绝对有其必要性，所幸最近几个月，成本已受到有效控制，相信1984年

的成本增加率将会低于通货膨胀，这自信源自于我们与Chuck多年来共事的经验，打从我

们买下喜斯以来便由他负责，而他的表现就如同下表一样有目共睹:

Sales('000) Profit('000) Pounds('000) Stores

1983 (53weeks) 133,531 13,699 24,651 207

1982 123,662 11,875 24,216 202

1981 112,578 10,779 24,052 199

1980 97,715 7,547 24,065 191

1979 87,314 6,330 23,985 188

1978 73,653 6,178 22,407 182

1977 62,886 6,154 20,921 179

1976 (53weeks) 56,333 5,569 20,553 173

1975 50,492 5,132 19,134 172

1974 41,248 3,021 17,883 170

1973 35,050 1,940 17,813 169

1972 31,337 2,083 16,954 167

● 我们面临的另一个问题，如上表中可看到的是我们在实际售出的糖果磅数停滞不前，事实

上这是这个行业普遍遇到的困难，只是过去我们的表现明显优于同业，不过现在却一样

惨。过去四年来我们平均每家分店卖出的糖果数事实上无多大变化，尽管分店数有所增加

(而销售费用有同样增加)，当然营业额因我们大幅调涨售价而增加许多，但我们认为衡量

一家店经营绩效的标准在于每家分店卖出糖果磅数而非销售额，1983年平均一家店的销售

量减少了0.8%，不过这已是1979年来较好的表现了，累计的降幅约达8%，集体订购量(约

占整体销售的25%)在经过1970年代成长高峰后已停滞不前。

我们不确定分店与集体订购的销售量无法增加主要是受到我们的订价策略还是景气萧条或

是我们的市场占有率太高的影响，不过1984年我们调涨的幅度较以往几年温和，希望明年

跟各位报告的销售量能因此增加，不过我们却无任何依据能保证这种情况一定发生。

除了销量的问题，喜斯具有多项且重要的竞争优势，在我们主要的销售地区-西部，我们的

糖果为消费者所偏爱，他们甚至愿意用多花二三倍的价钱来享受(糖果就如同股票一样，价

格与价值乃有所不同，价格是指你所付出的，而价值却是指你所得到的) ，我们全美直营

店服务的品质跟我们的产品一样好，亲切贴心的服务人员就跟包装上的商标一样，以一家

雇用二千名季节性员工的企业来说，可是不容易办到的，这都要归功于Chuck与所有同仁

的努力。而由于我们在1984年仅微幅调整价格，所以预期明年度的获利只与今年相当。

● 我们本身除了经营保险业外，还在这项产业有庞大的投资部位，而这些由本人作决策的事

业，其经营成果显而易见的很惨，所幸那些不受本人控制的部份，如GEICO表现杰出，才

避免整个集团经营亮起红灯，没错你心里想的完全正确，几年前我犯下的错误如今已找上

门来了。

整个产业如下表所示，已低迷了好几个年头:

Yearly Change in Combined

Ratio

Premiums Written after

Policyholder

Dividends

% %

1972 10.2% 96.2%

1973 8.0% 99.2%

1974 6.2% 105.4%

1975 11.0% 107.9%

1976 21.9% 102.4%

1977 19.8% 97.2%

1978 12.8% 97.5%

1979 10.3% 100.6%

1980 6.0% 103.1%

1981 3.9% 106.0%

1982 (Rev.) 4.4% 109.7%

1983 (Est.) 4.6% 111.0%

● 资料明白显示出目前整个产业，包括股市、共同基金与互助会所面临的惨况，Combined

Ratio代表所有的保险成本(发生的理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比重，一百以下表示有

承销利益，反之则发生亏损

如同去年我们所揭示的原因，我们认为1983年的惨况仍将持续好几个年头，(正如Yogi所

说:又是déjà vu.)不过并不表示情况不会好转，事实上一定会，只是要未来几年的平均

Combined Ratio明显低于前几年的水准将不太可能，基于对通货膨胀的预期，除非保费

收入每年以超过10%成长，否则损失比率将很难压到比现在的水准还低。

我们自己的Combined Ratio是121，由于最近Mike Goldberg以接手负责保险事业的经

营，所以这个烫手山竽交给他来解决，要比本人亲自处理要来得好得多了，然而不幸的

是，保险这行业前置期很长，虽然企业政策与人员可随时改进，但其效果却须要相当长的

一段时间才能显现，(事实上我们就靠这点在投资GEICO上，赚了很多钱，我们可以在公

司营运效益真正显现之前，先一步预期) ，所以目前的窘境事实上是我两三年前直接负责

营运时所捅下的偻子。所以尽管整体表现不佳，但其中仍有几位经理人表现杰出，Roland

所领导的National Indemnity在同业对手一片惨泹时，一支独秀，而Tom在Colorado展露

头角，我们可说是挖到宝了。

近来我们在再保险领域的表现极为活跃，而事实上我们希望能够再更活跃一些，在这行投

保者相当注重承保者长期的债信以确保其对之多年后的承诺得以实现，这一点波克夏所提

供坚实的财务实力使我们成为客户倚赖的首选。这行生意的来源主要是终身赔偿

(Structured Settlement)即损害请求者每月定期领取赔偿费直到终身而非一次给付，这对请

求者来说可享受税赋上的优惠，也可避免一下子把赔偿款花得精光，通常这些被害人皆严

重伤残，所以分次给付可确保其往后数十年的衣食无虞，而关于这点我们自认为可提供无

与伦比的保障，没有其它再保业者，即使其资产再雄厚，有比我们更坚强的财务实力。

我们也想过或许靠着本身坚强的财务实力，可承受有意愿移转其损失赔偿准备的公司，在

这类个案中，保险公司一次付给我们一大笔钱，以承担未来所有(或一大部份)须面临的损

害赔偿，当然相对的受托人要让委托人对其未来年度的财务实力有信心，在这一点上我们

的竞争力明显优于同业。

前述两项业务对我们而言极具潜力，且因为它们的规模与预计可产生的投资利益大到让我

们特别将其承销成绩，包括Combined Ratio 另行列示，这两项业务皆由National

Indemnity的Don 负责。 (1983)

● GEICO在1983年的表现之好，其程度跟我们自己掌管的保险事业差劲的程度一样，跟同业

平均水准111相比，GEICO在加计预估分配给保户的股利后的数字为96，在这之前我从不

认为它能够表现的如此之好，这都要归功于优异的企业策略与经营阶层。

Jack与Bill在承销部们一贯维持着良好的纪律(其中包含最重要的适当地损失准备提列)而他

们的努力从新事业的开展有成获得了回报，加上投资部门的Lou Simpson，这三个人组成

了保险业的梦幻队伍。

我们拥有GEICO大约三分之一的股权，依比例约拥有二亿七千万的保费收入量，约比我们

本身所有的还多80%，所以可以这么说我们拥有的是全美最优质的保险业务，但这并不代

表我们就不需改进自有的保险业务。(1983)

● 有人常问为什么波克夏不分割它的股票，而这个问题通常是建立在这个动作将会对股东有

利的假设基础之上，不过我们并不认同这点，让我告诉你为什么。

我们有一个目标是希望波克夏的股价能与其本身拥有的内含价值成正相关(请注意是合理的

正相关而非完全一致，因为如果一般绩优公司的股价远低于其真正价值的话，波克夏也很

难免除在外) ，而一个公司要维持合理的股价跟其所背后的股东有很大关系，若公司的股

东与潜在的买家主要都是基于非理性或情绪性的投资该公司股票，则公司股票便会不时出

现很离谱的价格，躁郁的人格会导致躁郁的价格，这种性格甚至有助于我们买卖其它公司

的股票，但我们尽量避免这种情况跟波克夏沾上边将会对身为股东的你我有利。

很难确保公司股东皆维持高水平，A太太可依自己喜好选择其个人的四百文件投资组合，任

何人都可买任何股票，没有任何公司可依智力、情绪稳定度、道德感或衣着品味来筛选股

东，所以股东优生学基本上是一项不可能的任务。

但大致而言，我们觉得可透过不断地沟通公司经营哲学以吸引并维持优质的股东群，以达

到自我筛选的目的。例如一场标榜为歌剧的音乐会，跟另一场以摇滚乐为号召的演唱会，

铁定会吸引不同的观众群来欣赏，虽然任何人皆可自由买票进场。相同地透过不断地宣传

与沟通，我们希望能够吸引到认同我们经营理念与期望的股东(一样重要的是说服那些不认

同的远离我们)我们希望那些倾向长期投资且把公司当成是自己事业一样看待的股东加入我

们，大家重视的是公司的经营成果而非短期的股价波动。

具有这项特质的投资人属于极少数，但我们却拥有不少，我相信大概有90%(甚至可能超过

95%)的股东已投资波克夏或Blue Chips达五年以上，另外95%的股东，其持有的波克夏股

票价值比起其本身第二大持股超过两倍以上，在股东上千人，市值超过十亿的公司中，我

敢保证波克夏的股东与经营者的想法是最能契合的，我们很难再将我们股东的素质再加以

提升。

如果我们将公司的股票分割，同时采行一些注重公司股价而非企业价值的动作，我们吸引

到的新进股东其素质可能要比离开的股东差得多，当波克夏的股价为1,300元时，很少有人

负担得起，对于买得起一股的人来说，将股票分割为一百股对他来说并无任何影响，而那

些认为有差别且真的因为我们股票分割而买进的人肯定会将我们现有的股东水准往下拉(难

到我们牺牲到那些原有思想透澈换来一堆认为九张十元钞要比一张百元钞好的蛋头真得能

够提升整个股东团队的素质吗?)人们若非基于价值而买进股票早晚也会基于相同原因卖掉

股票，他们的加入只会使公司的股价偏离价值面而作不合理的波动。所以我们尽量避免那

些会招来短期投机客的举动，而采取那些会吸引长线价值型投资者的政策，就像你在怖满

这类型投资者的股票市场中买进波克夏的股票，你也可以在相同的市场中卖出，我们尽量

维持这种理想的状态。

股票市场上讽刺的一点是太过于重视变动性，经纪商称之为流动性与变现性，对那些高周

转率的公司大加赞扬(那些无法让你口袋麦可麦可的人，一定会让你的耳朵不得闲)但投资

人必须有所认知，那就是凡事对庄家有利的一定对赌客不利，而过热的股市跟赌场没有两

样。假设一家公司的股东权益报酬率为12%，而其股票年周转率为百分之百，又若买卖股

票须抽1%的手续费(低价股的费率可能还更高)而公司股票以帐面净值进行交易，这样算下

来光是每年股权移转的交易成本便占去净值的百分之二，且对公司的获利一点帮助都没

有，(这还不包括选择权交易，后者将会使这项磨擦成本更上一层楼)玩这种大风吹的游戏

实在是有点划不来，若是政府突然宣布调高企业或个人所得税16%时，相信大家一定都会

跳起来，但过度重视变动性的结果便是要付出这样的代价。

过去在每天交易量约一亿股的年代(以今日的水准算是相当低的了) ，对所有权人来说是绝

对是祸不是福，因为那代表大家要付出二倍于五千万股交易量的成本，又假设每买卖一股

的交易成本为十五分钱，则一年累积下来约要花费75亿美金的代价，这相当于爱克森石

油、通用动力、通用汽车与太古石油这四家全美最大企业的年度盈余加总，这些公司以

1982年底计有750亿美元净值，约占财富杂志五百大企业净值与获利的12%，换句话说投资

人只因为手痒而将手中股票换来换去的代价等于是耗去这些大企业辛苦一年的所得，若再

加计约20亿投资管理费的话，更相当于全美前五大金融机构(花旗、美国银行、大通银行、

汉华银行与摩根银行)获利的总和，这昂贵的游戏只是用来决定谁能吃这块饼，但没有一点

办法让饼变得更大。(我知道有一种论点说这过程能使资金作更有效的配置，但我们却怀疑

其可信度，相反的过热的股市反而妨碍的资金合理的配置，反而使饼变得更小。亚当史密

斯说:自由市场中有一只看不见的大手能导引经济社会使其利益极大化，我们的看法是-赌

场般的股市与神经质的投资行为仿佛是一只看不见的大脚碍手碍脚地拖累了经济社会向前

发展。

与那些过热的股票相比，波克夏目前的买卖价差约为30点，或大约2% ，依据交易量大小

的不同，买卖双方所需支付的成本约略从4%(只买卖几股)递减至1 1/2 %(若量大的话可以议

价方式降低差价与手续费)，而波克夏的股票交易单量通常较大，故平均成本不超过2%。

同时波克夏股票的周转率(扣除盘商间交易与亲属赠与)每年约仅3%，也就是说总的而言，

波克夏股东每年所付出的交易成本约占其市值的万分之六，粗估约为90万美金(这笔金额不

少，但远低于市场平均) ，股票分割会增加交易成本，降低股东素质并鼓励公司股价与其

内含价值悖离，我们想不到有任何一点好处。(1983)

● 去年这时我登了一小段广告寻求可能的购并对象，在我们的新闻事业我们告诉广告主重复

刊登便会有结果(事实上是如此)，所以今年我再复述一次我们购并的标准: 我们对具以下条

件的公司有兴趣:

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有五百万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟) ，我

们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股

份。我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，对于那些好的公司与好的

经营阶层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。(1983)

● 今年的股东指定捐赠计划约有96.4%的有效票参与，总计在1984年初(帐列1983年)捐出的款

项分配给1,353家慈善机构，共计约三百万美元，虽然股东回复占股权的比率颇高，但占股

东总数的比率却不甚理想，主要的原因可能是新购并进来的股东人数较多且不熟悉本计划

的内容，我们建议新股东赶快阅读相关信息，若你也想参加的话，我们强烈建议你赶快把

股份从经纪人那儿改登记于自己的名下。(1982)

● Blue Chips与波克夏的合并案顺利完成，仅有低于0.1%的股东表示反对，也没有人要求再

评估，在1983年我们因而获得了一些租税上的优惠，我们预期往后几年能够再获得一些，

此外整个合并案有个小插曲，相较于1965年现有经营阶层接手时的1,137,778股，波克夏现

今有1,146,909股流通在外，若你当初持有1%的股权约等于现在的0.99%股权，不过波克夏

的资产已从过去单纯的纺织机器设备厂房，增加为拥有新闻、糖果、家具与保险事业，外

加13亿美金的有价证券。

我们欢迎原来是Blue Chips的股东加入我们，为了帮助你们对波克夏有进一步的认识，只

要来信索取我们很愿意将1977-1982的年报寄给各位。(1983)

● 附录(待续)

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

This past year our registered shareholders increased from

about 1900 to about 2900. Most of this growth resulted from our

merger with Blue Chip Stamps, but there also was an acceleration

in the pace of natural?increase that has raised us from the

1000 level a few years ago.

With so many new shareholders, it’s appropriate to summarize

the major business principles we follow that pertain to the

manager-owner relationship:

o Although our form is corporate, our attitude is

partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as

owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners. (Because

of the size of our shareholdings we also are, for better or

worse, controlling partners.) We do not view the company itself

as the ultimate owner of our business assets but, instead, view

the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the

assets.

o In line with this owner-orientation, our directors are all

major shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway. In the case of at

least four of the five, over 50% of family net worth is

represented by holdings of Berkshire. We eat our own cooking.

o Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications

mentioned later) is to maximize the average annual rate of gain

in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not

measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by

its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that

the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future - a

greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be

disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average

large American corporation.

o Our preference would be to reach this goal by directly

owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and

consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second

choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily

through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance

subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the

need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital

allocation.

o Because of this two-pronged approach to business ownership

and because of the limitations of conventional accounting,

consolidated reported earnings may reveal relatively little about

our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and

managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However,

we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we

control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures,

along with other information we will supply about the individual

businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about

them.

o Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or

capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are

similar, we much prefer to purchase $2 of earnings that is not

reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to

purchase $1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely

the choice that often faces us since entire businesses (whose

earnings will be fully reportable) frequently sell for double the

pro-rata price of small portions (whose earnings will be largely

unreportable). In aggregate and over time, we expect the

unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic

business value through capital gains.

o We rarely use much debt and, when we do, we attempt to

structure it on a long-term fixed rate basis. We will reject

interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance

sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the

only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our

fiduciary obligations to policyholders, depositors, lenders and

the many equity holders who have committed unusually large

portions of their net worth to our care.

o A managerial wish list?will not be filled at shareholder

expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses

at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to

our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would

do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by

diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the

stock market.

o We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically

against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by

assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at

least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this

test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year

rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to

use retained earnings wisely.

o We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in

business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of

issuance - not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock

for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as

well. We will not sell small portions of your company - and that

is what the issuance of shares amounts to - on a basis

inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.

o You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I

share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price,

we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that

Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses

as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as

long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations.

We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us

into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to

suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to

satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The

projections will be dazzling - the advocates will be sincere -

but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible

industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in

quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard

your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We

would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage

in it.

o We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the

pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our

guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to

know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less.

Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it

would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of

accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves

than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on

others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO

who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in

private.

o Despite our policy of candor, we will discuss our

activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally

required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject

to competitive appropriation just as good product or business

acquisition ideas are. Therefore, we normally will not talk

about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities

we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks

we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those

reports but say no comment?on other occasions, the no-comments

become confirmation.

That completes the catechism, and we can now move on to the

high point of 1983 - the acquisition of a majority interest in

Nebraska Furniture Mart and our association with Rose Blumkin and

her family.

Nebraska Furniture Mart

Last year, in discussing how managers with bright, but

adrenalin-soaked minds scramble after foolish acquisitions, I

quoted Pascal: it has struck me that all the misfortunes of men

spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly

in one room.?

Even Pascal would have left the room for Mrs. Blumkin.

About 67 years ago Mrs. Blumkin, then 23, talked her way

past a border guard to leave Russia for America. She had no

formal education, not even at the grammar school level, and knew

no English. After some years in this country, she learned the

language when her older daughter taught her, every evening, the

words she had learned in school during the day.

In 1937, after many years of selling used clothing, Mrs.

Blumkin had saved $500 with which to realize her dream of opening

a furniture store. Upon seeing the American Furniture Mart in

Chicago - then the center of the nation’s wholesale furniture

activity - she decided to christen her dream Nebraska Furniture

Mart.

She met every obstacle you would expect (and a few you

wouldn’t) when a business endowed with only $500 and no

locational or product advantage goes up against rich, longentrenched

competition. At one early point, when her tiny

resources ran out, .rs. B?(a personal trademark now as well

recognized in Greater Omaha as Coca-Cola or Sanka) coped in a way

not taught at business schools: she simply sold the furniture and

appliances from her home in order to pay creditors precisely as

promised.

Omaha retailers began to recognize that Mrs. B would offer

customers far better deals than they had been giving, and they

pressured furniture and carpet manufacturers not to sell to her.

But by various strategies she obtained merchandise and cut prices

sharply. Mrs. B was then hauled into court for violation of Fair

Trade laws. She not only won all the cases, but received

invaluable publicity. At the end of one case, after

demonstrating to the court that she could profitably sell carpet

at a huge discount from the prevailing price, she sold the judge

$1400 worth of carpet.

Today Nebraska Furniture Mart generates over $100 million of

sales annually out of one 200,000 square-foot store. No other

home furnishings store in the country comes close to that volume.

That single store also sells more furniture, carpets, and

appliances than do all Omaha competitors combined.

One question I always ask myself in appraising a business is

how I would like, assuming I had ample capital and skilled

personnel, to compete with it. I. rather wrestle grizzlies than

compete with Mrs. B and her progeny. They buy brilliantly, they

operate at expense ratios competitors don’t even dream about, and

they then pass on to their customers much of the savings. It’s

the ideal business - one built upon exceptional value to the

customer that in turn translates into exceptional economics for

its owners.

Mrs. B is wise as well as smart and, for far-sighted family

reasons, was willing to sell the business last year. I had

admired both the family and the business for decades, and a deal

was quickly made. But Mrs. B, now 90, is not one to go home and

risk, as she puts it, losing her marbles? She remains Chairman

and is on the sales floor seven days a week. Carpet sales are

her specialty. She personally sells quantities that would be a

good departmental total for other carpet retailers.

We purchased 90% of the business - leaving 10% with members

of the family who are involved in management - and have optioned

10% to certain key young family managers.

And what managers they are. Geneticists should do

handsprings over the Blumkin family. Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s

son, has been President of Nebraska Furniture Mart for many years

and is widely regarded as the shrewdest buyer of furniture and

appliances in the country. Louie says he had the best teacher,

and Mrs. B says she had the best student. Theye both right.

Louie and his three sons all have the Blumkin business ability,

work ethic, and, most important, character. On top of that, they

are really nice people. We are delighted to be in partnership

with them.

Corporate Performance

During 1983 our book value increased from $737.43 per share

to $975.83 per share, or by 32%. We never take the one-year

figure very seriously. After all, why should the time required

for a planet to circle the sun synchronize precisely with the

time required for business actions to pay off? Instead, we

recommend not less than a five-year test as a rough yardstick of

economic performance. Red lights should start flashing if the

five-year average annual gain falls much below the return on

equity earned over the period by American industry in aggregate.

(Watch out for our explanation if that occurs as Goethe observed,

.hen ideas fail, words come in very handy.?

During the 19-year tenure of present management, book value

has grown from $19.46 per share to $975.83, or 22.6% compounded

annually. Considering our present size, nothing close to this

rate of return can be sustained. Those who believe otherwise

should pursue a career in sales, but avoid one in mathematics.

We report our progress in terms of book value because in our

case (though not, by any means, in all cases) it is a

conservative but reasonably adequate proxy for growth in

intrinsic business value - the measurement that really counts.

Book value’s virtue as a score-keeping measure is that it is easy

to calculate and doesn’t involve the subjective (but important)

judgments employed in calculation of intrinsic business value.

It is important to understand, however, that the two terms - book

value and intrinsic business value - have very different

meanings.

Book value is an accounting concept, recording the

accumulated financial input from both contributed capital and

retained earnings. Intrinsic business value is an economic

concept, estimating future cash output discounted to present

value. Book value tells you what has been put in; intrinsic

business value estimates what can be taken out.

An analogy will suggest the difference. Assume you spend

identical amounts putting each of two children through college.

The book value (measured by financial input) of each child’s

education would be the same. But the present value of the future

payoff (the intrinsic business value) might vary enormously -

from zero to many times the cost of the education. So, also, do

businesses having equal financial input end up with wide

variations in value.

At Berkshire, at the beginning of fiscal 1965 when the

present management took over, the $19.46 per share book value

considerably overstated intrinsic business value. All of that

book value consisted of textile assets that could not earn, on

average, anything close to an appropriate rate of return. In the

terms of our analogy, the investment in textile assets resembled

investment in a largely-wasted education.

Now, however, our intrinsic business value considerably

exceeds book value. There are two major reasons:

(1) Standard accounting principles require that common

stocks held by our insurance subsidiaries be stated on

our books at market value, but that other stocks we own

be carried at the lower of aggregate cost or market.

At the end of 1983, the market value of this latter

group exceeded carrying value by $70 million pre-tax,

or about $50 million after tax. This excess belongs in

our intrinsic business value, but is not included in

the calculation of book value;

(2) More important, we own several businesses that possess

economic Goodwill (which is properly includable in

intrinsic business value) far larger than the

accounting Goodwill that is carried on our balance

sheet and reflected in book value.

Goodwill, both economic and accounting, is an arcane subject

and requires more explanation than is appropriate here. The

appendix that follows this letter - .oodwill and its

Amortization: The Rules and The Realities?- explains why

economic and accounting Goodwill can, and usually do, differ

enormously.

You can live a full and rewarding life without ever thinking

about Goodwill and its amortization. But students of investment

and management should understand the nuances of the subject. My

own thinking has changed drastically from 35 years ago when I was

taught to favor tangible assets and to shun businesses whose

value depended largely upon economic Goodwill. This bias caused

me to make many important business mistakes of omission, although

relatively few of commission.

Keynes identified my problem: .he difficulty lies not in

the new ideas but in escaping from the old ones.?My escape was

long delayed, in part because most of what I had been taught by

the same teacher had been (and continues to be) so

extraordinarily valuable. Ultimately, business experience,

direct and vicarious, produced my present strong preference for

businesses that possess large amounts of enduring Goodwill and

that utilize a minimum of tangible assets.

I recommend the Appendix to those who are comfortable with

accounting terminology and who have an interest in understanding

the business aspects of Goodwill. Whether or not you wish to

tackle the Appendix, you should be aware that Charlie and I

believe that Berkshire possesses very significant economic

Goodwill value above that reflected in our book value.

Sources of Reported Earnings

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire’s reported

earnings. In 1982, Berkshire owned about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps

whereas, in 1983, our ownership was 60% throughout the first six

months and 100% thereafter. In turn, Berkshire’s net interest in

Wesco was 48% during 1982 and the first six months of 1983, and

80% for the balance of 1983. Because of these changed ownership

percentages, the first two columns of the table provide the best

measure of underlying business performance.

All of the significant gains and losses attributable to

unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are

aggregated with securities transactions on the line near the

bottom of the table, and are not included in operating earnings.

(We regard any annual figure for realized capital gains or losses

as meaningless, but we regard the aggregate realized and

unrealized capital gains over a period of years as very

important.) Furthermore, amortization of Goodwill is not charged

against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the

Appendix, is set forth as a separate item.

Net Earnings

Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax

-------------------------------------- ------------------

Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share

------------------ ------------------ ------------------

1983 1982 1983 1982 1983 1982

-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------

(000s omitted)

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............ $(33,872) $(21,558) $(33,872) $(21,558) $(18,400) $(11,345)

Net Investment Income ... 43,810 41,620 43,810 41,620 39,114 35,270

Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (100) (1,545) (100) (1,545) (63) (862)

Associated Retail Stores .. 697 914 697 914 355 446

Nebraska Furniture Mart(1) 3,812 -- 3,049 -- 1,521 --

See’s Candies ............. 27,411 23,884 24,526 14,235 12,212 6,914

Buffalo Evening News ...... 19,352 (1,215) 16,547 (724) 8,832 (226)

Blue Chip Stamps(2) ....... (1,422) 4,182 (1,876) 2,492 (353) 2,472

Wesco Financial - Parent .. 7,493 6,156 4,844 2,937 3,448 2,210

Mutual Savings and Loan ... (798) (6) (467) (2) 1,917 1,524

Precision Steel ........... 3,241 1,035 2,102 493 1,136 265

Interest on Debt .......... (15,104) (14,996) (13,844) (12,977) (7,346) (6,951)

Special GEICO Distribution 21,000 -- 21,000 -- 19,551 --

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions .......... (3,066) (891) (3,066) (891) (1,656) (481)

Amortization of Goodwill .. (532) 151 (563) 90 (563) 90

Other ..................... 10,121 3,371 9,623 2,658 8,490 2,171

-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings .......... 82,043 41,102 72,410 27,742 68,195 31,497

Sales of securities and

unusual sales of assets .. 67,260 36,651 65,089 21,875 45,298 14,877

-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------

Total Earnings .............. $149,303 $ 77,753 $137,499 $ 49,617 $113,493 $ 46,374

======== ======== ======== ======== ======== ========

(1) October through December

(2) 1982 and 1983 are not comparable; major assets were

transferred in the merger.

For a discussion of the businesses owned by Wesco, please

read Charlie Munger’s report on pages 46-51. Charlie replaced

Louie Vincenti as Chairman of Wesco late in 1983 when health

forced Louie’s retirement at age 77. In some instances, .ealth?

is a euphemism, but in Louie’s case nothing but health would

cause us to consider his retirement. Louie is a marvelous man

and has been a marvelous manager.

The special GEICO distribution reported in the table arose

when that company made a tender offer for a portion of its stock,

buying both from us and other shareholders. At GEICO’s request,

we tendered a quantity of shares that kept our ownership

percentage the same after the transaction as before. The

proportional nature of our sale permitted us to treat the

proceeds as a dividend. Unlike individuals, corporations net

considerably more when earnings are derived from dividends rather

than from capital gains, since the effective Federal income tax

rate on dividends is 6.9% versus 28% on capital gains.

Even with this special item added in, our total dividends

from GEICO in 1983 were considerably less than our share of

GEICO’s earnings. Thus it is perfectly appropriate, from both an

accounting and economic standpoint, to include the redemption

proceeds in our reported earnings. It is because the item is

large and unusual that we call your attention to it.

The table showing you our sources of earnings includes

dividends from those non-controlled companies whose marketable

equity securities we own. But the table does not include

earnings those companies have retained that are applicable to our

ownership. In aggregate and over time we expect those

undistributed earnings to be reflected in market prices and to

increase our intrinsic business value on a dollar-for-dollar

basis, just as if those earnings had been under our control and

reported as part of our profits. That does not mean we expect

all of our holdings to behave uniformly; some will disappoint us,

others will deliver pleasant surprises. To date our experience

has been better than we originally anticipated, In aggregate, we

have received far more than a dollar of market value gain for

every dollar of earnings retained.

The following table shows our 1983 yearend net holdings in

marketable equities. All numbers represent 100% of Berkshire’s

holdings, and 80% of Wesco’s holdings. The portion attributable

to minority shareholders of Wesco has been excluded.

No. of Shares Cost Market

------------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

690,975 Affiliated Publications, Inc. .... $ 3,516 $ 26,603

4,451,544 General Foods Corporation(a) ..... 163,786 228,698

6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ................ 47,138 398,156

2,379,200 Handy & Harman ................... 27,318 42,231

636,310 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 4,056 33,088

197,200 Media General .................... 3,191 11,191

250,400 Ogilvy & Mather International .... 2,580 12,833

5,618,661 R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.(a) 268,918 314,334

901,788 Time, Inc. ....................... 27,732 56,860

1,868,600 The Washington Post Company ...... 10,628 136,875

---------- ----------

$558,863 $1,287,869

All Other Common Stockholdings ... 7,485 18,044

---------- ----------

Total Common Stocks .............. $566,348 $1,305,913

========== ==========

(a) WESCO owns shares in these companies.

Based upon present holdings and present dividend rates -

excluding any special items such as the GEICO proportional

redemption last year - we would expect reported dividends from

this group to be approximately $39 million in 1984. We can also

make a very rough guess about the earnings this group will retain

that will be attributable to our ownership: these may total about

$65 million for the year. These retained earnings could well

have no immediate effect on market prices of the securities.

Over time, however, we feel they will have real meaning.

In addition to the figures already supplied, information

regarding the businesses we control appears in Management’s

Discussion on pages 40-44. The most significant of these are

Buffalo Evening News, See’s, and the Insurance Group, to which we

will give some special attention here.

Buffalo Evening News

First, a clarification: our corporate name is Buffalo

Evening News, Inc. but the name of the newspaper, since we began

a morning edition a little over a year ago, is Buffalo News.

In 1983 the News somewhat exceeded its targeted profit

margin of 10% after tax. Two factors were responsible: (1) a

state income tax cost that was subnormal because of a large loss

carry-forward, now fully utilized, and (2) a large drop in the

per-ton cost of newsprint (an unanticipated fluke that will be

reversed in 1984).

Although our profit margins in 1983 were about average for

newspapers such as the News, the paper’s performance,

nevertheless, was a significant achievement considering the

economic and retailing environment in Buffalo.

Buffalo has a concentration of heavy industry, a segment of

the economy that was hit particularly hard by the recent

recession and that has lagged the recovery. As Buffalo consumers

have suffered, so also have the paper’s retailing customers.

Their numbers have shrunk over the past few years and many of

those surviving have cut their linage.

Within this environment the News has one exceptional

strength: its acceptance by the public, a matter measured by the

paper’s enetration ratio?- the percentage of households within

the community purchasing the paper each day. Our ratio is

superb: for the six months ended September 30, 1983 the News

stood number one in weekday penetration among the 100 largest

papers in the United States (the ranking is based on city zone?

numbers compiled by the Audit Bureau of Circulations).

In interpreting the standings, it is important to note that

many large cities have two papers, and that in such cases the

penetration of either paper is necessarily lower than if there

were a single paper, as in Buffalo. Nevertheless, the list of

the 100 largest papers includes many that have a city to

themselves. Among these, the News is at the top nationally, far

ahead of many of the country’s best-known dailies.

Among Sunday editions of these same large dailies, the News

ranks number three in penetration - ten to twenty percentage

points ahead of many well-known papers. It was not always this

way in Buffalo. Below we show Sunday circulation in Buffalo in

the years prior to 1977 compared with the present period. In

that earlier period the Sunday paper was the Courier-Express (the

News was not then publishing a Sunday paper). Now, of course, it

is the News.

Average Sunday Circulation

--------------------------

Year Circulation

---- -----------

1970 314,000

1971 306,000

1972 302,000

1973 290,000

1974 278,000

1975 269,000

1976 270,000

1984 (Current) 376,000

We believe a paper’s penetration ratio to be the best

measure of the strength of its franchise. Papers with unusually

high penetration in the geographical area that is of prime

interest to major local retailers, and with relatively little

circulation elsewhere, are exceptionally efficient buys for those

retailers. Low-penetration papers have a far less compelling

message to present to advertisers.

In our opinion, three factors largely account for the

unusual acceptance of the News in the community. Among these,

points 2 and 3 also may explain the popularity of the Sunday News

compared to that of the Sunday Courier-Express when it was the

sole Sunday paper:

(1) The first point has nothing to do with merits of the

News. Both emigration and immigration are relatively

low in Buffalo. A stable population is more interested

and involved in the activities of its community than is

a shifting population - and, as a result, is more

interested in the content of the local daily paper.

Increase the movement in and out of a city and

penetration ratios will fall.

(2) The News has a reputation for editorial quality and

integrity that was honed by our longtime editor, the

legendary Alfred Kirchhofer, and that has been preserved

and extended by Murray Light. This reputation was

enormously important to our success in establishing a

Sunday paper against entrenched competition. And without

a Sunday edition, the News would not have survived in the

long run.

(3) The News lives up to its name - it delivers a very

unusual amount of news. During 1983, our news hole?

(editorial material - not ads) amounted to 50% of the

newspaper’s content (excluding preprinted inserts).

Among papers that dominate their markets and that are of

comparable or larger size, we know of only one whose news

hole percentage exceeds that of the News. Comprehensive

figures are not available, but a sampling indicates an

average percentage in the high 30s. In other words, page

for page, our mix gives readers over 25% more news than

the typical paper. This news-rich mixture is by intent.

Some publishers, pushing for higher profit margins, have

cut their news holes during the past decade. We have

maintained ours and will continue to do so. Properly

written and edited, a full serving of news makes our

paper more valuable to the reader and contributes to our

unusual penetration ratio.

Despite the strength of the News?franchise, gains in ROP

linage (advertising printed within the newspaper pages as

contrasted to preprinted inserts) are going to be very difficult

to achieve. We had an enormous gain in preprints during 1983:

lines rose from 9.3 million to 16.4 million, revenues from $3.6

million to $8.1 million. These gains are consistent with

national trends, but exaggerated in our case by business we

picked up when the Courier-Express closed.

On balance, the shift from ROP to preprints has negative

economic implications for us. Profitability on preprints is less

and the business is more subject to competition from alternative

means of delivery. Furthermore, a reduction in ROP linage means

less absolute space devoted to news (since the news hole

percentage remains constant), thereby reducing the utility of the

paper to the reader.

Stan Lipsey became Publisher of the Buffalo News at midyear

upon the retirement of Henry Urban. Henry never flinched during

the dark days of litigation and losses following our introduction

of the Sunday paper - an introduction whose wisdom was questioned

by many in the newspaper business, including some within our own

building. Henry is admired by the Buffalo business community,

he’s admired by all who worked for him, and he is admired by

Charlie and me. Stan worked with Henry for several years, and

has worked for Berkshire Hathaway since 1969. He has been

personally involved in all nuts-and-bolts aspects of the

newspaper business from editorial to circulation. We couldn’t do

better.

See’s Candy Shops

The financial results at See’s continue to be exceptional.

The business possesses a valuable and solid consumer franchise

and a manager equally valuable and solid.

In recent years See’s has encountered two important

problems, at least one of which is well on its way toward

solution. That problem concerns costs, except those for raw

materials. We have enjoyed a break on raw material costs in

recent years though so, of course, have our competitors. One of

these days we will get a nasty surprise in the opposite

direction. In effect, raw material costs are largely beyond our

control since we will, as a matter of course, buy the finest

ingredients that we can, regardless of changes in their price

levels. We regard product quality as sacred.

But other kinds of costs are more controllable, and it is in

this area that we have had problems. On a per-pound basis, our

costs (not including those for raw materials) have increased in

the last few years at a rate significantly greater than the

increase in the general price level. It is vital to our

competitive position and profit potential that we reverse this

trend.

In recent months much better control over costs has been

attained and we feel certain that our rate of growth in these

costs in 1984 will be below the rate of inflation. This

confidence arises out of our long experience with the managerial

talents of Chuck Huggins. We put Chuck in charge the day we took

over, and his record has been simply extraordinary, as shown by

the following table:

52-53 Week Year Operating Number of Number of

Ended About Sales Profits Pounds of Stores Open

December 31 Revenues After Taxes Candy Sold at Year End

------------------- ------------ ----------- ---------- -----------

1983 (53 weeks) ... $133,531,000 $13,699,000 24,651,000 207

1982 .............. 123,662,000 11,875,000 24,216,000 202

1981 .............. 112,578,000 10,779,000 24,052,000 199

1980 .............. 97,715,000 7,547,000 24,065,000 191

1979 .............. 87,314,000 6,330,000 23,985,000 188

1978 .............. 73,653,000 6,178,000 22,407,000 182

1977 .............. 62,886,000 6,154,000 20,921,000 179

1976 (53 weeks) ... 56,333,000 5,569,000 20,553,000 173

1975 .............. 50,492,000 5,132,000 19,134,000 172

1974 .............. 41,248,000 3,021,000 17,883,000 170

1973 .............. 35,050,000 1,940,000 17,813,000 169

1972 .............. 31,337,000 2,083,000 16,954,000 167

The other problem we face, as the table suggests, is our

recent inability to achieve meaningful gains in pounds sold. The

industry has the same problem. But for many years we

outperformed the industry in this respect and now we are not.

The poundage volume in our retail stores has been virtually

unchanged each year for the past four, despite small increases

every year in the number of shops (and in distribution expense as

well). Of course, dollar volume has increased because we have

raised prices significantly. But we regard the most important

measure of retail trends to be units sold per store rather than

dollar volume. On a same-store basis (counting only shops open

throughout both years) with all figures adjusted to a 52-week

year, poundage was down .8 of 1% during 1983. This small decline

was our best same-store performance since 1979; the cumulative

decline since then has been about 8%. Quantity-order volume,

about 25% of our total, has plateaued in recent years following

very large poundage gains throughout the 1970s.

We are not sure to what extent this flat volume - both in

the retail shop area and the quantity order area - is due to our

pricing policies and to what extent it is due to static industry

volume, the recession, and the extraordinary share of market we

already enjoy in our primary marketing area. Our price increase

for 1984 is much more modest than has been the case in the past

few years, and we hope that next year we can report better volume

figures to you. But we have no basis to forecast these.

Despite the volume problem, See’s strengths are many and

important. In our primary marketing area, the West, our candy is

preferred by an enormous margin to that of any competitor. In

fact, we believe most lovers of chocolate prefer it to candy

costing two or three times as much. (In candy, as in stocks,

price and value can differ; price is what you give, value is what

you get.) The quality of customer service in our shops - operated

throughout the country by us and not by franchisees is every bit

as good as the product. Cheerful, helpful personnel are as much

a trademark of See’s as is the logo on the box. That’s no small

achievement in a business that requires us to hire about 2000

seasonal workers. We know of no comparably-sized organization

that betters the quality of customer service delivered by Chuck

Huggins and his associates.

Because we have raised prices so modestly in 1984, we expect

See’s profits this year to be about the same as in 1983.

Insurance - Controlled Operations

We both operate insurance companies and have a large

economic interest in an insurance business we don’t operate,

GEICO. The results for all can be summed up easily: in

aggregate, the companies we operate and whose underwriting

results reflect the consequences of decisions that were my

responsibility a few years ago, had absolutely terrible results.

Fortunately, GEICO, whose policies I do not influence, simply

shot the lights out. The inference you draw from this summary is

the correct one. I made some serious mistakes a few years ago

that came home to roost.

The industry had its worst underwriting year in a long time,

as indicated by the table below:

Yearly Change Combined Ratio

in Premiums after Policy-

Written (%) holder Dividends

------------- ----------------

1972 .................... 10.2 96.2

1973 .................... 8.0 99.2

1974 .................... 6.2 105.4

1975 .................... 11.0 107.9

1976 .................... 21.9 102.4

1977 .................... 19.8 97.2

1978 .................... 12.8 97.5

1979 .................... 10.3 100.6

1980 .................... 6.0 103.1

1981 .................... 3.9 106.0

1982 (Revised) .......... 4.4 109.7

1983 (Estimated) ........ 4.6 111.0

Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages.

Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire

industry, including stock, mutual, and reciprocal companies. The

combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred

plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums; a ratio below

100 indicates an underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates

a loss.

For the reasons outlined in last year’s report, we expect

the poor industry experience of 1983 to be more or less typical

for a good many years to come. (As Yogi Berra put it: it will be

deja vu all over again.? That doesn’t mean we think the figures

won’t bounce around a bit; they are certain to. But we believe

it highly unlikely that the combined ratio during the balance of

the decade will average significantly below the 1981-1983 level.

Based on our expectations regarding inflation - and we are as

pessimistic as ever on that front - industry premium volume must

grow about 10% annually merely to stabilize loss ratios at

present levels.

Our own combined ratio in 1983 was 121. Since Mike Goldberg

recently took over most of the responsibility for the insurance

operation, it would be nice for me if our shortcomings could be

placed at his doorstep rather than mine. But unfortunately, as

we have often pointed out, the insurance business has a long

lead-time. Though business policies may be changed and personnel

improved, a significant period must pass before the effects are

seen. (This characteristic of the business enabled us to make a

great deal of money in GEICO; we could picture what was likely to

happen well before it actually occurred.) So the roots of the

1983 results are operating and personnel decisions made two or

more years back when I had direct managerial responsibility for

the insurance group.

Despite our poor results overall, several of our managers

did truly outstanding jobs. Roland Miller guided the auto and

general liability business of National Indemnity Company and

National Fire and Marine Insurance Company to improved results,

while those of competitors deteriorated. In addition, Tom Rowley

at Continental Divide Insurance - our fledgling Colorado

homestate company - seems certain to be a winner. Mike found him

a little over a year ago, and he was an important acquisition.

We have become active recently - and hope to become much

more active - in reinsurance transactions where the buyer’s

overriding concern should be the seller’s long-term

creditworthiness. In such transactions our premier financial

strength should make us the number one choice of both claimants

and insurers who must rely on the reinsurer’s promises for a

great many years to come.

A major source of such business is structured settlements -

a procedure for settling losses under which claimants receive

periodic payments (almost always monthly, for life) rather than a

single lump sum settlement. This form of settlement has

important tax advantages for the claimant and also prevents his

squandering a large lump-sum payment. Frequently, some inflation

protection is built into the settlement. Usually the claimant

has been seriously injured, and thus the periodic payments must

be unquestionably secure for decades to come. We believe we

offer unparalleled security. No other insurer we know of - even

those with much larger gross assets - has our financial strength.

We also think our financial strength should recommend us to

companies wishing to transfer loss reserves. In such

transactions, other insurance companies pay us lump sums to

assume all (or a specified portion of) future loss payments

applicable to large blocks of expired business. Here also, the

company transferring such claims needs to be certain of the

transferee’s financial strength for many years to come. Again,

most of our competitors soliciting such business appear to us to

have a financial condition that is materially inferior to ours.

Potentially, structured settlements and the assumption of

loss reserves could become very significant to us. Because of

their potential size and because these operations generate large

amounts of investment income compared to premium volume, we will

show underwriting results from those businesses on a separate

line in our insurance segment data. We also will exclude their

effect in reporting our combined ratio to you. We front end?no

profit on structured settlement or loss reserve transactions, and

all attributable overhead is expensed currently. Both businesses

are run by Don Wurster at National Indemnity Company.

Insurance - GEICO

Geico’s performance during 1983 was as good as our own

insurance performance was poor. Compared to the industry’s

combined ratio of 111, GEICO wrote at 96 after a large voluntary

accrual for policyholder dividends. A few years ago I would not

have thought GEICO could so greatly outperform the industry. Its

superiority reflects the combination of a truly exceptional

business idea and an exceptional management.

Jack Byrne and Bill Snyder have maintained extraordinary

discipline in the underwriting area (including, crucially,

provision for full and proper loss reserves), and their efforts

are now being further rewarded by significant gains in new

business. Equally important, Lou Simpson is the class of the

field among insurance investment managers. The three of them are

some team.

We have approximately a one-third interest in GEICO. That

gives us a $270 million share in the company’s premium volume, an

amount some 80% larger than our own volume. Thus, the major

portion of our total insurance business comes from the best

insurance book in the country. This fact does not moderate by an

iota the need for us to improve our own operation.

Stock Splits and Stock Activity

We often are asked why Berkshire does not split its stock.

The assumption behind this question usually appears to be that a

split would be a pro-shareholder action. We disagree. Let me

tell you why.

One of our goals is to have Berkshire Hathaway stock sell at

a price rationally related to its intrinsic business value. (But

note rationally related? not identical? if well-regarded

companies are generally selling in the market at large discounts

from value, Berkshire might well be priced similarly.) The key to

a rational stock price is rational shareholders, both current and

prospective.

If the holders of a company’s stock and/or the prospective

buyers attracted to it are prone to make irrational or emotionbased

decisions, some pretty silly stock prices are going to

appear periodically. Manic-depressive personalities produce

manic-depressive valuations. Such aberrations may help us in

buying and selling the stocks of other companies. But we think

it is in both your interest and ours to minimize their occurrence

in the market for Berkshire.

To obtain only high quality shareholders is no cinch. Mrs.

Astor could select her 400, but anyone can buy any stock.

Entering members of a shareholder club?cannot be screened for

intellectual capacity, emotional stability, moral sensitivity or

acceptable dress. Shareholder eugenics, therefore, might appear

to be a hopeless undertaking.

In large part, however, we feel that high quality ownership

can be attracted and maintained if we consistently communicate

our business and ownership philosophy - along with no other

conflicting messages - and then let self selection follow its

course. For example, self selection will draw a far different

crowd to a musical event advertised as an opera than one

advertised as a rock concert even though anyone can buy a ticket

to either.

Through our policies and communications - our

advertisements?- we try to attract investors who will

understand our operations, attitudes and expectations. (And,

fully as important, we try to dissuade those who won’t.) We want

those who think of themselves as business owners and invest in

companies with the intention of staying a long time. And, we

want those who keep their eyes focused on business results, not

market prices.

Investors possessing those characteristics are in a small

minority, but we have an exceptional collection of them. I

believe well over 90% - probably over 95% - of our shares are

held by those who were shareholders of Berkshire or Blue Chip

five years ago. And I would guess that over 95% of our shares

are held by investors for whom the holding is at least double the

size of their next largest. Among companies with at least

several thousand public shareholders and more than $1 billion of

market value, we are almost certainly the leader in the degree to

which our shareholders think and act like owners. Upgrading a

shareholder group that possesses these characteristics is not

easy.

Were we to split the stock or take other actions focusing on

stock price rather than business value, we would attract an

entering class of buyers inferior to the exiting class of

sellers. At $1300, there are very few investors who can’t afford

a Berkshire share. Would a potential one-share purchaser be

better off if we split 100 for 1 so he could buy 100 shares?

Those who think so and who would buy the stock because of the

split or in anticipation of one would definitely downgrade the

quality of our present shareholder group. (Could we really

improve our shareholder group by trading some of our present

clear-thinking members for impressionable new ones who,

preferring paper to value, feel wealthier with nine $10 bills

than with one $100 bill?) People who buy for non-value reasons

are likely to sell for non-value reasons. Their presence in the

picture will accentuate erratic price swings unrelated to

underlying business developments.

We will try to avoid policies that attract buyers with a

short-term focus on our stock price and try to follow policies

that attract informed long-term investors focusing on business

values. just as you purchased your Berkshire shares in a market

populated by rational informed investors, you deserve a chance to

sell - should you ever want to - in the same kind of market. We

will work to keep it in existence.

One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on

activity. Brokers, using terms such as marketability?and

liquidity? sing the praises of companies with high share

turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill

your ear). But investors should understand that what is good for

the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock

market is the pickpocket of enterprise.

For example, consider a typical company earning, say, 12% on

equity. Assume a very high turnover rate in its shares of 100%

per year. If a purchase and sale of the stock each extract

commissions of 1% (the rate may be much higher on low-priced

stocks) and if the stock trades at book value, the owners of our

hypothetical company will pay, in aggregate, 2% of the company’s

net worth annually for the privilege of transferring ownership.

This activity does nothing for the earnings of the business, and

means that 1/6 of them are lost to the owners through the

frictional?cost of transfer. (And this calculation does not

count option trading, which would increase frictional costs still

further.)

All that makes for a rather expensive game of musical

chairs. Can you imagine the agonized cry that would arise if a

governmental unit were to impose a new 16 2/3% tax on earnings of

corporations or investors? By market activity, investors can

impose upon themselves the equivalent of such a tax.

Days when the market trades 100 million shares (and that

kind of volume, when over-the-counter trading is included, is

today abnormally low) are a curse for owners, not a blessing -

for they mean that owners are paying twice as much to change

chairs as they are on a 50-million-share day. If 100 millionshare

days persist for a year and the average cost on each

purchase and sale is 15 cents a share, the chair-changing tax for

investors in aggregate would total about $7.5 billion - an amount

roughly equal to the combined 1982 profits of Exxon, General

Motors, Mobil and Texaco, the four largest companies in the

Fortune 500.

These companies had a combined net worth of $75 billion at

yearend 1982 and accounted for over 12% of both net worth and net

income of the entire Fortune 500 list. Under our assumption

investors, in aggregate, every year forfeit all earnings from

this staggering sum of capital merely to satisfy their penchant

for financial flip-flopping? In addition, investment

management fees of over $2 billion annually - sums paid for

chair-changing advice - require the forfeiture by investors of

all earnings of the five largest banking organizations (Citicorp,

Bank America, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover and J. P.

Morgan). These expensive activities may decide who eats the pie,

but they don’t enlarge it.

(We are aware of the pie-expanding argument that says that

such activities improve the rationality of the capital allocation

process. We think that this argument is specious and that, on

balance, hyperactive equity markets subvert rational capital

allocation and act as pie shrinkers. Adam Smith felt that all

noncollusive acts in a free market were guided by an invisible

hand that led an economy to maximum progress; our view is that

casino-type markets and hair-trigger investment management act as

an invisible foot that trips up and slows down a forward-moving

economy.)

Contrast the hyperactive stock with Berkshire. The bid-andask

spread in our stock currently is about 30 points, or a little

over 2%. Depending on the size of the transaction, the

difference between proceeds received by the seller of Berkshire

and cost to the buyer may range downward from 4% (in trading

involving only a few shares) to perhaps 1 1/2% (in large trades

where negotiation can reduce both the market-maker’s spread and

the broker’s commission). Because most Berkshire shares are

traded in fairly large transactions, the spread on all trading

probably does not average more than 2%.

Meanwhile, true turnover in Berkshire stock (excluding

inter-dealer transactions, gifts and bequests) probably runs 3%

per year. Thus our owners, in aggregate, are paying perhaps

6/100 of 1% of Berkshire’s market value annually for transfer

privileges. By this very rough estimate, that’s $900,000 - not a

small cost, but far less than average. Splitting the stock would

increase that cost, downgrade the quality of our shareholder

population, and encourage a market price less consistently

related to intrinsic business value. We see no offsetting

advantages.

Miscellaneous

Last year in this section I ran a small ad to encourage

acquisition candidates. In our communications businesses we tell

our advertisers that repetition is a key to results (which it

is), so we will again repeat our acquisition criteria.

We prefer:

(1) large purchases (at least $5 million of after-tax

earnings),

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future

projections are of little interest to us, nor are

turn-around?situations),

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while

employing little or no debt,

(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),

(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we

won’t understand it),

(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or

that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,

about a transaction when price is unknown).

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise

complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily

within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer

to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we

receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We

invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people

with whom we have done business in the past. For the right

business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

* * * * *

About 96.4% of all eligible shares participated in our 1983

shareholder-designated contributions program. The total

contributions made pursuant to this program - disbursed in the

early days of 1984 but fully expensed in 1983 - were $3,066,501,

and 1353 charities were recipients. Although the response

measured by the percentage of shares participating was

extraordinarily good, the response measured by the percentage of

holders participating was not as good. The reason may well be

the large number of new shareholders acquired through the merger

and their lack of familiarity with the program. We urge new

shareholders to read the description of the program on pages 52-

53.

If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly

urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are

registered in the actual owner’s name, not in street?or nominee

name. Shares not so registered on September 28, 1984 will not be

eligible for any 1984 program.

* * * * *

The Blue Chip/Berkshire merger went off without a hitch.

Less than one-tenth of 1% of the shares of each company voted

against the merger, and no requests for appraisal were made. In

1983, we gained some tax efficiency from the merger and we expect

to gain more in the future.

One interesting sidelight to the merger: Berkshire now has

1,146,909 shares outstanding compared to 1,137,778 shares at the

beginning of fiscal 1965, the year present management assumed

responsibility. For every 1% of the company you owned at that

time, you now would own .99%. Thus, all of today’s assets - the

News, See’s, Nebraska Furniture Mart, the Insurance Group, $1.3

billion in marketable stocks, etc. - have been added to the

original textile assets with virtually no net dilution to the

original owners.

We are delighted to have the former Blue Chip shareholders

join us. To aid in your understanding of Berkshire Hathaway, we

will be glad to send you the Compendium of Letters from the

Annual Reports of 1977-1981, and/or the 1982 Annual report.

Direct your request to the Company at 1440 Kiewit Plaza, Omaha,

Nebraska 68131.

Warren E. Buffett

March 14, 1984 Chairman of the Board

Appendix

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

This appendix deals only with economic and accounting Goodwill ?not the goodwill of

everyday usage. For example, a business may be well liked, even loved, by most of its customers

but possess no economic goodwill. (AT&T, before the breakup, was generally well thought of,

but possessed not a dime of economic Goodwill.) And, regrettably, a business may be disliked

by its customers but possess substantial, and growing, economic Goodwill. So, just for the

moment, forget emotions and focus only on economics and accounting.

When a business is purchased, accounting principles require that the purchase price first be

assigned to the fair value of the identifiable assets that are acquired. Frequently the sum of the

fair values put on the assets (after the deduction of liabilities) is less than the total purchase

price of the business. In that case, the difference is assigned to an asset account entitled

"excess of cost over equity in net assets acquired". To avoid constant repetition of this

mouthful, we will substitute "Goodwill".

Accounting Goodwill arising from businesses purchased before November 1970 has a special

standing. Except under rare circumstances, it can remain an asset on the balance sheet as long

as the business bought is retained. That means no amortization charges to gradually extinguish

that asset need be made against earnings.

The case is different, however, with purchases made from November 1970 on. When these create

Goodwill, it must be amortized over not more than 40 years through charges ?of equal amount in

every year ?to the earnings account. Since 40 years is the maximum period allowed, 40 years is

what managements (including us) usually elect. This annual charge to earnings is not allowed as

a tax deduction and, thus, has an effect on after-tax income that is roughly double that of most

other expenses.

That’s how accounting Goodwill works. To see how it differs from economic reality, let’s

look at an example close at hand. We’ll round some figures, and greatly oversimplify, to make

the example easier to follow. We’ll also mention some implications for investors and managers.

Blue Chip Stamps bought See’s early in 1972 for $25 million, at which time See’s had about

$8 million of net tangible assets. (Throughout this discussion, accounts receivable will be

classified as tangible assets, a definition proper for business analysis.) This level of tangible

assets was adequate to conduct the business without use of debt, except for short periods

seasonally. See’s was earning about $2 million after tax at the time, and such earnings seemed

conservatively representative of future earning power in constant 1972 dollars.

Thus our first lesson: businesses logically are worth far more than net tangible assets when

they can be expected to produce earnings on such assets considerably in excess of market rates

of return. The capitalized value of this excess return is economic Goodwill.

In 1972 (and now) relatively few businesses could be expected to consistently earn the 25% after

tax on net tangible assets that was earned by See’s ?doing it, furthermore, with conservative

accounting and no financial leverage. It was not the fair market value of the inventories,

receivables or fixed assets that produced the premium rates of return. Rather it was a

combination of intangible assets, particularly a pervasive favorable reputation with consumers

based upon countless pleasant experiences they have had with both product and personnel.

Such a reputation creates a consumer franchise that allows the value of the product to the

purchaser, rather than its production cost, to be the major determinant of selling price.

Consumer franchises are a prime source of economic Goodwill. Other sources include

governmental franchises not subject to profit regulation, such as television stations, and an

enduring position as the low cost producer in an industry.

Let’s return to the accounting in the See’s example. Blue Chip’s purchase of See’s at $17

million over net tangible assets required that a Goodwill account of this amount be established

as an asset on Blue Chip’s books and that $425,000 be charged to income annually for 40 years

to amortize that asset. By 1983, after 11 years of such charges, the $17 million had been reduced

to about $12.5 million. Berkshire, meanwhile, owned 60% of Blue Chip and, therefore, also 60%

of See’s. This ownership meant that Berkshire’s balance sheet reflected 60% of See’s

Goodwill, or about $7.5 million.

In 1983 Berkshire acquired the rest of Blue Chip in a merger that required purchase accounting

as contrasted to the "pooling" treatment allowed for some mergers. Under purchase accounting,

the "fair value" of the shares we gave to (or "paid") Blue Chip holders had to be spread over the

net assets acquired from Blue Chip. This "fair value" was measured, as it almost always is when

public companies use their shares to make acquisitions, by the market value of the shares given

up.

The assets "purchased" consisted of 40% of everything owned by Blue Chip (as noted, Berkshire

already owned the other 60%). What Berkshire "paid" was more than the net identifiable assets

we received by $51.7 million, and was assigned to two pieces of Goodwill: $28.4 million to

See’s and $23.3 million to Buffalo Evening News.

After the merger, therefore, Berkshire was left with a Goodwill asset for See’s that had two

components: the $7.5 million remaining from the 1971 purchase, and $28.4 million newly created

by the 40% "purchased" in 1983. Our amortization charge now will be about $1.0 million for the

next 28 years, and $.7 million for the following 12 years, 2002 through 2013.

In other words, different purchase dates and prices have given us vastly different asset values

and amortization charges for two pieces of the same asset. (We repeat our usual disclaimer: we

have no better accounting system to suggest. The problems to be dealt with are mind boggling

and require arbitrary rules.)

But what are the economic realities? One reality is that the amortization charges that have been

deducted as costs in the earnings statement each year since acquisition of See’s were not true

economic costs. We know that because See’s last year earned $13 million after taxes on about

$20 million of net tangible assets ?a performance indicating the existence of economic Goodwill

far larger than the total original cost of our accounting Goodwill. In other words, while

accounting Goodwill regularly decreased from the moment of purchase, economic Goodwill

increased in irregular but very substantial fashion.

Another reality is that annual amortization charges in the future will not correspond to

economic costs. It is possible, of course, that See’s economic Goodwill will disappear. But it

won’t shrink in even decrements or anything remotely resembling them. What is more likely is

that the Goodwill will increase ?in current, if not in constant, dollars ?because of inflation.

That probability exists because true economic Goodwill tends to rise in nominal value

proportionally with inflation. To illustrate how this works, let’s contrast a See’s kind of

business with a more mundane business. When we purchased See’s in 1972, it will be recalled,

it was earning about $2 million on $8 million of net tangible assets. Let us assume that our

hypothetical mundane business then had $2 million of earnings also, but needed $18 million in

net tangible assets for normal operations. Earning only 11% on required tangible assets, that

mundane business would possess little or no economic Goodwill.

A business like that, therefore, might well have sold for the value of its net tangible assets, or

for $18 million. In contrast, we paid $25 million for See’s, even though it had no more in

earnings and less than half as much in "honest-to-God" assets. Could less really have been

more, as our purchase price implied? The answer is "yes" ?even if both businesses were

expected to have flat unit volume ?as long as you anticipated, as we did in 1972, a world of

continuous inflation.

To understand why, imagine the effect that a doubling of the price level would subsequently

have on the two businesses. Both would need to double their nominal earnings to $4 million to

keep themselves even with inflation. This would seem to be no great trick: just sell the same

number of units at double earlier prices and, assuming profit margins remain unchanged, profits

also must double.

But, crucially, to bring that about, both businesses probably would have to double their nominal

investment in net tangible assets, since that is the kind of economic requirement that inflation

usually imposes on businesses, both good and bad. A doubling of dollar sales means

correspondingly more dollars must be employed immediately in receivables and inventories.

Dollars employed in fixed assets will respond more slowly to inflation, but probably just as

surely. And all of this inflation-required investment will produce no improvement in rate of

return. The motivation for this investment is the survival of the business, not the prosperity of

the owner.

Remember, however, that See’s had net tangible assets of only $8 million. So it would only

have had to commit an additional $8 million to finance the capital needs imposed by inflation.

The mundane business, meanwhile, had a burden over twice as large ?a need for $18 million of

additional capital.

After the dust had settled, the mundane business, now earning $4 million annually, might still be

worth the value of its tangible assets, or $36 million. That means its owners would have gained

only a dollar of nominal value for every new dollar invested. (This is the same dollar-for-dollar

result they would have achieved if they had added money to a savings account.)

See’s, however, also earning $4 million, might be worth $50 million if valued (as it logically

would be) on the same basis as it was at the time of our purchase. So it would have gained $25

million in nominal value while the owners were putting up only $8 million in additional capital ?

over $3 of nominal value gained for each $1 invested.

Remember, even so, that the owners of the See’s kind of business were forced by inflation to

ante up $8 million in additional capital just to stay even in real profits. Any unleveraged

business that requires some net tangible assets to operate (and almost all do) is hurt by

inflation. Businesses needing little in the way of tangible assets simply are hurt the least.

And that fact, of course, has been hard for many people to grasp. For years the traditional

wisdom ?long on tradition, short on wisdom ?held that inflation protection was best provided by

businesses laden with natural resources, plants and machinery, or other tangible assets ("In

Goods We Trust"). It doesn’t work that way. Asset-heavy businesses generally earn low rates

of return ?rates that often barely provide enough capital to fund the inflationary needs of the

existing business, with nothing left over for real growth, for distribution to owners, or for

acquisition of new businesses.

In contrast, a disproportionate number of the great business fortunes built up during the

inflationary years arose from ownership of operations that combined intangibles of lasting

value with relatively minor requirements for tangible assets. In such cases earnings have

bounded upward in nominal dollars, and these dollars have been largely available for the

acquisition of additional businesses. This phenomenon has been particularly evident in the

communications business. That business has required little in the way of tangible investment ?

yet its franchises have endured. During inflation, Goodwill is the gift that keeps giving.

But that statement applies, naturally, only to true economic Goodwill. Spurious accounting

Goodwill ?and there is plenty of it around ?is another matter. When an overexcited management

purchases a business at a silly price, the same accounting niceties described earlier are

observed. Because it can’t go anywhere else, the silliness ends up in the Goodwill account.

Considering the lack of managerial discipline that created the account, under such

circumstances it might better be labeled "No-Will". Whatever the term, the 40-year ritual

typically is observed and the adrenalin so capitalized remains on the books as an "asset" just as

if the acquisition had been a sensible one.

* * * * *

If you cling to any belief that accounting treatment of Goodwill is the best measure of economic

reality, I suggest one final item to ponder.

Assume a company with $20 per share of net worth, all tangible assets. Further assume the

company has internally developed some magnificent consumer franchise, or that it was

fortunate enough to obtain some important television stations by original FCC grant. Therefore,

it earns a great deal on tangible assets, say $5 per share, or 25%.

With such economics, it might sell for $100 per share or more, and it might well also bring that

price in a negotiated sale of the entire business.

Assume an investor buys the stock at $100 per share, paying in effect $80 per share for Goodwill

(just as would a corporate purchaser buying the whole company). Should the investor impute a

$2 per share amortization charge annually ($80 divided by 40 years) to calculate "true" earnings

per share? And, if so, should the new "true" earnings of $3 per share cause him to rethink his

purchase price?

* * * * *

We believe managers and investors alike should view intangible assets from two perspectives:

In analysis of operating results ?that is, in evaluating the underlying economics of a business

unit ?amortization charges should be ignored. What a business can be expected to earn on

unleveraged net tangible assets, excluding any charges against earnings for amortization of

Goodwill, is the best guide to the economic attractiveness of the operation. It is also the best

guide to the current value of the operation’s economic Goodwill.

In evaluating the wisdom of business acquisitions, amortization charges should be ignored also.

They should be deducted neither from earnings nor from the cost of the business. This means

forever viewing purchased Goodwill at its full cost, before any amortization. Furthermore, cost

should be defined as including the full intrinsic business value ?not just the recorded

accounting value ?of all consideration given, irrespective of market prices of the securities

involved at the time of merger and irrespective of whether pooling treatment was allowed. For

example, what we truly paid in the Blue Chip merger for 40% of the Goodwill of See’s and the

News was considerably more than the $51.7 million entered on our books. This disparity exists

because the market value of the Berkshire shares given up in the merger was less than their

intrinsic business value, which is the value that defines the true cost to us.

Operations that appear to be winners based upon perspective (1) may pale when viewed from

perspective (2). A good business is not always a good purchase ?although it’s a good place to

look for one.

We will try to acquire businesses that have excellent operating economics measured by (1) and

that provide reasonable returns measured by (2). Accounting consequences will be totally

ignored.

At yearend 1983, net Goodwill on our accounting books totaled $62 million, consisting of the

$79 million you see stated on the asset side of our balance sheet, and $17 million of negative

Goodwill that is offset against the carrying value of our interest in Mutual Savings and Loan.

We believe net economic Goodwill far exceeds the $62 million accounting number.

● 一九八四年

1984年波克夏的净值约增加了一亿五千万美金，每股约等于133美金，这个数字看起来似乎还不

错，不过若考虑所投入的资金，事实上只能算普通，二十年来我们的净值约以22.1%年复合成长率

增加(从1965年的19.46到1984年的1,108.77) ，去年则只有13.6%。

如同我们去年曾提过的，真正重要的是每股内含价值的成长率，不过由于其涉及太多主观的意见而

难以计算，所以以我们的情况，通常用帐面价值当作代替(虽然通常是有点低估) ，我个人认为在

1984年内含价值与帐面价值增加的程度可谓相当。

过去个人以学术角度曾跟各为提到暴增的资本将会托累资本报酬率，不幸的是今年我们以报导新闻

的方式跟各位报告，过去动辄22%的成长率已成历史，在往后十年我们大约要赚到39亿美金，每年

才能以15%成长(假设我们仍维持目前的股利政策，后面我会详加讨论)，想要顺利达成目标，必需

要有一些极棒的点子，我跟我的执行合伙人Charlie Munger目前并无任何够棒点子，不过我们的经

验是有时它会突然冒出来。

● 下表显示波克夏帐列盈余的来源，由于年中与Blue Chips合并致使我们在一些长期投资的股

权发生变动，

而各个公司资本利得损失并不包含在内而是汇总于下表最后「已实现出售证券利得」一栏

(我们认为单一年度的出售证券利得并无太大意义，但每年加总累计的数字却相当重要)，至

于商誉的摊销则以单一字段另行列示，虽然本表列示的方式与一般公认会计原则不尽相同但

最后的损益数字却是一致的:

1984 Unit:

US'000

Earnings Before Income Tax After

Income

Tax

Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

100.0% (48,060) (48,060) (25,955)

100.0% 68,903 68,903 62,059

Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles 100.0% 418 418 226

Associated Retail Stores 100.0% (1,072) (1,072) (579)

Nebraska Furniture Mart 80.0% 14,511 11,609 5,917

See's Candies 100.0% 26,644 26,644 13,380

Buffalio Evening News 100.0% 27,328 27,328 13,317

Blue Chip Stamps-Parent 100.0% (1,843) (1,843) (899)

Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent 80.1% 9,777 7,831 4,828

Mutual Savings and Loan 80.1% 1,456 1,166 3,151

Presion Steel 80.1% 4,092 3,278 1,696

Amortization of Goodwill (1,434) (1,434) (1,434)

Interest on Debt (14,734) (14,097) (7,452)

Shareholder's Contribution (3,179) (3,179) (1,716)

Other 4,932 4,529 3,476

87,739 82,021 70,015

Realized Securities Gain 112,810 109,272 78,881

Total Earnings-all entities 200,549 191,293 148,896

● 比较细心的股东可能会发现GEICO特别股利的金额与其分类的位置有变动，虽然损益数字

些微受到影响，但实质上并无太大差别，但背后的故事却相当有趣。

如同去年我报告过的，(1)1983年中GEICO 宣布实施库藏股买回自家股票(2)同时我们签署协

议同意GEICO 自我们手中买回等比例的股份(3)总结最后我们卖还给GEICO 35万股，并收到

2,100万现金，而我们在GEICO的持股比例则维持不变(4)我们著名的律师事务所认可这整件

交易为减资(5)依税法我们只要缴交6.9%的集团企业间股利税(6)最重要的是这2,100万现金比

我们未认列的未分配盈余少得多，故经济实质面而言，我们将之视为股利的分配。

但由于这种情况并不常见且金额又不小，所以在去年季报与年报中我们特别加以分别列示，

并且经我们的本地签证会计师认可同意。

而1984年General Foods也发生同样的状况，只是后者是直接自公开市场中买回，所以我们

每天卖出一点股份以使我们在该公司的持股比例维持不变，同样的双方在交易之前已签订好

协议，且我们收到的现金比我们在该公司未认列的未分配盈余少得多，总计我们收到2,100

万现金，而持股比例则维持在8.75%不变。

但这时签证会计师的纽约总部却跳出来讲话，否决的其分所的结论，认定我们与GEICO 与

General Foods之间的交易属于股权买卖而非股利分配，在这种情况下，我们所收到的现金

被认定为出售股票收入，在扣除当初的原始投资成本后，应列示为资本利得，当然这只是会

计上的处理与税务无关。

虽然我们并不认同纽约方面的看法，但为免会计师出具保留意见，我们仍勉强接收，并重编

1983年的报表，尽管如此，公司实质上未受任何影响，我们在这两家公司的权益、帐上的现

金、所得税与持有股权的市值皆维持不变。

而今年我们又与General Foods签订类似的协议，为了确保在税法上得以认定为股利分配，

我们仍将在该公司维持持有的股权比例不变，当然若后续还有类似的情况我们一定会跟所有

的股东报告。而在参与过这么多次类似的交易后，我们觉得这种作法对不卖出股份的股东同

样有利，当一家经营绩效良好且财务基础健全的公司发现自家的股价远低于其内含价值时，

买回自家股票是保障股东权益最好的方法了。

但我必须说明我是指那些基于本益比角度的买回，并不包括那种不道德的green-mail(在这类

交易中，甲乙双方为自身私利协议剥削不知情的丙方，甲方-是指职业股东在刚买下股票

后，便对公司经营阶层发出要钱或是要命的勒索，而乙方-是指息事宁人的公司经营阶层，

愿意用高价买回，只要这个钱不要是他出的就好，丙方-就这样被牺牲，别人花钱他来买

单，结果公司经营阶层还信势旦旦的说要维持公司利益，而不知情的股东只能呆呆的被宰还

不自知。

去年我们几个投资部位较大的被投资公司只要其价格与价值差异颇大时，都努力买回自家股

份，而对于身为股东的我们而言，有两点好处

第一点很明显，是一个简单的数学问题，透过买回公司的股票，等于只要花一块钱的代价便

能够获得两块钱的价值的，所以每股的内含价值可大大的提高，这比花大钱去购并别人的公

司的效果要好得多。

第二点较不明显，且没有什么人知道，实际上也很难去衡量，但时间一长其效果越明显，那

就是管理当局可透过买回自家的股票来对外宣示其重视股东权益的心而非一昧的要扩张个人

经营事业的版图，因为后者往往不但对股东没有帮助，甚至反而有害股东的利益。如此一

来，原有的股东与有兴趣的投资人将会对公司的前景更具信心，而股价便会向上反应而与其

本身的价值更为接近。

相对地那一些成天把维护股东权益的口号挂在嘴边，却对买回自家股票的建议置之不理的

人，很难说服大家他不是口是心非，久而久之，他便会被市场投资人所离弃。

最近我们靠前三大持股-GEICO、General Foods与华盛顿邮报大量买回自家股票(艾克森-我

们的第四大持股也积极买回股票，只是因为我们是最近才建立部位，所以影响不大)，而大

发利市，我们对于投资这种具竞争优势同时又真正注重股东权益的管理阶层感到相当安心。

● 下表显示我们在1984年底，主要的投资部位(所有数字已扣除Wesco等公司的少数股权)

Company Name Shares Cost Market Unrealized

Affiliated Publications, Inc. (a) 690,975 3,516 32,908 29,392

American Boradcasting Company (a) 740,400 44,416 46,738 2,322

Exxon Corporation (a) 3,895,710 173,401 175,307 1,906

General Foods, Inc (b) 4,047,191 149,870 226,137 76,267

GEIGO Corporation (a) 6,850,000 45,713 397,300 351,587

Handy & Harman (a) 2,379,200 27,318 38,662 11,344

Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc (a) 818,872 2,570 28,149 25,579

Media General

Northwest Industries (a) 555,949 26,581 27,242 661

Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc

R.J. Reynolds Industries

Time, Inc (a) 2,553,488 89,327 109,162 19,835

The Washington Post Company (a) 1,868,600 10,628 149,955 139,327

All Other Common Stock 11,634 37,326 25,692

Total Common Stock 584,974 1,268,886 683,912

(55,653)

● 最近十年来实在很难找得到同时能够符合我们质与量(价格与价值的差距)标准的投资标的，

我们尽量避免降格以求，但你知道什么事都不做才是最困难的一件事(有一位英国政治家将

该国十九世纪的伟大归功于统治者的无为而治，但历史学家可以随随便便就提议，不过后继

统治者却很难真得做得到)

除了先前曾提到的数字，有关Wesco的经营理念在Charlie Munger写的报告中会详加描述。

此外我们实际掌控的企业，如Nebraska家具店、喜斯糖果、水牛城日报与保险事业集团的经

营，将在稍后加以说明

Nebraska家具店

去年我曾介绍过B太太跟她的家族的优异表现，不过事实上我还低估他们的管理才能与人格

特质，B太太身为公司的负责人，现年九十一岁，当地的报纸曾形容她每天工作完便回家吃

饭睡觉，每晚等不到天亮便急着要回店里头上班，每天从早到晚，每周工作七天，她一天所

决定的事情可能比一家大公司总裁一年内决定的事还多（当然是指好的决策）

今年五月B太太荣获纽约大学颁赠荣誉博士学位，（她是个跳级生，在她获得这个学位之

前，从来没有到学校上过一天课），在她之前获颁这项殊荣的包有括艾克森石油总裁、花旗

银行总裁、IBM总裁与通用汽车总裁等杰出企业人士。

而B家族有其母必有其子，由他们的表现可以得知，Louie　B太太的儿子跟他三个小孩，皆

遗传到B太太的个性，去年NFM单店的营业额增加一千多万美金，成为一亿一千多万，是全

美单店业绩最高的一家家具量贩店，事实上它的成功不是没有道理的，以下数字说明一切

根据去年财报，全国最大的家具零售商－Levitz 自夸其所卖价格要比当地所有传统家具店要

便宜许多，而该公司的毛利率却高达44.4%(亦即消费者每付100元所买的货品，公司的成本

只要55.6元)而NFM的毛利却只有前者的一半，其所凭借的便是优异的效率（包含薪资、租

金与广告费等成本只占营业额的16.5%），我们不是要批评Levitz，事实上该公司经营亦颇

出色，只是NFM的表现实在是太好了，（记着这一切的一切都是从B太太1937年的五百块本

钱开始），靠着精打细算与大量采购的成本优势，NFM在供献股东盈余的同时，也替顾客

节省了可观的采购预算，这一点也使得该公司的客户分布越来越广。

人们常常问我，B太太到底有什么经营诀窍，而其实说穿了也不是什么深奥的道理，他们整

个家族（1）对事业怀抱的热情与冲劲会让富兰克林与Horatio Alger看起来像辍学生（2）脚

踏实地的去落实并果断的决定要作的事情（3）不受外在对于公司竞争力没有帮助的诱惑

（4）对待所有人皆能保持高尚的人格

我们对于B太太家族的人格的信任可从以下交易过程看出，NFM从来未找会计师查核，我们

也从未对存货进行盘点或核对应收帐款或固定资产，我们便交给她一张五千五百万的支票，

而她给我们的是一句口头的承诺。

我们很荣幸能与B太太合伙作生意(1984)

喜斯糖果

下表是该公司自从被Blue Chips买下后，对其表现的一段回顾:

Sales('000) Profit('000) Pounds

('000)

Stores

1984 135,946 13,380 24,759 214

1983 (53weeks) 133,531 13,699 24,651 207

1982 123,662 11,875 24,216 202

1981 112,578 10,779 24,052 199

1980 97,715 7,547 24,065 191

1979 87,314 6,330 23,985 188

1978 73,653 6,178 22,407 182

1977 62,886 6,154 20,921 179

1976 (53weeks) 56,333 5,569 20,553 173

1975 50,492 5,132 19,134 172

1974 41,248 3,021 17,883 170

1973 35,050 1,940 17,813 169

1972 31,337 2,083 16,954 167

● 看得出其表现并非处于持续成长的状态，事实上盒装巧克力这行业的获利情况并不一定，有

的品牌赔钱，但有的却颇有赚头，就我们所知只有一家竞争对手维持高获利，而喜斯的成功

要归功于优秀的产品与杰出的经营人才-Chuck Huggins.

尽管在1984年我们产品价格的涨幅不若以往，大约1.4%，不过还好我们在过去几年一直困扰

我们的成本控制问题上大有进展，除了我们无法控制原料成本外，其它费用仅较去年增加

2.2%。过去我们由于单店销售数量(指重量，而非金额)略微下滑，整体销量只能靠增加门市

来扩张，当然使得销售成本恶化，1984年单店销量减少1.1%，但整体销量因扩点的关系成长

0.6%(两者皆已将1983年53周的因素列入考量)

喜斯糖果的销售受到季节因素的影响越来越大，在圣诞节到来的前四周，其业绩与获利分别

占全年的四成与七成五，此外复活节与情人节期间的业绩也特别好，至于平时的生意表现便

平平，不过也因为如此使得管理部门与员工在忙季特别辛苦，须要特别的耐性来处理大量的

订单。而即使如此服务态度与产品品质却一点也没有打折扣，至于其它同业我就不管保证，

事实上有的为了降低成本增加保存期限而添加防腐剂或将成品加以冷冻，我们宁愿大家辛苦

一点而拒绝这样的作法。

此外我们的店在非假日期间遭遇到一些新式食物与零食店的竞争，所幸在1984年我们推出六

种新式糖果棒加以反击，其效果颇佳广为消费者所接受，目前我们正在研发新产品预计在不

久的未来推出上市。

展望明年我们期望把成本增加幅度压得比通货膨胀率低，当然这比必须要增加单店的销量来

加以配合，预估平均售价将调涨6-7%，获利将稳定成长。

水牛城晚报

1984年该报的获利超过我们的预期，与喜斯糖果控制成本一样具成效，不包括编辑室，整体

的工作时数减少约2.8%，由于生产力的增进，使得整体成本减少约4.9%，Stan Lipsey与其

经营团队的表现为业界之最，但我们同时也面临一项不利的因素，在年中我们与工会签订一

项数年的工作合约，使得工资大幅调涨，基于过去1977-1982年该报亏损时，工会与员工一

致配合的态度，是使我们战胜Courier-express的关键因素，所以我们认为这种调整尚属合

理，若非当时我们及时将成本降低，现在的结局可能完全相反，而由于这项调整案系分阶段

进行，所以对1984年的影响有限，但到明年此时便会全数反应，虽然我们可以努力提高生产

力作为因应，但不可避免的明年的单位劳动成本将大幅增加，而新闻印刷成本预估也将增

加，由于这两项不利因素，明年毛利将略微下滑。

但另外有两点是对公司有利的:

(1)本报发行流通的范围是一个广告效用极高的地区，相对于一般地区性报纸对广告主的效益

极为有限，一个几百英哩远的订户对于位在本地的杂货店来说一点效用也没有，对于一家报

社来说，其揩支主要取决于总发行量，而其广告收入(约占总营收的七到八成)却要依靠实际

有效的发行量。

(2)水牛城报纸的零售业绩特别突出，广告主只要凭着这份报纸便能将信息传递到所有潜在的

客户手中。

去年我曾告诉各位该报优异的读者接受度(在全美前一百大报纸中，我们在平日排名第一、

而假日则排第三) ，最新的资料显示前者仍维持第一、而后者则跃居第二位(不过我们水牛城

的订户数却减少，主要是在平日部份) ，而我们曾提到高接受度的原因是由于我们丰富的新

闻内容(在相同规模的报纸中，我们提供的新闻量是最多的) ，1984年的比率是50.9%(相较于

去年的50.4%)，远较一般的35%-40%高出许多，而我们也会继续维持在50%以上的比率，另

外去年我们虽然减少一般部门的工作时数，但编辑部门的编制却维持不变，虽然编辑室的开

支增加达9.1%，远较总成本增加4.9%为高。

在商业社会中，一家强势报纸的优势是极为明显的，老板通常相信惟有努力地推出最好的产

品才能维持高获利，但是这种令人信服的理论却让无法令人信服的事实打破，当一流的报纸

维持高获利时，三流报纸所赚得的钱却一点也不逊色有时甚至更多，只要你的报纸在当地够

强势，当然产品的品质对于一家报纸提高市场占极为关键，而我们也相信在水牛城也是如

此，而且像Alfred这样的人能领先我们的最主要原因亦是如此。

一旦主宰当地市场，报纸本身而非市场将会决定这份报纸是好还是坏，不过好或坏，终将大

发利市，在一般行业却不是这样，不良品质的产品它的生意一定不好，但即使是一份内容贫

乏的报纸对一般民众来说仍具有布告栏的价值，其它条件相同时，一份烂报当然无法像一份

一流报纸拥有广大的读者，但对一般市民却仍具用处，而间接使得广告主认同其存在的价

值。

因为市场对于报纸品质的要求水准并不高，管理阶层便须自我要求，我们的报纸在量的方面

具体地要求新闻成本须高于一般同业水准，而我们也有信心Stan Lipsey与Murray Light会

继续在质的方面予以加强，Charlie与我皆相信报纸是社会中的一特殊机构，我们相当引以

为傲，也期待在往后的日子更将更上层楼。

●

Yearly Change in Combined

Ratio

Premiums Written after

Policyholder

Dividends

% %

1972 10.2% 96.2%

1973 8.0% 99.2%

1974 6.2% 105.4%

1975 11.0% 107.9%

1976 21.9% 102.4%

1977 19.8% 97.2%

1978 12.8% 97.5%

1979 10.3% 100.6%

1980 6.0% 103.1%

1981 3.9% 106.0%

1982 4.4% 109.7%

1983 (Rev.) 4.5% 111.9%

1984 (Est.) 8.1% 117.7%

● 上表充份显示出整个产险业所面临到的状况，Combined Ratio代表保险总成本(产生的损失与

费用)占保费收入的比率，当它低于一百时表示有承保利益，反之则有承保损失，过去几年

我一再强调公司每年惟有保持10%以上的保费成长速度方能确保此比率不变，这是基于费用

占保费收入的比例不变，而理赔损失将因为单量、通膨与法院判决扩大理赔范围等原因，而

每年成长百分之十的假设。而不幸的是，实际情况真如我所预言，总计从1979-1984年间保

费收入约增加61%(平均年增率10%)，而Combined Ratio与1979年一样皆是100.6，相较之下，

同业保费平均增加30%，而Combined Ratio则变成117.7，而到今天我们仍相信保费收入的年变

动率是承保获利趋势的最佳指针。目前显示明年的保费年增率将超过10%，所以假设明年不

会发生什么特别大的灾害，我们预期Combined Ratio将往好的方向发展，然而若依照目前产业

损失的估计(及年增率10%)保费收入必须连徐续五年成长15%，才能将Combined Ratio降回到

100，亦即代表到1989年时保费须成长整整一倍，这似乎是不太可能的一件事，所以持平而

言，我们预期保费每年将成长约略超过10%，而Combined Ratio在产业竞争激烈的情况下，将

维持在108-113区间。

我们自己在1984年的Combined Ratio是可怜的134(在这里我不包括Structured Settlement在内)

这是连续三年我们的表现比同业水准差，我们预期明年Combined Ratio会变好，而且也会比同

业表现的好，Mike 自从从我手中接下保险业务后已改正了不少先前我所犯下的错误，而且

过去几年我们的业务集中在一些表现不如预期的保单上，这种情况将有助于与我们竞争的同

业退缩甚至出局，而当竞争局势打破后，我们就可以提高保费而不怕失去客户。过去几年我

一再告诉各位总有一天我们坚强的财务实力将有助于我们取得保险营运的竞争优势，而这一

天终将来临，无疑的我们是全美产险营运最佳，资金最雄厚的保险公司(甚至比一些有名规

模又大的公司还要好) ，同样重要的是公司的政策便是要持续维持此优势，保单购买者用钱

所换到的只是一纸承诺，而这纸承诺必须要经得起所有的逆境而非顺境的考验，最低限度，

它必须要能够经得起低迷股市与特别不利的承保状况等双重考验，我们的保险子公司有意愿

也有能力确保其承诺在任何状况下兑现，这是没有多少家保险公司能做得到的。

我们的财务实力对于去年曾提过的Structured Settlement与损失准备提列业务上来说是一项

很好用的利器，Structured Settlement的理培申请户与申请再保的保险公司必须要百分之百

确定在往后的几十年内能顺利获得支付，很少产险公司能够符合这种要求(事实上只有少数

几家公司能让我们有信心将我们自己的风险再保出去) ，而我们在这方面的业务大有成长，

我们持有用以弥补可能的负债的资金从一千六百万成长至三千万，我们预期这项业务将继续

成长且成长速度更快，为此我们特地为执行该业务的哥伦比亚保险公司办理增资，虽然竞争

颇为激列但获利却也令人满意。

● 至于GEICO的消息与往常一样大致上都不错，这家公司1984年在其主要业务的投保户大幅

增加，而其投资部们的表现一样优异，虽然承销结果不尽理想，但仍较同业突出，截至去年

底我们拥有该公司36%的权益，若以其产险总保费收入亿八千万计，我们的部份约有三亿二

千万左右，大约是我们自己承保量的二倍。

过去几年我一再提醒各位GEICO的股价涨幅明显超越其本业的表现，虽然后者一样杰出，

GEICO在我们公司的帐面价值成长幅度大于该公司本身内含价值的成长幅度，而我同时也

警告各位这种情形不会年复一年地一再发生，总有一天其股价的表现将逊于本业，而这句话

在1984年应验了，去年GEICO在波克夏的帐面值没什么变动，不过其公司的内含价值却大

幅增加，而由于GEICO代表着波克夏27%的净值，当其市场价值迟滞不前，直接便影响到波

克夏净值成长的表现，但我们对这样的结果并不会觉得有什么不好，我们宁愿要GEICO的

企业价值增加X倍而股价下跌，也不要公司内含价值减半而股价高涨，以GEICO这个case，

乃至于我们所有的投资，我们看得是公司本质的表现而非其股价的表现，如果我们对公司的

看法正确，市场终将还它一个公道。

所有的波克夏股东皆由于GEICO的经营团队，包括Jack Byrne、Bill Snyder与Lou Simpson

而获益良多，在他们的核心事业-低成本的汽车与房屋住宅保险，GEICO拥有显著且持续的

竞争优势，这在一般业界并不多见，可谓投资人的稀世珍宝(GEICO本身正说明的这一点，

优秀的经营团队将所有的重心放在核心事业以维持高获利能力) ，GEICO核心事业所产生的

资金大部份皆交由Lou Simpson来投资，Lou是一个情绪与理性兼具的罕见人才，这项人格

特色使其在长期投资方面有杰出表现，即使承受的较低的风险，其投资报酬却较同业表现要

好的许多，我对以上三位杰出经理人表达赞赏与感谢之意。

● 我认为所有在产险业有重大投资的股东对于这行业每年盈余报告的一项盲点要特别注意，

Phil Graham在担任华盛顿邮报的发行人时曾说:「新闻日报是攥写历史的第一手草稿」，而

很不幸的，产险业者所提供的年度财务报告，也可称得上是该公司财务与经营状况的第一手

草稿。

主要的问题在于成本，保险业最主要的成本是保户的理赔，而对于当年的收入会发生多少损

失实在是很难以去估计，有时损失的发生与其程度要在好几十年之后才会明朗。一般来说，

产险业当年度认列的损失主要包含有下列几项: (1)当年发生且支付的损失 (2)对于已发生且提

报但仍未合解案件的估计损失 (3) 对于已发生但尚未提报，亦即保险业者尚不知情案件所作

的损失估计数字(一般业界称之为IBNR-发生了但尚未提报) 以及 (4)对于以前年度对于前述(2)

(3)项估计所作之调整

虽然上述的调整时间可能会拉得很长，但不管怎样，先前在X年所估数字与实际的差异，于

以后年度不论是X+1 或是 X+10年，一定要修正回来，而这无可避免地，也将使得以后年度

的损益数字遭到误导，举例来说，假设我们的一位保户在1979年受伤，而当时估计的理赔金

额为一万美元，所以在当年度我们便会在帐上提列一万美元的损失与准备，又若后来到了

1984年商双方以十万美元合解，结果我们必须还要于1984年另行认列九万美元的损失，虽然

我们明知道该项损失系属于1979年所发生的，又再假设那是我们在1979年所接惟一的个案，

则公司的损益与股东的权益将明显遭到误导。

不管管理当局的意图如何地正当，由于需要广泛地应用”估计”来组合产险业财务报表上所

有看似真确的损益数字，所以无可避免地其中一定隐含着某些错误。而为了减少这类错误，

大部份的保险人运用各种不同的统计方法来调整其对成千上万的被保险人之损失估算以作为

加总估计所有应付义务的基础资料，而除此之外另外提列的特别准备则称之为补充准备，而

调整的目的是要使得损失在真正确定支付金额之前高估与低估的机率尽量接近百分之五十。

在波克夏我们已另加一项我们认为合理的损失准备，然而近年来它们却显得不太适当，而在

此有必要让各位知道牵涉到这项损失准备提列错误的严重性，如此大家便可明了此提列过程

是如何地不合理，从而判断公司的财务报表是否存在某些系统性的偏差。

下表显示近年来我们跟各位报告的保险承销成绩，同时并提供一年之后以”若当时我们知道

则我们认为我们现在认为应该是如何”的基础下的计算数字，而所谓地”我们认为我们现在

认为应该是如何”系因为这其中还包含许多对以前发生的损失所作的估计调整，然而这些损

失却还没有作最后的确定，只是因为一年的经过使得整个估计过程较为准确而已。

(Structured Settlement 与loss reserve assumption等保险业务不包括其中)

Underwritting Results Corrected Figures Differenciation

as Reported to You After One Year Experience

1980 6,738,000 14,887,000 8,149,000

1981 1,478,000 (1,118,000) (2,596,000)

1982 (21,462,000) (25,066,000) (3,604,000)

1983 (33,192,000) (50,974,000) (17,782,000)

1984 (45,413,000) ? ?

● 为了让各为近一步了解上表，让我们以1984年的数字加以解释，当年的税前承保损失为四千

五百万(这其中包括二千七百万为当年度所发生的损失，加上前一年度一千七百万估计的差

异数)

由此你可以发现，我跟各位报告的数字与实际所发生的数字有很大的出入，而且这几年的差

异数越来越不利，这特别让我觉得非常地懊恼，因为(1)我一向自认说话算话(2)我和我的保

险事业经理人若早发现事情的严重性一定不会坐视不管(3)我们少估计了损失，等于是多付给

国库本来不需付的税金(虽然早晚会修正回来，只是时间拉得越长，我们损失的利息就越

多) 。

而由于我们将整个重心摆在意外险与再保险事业，比起其它产险业者我们在估计损失这上头

隐含更多问题，(当你承保的一栋建筑物烧毁了，你可以很快地在损失成本上作反应，比起

一家向你投保的雇主发现他一名退休的员工在几十年前因工作关系感染某种疾病)即便如

此，我仍对于所犯的错误感到不好意思，在直接投保部份，我们大大低估了法院及陪审团不

顾事实真相与过去判例对损害赔偿的认定，而要求我们这些所谓深口袋付钱的群起效应，我

们也低估了一般大众对于受伤者应获得钜额补偿的传染效应。在再保险部份，既然我们自身

已低估了应提列准备，向我们寻求再保的保险公司也犯了相同的错误，由于我们的损失系依

据对方所提供的资料提存，所以他们犯的错也等于是我们犯的错一样。

最近我听到一则故事可以用来说明保险业目前所遇到的会计问题，有一位仁兄因公赴海外出

差，有一天接到他姐姐来电表示父亲因意外身故，由于一时无法赶回国内参加丧礼，他便交

待姐姐处理一切丧葬事宜并允诺负责所有费用，之后当他回国后不久便收到一张几百块美金

的帐单，他马上就把它给付掉，不过隔一阵子他又收到一张15元的帐单，而他也付了，可是

没想到一个月过后他再度收到类似15元的帐单，他终于忍不住打电话给他姐姐问一问是怎么

回事，只见他老姐在电话的另一头淡淡地表示:「噢! 没什么，忘了告诉你，那是因为爸爸身

上穿的那套西装是用租的」如果这几年你是从事保险业-尤其是再保险事业的话，这段故事

听下来可能会让你很心痛，尽管我们已尽可能让所有类似前述的西装租金列入在当期的财务

报表上，但过去这几年的结果却令我们感到汗颜，也足以引起各位的怀疑，在往后的年报中

我会持续跟诸位报告每年浮现的差异，不论是有利或是不利的。

当然在产险业间，不是所有准备提列不当的错误都是无心之过，随着承保绩效持续恶化，加

上管理当局在损失准备提列乃至于财务报表表达上有很大的裁量权，所以人性黑暗的一面便

彰显出来，有些公司若真正认真去评估其可能发生的损失成本的话，他们可能早已不适合再

继续经营下去，在这种情况下，有些被迫往特别乐观的方向去看待那些还未支付的潜在赔偿

款，有些则从事一些可以将损失暂时隐藏起来的交易行为。当然这些行为可以撑过一阵子，

外部独立的会计师也很难有效地对这类行为加以规范制止，当一家保险公司的实际上的负债

大于资产时，通常必须由公司本身宣告自己死亡，在这种强调自我诚信的制度下，尸体本身

通常会一再给自己翻案复活的机会。

在大部份的公司，倒闭的原因是因为现今周转不灵，但保险公司的情况却不是如此，你挂掉

时可能还脑满肠肥，因为保费是从保户一开始投保时便收到，但理赔款却是在损失发生之后

许久才须支付，所以一家保险公司可能要在耗尽净值之后许久才会真正耗用完资金，而事实

上这些所谓的活死人，通常更卯尽全力以任何价格承担任何风险来吸收保单，以始得现金持

续流入，这种态度就好象一个亏空公款去赌博的职员，只能被迫继续污公司的钱再去赌，期

望下一把能够幸运的捞回本钱以弥补以前的亏空，而即使不成功反正污一百万是死罪，污一

千万也是死罪，只要在事情东窗事发之前，他们还是能够继续保有原来的职位与待遇。

别的产险公司所犯的错对波克夏来说，不是只是听听而已，我们不但身受那些活死人削价竞

争之痛，当他们真得倒闭时，我们也要跟着倒霉，因为许多州政府设立的偿债基金系依照保

险业经营状况来征收，波克夏最后可能被迫要来分担这些损失，且由于通常要很晚才会发

现，事件会远比想象中严重，，而原本体质较弱但不致倒闭的公司可能因而倒闭，最后如滚

雪球一般，一发不可收拾，当然如果管理当局发现的早而及时加以防范，强制那些烂公司结

束经营，当可防止问题进一步扩大。

● 从1983年十月到1984年六月间，波克夏的保险子公司持续买进大笔的华盛顿公用电力供应系

统的一、二、三期债券(WPPSS 就是那家在1983年七月因无法履约偿还当初发行二十二亿美

元债券用以兴建四、五期电厂计划(现已放弃)的公司，虽然这两种债券在义务人、承诺事项

与抵押担保品上有极大不同，但四、五期问题的发生对于一、二、三期债券来说，已蒙上一

层阴影，且有可能对后续发行债券产生重大问题，此外一、二、三期本身的一些问题也可能

摧毁Bonneville所提供原先看起来颇具信用基础的保证。尽管有这些负面因素，但Charlie跟

我评估以我们当出买进时所承担的风险与购买的价格(远低于现在的市价)来说，其预期报酬

仍足以弥补所要承担的风险。

如你所知我们为保险子公司买进上市公司股票的标准与我们买下整家企业的标准并无二致，

然而这种企业评价模式并未广为基金经理人所应用，甚至还遭到学术人士批评，尽管如此，

对于那些追随者来说却颇为受用(对此有些学者会说，或许实际上真得可行，但理论上一定

行不通，简单地说，若我们能以合理的价格买到代表一小部份优良企业的经济利益，且能累

积一些这样的投资组合的话，对我们来说也是一件不错的事。而我们甚至把这种评价模式衍

伸到像WPPSS这类的债券投资之上，我们比较在WPPSS的一亿四千万期末投资成本与同样

金额的股权投资，前者可产生二千三百万的税后盈余(透过支付利息费用)且都是现金，只有

少数企业每年可赚得16.3%的税后资本报酬率，就算有其股票价格也高得吓人，以一般平均

购并交易来说，一家无财务杠杆每年可赚得二千三百万的税后盈余(等于要税前要赚四千五

百万)的公司，大约要价二亿五到三亿美元(有时还更高)，当然对于那种我们了解且特别偏爱

的公司，或许真的下得了手，但那还是等于我们购买WPPSS价钱的两倍。

然而在WPPSS这个Case，我们仍然认为存在有在一、二年内一文不值的些许潜在风险，同

时可能也会有暂时付不出利息的风险存在，更重要的是我们所持有二亿美金面值(大约比我

们持有成本高出48%)的债券。当然获利具有上限也是一大缺点，但各位必须了解，大部份的

事业投资除非持续投入大量的资金，事实上所谓的获利上限的空间极为有限，这是因为大部

份的企业无法有效地提高其股东权益报酬率-即使是原先一般认定可自动提高报酬率的高通

膨环境也是如此。

让我们对这个把债券当作投资的个案进一步作说明，若你决定将每年12%报酬的债券利息收

入继续买入更多的债券，它就好比你投资一些保留盈余继续再投资的一般企业一样，就前者

而言，若今天你以一千万投资30年票票面零利率的债券，则三十年后即2015年你约可得到三

亿美元，至于后者，若你同样投资一千万，则三十年后一样公司市值可增加至三亿美元，两

者在最后一年皆可赚得三千二百万美元。换句话说，我们投资债券就好象把它当成一种特殊

的企业投资，它具备有利的特点，也有不利的特点，但我们相信若你以一般投资的角度来看

待债券的话，将可避免一些头痛的问题。例如在1946年二十年期AAA级的免税债券其殖利

率约1%不到，事实上买进这些债券的投资人等于是投资一家每年赚不到一个百分点的烂企

业，若这些投资人有一点商业头脑，面对这样的投资条件，他一定会大笑地摇头走开，当时

有一些具有大好前景且每年可赚得税后10%、12%甚至15%的公司，却以帐面价值进行交

易，当时能以帐面价值交易的公司大概没有人会怀疑它赚不到1%的报酬率，但当时习惯买

卖债券的投资人仍努力地在这样的基准下进行交易，在往后的二十年间，虽然情况没有当初

那么夸张，债券投资人持续地以从商业角度来看完全不合理的条件，签下长达二、三十年的

约定，(在至今我个人认为最佳的投资教材- 由葛拉罕所写的the intelligent investor书中最后

一段提到，最佳的投资是以商业角度来看的投资)

我们必须再次强调投资WPPSS一定具有相当风险，且很难加以具体衡量，但Charlie跟我一

生若有五十次类似的投资机会，我想我们最后结算的成绩应该不赖，但我想我们一年大概遇

不到五次以上相同的机会，虽然长期累积下来的成绩铁定会不错，但也难保有一年的结果会

很惨(那也是为什么前面所有的句子开头不是Charlie跟我或是我们的原因) 。

大部份的经理人没有太大的动机去作那些-聪明但有时可能会变成白痴的决策，他们个人的

得失利弊太明确不过了，若一个很棒的点子真的成功，上头可能拍拍他的肩膀以示鼓励，但

万一要是失败，却可能要卷铺盖走路(依照老方法而失败是一条可行之路，就一整个团体而

言，旅鼠可能身负臭名，但却没有一只单独的旅鼠会受到责难) ，但在波克夏却不同，拥有

47%的股权，Charlie跟我不怕被炒鱿鱼，我们是以老板而非伙计的身份支领报酬，所以我们

把波克夏的钱当作自己的钱一样看待，这常使得我们在投资行为与管理风格上不遵循老路。

我们不默守成规的作法表现在我们将保险事业的资金集中投资之上(包括WPPSS债券投

资) ，而这种作法之有当像我们一样具备特别雄厚的财务实力方能成功，对其它保险公司来

说，相同程度的集中持股可能完完全全不适当，因为它们的资金实力可能无法承受任何重大

错误的发生，不管那个投资机会基于或然率的分析看起来多么吸引人都一样。以我们的财务

实力我们可以买下少数一大笔的我们想要买且用合理的价格投资的股票(Bill Rose形容过度

分散投资的麻烦，若你拥有四十位妻妾，你一定没有办法对每一个女人认识透彻，长期下来

我们集中持股的政策终会显现出它的优势，虽然多少会受到规模太大的拖累，而就算某一年

度它们表现得特别糟，至少你还能够庆幸我们投入的资金比各位还多。

我们在WPPSS的债券投资分几个不同时点与价格买进，若我们决定要调节有关部份，可能

要在变动结束后许久才会知会各位，(在你看到这篇年报时，我们可能已卖到或加码相关部

位) ，由于股票的买卖是属于竞争激烈的零和游戏，所以即使是因此加入一点竞争到任何一

方，也会大大影响我们的获利，所以我们买进WPPSS的债券可以作为最佳范例，从1983年

十月到1984年六月间，我们试着买进所有第一、二、三期的债券，但到最后我们只买到所有

流通在外数量的百分之三，如果我们在碰到一个头脑清楚的投资人，知道我们要吃货而跟着

进场，结果可能是我们以更高的价格买到更少的债券，(随便一个跟班可能要让我们多花五

百万美金)基于这项理由，我们并不透露我们在股票市场上的进出，不论是对媒体，或是对

股东，甚至对任何人，除非法令上特别要求。

最后我们对WPPSS的债券的最后心得是大部份情况下，我们不喜爱购买长期的债券，事实

上近几年来也很少买进，那是因为债券就像美元一样稳固，而我们对于美元长期的前景看

淡，我们相信高通货膨胀摆在眼前，虽然我们无法预测真正的数字，而且不排除完全失控的

可能性。这听起来不大可能会发生，考量到目前通膨已有下降的趋势，但我们认为以目前的

财政政策(特别是预算赤字)相当危险且很难加以改善(到目前为止两党的政治人物多听从

Charlie Brown的建议，没有什么问题是无法加以控制的)但若不能加以改善，高通膨或许暂

时不再发生(但却无法完全摆脱) ，而且一旦成形，可能会加快速度向上飙涨。其实投资股票

或债券并无太多分别，当通膨维持在5%-10%之间，但在高通膨时代可就完全不是那么一回

事了，在那种情况下，投资股票组合在实质上将会蒙受重大损失，但已流通在外的债券却可

能更惨，所以我们认为所有目前流通在外的债券组合事实上隐含着极大的风险，所以我们对

于债券投资特别谨慎，只有当某项债券比起其它投资机会明显有利时我们才会考虑，而事实

上这种情况少之又少。

● 一般公司都会跟股东报告股利政策，但通常不会详加解释，有的公司会说我们的目标时发放

40%-50%的盈余，同时以消费者物价指数增加的比率发放股利，就这样而已，没有任何分析

解释为何这类的政策会对股东有利，然而资金的配置对于企业与投资管理来说是相当重要的

一环，因此我们认为经理人与所有权人应该要好好想想在什么情况下，将盈余保留或加以分

配会是对股东最有利。

首先要了解的是，并非所有的盈余都会产生同样的成果，在许多企业尤其是那些资本密集

(资产/获利比例高)的公司，通膨往往使得帐面盈余变成人为的假象，这种受限制的盈余往往

无法被当作真正的股利来发放而必须加以保留再投资以维持原有的经济实质，万一要是勉强

发放，将会使得公司在以下几方面失去竞争力: (1)维持原有销售数量的能力(2)维持其长期竞

争优势(3)维持其原有财务实力，所以不论其股利发放比率是如何保守，一家公司要是常此以

往将会使得其注定面临淘汰，除非你一再抑注更多资金。

对公司老板来说受限制的盈余也并非毫无价值，但它们的折现值通常少得可怜，事实上企业

又非用它们不可，不管它们可产生的经济效益有多差，(这种不管前景多么不乐观一律保留

的情况，在十年前由Consolidated Edison无意间所提出而后令人难以置信的广泛流传着，在

当时一项惩罚性的规范政策是使得公司的股价以远低于帐面价值的价格交易的主要原因，有

时甚至以25%的帐面值交易，亦即当每一块钱的盈余被予以保留再投资，市场预期其将来所

可能产生的经济效益只有25分钱，讽刺的是尽管这种由金变成铜的现象一再发生，大部份的

盈余还是持续的被保留下来再投资。在此同时，在纽约都会区的建筑工地逐渐树起了企业的

标语写到:「我们还要继续挖下去吗?」

对于受限制的盈余我不再多谈，让我们将话题转到更有价值的不受限制的部份，所谓不受限

制的盈余顾名思义可以加以保留，也可以予以分配，我们认为分配与否主要取决于管理当局

判断何者对公司股东较为有利，当然这项原则并未广为大家所接受，基于某些理由管理当局

往往偏好将盈余予以保留以扩大个人的企业版图，同时使公司的财务更为优渥，但我们仍然

相信将盈余保留只有一个理由，亦即所保留的每一块钱能发挥更有的效益，且必需要有过去

的成绩左证或是对未来有精譬的分析，确定要能够产生大于一般股东自行运用所生的效益。

具体而言，假设有一位股东持有一种10%无风险永久债券，这种债券有一个特色，那就是投

资人每年有权可选择领取10%的债息或将此10%继续买进同类型的债券，假设其中有一年当

时长期无分险的殖利率为是5%，则投资人应当不会笨到选择领取现金而会将之继续买进同

类型的债券，因为后者能够产生更高的价值，事实上若他真得需要现金的话，他大可以在买

进债券后在市场上以更高的价格拋售变现，换句话说若市场上的投资人够聪明的话，是没有

人会选择直接领取现金债息的。相反的若当时市场的殖利率是15%，则情况将完全相反，没

有人会笨到要去投资10%的债券，即使他手上的闲钱真得太多，他也会先选择领取现金之后

再到市场上以较低的价格买进相同的债券。

同样的道理也可以运用在股东思考公司的盈余是否应该发放的问题之上，当然这时候的分析

可能较为困难且容易出错，因为再投资所能赚得的报酬率不像债券那个case是白纸黑字的数

字，反而可能会变动不一，股东必须去判断在可见的未来其平均的报酬率是多少，而一旦数

字订下来的话，之后的分析就简单多了，若预期报酬率高便可以再投资，反之则应要求加以

分配。许多企业的经理人很理智地运用上述标准对待旗下子公司，但到了自己所掌管的母公

司可就完全不是那么一回事了，他们很少会站在股东的立场为大家想，这种类似精神分裂症

的经理人，一面要求每年只能产生5%报酬率的子公司甲将资金分配回母公司，然后转投资

到每年可产生15%报酬率的子公司乙，这时他从不会忘记以前在商学院所学到的校训，但若

母公司本身预期的报酬率只有5%(市场上的平均报酬率是10%)，他顶多只会依循公司从前或

同业平均的现金股利发放率来做而已，当他要求旗下子公司提出报告对其保留盈余的比例作

出解释的同时，他却从来不会想到要对他公司背后的股东提出任何说明。

在判断是否应将盈余保留在公司，股东不应该只是单纯比较增加的资本所能增加的边际盈

余，因为这种关系会被核心事业的现况所扭曲，在高通膨的时代，某些具特殊竞争力的核心

事业能够运用少量的资金创造极高的报酬率(如同去年我们曾提过的商誉) ，除非是经历销售

量的钜幅成长，否则一家好的企业定义上应该是指那些可以产生大量现金的公司，相对的如

果一家公司将本来的资金投入低报酬的事业，那么即使它将增加的资本投入较高报酬的新事

业，表面上看起来是不错，但实际上却不怎么样，就好比在高尔夫球配对赛中，虽然大部份

的业余选手成绩一蹋胡涂，但团体比赛只取最好的成绩却由于部份职业选手的精湛球技而显

得出色。许多表面上持续缴出好绩效的公司事实上把大部份的资金投注在不具竞争力的事业

之上。只是前者掩盖住后者惨不忍睹(通常是用高价购并平庸的企业)的失败，而经营阶层也

一再强调他们从前一次挫败所学到的经验，但同时马上物色下一次失败的机会。这种情况

下，股东们最好把荷包看紧，只留下必要的资金以扩充高报酬的事业，剩下的部份要嘛就发

还给股东，要嘛就用来买回库藏股(一种暨可以增加股东权益，又可以避免公司乱搞的好方

法) 。

以上的讨论并不是指说公司的股利要随着每季盈余或投资机会的些微差异便要跟着变来变

去，上市公司的股东一般偏好公司有一贯稳定的股利政策，因此股利的发放应该要能够反应

公司长期的盈余预期，因为公司的前景通常不会常常变化，股利政策也应该如此，但长期而

言公司经营阶层应该要确保留下的每一块钱盈余发挥效用，若一旦发现盈余保留下来是错

的，那么同样也代表现有经营阶层留下来是错的。

现在让我们回过头来检视波克夏本身的股利政策，过去记录显示波克夏的保留盈余可赚得较

市场更高的报酬率，亦即每保留一块钱盈余可创造大于一块钱的价值，在这种情况下，任何

发放股利的动作可能都不利于所有波克夏的大小股东。事实上，以我们过去刚开始经营事业

的经验显示，在公司的草创初期发放大量的现金股利并不是一件好的事情，当时Charlie跟

我掌控三家企业-波克夏、多元零售与蓝筹邮票公司(现在已合并为一家公司) ，蓝筹邮票公

司只发放一点股利而其余两家皆未发放，相反的若当时我们把所赚的钱统统发掉，我们现在

可能赚不到什么钱，甚至连一点资本也没有，这三家公司当初各自靠一种事业起家(1) 波克

夏的纺织(2) 多元零售的百货公司(3) 蓝筹邮票的邮票买卖，这些基础事业(特别要提到的是，

那些我跟Charlie再三斟酌敲定的一个形容词)目前已(1)幸存下来但赚不到什么钱(2)规模萎缩

并发生大幅亏损(3)只剩当初入主时，5%的营业额。所以只有将资金投入到更好的事业，我

们才能克服先天上的劣势(就好象是在补救年轻时的荒诞)很明显的，多角化是对的。

我们将持续多角化并支持现有事业的成长，虽然我们一再强调，这些努力的报酬铁定比过去

的成绩逊色，但只要被保留下来的每一块钱能够创造更大的利益，我们便会持续的这样做，

而一旦我们评估留下的盈余无法达到前述的标准，我们一定会把所有多余的钱发还给股东，

当然会同时权衡过去的记录与未来的前景，当然单一年度的变化颇大，基本上我们会以五年

为期来作判断。

我们现今的计划是用保留的盈余来扩充保险事业，我们大部份的竞争对手财务状况比我们差

而不愿大幅的扩充，但此刻正值保费收入大幅成长之际，比起1983年的50亿，预计1985年将

成长至150亿，这正是我们大捞一笔的难得良机，当然没有什么事百分之百确定的。

● 又到了每年我刊登小广告的时候了，去年John Loomis我们一位特别有心的股东，跟我们提

到一家完全符合我们标准的公司，我们马上加以锁定，只可惜最后因为一项无解的问题而功

亏一篑，以下是跟去年一模一样的广告:

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有五百万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟) ，我们

倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。

我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，对于那些好的公司与好的经营阶

层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。(1984)

● 今年破记录的有97.2%的有效股权参与1984年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约三百多万美元捐

出的款项分配给1,519家慈善机构，股东会的资料包含一个可以让你表达对这项计划的意见

(例如应否继续、每一股应捐赠多少等等)你可能会有兴趣知道事实上在此之前从未有一家公

司是以股东的立场来决定公司捐款的去向，经理人在信任资本主义的同时，好象不太相信资

本家。

我们建议新股东赶快阅读相关信息，若你也想参加的话，我们强烈建议你赶快把股份从经纪

人那儿改登记于自己的名下。

● 波克夏的股东年会预计于1985年五月二十一在奥玛哈举行，我希望各位届时都能参加，大部

份的股东年会都是在浪费股东与经营阶层的时间，有时是因为经营阶层不愿深入讨论公司的

实质面，有时是因为有些股东只顾自己出锋头而未真正关心公司的事务，本来应该是经营事

业的讨论会最后往往变成一场闹剧(这是件再划算不过的主意，只要买进一股，你就可以让

一大群人坐着听你高谈阔论) ，最后往往是劣币驱逐良币，使得真正关心公司的股东避而远

之，剩下一堆爱现的小丑。

波克夏的股东年会却完全不是那么一回事，虽然与会的股东一年比一年多，但至今我们却很

少遇到什么蠢问题或是以自我为中心的言论，相反的，大家提出的都是一些有见地的商业问

题，正因为大家开会的目的便是为此，因此不管要花多少时间我跟Charlie很乐意为大家解

答这类的问题，(然而很抱歉我们无法在其它的时候用书面或电话回答问题，因为以一家拥

有三千名股东的公司，若一一回答的话实在是太没有效率了) ，而我们惟一无法回答的商业

问题是正直要花多少代价去证明，尤其是我们在股票市场上的进出。

最后我通常要花一点时间来吹嘘我们公司的管理干部有多好，欢迎来参加年会，你就晓得为

什么了，外县市来的可以考虑到Nebraska家具店逛逛，若你决定买些东西，你会发现你所省

下的钱足够支付你这趟的旅费，相信我你一定会觉得不虚此行的。

● 期后事项，三月十八在报告付梓的一周之后，我们协议以每股172.5美金买进三百万股资本

城广拨Capital Cities Communications，其中有一项附带要件是资本城必须要能够成功买下

ABC美国广播公司，否则合约无效，在前几年的年度我们一再对资本城的领导阶层-包括

Tom Murphy 与Dan Burke表示推崇，原因很简单，因为他们不管在能力与人格方面，皆是

一时之选，明年的年报我将会详加说明这项投资案的始末。

● 一九八五年

各位可能还记得去年年报最后提到的那个爆炸性消息，平时表面上虽然没有什么动作，但我们的

经验显示偶尔也会有一些大卡司出现，这种精心设计的企业策略终于在1985年有了结果，在今年

报告的后半部将会讨论到(a)我们在资本城/ABC的重大投资部位(b)我们对Scott&Fetzer的购并(c)

我们与消防人员保险基金的合约(d)我们卖出在通用食品的部位。

去年波克夏的净值约增加了六亿一千万美金，约相当于增加了48.2%，这比率就好比哈雷慧星造

访一般，在我这辈子中再也看不到了，二十一年来我们的净值从19.46增加到1,643.71约为23.2%

年复合成长率，这又是一项不可能再重现的比率。

有两个因素让这种比率在未来难以持续，一种因素属于暂时性-即与过去二十年相较，现在股市

中缺乏合适的投资机会，如今我们已无法为我们的保险事业投资组合找到价值低估的股票，这种

情况与十年前有180度的转变，当时惟一的问题是该挑那一个便宜货。市场的转变也对我们现有

的投资组合产生不利的影响，在1974年的年报中，我可以说我们认为在投资组合中有几支重要个

股有大幅成长的潜力，但现在我们说不出口，虽然我们保险公司的主要投资组合中，有许多公司

如同过去一样拥有优秀经营团队也极具竞争优势，但目前市场上的股价已充份反应这项特点，这

代表今后我们保险公司的投资绩效再也无法像过去那样优异。

第二项负面因素更显而易见的是我们的规模，目前我们在股票投入的资金是十年前的20倍，而市

场的铁则是成长终将拖累竞争的优势，看看那些高报酬率的公司，一旦当他们的资本额超过十亿

美金，没有一家在往后的十年能够靠再投资维持20%以上的报酬率，而仅能依赖大量配息或买回

自家股份来维持，虽然前者能为股东带来更大的利益，但公司就是无法找到理想的投资机会。

而我们的问题就跟他们一样，去年我告诉各位在往后十年我们大约要赚到39亿美金，才能有15%

的成长，今年同样的门槛提高到57亿美金(根据统记:扣除石油公司不算，只有15家公司在过去十

年能够赚到57亿)

我跟Charlie-经营波克夏事业的合伙人，对于波克夏能够保持比一般美国企业更高的获利能力持

乐观的态度，而只要获利持续身为股东的你也能保证因此受惠，(1)我们不必去担心每季或每年的

帐面获利数字，相反地只要将注意力集中在长远的价值上即可(2)我们可以将事业版图扩大到任何

有利可图的产业之上，而完全不受经验、组织或观念所限(3)我们喜爱我们的工作，这些都是关键

因素，但即便如此我们仍必须要大赚一笔(比过去达到23.2%还要更多)才有办法使我们的平均报酬

率维持15%

另外我还必须特别提到一项投资项目，是与最近购买本公司股票的投资人有密切相关的，过去一

直以来，波克夏的股票价格约略低于内含价值，维持在这样的水准，投资人可以确定(只要折价

的幅度不再继续扩大)其个人的投资经验与该公司本身的表现维持一致，但到了最近，这种折价

的状况不再，甚至有时还会发生溢价，折价情况的消失代表着波克夏的市值增加的幅度高于内含

价值增长的速度(虽然后者的表现也不错)，当然这对于在此现象发生前便持有股份的人算是好消

息，但对于新进者或即将加入者却是不利的，而若想要使后者的投资经验与公司的表现一致，则

这种溢价现象便必需一直维持，然而管理当局无法控制股价，当然他可对外公布政策与情况，促

使市场参与者的行为理性一点，而我个人偏好(可能你也猜得到)即期望公司股价的表现尽量与其

企业本身价值接近，惟有维持这种关系，所有公司的股东在其拥有所有权期间皆能与公司共存共

荣，股价剧幅的波动并无法使整体的股东受惠，到头来所有股东的获利总和必定与公司的获利一

致，但公司的股价长时间偏离内含价值(不管是高估或低估)都将使得企业的获利不平均的分配到

各个股东之间，而其结果好坏完全取决于每个股东本身有多幸运、或是聪明愚笨，长久以来，波

克夏本身的市场价值与内含价值一直存在着一种稳定的关系，这是在所有我熟悉的上市公司中少

见的，这都要归功于所有波克夏的股东，因为大家都很理性、专注、以投资为导向，所以波克夏

的股价一直很合理，这不凡的结果是靠一群不凡的股东来完成，几乎我们所有的股东都是个人而

非法人机构，没有一家上市公司能够像我们一样。

或许你会认为法人机构，拥有高薪的职员与经验丰富的专业人员会成为金融市场稳定与理性的力

量，那你就大错特错了，那些法人持股比重较重且持续受关注的的股票，其价格通常都不合理。

我的老师葛拉罕四十年前曾讲过一个故事说明为何专业的投资人员会是如此，一个老石油开发商

蒙主宠召，在天堂的门口遇到了圣彼得，圣彼得告诉他一个好消息跟一个坏消息，好消息是他有

资格进入天堂，但坏消息却是天堂里已没有位置可以容纳额外的石油开发商，老石油开发商想了

一下，跟圣彼得说只要让他跟现有住户讲一句话就好，圣彼得觉得没什么大碍就答应了，只见老

石油开发商对内大喊:「地狱里发现石油了」，不一会儿，只见天堂的门打开，所有的石油开发商

争先恐后地往地狱奔去，圣彼得大开眼界地对老开发商说:「厉害!厉害!现在你可以进去了」，但

只见老开发商顿了一下后，说到:「不!我还是跟他们一起去比较妥当，传言有可能是真的」

下表显示波克夏帐列盈余的主要来源，这些数字加上一些更详细的各部门信息是Charlie跟我注意

的重点，反而我们不认为合并的总数对于管理与评量波克夏有什么帮助，事实上我们内部本身从

来不会用到。

部门信息对于想要了解一家多角化公司的投资人来说同等重要，企业经理人在购并一家公司时通

常也会坚持这一点，但最近这几年对于要决定买进卖出股权的投资人却要不到这样的信息，相反

的当股东想要了解公司的经营情况而跟管理阶层要这样的信息时，他们通常以可能危害公司利益

来响应，直到最后证管会下令公司须揭露才心甘情愿一五一十的报告出来，这种态度的转变让我

想起Al Capone的比喻:拿着一只枪好好的说的效果，会比光是好好的说要好的多。

下表商誉的摊销以单一字段另行列示(理由详我1983年的附录)，

1985 Unit:US'000

Earnings Before

Income Tax

After Income Tax

Percent Total Berkshire

Berkshire Share

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

100.0% (44,230) (44,230) (23,569)

100.0% 95,217 95,217 79,716

Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles 100.0% (2,395) (2,395) (1,324)

Associated Retail Stores 100.0% 270 270 134

Nebraska Furniture Mart 100.0% 12,686 12,686 5,181

See's Candies 100.0% 28,989 28,989 14,558

Buffalio Evening News 100.0% 29,921 29,921 14,580

Blue Chip Stamps-Parent 100.0% 5,763 5,763 2,813

Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent 100.0% 9,500 9,500 4,191

Mutual Savings and Loan 100.0% 2,622 2,622 4,016

Presion Steel 100.0% 3,896 3,896 1,477 28.4%

Amortization of Goodwill (1,475) (1,475) (1,475)

Interest on Debt (14,415) (14,415) (7,288)

Shareholder's Contribution (4,006) (4,006) (2,164)

Other 3,106 3,106 2,102

125,449 125,449 92,948 25.9%

Realized Securities Gain 487,907 109,272 342,867

613,356 234,721 435,815 -85.7%

● 1985年出售证券的收益特别高，但事实上不代表今年就是丰收的一年(虽然事实上的确

是)，出售证券收益就好象大学生的毕业典礼一样，四年来所学的知识在一朝正式被认可，

而事实上在当天你可能一点长进都没有，我们可能持有一支股票长达十年之久，而在这期

间其价值与股价可能以稳定的步调增长，可是在我们真正出售的那一年其价值可能一点也

没变，或甚至减少，但所有的帐面利益却全反应在出售的那一年，(但是如果这支股票是由

我们的保险子公司持有，其市价的变东将会按期反应在帐面之上) ，总而言之，帐列出售

损益是没有什么意义的，根本无法反应我们在当年度的实际表现。

1985年大部份出售证券的收益约三亿四千万美金是缘于我们出售通用食品的股票，我们从

1980年开始便持有大部份个股，我们当初以远低于我们认为合理的每股企业价值的价位买

进，年复一年，Jim与Phil等管理阶层的优异表现大幅提升该公司的价值，一直到去年秋

天，Philip Morris对该公司提出购并的要求，使其价值显现出来，我们因四项因素而大大

受惠(1)便宜的买进价格(2)一家优秀的公司(3)一群能干且注重股东权益的管理阶层(4)愿意出

高价的买主，而最后一项因素是这项获利能够一举浮现的惟一原因，但我们却认为前三项

才是能为波克夏股东创造最大利益的原因。在选择股票时，我们专注于如何漂亮的买进，

而全不考虑出售的可能性。

今年我们又再度收到被投资公司的特别股利，这次是华盛顿邮报以及通用食品，(通用的这

笔交易很明显地是发生在Philip Morris提出并购要求之前) ，这种特别股利的发生系由于

公司在买回我们手中的股份的同时也从其它股东那里买回等比例的股份，合约中并明订我

们在该公司所占的股权比例在买卖交易的前后维持不变，这类交易被IRS认定为类似股利

的发放，因为身为一位股东即使在收到现金之后，在该公司的股权比例仍维持不变。这对

我们来说较为有利，因为美国税法规定法人纳税义务人(不像个人) ，对于股利的所得税远

低于长期投资的资本利得税(而其中的差异将会再扩大，若国会通过的法案正式成为法律:

相关条款规定企业实现的资本利得所适用税率与一般所得相同) ，然而会计原则对于这类

交易在财务报表上应如何处理却无统一看法，为与去年作法一致，在财务上我们仍将之视

为资本利得。

虽然我们不刻意促成这类交易案，但当管理当局自动提出这种想法时，我们通常站在支持

的立场，虽然每次我们都觉得选择不卖的股东(当然大家都有权利以我们收到的价格出售)

将因公司以低于内含价值的价格买回而受惠，但税负上的优惠以及我们寄望与管理阶层维

持合作的态度以增进所有股东权益，使得我们不得不接受卖回股份，但只有在我们的持股

比例未减损的大原则之下进行。

● 通常讲到这里接下来要谈的是，我们经营的主要事业，在开始之前，先看看我们所属事业

的一项失败，我们的副主席Charlie Munger，总是强调研究事业与人生各方面的失败要比

研究成功要重要的多，他这样的精神正如有人说:「我总是想要知道以后我会怎么死，然后

尽量去避免这件事发生。」而你可能也看得出，我们两个可说是合作无间，他喜欢研究错

误，而我总是能够确保他有足够的题材去作研究，尤其是在纺织与保险事业方面。

关闭纺织事业-七月时我们决定关闭我们在纺织事业的营运，而到年底之前这项令人不太愉

快的工作也大致告一段落，而回顾纺织产业的历史深具启发性。

当巴菲特合伙事业(当时由我本人担任该合伙事业的执行合伙人)在二十一年前买下波克夏

纺织公司的控制权时，公司的帐面价值约为二仟二百万美元，全部集中在纺织事业，然而

当时由于公司无法赚得与帐面价值相称的报酬，其内含价值却远低于此数，事实上，在此

之前九年，(即波克夏与海瑟威两家合并经营期间)合计总营收达五亿多美元，却发生一仟

万美金的亏损，虽然时有获利，但总是进一步、退两步。

在我们买下该公司的当时，南方的纺织工厂由于不具工会组织而被公认为较具竞争优势，

大部份北方的工厂皆已结束营运，而当时许多人认为我们也应该将该公司清算。然而我们

觉得公司若能有一位长期稳定的管理者，营运将可改善，所以当时我们马上选中Ken

Chase接手，有关这点我们到是作对了，Ken跟后来接替他的Garry作得非常好，一点也不

输给我们其它获利更高的事业经营者。

在1967年初我们利用纺织事业产生的大量现金进入保险事业买下National Indemnity，一

部份资金来自于盈余，一部份则来自于减少纺织事业的存货、应收与固定资产的投资，这

次撤退的决策事后证明完全正确，即使由于Ken的管理营运大为改善，但纺织事业从未赚

到什么钱，即使是在景气高峰的时候。波克夏后来持续多角化，始得纺织业的不良对于公

司整体的影响越来越轻微，而我们之所以继续来在纺织业的原因，我早在1978年便曾提过

(后来也曾陆续提到)

(1)该公司为当地非常重要的雇主

(2)管理当局坦诚面对困境并努力解决问题

(3)劳工体认困境并极力配合

(4)尚能产生稳定现金收入

我后来还说只要这些情况持续不变(我们也预期不会变)，即使有更多更好的投资机会，我

们仍会支持纺织事业坚持下去。

但事实证明第四点是错的，虽然隔年1979年的获利状况还不错，但之后却耗用大量的资

金，直到1985年中情况变得再明显不过，若我们能够找到合适的买主，即使贱价出售我们

也不愿意看到该事业被清算，但我们清楚这点，表示别人更清楚，没有人会有兴趣。

我们不会因为想要将企业的获利数字增加一个百分点，便结束比较不赚钱的事业，但同时

我们也觉得只因公司非常赚钱便无条件去支持一项完全不具前景的投资的作法不太妥当，

亚当史密斯一定不赞同我第一项的看法，而卡尔马克斯却又会反对我第二项见解，而采

行中庸之道是惟一能让我感到安心的作法。

我必须还要再强调一次，Ken与Garry两个人都极具干劲与想象力，努力地想要使我们的纺

织事业经营成功，为了使公司持续稳定获利，他们重新规划产品线、生产流程与通路商配

置，同时也大手笔并购了同业Waumbec，期望能够发挥合并综效(一个企业合并广泛应用

的名词，用来解释一些想不出有其它任何意义的购并案) ，但到结果最后一点用都没有，

而这一切都因我没有及早结束这项事业，最近商业周刊有一篇文章提到1980年以来一共有

250家纺织业结束营运，这些工厂的老板所收到的所有信息我全都明了，只是他们能够更

客观地看待事情，我忽略了Comte的建议:「智者应该是心灵的仆人，而非它的奴隶」，相

信你所相信的。

国内的纺织业所面临的是全球产能过剩的商品化产品的激烈竞争，我们所面临的问题主要

归因于直接或者是间接来自于国外低劳力成本的竞争。但关厂绝对不是本国劳工的错，事

实上比起美国其它产业的劳工来说，纺织业的员工薪资水准低得可怜，在劳资协议时，工

会的干部与成员充份体认到整个产业所面临的困境，从未作出不合理的调薪要求或不符生

产效益的诉求，相反地，大家都努力的想要维持竞争力，而即使到了公司最后清算的时

刻，他们仍极力配合，而讽刺的是，要是工会表现的过份一点，使我们早一点体认到这行

不具前景而立克关厂，我们的损失可能会少一点。

长年以来，我们一再面临投入大量的资本支出以降低变动成本的抉择，每次提出的企划案

看起来都稳赚不赔，以标准的投资报酬率来看，甚至比起我们高获利的糖果与新闻事业还

好的许多，但这预期的报酬最后都证明只是一种幻象，因为我们许多竞争者，不管是国内

或者是国外，全都勇于投入相同的资本支出，使得降低的成本被迫全数反应在售价之上，

在个别公司看来，每家公司的资本支出计划看起来都再合理不过，在若整体观之，其效益

完全被抵销掉而变得很不合理，就好比每个去看游行队伍的观众，以为自己只要蹎一蹎脚

就可以看得更清楚一样，每多投入一回合，所有的竞争者投注的金额就越高，但投资报酬

却一点也不见起色。

结果是我们面对一个悲惨的抉择，大笔的资本支出虽然可以令我们的纺织事业得以存活，

但其相对的投资报酬却是少得可怜，每次投入一笔资金，依然还是要面对国外低成本的强

力竞争，若不再继续投资，将使我们更不具竞争力，即使是与国内同业相比，我总觉得自

己就好象伍迪爱伦在他某一部电影中所形容的:「比起历史上的任何一刻，此时人类面临抉

择的路口，一条通往绝望的深渊，而另一条则通往毁灭，请大家一起祈祷让我们有足够的

智能去作正确的决定」

想要对在商品化产业是否应继续投资作决定，看看Burlington工业-二十年来为美国最大的

纺织公司，1964年该公司的营业额约为十二亿美元(波克夏则约五千万)，他们在行销与生

产上拥有我们无法比拟的优势，当然盈余数字也比我们要好看得多，当然它的股价为60块

(波克夏则约13块) 。之后Burlington决定固守纺织本业，直到1985年营业额达二十八亿美

金，在此二十年间该公司总计投入约三十亿美金的资本支出，这数字远比其它同业高出许

多，换算每股约为二百元，而我相信大部份的花费用于降低成本与扩张之上，以该公司决

定固守本业的决定之上，这种投资决策绝对是合理的。

但尽管如此，比起二十年前该公司现在的实际销售数字与投资报酬却是大不如前，该公司

现在的股价是34元，若考虑1965年每二股配一股计算在内，大约略高于当年的60元，而在

此同时，消费者物价指数却早已增加三倍，因此每股大约仅剩下当初三分之一的购买力，

虽然每年有固定的盈余发放，但它的购买力一样受到严重的减损。

这个对股东来说最悲惨的结局，说明了花费大量人力物力在错误的产业所可能导致的后

果，这种情况有如山谬杰克森的那匹马，一只能数到十的马是只了不起的马，却不是了不

起的数学家，同样的一家能够合理运用资金的纺织公司是一家了不起的纺织公司，但却不

是什么了不起的企业。

从个人的经验与观察得到一个结论，那就是一项优异的记录背后(从投资报酬率的角度来衡

量)你划的是一条怎样的船更胜于你怎样去划(虽然不管一家公司好或坏，努力与才能也很

重要) ，几年前我曾说当一个以管理著名的专家遇到一家不具前景的公司时，通常是后者

会占上风，如今我的看法一点也不变，当你遇到一艘总是会漏水的破船，与其不断白费力

气去补破洞，还不如把精力放在如何换条好船之上。

● 有关我们在纺织业投资的”辉煌历史” 还有一段后话，有些投资人在买卖股票时把帐面价

值看得很重(就像早期我的作风一样)，也有些经济学者相信重置价值在计算一家公司的股

价时极为重要，关于这两种说法在经过拍卖纺织机器设备后，让我好好地上了一课，卖掉

的设备(包括部份先前已处分的)满满一工厂全为堪用品，原始成本为一仟三百万美金(包括

近几年投入的二百万) ，经过加速摊提折旧后，帐面价值八十六万，虽然没有人会笨到再

继续投资，但要买一套全新的设备也要花三、四千万美金。但你知道吗?整个机器处分只收

到十六万，扣除掉处份所耗费的成本，最后一毛也不剩，我们在几年前买五千块一只的纺

纱开价五十元还没人要，最后以几近下脚价格的二十六块卖掉，连付搬运的工资都不够。

想想看二家水牛城报摊或一家喜斯糖果店铺所能发挥的经济价值还比它高，而这些有形资

产在几年之前，不同的经济环境之下，却能一口气雇用上千个人。

● 记得十二岁时我和爷爷一起住了大概有四个月，那时他开了一家杂货店，且用心写了一本

书，每晚还指定几页要我读，书名不盖你，叫「如何经营一家杂货店与我从钓鱼上学到的

一些事」，我爷爷以为所有人对于这两件事一定都会感兴趣，且全世界一定都会看重他的

想法，看完下面这一段后，你一定会觉得我的写作风格与内容(也包含个性)完全承袭了我

爷爷。

我把Nebraska家具店、喜斯糖果店与水牛城报纸摆在一起谈是因为我认为这几家企业的竞

争优势、弱点与产业前景跟我一年前报告的一样，一点都没有改变，简短的叙述不代表它

们占我们公司的重要性有丝毫的减损，1985年合计税前净利为七千二百万美元，在十五年

前还未买下它们之前，此数字为八百万美元，从八百万到七千二百万，看起来好象很惊人

(事实上也是) ，但你千万不要以来本来就是这样，首先你必须确定基期没有被低估，还要

考虑所投入的资金，以及增加盈余所需再投入的资金。关于这几点，这三家公司完全经得

起考验，第一，十五年前它们相对于其所耗用的资本，所产生的盈余颇为可观，第二，虽

然每年增加了六千多万盈余，其额外投入的资本也不过只有四千万美金而已。公司运用少

数额外资金便能大幅提高获利能力的原因在于高通膨时代品牌商誉所能发挥的魔力，(我们

在1983年报中有详细解释) ，这些公司的特性使得我们可以将他们所赚到的盈余用在别的

用途之上，然而一般的美国企业就不是这么一回事，想要大幅提高获利相对地往往也要再

投入大量的资金，平均要每投入五块钱每年才能增加一块钱的获利，等于要额外投入三亿

美元，才能达到我们这三家公司的获利水准。

当资本报酬率平平，这种大堆头式的赚钱方式跟本没什么了不起，你坐在摇椅上也能轻松

达到这样的成绩，好比只要把你存在银行户头里的钱，一样可以赚到加倍的利息，没有人

会对这样的成果报以掌声，但通常我们在某位资深主管的退休仪式上歌颂他在任内将公司

的盈余数字提高数倍，却一点也不会去看看这些事实上是因为公司每年所累积盈余与复利

所产生的效果。当然若那家公司在此期间以有限的资金赚取极高的报酬或是只增加一点资

金便创造更多的盈余，则他所得到的掌声是名符其实，但若报酬率平平或只是用更多的资

金堆积出来的结果，那么就应该把掌声收回，因为只要把存在银行所赚的8%利息再继续存

着，18年后你的利息收入自然加倍。

这种简单的算术问题常常被公司所忽略而损及股东的权益，因为许多公司的奖励计划随随

便便大方的犒赏公司主管，例如十年固定价格的认股权，事实上公司的盈余增加有许多只

是单纯地因为盈余累积所产生的效果，有一个例子可以用来说明这其间的不合理性，假设

你在银行有年利率8%定存十万元交由一位信托人士来保管，由他来决定你每年实际要领多

少利息出来，未领出的利息则继续存在银行利滚利，再假设我们伟大的信托人将实领利息

的比例定为四分之一，最后让我来看看十年之后你会得到什么，十年后你的户头会有

179,084，此外在信托人的精心安排下，你每年所赚的利息会从8,000增加到13,515，实领的

利息也从2,000增加到3,378，而最重要的是当每年你的信托人送交的你的年度报告时，你

会发现图表中每一项数字都是一飞冲天。

现在让我们再作进一步假设，你与信托人签订的信托合约中有一项附予信托人十年固定价

格的认股权的约定，到最后发现你的信托人会从你的口袋中大捞一笔，而且你会发现要是

利息负现的比例越低，你付的就会越多。而你不要以为这跟你一点关系都没有，在现实社

会中这样的情况比比皆是，这些公司主管只因公司盈余累积而非将公司资金管理得当便大

捞一票，十个月我都觉得太长，更何况是长达十年以上。

而事实上，公司主管对于选择权(扣除附认股权可让公司立即取得对价)这档子事具有双重

标准，假设是对外发行这样的认股权，其价格一定会高得惊人，当然这种奖励方法有时也

会用到那些有才能、对公司真正有贡献的人身上，(事实上，一家公司真正给有杰出表现的

人往往给的不够多) ，不过通常只是碰巧，而这种选择权一旦给了，便无法收回，无论这

个人之后表现如何都不能取消(只要他老兄继续留在公司)，一个庸才从选择权赚到的跟真

正的人才一样多，这实在是管理界的李伯大梦最好的去处了。

我忍不住要再提一下之前克来斯勒所给美国政府外部选择权作为部份报酬以请求其为借款

担保的案例，当后来这些选择权变得价值不菲时，克来斯勒竭尽所能想要修改条件，声称

这比真正应该给政府协助该公司东山再起的报酬多出太多，该公司认为政府所获得与付出

不成正比的不满最后甚至演变成全国性的新闻，这种不平之鸣显得有点突兀，因为就我所

知，没有一家公司的经理人会对本身在选择权的不劳而获表示过任何异议。讽刺的是，大

家一再发表「选择权的实施有其必要，因为如此一来经理人与股东便能同舟一济」的论

调，而事实上，两者的船是完全不同，所有股东皆必须负担资金成本，而经理人持有的固

定价格选择权却什么也不必承担，股东在期盼公司发达的同时还必须承受公司可能失败的

风险，事实上一个你希望能享有认股权的投资计划往往是你不会想要投资的计划，(若有人

要免费送我乐透彩券，我一定欣然接受，但若要我买一张则完全免谈) 。

在股利政策方面亦然，凡事对持有选择权的经理人最有利的对股东一定最不利，回到之前

的银行存款上头，不领利息对于持有选择权的受托人最有利，相反地，身为委托人应该要

倾向把利息全领出来，免得让经理人利用利滚利占你便宜。

虽然有那么多缺点，选择权在某些时后还是很好用，我批评的重点主要是它们被无限制地

遭到滥用，这里我有三点要说明:

(1)由于选择权与公司整体的表现惜惜相关，所以理论上它们应该用在负责公司全局的高阶

主管身上，部门的主管则应视其负责部份的表现给予奖励，对于打击率高达三成五的球员

来说，应该给予大幅的调薪，即使他待的是一支大烂队，相反地，对于打击率一成五的球

员，就算他们那一队最后得到冠军也应该请他走路，只有负责全局的人，如总教练才应与

球队整体战绩绑在一起

(2)选择权规划应当要非常慎重，除非有特殊原因，应该要把资金成本与保留盈余的影响列

入考量，价格也要合理的订定，当公司面临外部购并时，他们一定马上指出市价是如何地

不合理无法反应公司实际的价值，但是为何公司要以更低的价格贱卖给公司部份股权给经

理人呢?(他们甚至还会说，会尽量以最低的价格将股权卖给内部人，不管公司要负担多少

税负)除非在非常特殊的情况，公司不管是将部份股权廉价卖给内部人或外部人，原来的股

东权益一定受到损害，最后的结论是选择权的认购价一定要与真实价值相当

(3)我必须强调有一些我非常欣赏且经营绩效更甚于我的经理人，不认同我在固定价格选择

权的看法，他们建立了一套具个人管理风格的企业文化，而其中固定价格认股权是他们认

为非常有用的一项工具，以他们个人的领导风格与示范并以认股权作为诱因，他们成功地

引导部属以股东的心态来想事情，这种风格不多见，但若有我们也必须小心的加以维护，

即使这样的作法会破坏公平性与效率，孰谚有云:「东西若没坏，就不必修理」，这总比无

可救药的完美主义好得多。

然而在波克夏我们采用的奖励计划系依每个人在其职权范围内的目标达成状况做为奖赏的

依据，若喜斯糖果表现的好，则这与新闻事业部门一点关系都没有，反之亦然，而我们在

发放奖金时与公司本身股价高低没有任何关连，我们认为表现好的单位，不管波克夏的股

价是涨是跌，都应该奖励，同样的即使波克夏的股价飙涨，若员工表现平平也不应该大发

奖金，而表现系依据各个公司本身竞争条件与环境列入考量，有时只是运气好搭上顺风车

一切平顺，有时只是运气差遇到逆境特别倒霉。即使是在这样的制度下，有时奖励也相当

可观，在各个部门中，视状况有人可以领到底薪五倍以上的奖金，以今年为例就有人会领

到二百万以上的奖金，而事实上金额并没有上限，与阶级与年资也没有太大关连，若表现

得好一个小单位的主管可能比一个大单位的主管领得多的多，只要打击率能超过三成，不

管你是二十岁的菜鸟或是四十岁的老将，我们都一样重视。

而很显然的，波克夏各事业的经理人可以利用他们所领到的奖金(或甚至去借钱)到股票市

场上买进公司本身的股票，而事实上有许多人确实如此，而且持股比例甚高，与其它股东

一样承担风险与资金成本，这些经理人确实与公司站在同一条阵线之上。

● 最后让我们回到主要的三项事业

在Nebraska家具店我们最具优势的竞争力在于低成本的营运，并提供客户最有质感的家

具，身为全国同类型中规模最大的一家店，即使小镇的经济明显衰退，营收仍创新高，我

也很高兴跟各位报告，家具店的负责人B太太虽然高龄92，每天仍以年轻人跟不上的步伐

在店里忙碌着，坐在轮椅上，她一个礼拜工作七天，我希望当大家造访Omaha时，能到店

礼看看她，相信你会与我一样精神一振。

在喜斯糖果我们与同业竞争对手相比，其单店销售量仍大幅领先，虽然我们广为消费大众

所接受认同，整个产业表现并不好，单店糖果销售磅数持续下滑，这使得单位成本提高，

而我们却只能稍微调涨价格，如此一来我们的毛利势必受到影响。

在新闻事业方面一样很难增加发行量，虽然广告量略增，但主要来自于夹报部份，ROP 广

告(报纸版面上的广告)却减少，前者的利润远比后者低，且竞争较激烈，所幸去年成本控

制得宜而家庭订户数表现颇佳。

我们较不担心的是这三家都有优秀的管理阶层，在接手喜斯我们便一直有Chuck掌控大

局，选上他是我们作得最对的决策之一，在新闻事业我们也有Stan Lipsey同样是狠角色，

他跟我们在一起十七年了，每当我们复予他更多责任，他的才能表现便更上一层楼，在家

具店不用说我们则有B太太家族，三代同堂可谓一门豪杰。

能够跟这一群优秀的专业经理人一起共事，我实在感到非常幸运，在专业上我佩服之至，

在私人方面则是我的好朋友。

● 下表是年报中常见表格的更新，列示保险事业的主要两项数字:

Yearly Change in Combined Ratio

Premiums Written after Policy-holder

Dividends

% %

1972 10.2% 96.2%

1973 8.0% 99.2%

1974 6.2% 105.4%

1975 11.0% 107.9%

1976 21.9% 102.4%

1977 19.8% 97.2%

1978 12.8% 97.5%

1979 10.3% 100.6%

1980 6.0% 103.1%

1981 3.9% 106.0%

1982 4.4% 109.7%

1983 4.5% 111.9%

1984 (Rev.) 9.2% 117.9%

1985 (Est.) 20.9% 118.0%

● 综合比率Combined Ratio代表所有的保险成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下

表示有承保利益，反之100以上则表示有承保损失。

1985年产业整体的数字有点不寻常，保费收入大幅成长，而投保损失则与前几年一样以固

定比率成长(约比通货膨胀率高几个百分点) ，结果两项因素加起来竟使得Combined Ratio

下降，只是损失不大配合，虽然通膨有趋缓的现象，理赔损失却成长惊人，相较于去年的

16%，今年创新高的17%更显得惊人。

意外并不是损失成长的主因，虽然1985年确实有几次相当大的飓风发生，但所造成的损失

仅占保费收入的2%，这比例不算异常，而且也不是投保汽车、房屋、员工或其它投保标的

出险的爆增。

可能可以解释的原因是去年业界大幅提拨损失准备，就像报告所显示的，这场景有点像检

讨会议，保险事业经理人大家一窝蜂地承认前几年损失准备确实提拨不足，而结果修正后

的数字严重影响今年的损益。

另外一项更令人困扰的因素是社会或司法通膨成本的增加，保险业者的赔偿能力已成为陪

审团判决责任与损害成立与否的重要因素，越来越多人觊谀深口袋，不管保单上是怎么

写、不管事实真相为何，也不管以前的判例。这成为保险业预测未来的最不确定的因素，

尽管如此，短期间的影响尚属有限，只要保费成长的速度持续，不要发生什么特别大的灾

难，明年产业整体的Combined Ratio可望大幅下降。

不过获利改善的情况无法持续太久，主要有两个原因，一是商品化企业只有在价格稳定或

供给短缺的情况下才能维持高获利，一是公司必须在景气转佳之前先扩充产能并准备好资

金。如同我在1982年年报跟各位报告过的，曾广泛地讨论商品化企业的特点，一般的投保

人不太在乎产品的差异而只注意价格，几十年来公会的垄断使得价格居高不下，但这种情

况如今已不复见到，在自由市场中保单与其它商品一样地被自由订价，当供给吃紧，价格

自然上升，反之就不会。

供给目前在许多险种有些吃紧，虽然保险业不像大部份的行业，所谓的产能只是心态上而

非实质的，保险业者可以接下无限量他认为适当的保单，这其间只受到主管当局与公会评

比的压力，公司与主管当局在乎的是资本的适足性，越多的资本当然是越好，也代表可以

签下更多的保单，在标准的商品化企业，如钢铁或铝业，要增加产能还要一定的前置期

间，而在保险业资金却是可以随时取得，因此供给不足的情况可能马上就会消失。这就是

目前实际发生的状况，在去年总计有十五家业者大约募集了三十亿的资金，使得他们可以

吃下所有可能的生意，而且资金募集的速度越来越快。照这样下去不用多久马上的会面临

到杀价竞争的情况，之后获利也会跟着受影响。而这一切都要归疚那些大幅增资的业者(有

人一定会批评，就像我们在纺织业一样，资本社会的动态变化，使得所有业者做出那种个

别看似合理，但就产业整体而言，弊多于利的结果。

以往年报我曾告诉过大家，波克夏雄厚的资本结构(堪称业界之最)有一天能让我们在保险

业拥有独一无二的竞争力，随着市场的紧缩，这一天已到来，去年我们的保费收入在经过

许多年的停滞之后，增加三倍以上，波克夏的财务实力(以及过去优异的记录)是我们争取

业务最有用的利器。我们正确地预期到大客户对于品质的要求，在他们了解到保单也不过

是一张借据，而许多借条在去年皆无法兑现。这些客户最后都被波克夏健全的资本结构吸

引上门，而另外有一点是我们没有预期到的发展，那就是还有许多客户是因为我们能够承

担钜额的风险而觉得我们与众不同。关于这点，你必须对钜额风险有一些认识，在以往有

许多业者都很愿意接下这种保单，但是他们会这样做的原因是透过再保险的安排，业者只

要保留一小部份的风险，而将大部份的风险移转给再保业者，想想看例如经理人投保额二

千五百万，透过与再保签约，保单发行公司可以只留下头一个一百万损失，超过的部份最

高到二千四百万由再保公司负责，照业界的说法，其保险毛额很高，但净额却很少。

在任何的再保安排中，最重要的问题是保费收入要如何来分配，以我们的经理人经营保险

为例，保险人必需要有足够的保费来弥补其承担第一个一百万损失的风险，而再保人必需

要有足够的保费来弥补其承担一百万到二千五百万损失的风险。一种解决这种难题的方法

叫做派翠克-亨利法则:系完全依照过去的经验，换句话说过去再保业者需要多少保费来弥

补其所承担的损失。但不幸的是过去的经验因为投保期间过长往往无法完全反映实际的情

况，亦即要在许多年之后才能真正知道会发生多少损失，而且最近产业能见度不但越来越

差，有时甚至还会误导，亦即法院不管以前判例倾向于给予钜额的赔偿，使得再保业者过

去推估的公式与结果相差太远而变成一场大灾难。派翠克-亨利不管用，换成Pogo所说:

「未来与过去绝对不同。」

产业的不确定性加上许多经验不足的新进者，使得这几年保险业者偏好维持低水准的保单

净额，他们能够吃下比其所能承担的风险要大得多的保单量，这样的作法有时在保险与再

保公司整体亏钱的情况下，本身甚至还能获利，(这种结局并不是刻意的，通常保单发行公

司对于校高阶的风险所生最后成本的了解的不一定比再保公司多) ，这种不合理的情况尤

其会发生在环境变化快且成本高涨的时代，如执行业务不当、经理人保险与产品责任险

等，在这些情况下，也难怪保险公司还会积极签发保单，即使保费毛额已相当不合理之

时。最明显的例子是在1984年有一家大型的同业，在那一年那家公司一共签下六十亿元的

保单，在保留其中的40%约二十五亿后，将剩下的三十五亿转给再保公司，结果保留部份

理赔的损失最后只有不到二亿元(算是不错的成绩) ，但是分保出去的部份却使再保业者蒙

受了十五亿元的损失，使得保险公司的Combined Ratio不到110，但再保公司却高达140，

而这与天然灾害一点关系都没有，完全是业者之间的(但发生的频率却相当高) ，虽然我尚

未看到该公司今年的年报，但可想而知这种不平衡的情况一定还继续维持着。已有好几年

一些反应较慢的再保业者由于无法对保费作合理的分配，甚至是估计，使得权益因而受

损，到最后再保业者的行为有点像马克吐温的猫一样，「一旦被热炉子烫过一次，便不会

再去碰任何炉子，即使是冷的炉子也一样」，再保业者在长期的意外险方面有太多不愉快

的经验，以至于到最后干脆放弃(有可能是正确地)该项业务，不管投保价格如何诱人，结

果使得某些业务的供给量严重短缺。如此一来许多再保客户便着急了，他们不能够再像以

前一样，动不动就将上千万的保单转给再保业者，进而也没有能力与财力自行吃下大额的

保单，有的业者的承保毛额萎缩到与承保净额相当。

在波克夏我们从来不玩这类的游戏，直到最近这样的作法使我们在某些业务处于不利的竞

争地位，不过现在整个局势已改变，我们拥有同业比不上的承保实力，只要我们认为价格

合理，我们愿意签下其它大型业者吃不下的保单，例如我们愿意承担一次可能损失一仟万

美元的风险，只要价格合理且其风险与我们已承保的风险无太大的相关。同业间连愿意承

担前述一半的都不多见，尽管在不久之前，有再保业者当靠山，许多业者甚至愿意吃下十

倍以上的保单。1985年我们旗下保险公司National Indemnity在保险杂志大幅刊登广告对

外宣传愿意吃下超过百万美金的大额保单，结果总计收到高达六百封的回函，最后约有五

千万美金的生意成交(先不要高兴太早，由于属于长期保单，至少鳔要经过五年以上才能确

定这次成功的行销也是成功的承保)，现在一般的保险经纪人要接高额的保单第一个一定会

想到我们的保险子公司。不过就像我说过的，供给吃紧的状况不会维持太久，大家最后还

是会回到低价竞争的老路，不过一两年内，我们在几项业务方面还是有很好的发挥空间，

Mike Goldberg 在营运上作了许多的改进(本人先前的管理不当，提供他不少发挥的空

间) ，尤其是最近几年他找了许多深具潜力的优秀人才进来，明年他们将更有机会一显长

才。

Combined Ratio方面也由去年的134进步到今年的111，只不过过去不良的影响还在，去年

我曾告诉各位由于本人在损失准备的提列不当，我曾保证会定期跟各位报告，本来我是想

说以后的记录应该会渐渐改善，不过到目前为止，好象并非如此，细节详后述，去年的损

失准备提列与前几年一样还是明显不足。所幸不足的部份主要发生在再保部份，而许多保

单已陆续到期，这种解释使我想起许多年前，通用再保的董事长告诉我的一个小故事，他

说每年公司的经理人都告诉他「除了佛罗里达的飓风豁中西部的龙卷风的话，今年的成绩

一定很好」，到最后实在忍不住他召集所有干部开会并建议他们干脆另外成立一个新的部

门，叫作「除了」部门专门把他们后来不计入的业务塞在那里算了。不管是在保险或其它

行业也好，应该把「除了」这个字眼从辞典里删除，如果你要参加比赛，就应该把对手所

有的得分全部计入，任何一直把「除了」挂在嘴上的经理人，之后只会说又上了一课的

人，真正应该上的课是应该要换得是演员而不是剧本。当然不可避免的作生意往往会出些

差错，而聪明的经理人一定能从中记取教训，但这教训最好是从别人身上学来的，若过去

习惯犯错表示未来还是会继续犯错。

波克夏持有38%股权的GEICO公司，在保费收入成长与投资收益方面皆表现突出，但在承

保结果与其过去高标准相较却表现平平，私家小客车与住宅房屋险是去年度恶化最厉害的

险种，GEICO也难逃一劫，虽然它的成绩比起其它主要的竞争对手要好得多。Jack在年中

离开GEICO去主持消防人员基金，留下Bill与Lou担任正副董事长，Jack之前挽救GEICO

免于破产的表现卓著，他的努力使得波克夏获益良多，我们欠他的实在是数不清。其中还

包括吸引许多优秀的人才，他找到具有跟他一样特质的经营阶层来继承他，使得他对公司

的贡献与影响力超过他实际的任期。

● 绝对不要轻易放弃任何一张饭票，结果我们跟着Jack 加入由他担任控股公司董事长兼总经

理的消防人员基金，1985年九月一日我们成为FFIC集团7%的参与者(不包括他们为不相关

的公司所接的再保险保单) ，合约为期四年，明订期间的损失与成本依比例分摊，除非到

期前予以展期，否则我们将不再继续参与，不过在可预见的未来我们仍须分摊FFIC在四年

间发生的损失中的7%。合约签订后FFIC须立即将7%的保费汇给我们，而我们也必须马上

支付其所发生的任何损失，预收的资金则用在投资之上，合约附带条件是本人必须随时提

供一般投资咨询服务给FFIC，但我并不介入特定投资决策，而波克夏也不参与该公司任何

的保险业务。目前FFIC 的业务量约达三十亿美元，且当费率调涨后规模有可能再增加，

该公司在1985年九月的未到期保费准备达十三亿美元，所以FFIC汇了其中的7%，相当于

九千多万美金给我们，同时我们也支付了三千万美金给他们代表他们已预付的理赔费用，

这部份的业务完全由National Indemnity承作，之后再将其中的七分之二转给Wesco的子公

司。在保险部门我们特别新增一项主要分配合约，不过由于属于新业务，所有数字只能算

是大概的估计。到了年底我们又取得一件新合约，明年度的金额大约为五千万元，我们希

望能够扩展这项业务，而产业环境也不错，许多公司产生超过其本身处理能力的业务，而

我们坚强的财务实力正是他们希望合作的最好对象。

Company Name Shares Cost Market Unrealized

Affiliated Publications, Inc. (a) 1,036,461 3,516 55,710 52,194

American Boradcasting Company (a) 900,800 54,435 108,997 54,562

Exxon Corporation

General Foods, Inc

GEIGO Corporation (a) 6,850,000 45,713 595,950 550,237

Handy & Harman (a) 2,379,200 27,318 43,718 16,400

Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc

Media General

Northwest Industries

Ogilvy & Mather Int'l, Inc

R.J. Reynolds Industries

Time, Inc (a) 847,788 20,385 52,669 32,284

The Washington Post Company (a) 1,727,765 9,731 205,172 195,441

All Other Common Stock 7,201 27,963 20,762

Total Common Stock 275,110 1,198,321 923,211

239,299

● 我们之前曾提到过去十年来投资环境已由过去完全不看重大企业的情况转变成适当的认

同，华盛顿邮报就是一个最好的例子，我们在1973年中以不到当时内含价值四分之一的价

格买进股权，计算价格/价值比并不需要有独到的眼光，大部份的证券分析师、经纪人与媒

体经营者跟我们一样估计该公司的价值约在四亿到五亿美元之间，但当时其仅一亿的股票

市值却是随处可见，只是我们具有的优势是态度，我们从葛拉罕那里学到成功投资的关键

是在买进好的公司股票在其股价相对于代表的实际价值被低估的时候。在1970年代早期大

部份的机构投资人却认为企业价值与他们考量买进卖出的价格并无太大关联，现在看来当

然令人难以置信，然而当时他们受到知名的商学院所提出的新理论所惑，「股票市场具有

完全的效率，因此计算企业的价值对于投资活动一点也不重要」，事后想想我们实在欠这

些学者太多了，在不管是桥牌、西洋棋或是选股等斗智的竞赛中，还有什么能让我们更有

利的，当对手被告知思考是白费力气的一件事。

1973到1974年间华盛顿邮报表现依旧良好使得内在价值持续增加，尽管如此我们在该公司

的持股市值却由原始成本的一仟多万减少25%变成八百万美元，本来我们觉得已经够便宜

的东西，没想到在一年之后具有无比大智能的市场又将它的标价又向下调整到至少比其实

际价值少两成的地步。

美好的结局可以预知，Kay Graham-华盛顿邮报的总裁具有无比的智能与勇气除了拥有极

佳的管理长才将公司的内在价值进一步提升之外，更大手笔地以便宜的价格大量买回公司

的股份，在此同时投资人开始体认到公司特殊的竞争优势而使得公司股价回升到合理的价

位。所以我们经历了三重享受，一来公司本身的价值提升，二来每股所代表的价值因公司

实施库藏股又增加，三来随着折价幅度逐渐缩小，股价的表现超越公司价值实际增加。

除了1985年依持股比例卖回给公司的股份外，其它的持股皆未变动，年底持股的市值加上

卖回股份所得的收入合计为二亿二仟万美元。

假若在当初1973年中我们将一仟万随便投资一家当时最热门的媒体事业，则到今年年底我

们持股的市值大约会在四到六仟万元之间，这结果显然比一般市场的平均表现高出许多，

其原因在于媒体的特殊竞争力，至于再多出来的一亿六仟万部份是因为华盛顿邮报的总裁

Kay作出的决策优于其它媒体事业的经营者，虽然她惊人的事业成就并未有人大幅报导，

但波克夏的所有股东却不能不加以珍惜。

由于我们买下资本城股份(后面会详描述)使得我必须在1986年被迫离开华盛顿邮报的董事

会，但只要法令许可我们将无限期的持有华盛顿邮报的股份，我们期待该公司的价值持续

稳定成长，我们也知道公司的管理阶层有才能且完全以股东的利益为导向，不过该公司的

市值目前已增加为十八亿美元，公司的价值很难再以当初市值仅一亿美元时的速度成长，

也由于我们其它主要的持股股价大多已反映，所以我们的投资组合很难再像过去一般具成

长潜力。

● 或许你会发现年底我们有一大笔Beatrice公司的持股，这是属于短期的套利动作，算是闲

置资金暂时的去处(虽然不是百分之百安全，因为交易有时也会发生问题导致重大的损

失) ，但我们大多只参与已宣布的购并案，当然若能为这些资金找到更长期可靠的去处我

们会更高兴，但现阶段却找不到任何合适的对象。

到年底为止，我们旗下保险子公司大约持有四亿美元的免税债券，其中大约有一半是

WPPSS华盛顿公用电力供应系统发行的债券(该公司我已于去年详尽的说明同时也解释在

事情尘埃落定之前我们为何不愿进一步说明公司的进出动作，就像我们投资股票时一样，

到年底我们在该债券的未实现投资利益为六仟二百万美元，三分之一的原因是由于债券价

格普遍上涨，其余则是投资人对于WPPSS一、二、三期计划有较正面的看法，我们每年

从该投资所获得的免税利益大约为三仟万美元。

● 大约在年后，波克夏买进约三百万股的资本城/ABC股票，(每股价格172.5美元，我追踪该

公司的管理绩效已有许多年，我认为他们是上市公司当中最优秀的，汤姆墨菲与丹柏克不

但是最优秀的管理阶层，也是那种你会想把自己的女儿嫁给他的那一种人，跟他们一起合

作实在是我的荣幸，也相当愉快，若相信各位若认识他们应该也会有这种感觉。

我们的股权投资使得资本城能够取得三十五亿美元的资金用来购并美国广播公司ABC，虽

然对资本城来说，或许ABC的效益无法在短暂几年内就立竿见影，但我们很有耐心一点也

不心急，毕竟就算是才华与努力俱备，还是需要时间来发酵，就算你让九个女人同时怀

孕，也不可能让小孩一个月就生出来。

为了展现我们的信心，我们特别与管理阶层签订了一项协议，在一定的期间内，我们的投

票权将交给担任CEO的汤姆墨菲(或是接任的丹柏克)来处理。事实上这项提案是由我与查

理主动提出，同时我们还自我限制了一些卖出股份的条件，这个动作主要是为了确保我们

出售的股份不会落到未经现有管理阶层同意的人士身上，有点类似几年前我们与吉列刮胡

刀与华盛顿邮报签订的协议。

由于有时钜额的股票交易可能必须要溢价，有些人可能认为这样的限制可能会损及波克夏

股东的权益，不过我们的看法正好完全相反，身为公司的所有权人，我们认定这些企业的

长期经济利益将因为这些限制而更加巩固，因为如此一来专业经理人便能全心全意的为公

司打拼，进而为全体股东创造最大的利益，很显然的这比让一些经理人整天为了换不同的

老板而分心，(当然有些经理人会把自己的利益摆在公司的利益之前，所以我们在投资时会

尽量避开这类的经营阶层)

今天企业的不稳定性是股权分散的必然结果，一家公司随时都会有大公东浮上台面，满口

仁义道德但实际上却包藏祸心，我们常藉由锁住自身持有的股权来宣示对公司稳定的支

持，这种安定感加上好的经营阶层与企业型态，是让企业获利丰收的沃土，这就是我们会

这样安排的用意所在。

当然人性面也很重要，我们不希望我们欣赏与推崇的经理人，在欢迎我们的加入后，会担

心一觉醒来，因为我们持有重要股权，所有事情一夕生变。我告诉他们绝对放心，我们一

定说话算话，而且也包括波克夏公司的承诺，万一我个人发生了什么不幸(意思是指我本人

活不到一百岁就挂了) 。

当然我们投资资本城的这次交易并未占到什么便宜，这反应出近年来媒体事业的蓬勃发展

(当然还比不上某些购并案的疯狂)，事实上也没有多少讨价还价的余地，但重点是这项投

资让我们能与这杰出的人材与事业结合在一起，而且是相当庞大的规模。

至于有人可能会觉得很奇怪，为何同样一家公司，你们的董事长在五、六年前以43块的价

钱卖掉，而现在却以172.5块的高价买回，有关这个问题，容我在多花一点时间，想一个漂

亮一点的答案给各位。

● 同一期间我们还花斥资三亿二千万美金购并了位于克里夫兰的史考特费泽，下一个段落我

将会说明波克夏购并公司的一些标准，史考特费泽就是个典型的例子-易懂、够大、管理

佳、很会赚钱。

该公司有17项事业，年营业额约七亿美金，很多都是该行的领导者，投资报酬率相当高，

拥有许多知名品牌，如克比家护系统、空气压缩机、瓦斯炉等。另外著名的世界百科全书

约占该公司销售额的四成，是主要的营业项目之一，其销售量比起其它四家同业的量还

多。

我和查理对世界百科全书特别感兴趣，事实上我读他们的书已有25年的历史，现在连我自

己的孙子都有一套，它被所有的老师、图书馆与读者评选为最有用的百科全书，而且它的

售价比起同类型的书还便宜，这种价美物廉产品的结合使得我们愿意以该公司提出的价格

进行投资，尽管直销业近几年来表现并不出色。

另外值得注意的是担任该公司总裁已九年的Ralph Schey，由于1960年代的购并风潮，当

他上任时，该公司共有多达31项的事业，他大刀阔斧将不合适或不赚钱的事业处置掉，他

在资本分配上的功力相当杰出，我们很高兴能与他一起共事。

事实上购并史考特费泽的过程相当有趣，在我们介入之前还有段小插曲，早在1984年便传

出该公司有意要出售，一家投资银行顾问花了好几个月编织了许多美丽的远景，以吸引一

些买主上门，最后在1985年中一项具有员工认股计划特色的出售案为股东大会所通过，然

而到了最后节骨眼却由于特定因素被搁置，我在报上看到这项消息，立刻写了一封简短的

信给Ralph Schey，虽然我并认识他本人，我说我们很欣赏公司过去的表现，不知道他有

没有兴趣与我们谈一谈，不久我与查理便在芝加哥与Ralph碰面共进晚餐，并在隔周正式

签定购并合约。

由于这项购并案与原本保险事业的大幅成长，将使明年公司的营收超越二十亿美元，大概

是今年的两倍。

史考特费泽购并案充份说明了我们对于购并采取随性的态度，我们并没有任何特定的策略

与计划，也没有专人来研究一些中介者提供的企划案，反而我们倾向一切顺其自然，反正

时候到了，我们就会有逤行动。

● 为了主动向命运招手，我们依惯例还是列出征求企业被购并的小广告，今年惟一的小变动

是第一项获利的标准略微提高，主要是因为我们期望购并能为波克夏带来明显的改变:

1. 钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟) ，我

们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股

份。我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，对于那些好的公司与好的

经营阶层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。

另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及

最常见的中介案(那些说你们要是能过碰一下面，一定会感兴趣之类的) 。在此重申我们对

这些一点兴趣都没有。(1985)

● 除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股份，就像

我们在资本城这个Case一样，当然这要是我们对于该事业与经营阶层都感到认同时才有可

能，而且是要大笔的交易，最少也要五千万美金以上，当然是越多越好。

● 今年破记录的有96.8%的有效股权参与1985年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约四百多万美元

捐出的款项分配给1,724家慈善机构，同时去年我们针对股东对于这项计划与股利政策的看

法，进行全面性的公民投票，包含一个可以让你表达对这项计划的意见(例如应否继续、每

一股应捐赠多少等等)你可能会有兴趣知道事实上在此之前从未有一家公司是以股东的立场

来决定公司捐款的去向(为免划地自限，我们尽量将问题的措辞保持弹性) ，在股东会的资

料中有相关的选票与结果，我们各位的响应对于本公司现行政策的执行具有重要的参考价

值。

● 我们也建议新股东赶快阅读相关信息，若你也想参加的话，我们强烈建议你赶快把股份从

经纪人那儿改登记于自己的名下。

● 五年前由于银行控股公司法的通过使得我们必须将旗下所有伊利诺银行的股权处份掉，当

时我们的作法是相当特别的，我们宣布波克夏与洛克福银行集团(伊利诺银行的母公司)的

换股比率，让除了我本人以外的所有股东自行决定是否将其所有或部份波克夏的股份转独

立的洛克福银行集团股份，剩下的部份由我本人全数吸收，当时我曾说，这种分法是最古

老且最有效分配一件东西的方法，就像是小时候大人会叫一个小孩切蛋糕，然后叫另一个

小孩先选一块一样，由我先将公司切成两半，在让所有股东自由选择。

去年伊利诺银行正式出售，当洛克福银行集团清算结束，所有股东所收到的售股收入与每

股波克夏的价值相当，我很高兴五年后看来当时那块蛋糕切的相当公平。

● 去年超过三千名的股东中大约有250名出席股东会，与会者的水准与去年相当，问的问题

显示大家都是有智能且真正关心公司的股东，这在其它上市公司的股东会是很少见到的，

麦达克思-在担任乔治亚州州长时曾批评当时糟糕透顶的狱政制度:「解决的方法其实很简

单，我们要做的就是提升人犯的素质水准」，我想要提升股东会的水准也是一样的道理。

● 波克夏的股东年会预计于1986年五月二十在奥玛哈举行，我希望各位届时都能参加，今年

将会有一项改变，那就是经过48年的坚持，本人将进行一项前所未有的习惯改变，将平常

喝的饮料改成新的樱桃可口可乐，而它也将是本次波克夏-海瑟威股东大会的指定引料。

最后记得带钱来，B太太已经答应若股东在会议期间造访她的家具店将会有意想不到的折

扣优惠!!

●

华伦巴菲特

董事长

1986.3.4

一九八六年

波克夏-海瑟威公司

致波克夏-海瑟威公司所有股东：

本公司在去年(1986年)的帐面净值增加了26.1%，大约是四亿九千多万美元，在过去

的22个年头(也就是现有经营阶层接掌本公司后) ，帐面每股净值由19.46美元，成长

到2,073美元，年复合成长率为23.3%，

在计算每股净值时，分子与分母都同样的重要，过去22年公司整体的净值虽然增加

超过有一百倍之多，但流通在外的股份却增加不到一个百分点

在过去的年报中我已不只一次地提醒大家，多数公司的帐面价值与其实际的内在价

值其实存在有极大的差异(后者才是对股东真正要紧的)，不过以我们公司本身的状况

而言，过去十多年来帐面价值在某种程度(从保守的角度)，却颇能代表本公司实际的

价值。意思是说Berkshire企业的价值略微超越其帐面价值，两者之间的比例一直维

持着稳定的差距。

而现在跟各位报告的好消息是，在1986年本公司企业价值增加的幅度应该是超过帐

面价值增加的幅度，我说"应该是"是因为企业价值的判断较为弹性，以我们本身的

例子来说，两个同样完全了解本公司的人所衡量出的价值，可以会差到10%以上。

本公司去年企业价值成长的原因，主要系归功于旗下主要企业经理人杰出的表现，

包含the Blumkins, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey与

Ralph Schey等人，这些企业，除了保险业外，这几年来在没有耗费额外的资金的前

提之下，还能稳定的提高公司的获利，这种成就塑造出我们所谓典型的经济价值或

商誉，这虽然无法在公司的资产负债表上反映出来，但必须向各位报告，在1986年

这种情况极为显著。

讲完了好消息，接下来的坏消息是本人的表现并不足以与这些优秀的经理人匹配，

当他们在各自的岗位上努力经营事业，可是我却没能好好有效地利用他们所产生的

资金。

查理孟格跟我平时主要只有两项工作，一个是吸引并维系优秀的经理人来经营我们

的各种事业，这项工作并不太难，通常在我们买下一家企业时，其本来的经理人便

早已在各种产业展现他们的长才，我们只要确定没有妨碍到他们即可，这点非常重

要，如果我的工作是组织一支职业高尔夫球队，若尼克劳斯或阿诺帕玛愿意替我效

力，我实在不必太费心去教他们如何挥杆。

其实我们一些经理人自己本身已经相当富有，(当然我们希望所有的经理人都如此)但

这一点都不影响他们继续为公司效力，他们之所以工作是因为乐在其中并散发出干

劲，毫无疑问地他们皆站在老板的角度看事情，这是我们对这些经理人最高的恭

维，而且你会为他们经营事业各方面成就所着迷。

这种职业病的典型，就像是一位天主教的裁缝省吃俭用了好几年，好不容易存了一

笔钱到梵蒂冈朝圣，当他回来后，教友们特地集会争相想要了解他对教宗的第一手

描述，赶快告诉我们，教宗到底是个怎么样的人，只见这位裁逢师，淡淡地说︰

「四十四腰，中等身材。」

查理跟我都知道，只要找到好球员，任何球队经理人都可以做的不错，就像是奥美

广告创办人大卫奥美曾说︰「若我们雇用比我们矮小的人，那么我们会变成一群株

孺，相反地若我们能找到一群比我们更高大的人，我们就是一群巨人。」

而这种企业文化也使得查理跟我可以很容易地去扩展波克夏的事业版图，我们看过

许多企业规定一个主管只能管辖一定人数的人员，但这规定对我们来说一点意义都

没有，当你手下有一群正直又能干的人才，在帮你经营一项他们深具感情的事业

时，你大可以同时管理一打以上这样的人，而且还行有余力打个盹，相反地，若他

们存心要欺骗你或是能力不够或是没有热情时，只要一个就够你操心的了，只要找

对人，查理与我甚至可以同时管理比现在多一倍的经理人都没有问题

我们将会继续维持这种与我们喜爱与崇敬的伙伴合作的原则，这种原则不但可以确

保经营的绩效极大化，也可以让我们能享受愉快的时光。否则要是仅为了赚钱成天

与一些会令你反胃的人为伍，这感觉就好象是当你本来就已经很有钱时，你还为了

钱跟不喜欢的人结婚一样。

查理跟我的第二项工作是处理资金的分配，这在Berkshire尤其重要，其主要原因有

三，一是因为我们赚的钱比别人多，二是我们通常将所赚的钱保留下来，最后也最

重要的是因为我们旗下的企业可以不需要太多的资金便能维持竞争力与成长性，

的确一家每年能赚23%且全数保留盈余的公司，比起每年只赚10%，且只保留半数盈

余的公司，前者资金分配的任务要繁重的多，所以将来若是我们运用盈余的方式不

佳，或是旗下主要被投资公司，诸如盖可、美国广播公司等表现不好，则Berkshire

经营情况恶化的程度将会非常地快，假设公司净值以后每年只有5%的成长，则公司

资金分配的工作虽然还是很重要，但体质改善的速度也会变慢许多。

事实上在1986年Berkshire资金分配的工作并不好干，我们确实是完成了一项购并案-

那就是买下费区-海默兄弟公司，后面我们还会有详细的描述，这家公司极具竞争

力，而且是由那种我们喜欢打交道的人在经营，不过就是小了点，大概只运用

Berkshire不到百分之二净值的资金。

在此同时我们从市场直接买进股权这方面也没有太大的进展，相较几年前我们可以

利用大笔资金以合理的价格买进许多不错的股票，所以最后我们只好将资金用来偿

还负债并囤积银弹，虽然这比死掉还好一点，但却没有做到繁衍下一代的任务，若

是查理跟我在往后的几年持续在资金分配这方面缴白券，Berkshire净值的成长势必

将会变缓许多。

我们会持续在市场上寻找符合我们标准的企业，我想要是运气好可能每几年就能够

找到一家，但若想要对公司净值有明显助益，则其规模就必须够大，只是以目前的

股票市场状况，我们实在很难为我们的保险公司找到合适的投资标的，当然市场终

究会转变，总有一天会轮到我们站上打击位置，只不过我们不清楚何时能够换我们

上场。

下表系Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，今年的表与前几年有几点不太一样的地方，

首先由于新购事业史考特-费泽、费区-海默的加入，我们营业项目增加了史考特-费

泽、寇比吸尘器、世界百科全书、费区-海默等四栏，同时也由于Berkshire整体规模

扩大了许多，我们也将几个较小的部门合并列示，另外如同过去我们将个别企业购

并的商誉摊销单独挑出，(原因请参阅1983年的附录)汇总后摆在最后一栏，由于史考

特-费泽、费区-海默两件购并案使得1986年的商誉摊销较以往增加许多

另外史考特-费泽的购并案依一般公认会计原则采购买法处理，所以在本表也稍作调

整，在合并财务报表上所显示的数字系依照一般公认会计原则所编制，但就我们本

身的观点，这个数字对于经理人与投资人来说，并不见得有意义，

因此下表所显示的数字系扣除这些调整前的数字，事实上这才是这家公司原本的盈

余状况，假设今天我们没有买下他们的话，(详细解释请参阅附录，不过若嫌内容不

具吸引力，可以不看，当然我也知道在所有六千位股东当中，有许多对于我个人在

会计方面的观点感到折服，希望你们都能好好地欣赏) ，同时我也强力推荐各位看看

查理每年写给Wesco股东的年报，里头有该公司旗下事业的详细介绍

1986 Unit:US'000

Earnings Before

Income Tax

After

Income Tax

Berkshire Share

Berkshire

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

Underwriting (55,844) (29,864)

Net Investment Income 107,143 96,440

Buffalio News 34,736 16,918

Fechheimer 8,400 3792

Kirby 20,218 10508

Nebraska Furniture Mart 17,685 7,192

Scott Fetzer-Diversified 25,358 13,354

See's Candies 30,347 15,176

Wesco Financial Corporation-

Parent 5,542 5,550

World Book 21,978 11,670

Amortization of Goodwill (2,555) (2,555)

Interest on Debt (23,891) (12,213)

Shareholder's Contribution (3,997) (2,158)

Other 10,737 (2,346)

195,857 　 131,464

Realized Securities Gain 216,242 150,897

Total Earnings-all entities 412,099 　 282,361

如你所见营业净利在1986年大幅改善，一方面是由于保险事业(这部份连同费区-海默

公司会在稍候详细说明)，一方面则是其它事业群的表现:

o水牛城报纸在史坦-利普席的带领下持续表现优异，连续第三年每人工作时数皆大

幅下绛，其它成本也控制得宜，即使该报的广告增加率远低于同业，营业毛利仍然

大幅增加，同时控制成本并不代表我们在新闻品质上有所退让，我们的新闻量(新闻

版面占整体版面的比例)持续维持在50%以上，这是现有相同或是更大规模的报纸中

比例最高的，一般同业的水准约只有40%

各位可不要小看这10%的差距，同样三十页的广告，40%约有二十页新闻，50%则代

表会有三十页的新闻，一比一的新闻与广告量是我们坚持的原则，我们相信这也是

为何水牛城报纸能在当地拥有全美最高渗透率的重要原因(订户数占当地家庭户数的

比率)，其中周日版的比率更令人印象深刻，十年前水牛城最主要的周日版报纸先锋

报发行量为27万份，渗透率63%，大概与全美其它大城市相当，这在当时已被视为

是很自然的上限，然而从1977年水牛城报纸开始发行周日版，虽然该地区人口数不

增反减，到如今其渗透率已达83%，且发行量更高达37万份。

虽然拥有超高的市场接受度，却也代表营业利润已达顶峰，虽然去年年底新闻用纸

价格调涨，同时1987年的广告比率增加量也比其它新闻同业来的少，但我们仍坚持

过半的新闻量，即便如此会使得我们的利润下降也在所不惜

屈指一算，今年已是我们买下水牛城报纸的第十个年头了，它带给我们的投资报酬

远远超过我们的预期，还有精神上的收获也是如此，我们对于水牛城报纸及其经营

者Murray Light的敬仰从买下它开始与日俱增，是他让这份报纸拥有超高的社区认

同度，他们在水牛城报纸面临困难与诉讼之时所展现的耐力，并未随着日后公司迈

入坦途就松卸，查理与我在此对他们表示由衷的感谢

o内布拉斯加家俱店NFM的布鲁金家族持续创造商业史上的奇迹，竞争者来来去

去，但B太太跟她的家族却仍屹立不摇，去年该店业绩成长10%达到一亿三千万美

金，是十年前的三倍，在当时该店便已独霸整个奥玛哈地区，若再考量本地缓慢的

人口成长率与温和的通货膨胀率，这种成绩更是难能可贵，而惟一可以解释的理由

就是随着NFM价廉物美、样式齐全的声名远播，其市场范围持续扩大，而为了应付

日后的成长，该店已着手扩充仓库，高龄93岁的B太太技压群雄，展现超高的销售能

力与耐力，一周工作七天，每天从开店到打烊，想要跟她竞争需要无比的勇气，大

家可能很容易就忽略B太太传奇，不过没关系93岁的她，还未抵达巅峰，等到2024年

波克夏股东会召开时，请大家拭目以待

o比起前几年来说喜斯糖果的销售磅数增加约2%，销售业绩略有成长，(若你是巧克

力的爱好者，告诉你一个惊人的数字，我们一年的销售量是一万两千公吨) ，只是过

去六年单店销售量持续下滑，使得我们只有靠增加店面来维持销售量不坠，但今年

这数字大致维持不变，主要是拜圣诞节销售旺季特别旺所赐，而即便销售业绩迟滞

不前，该公司仍然靠着成本控制维持利润空间，感谢Chuck Huggins在这方面为我们

所做的努力

喜斯糖果算是一种独一无二的个性化商品，甜美的糖果加上公道的价格，且该公司

完全掌握销售管道并由店员提供贴心的服务，Chuck的成就反应在客户的满意度之

上，并进而感染到整个公司，很少有销售公司能够持续维持客户导向的精神，这一

切都要归功于他，展望未来喜斯的获利应该可以维持在现有状态，我们仍会持续调

整价格，以反映增加的成本，

o世界百科全书是1986年加入我们的史考特-飞兹所属十七个部门中最大的一个，去

年我很高兴地跟各位介绍该公司的经营者与营运状况，一年后我更加开心地向大家

报告，Ralph真是个优秀的经理人，圆满地达成目标，虽然要管理各式各样的产品，

并面对不同的机会问题与挑战，Ralph却使得他的工作更加精彩更多元化，而且更重

要的是我们合作愉快，看来我们的好运持续不断

世界百科全书的销售量连续四年皆成长，儿童工艺套书也大幅成长，世界百科全书

称霸于直销市场，不但编排精美，且平均每页不到五毛钱，可谓老少咸宜，有一数

字相当有趣，那就是书中有高达四万多个困难字，入门部份由简单的生字组成，慢

慢地加入难度更高的单字，如此使得年轻的读者能够循序渐进，最后轻易的便能运

用大学程度以上的单字，推销百科全书是项神圣的天职，我们超过半数以上的销售

人员是现职或是退休的老师，有些则是图书馆员，他们将自己视为教育工作者，而

且做的有声有色，如果你家中还没有一套世界百科全书，那么我建议你赶快去买一

套放在家里

o寇比吸尘器同样维持连续四年的成长，全球的销售数量共成长了33%，虽然其产品

价格要比同类型吸尘器贵许多，但它的性能却将其它品牌远远拋在后面，有许多产

品经过了三、四十年还很耐用，想要最好的，就买寇比！

许多靠直销销售其产品的公司，近年来纷纷倒闭，主要是由于上班族妇女越来越多

所致，不过到目前为止，寇比吸尘器与世界百科全书的表现算是可圈可点，以上企

业再加上保险事业，便构成我们的主要事业领域，简单地带过并不意味着它们对我

们不具重要性，一方面是因为许多东西在过去的年报都已报告过，一方面是因为公

司的股东结构非常稳定(每年约有98%的股东会选择继续投资本公司)，所以我们不必

花太多时间重复赘述一些事情，当然若是有什么重大的事件或任何影响公司营运的

情况，我们一定会立即向各位股东报告，总的来说，前面所提的公司都有非常稳固

的经营基础，投资报酬率也很高，同时也拥有优秀的经营阶层，

另外每一年我都会在公司年报上不厌其烦地，提及我们想要买下公司的条件，在今

年终于有了具体的回报，去年的一月五日我收到一位资深股东Bob的一封信，他是费

区-海默公司的董事长，在此之前我并不认识Bob或费区-海默公司，他在信中提到他

经营的公司应该符合我们的条件，并提议大家碰个面，于是等到该公司年度报告出

炉后我们相约在奥马哈，他简单介绍一下公司的历史，这是一家专门制造与销售制

服的老牌公司，成立于1842年，Bob的父亲-Warren于1941年接手，跟着Bob与现在

担任总裁的弟弟George也加入该公司，在该家族的带领下，公司的业绩蒸蒸日上，

1981年该公司被一家专门从事融资购并(LBO)的投资集团买下，但现有经营阶层仍保

有部份股权，只是这类型的公司在被购并后，一开始通常都须承担极高的负债比

率，所幸由于公司营运稳健，等负债逐渐被清偿完毕后，公司的价值便立即显现出

来，基于某些原因，当初投资的LBO集团想要把股权卖掉，这时Bob立刻就想到我

们

事实上费区-海默正是我们想要买的公司类型，它有悠久的历史，有才能的管理人

员，品格高尚，乐在工作，且愿意与我们一起分享公司经营所带来的利益，所以我

们很快地就决定以四千六百多万美元买下该公司84%的股权，这与我们当初买下内

布拉斯加家具NFM的情况很类似，持有股权的大股东有资金上的需求，原有经营家

族有意愿继续经营公司并持有部份股权，且希望买下公司股权的股东不要只为了价

格便随便将公司股权出让，并确保股权交易完成后，公司的经营形态不受干扰，这

两家公司真正是我门所想要投资的类型，而它们也确实适得其所

说来你可能不敢相信，事实上我与查理甚至根本就从未去过费区-海默位于辛辛那提

的企业总部，(另外还有像帮我们经营喜斯糖果十五年之久的Chuck，也从未来过奥

玛哈Berkshire的企业总部) ，所以说若Berkshire的成功是建立在不断地视察工厂的

话，现在我们可能早就要面临一大堆问题了，因此在从事购并公司时，我们试着去

评估该公司的竞争能力，其优势与缺点，以及经营阶层的能力与水准，费区-海默在

各方面都很杰出，而Bob与George正值六十多岁的壮年期(以我们的标准而言)，且后

继还有Gary等三位优秀的子弟继承衣钵，身为购并的最佳典型，该公司只有唯一一

个小缺点，那就是它的规模不够大，我们希望下一次有机会能遇到各方面条件都与

费区-海默一般，且规模至少要有它好几倍大的公司，目前我们对于购并对象年度税

后获利的基本门槛已由每年的五百万美元，提高到一千万美元，

报告完毕后，最后还是重复一下我们的广告，假若你有一家公司符合以下我们所列

的条件，请尽快与我们连络

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复我们是否感兴趣(通常不超过五

分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的企业内含价值跟我们付出的一样

多，否则绝不考虑发行股份。我们欢迎可能的卖方向那些过去与我们合作过的伙伴

打听，对于那些好的公司与好的经营阶层，我们绝对可以提供一个好的归属。

当然我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问电话，包括新事业、转机股、拍卖

案以及最常见的中介案(那些通常会说你们要是能过碰一下面，一定会感兴趣之类

的) 。在此重申我们对这类型案件一点兴趣都没有。

除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股

份，就像我们在资本城这个Case一样，当然这要是我们对于该事业与经营阶层都感

到认同时才有可能，而且是要够大笔的交易，我想最少也要在五千万美金以上，当

然是越多越好

保险事业部门

下表是我们固定提供的保险业统计数字，今年起多加了发生损失与GNP通膨指数两

项，保费成长与损失比率与1986年差异，可用来解释为何整年度的承保表现能够大

幅改善的原因

Yearly Change

Combined

Ratio

Yearly

Change in GNP Deflators

Premiums Written Incurred Loss

1981 3.8% 106.0% 6.5% 9.7%

1982 4.4% 109.8% 8.4% 6.4%

1983 4.6% 112.0% 6.8% 3.9%

1984 9.2% 117.9% 16.9% 3.8%

1985 22.1% 116.5% 16.1% 3.3%

1986(Est.) 22.6% 108.5% 15.5% 2.6%

综合比率代表保险总成本(发生损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，若比率低于一

百，表示承保有利益，反之则会有损失，若将保险公司从保户那边收到的保费，(又

称浮存金)，运用在投资所赚取的利益列入考虑后（扣除股东权益部份），比率在

107-112间会是损益两平点，

保险事业经营的逻辑，若用以下列简表来说明，其实一点都不复杂，当保费收入年

成长率只能在4%到5%游移时，承保损失一定会增加，这不是因为意外、火灾、暴风

等意外灾害发生更频繁，也不是因为通货膨胀的关系，主要的祸首在于社会与司法

成本的膨胀，一方面是因为司法诉讼案件大幅增加，一方面是因为法官与陪审团倾

向超越原先保单上所订的条款，扩大保险理赔的范围，若这两种情况在未来没有好

转，则可以预见的是，保费收入年成长必须达到10%以上才有可能损益两平，即使

目前一般通货膨胀的水准维持在2%到4%之间也一样

如表上所示，保险业保费收入成长的速度甚至高于理赔损失增加的速度，因此承保

损失大幅下降，去年的年报我们就已预先报告可能会有这种情形发生，同时还判断

这样的荣景只是短暂的，很不幸的再一次我们一语中的，今年保费成长的速度已大

幅减缓，从第一季的27.1%一路下滑到第四季的18.7%，而且我们预期还会进一步下

滑，最后很有可能会落到10%的损益两平点之下，但尽管如此，只要1987年没有发

生什么重大的灾难，由于保费调整的递延性，承保结果还是能够改善，通常在保费

调整的半年到一年后，效果会反应到公司的盈余之上，但好景通常不易维持，过不

了多久一切又会回到原点，

保险商品的订价行为与一般商品的订价模式几乎一模一样，唯有在供给短缺时价格

才会上来，但偏偏这种光景维持不了多久，当获利旭日东升时，马上就有人会进来

泼冷水，增加投入资金抢食大饼，结果当然会埋下不少后遗症，供给增加，代表价

格下跌，跟着获利剧减，

当保险业龙头在要求他们的同业在订价时要维持同行之谊，我们可以观察到一个有

趣的现象，他们会问为什么我们不能从历史经验中学到教训，不管景气低潮或高

峰，都能够合理的订价以维持适当的获利呢??他们当然希望保险费能够像华尔街日

报一样，有一个好的开始，同时又能够每年持续稳定的调涨价格，但这种诉求得到

的效果，就像内布拉斯加州种植玉米的农夫，要求全世界其它种植玉米的农夫一起

遵守道德规范一样有限，事实上道德诉求的效果极其有限，重点是如何让玉米的产

量变少，最近两年来保险同业从资本市场上所募集的资金，就好象是新进耕种的玉

米田一样，结果是更多更多的玉米产量，只会使市场价格进一步滑落，我们自己本

身的保险事业在1986年的表现还算不错，展望明年一样乐观，虽然市场的状况让我

们获益不少，但真正要感谢的却是旗下经理人优异的能力与表现，我们的综合比率

从1985年的111减少到1986年的103，此外我们的保费成长率更是杰出，虽然最后的

数字现在还无从得知，但我确信我们是前一百大保险公司中成长最快的，诚然有一

部份的成长来自于我们与消防人员退休基金的合约，但即使在扣除这部份之后，我

们仍然维持第一，有趣的是在1985年我们是所有保险业者中成长最慢的一家，事实

上我们是不增反减，而只要市场情况不佳时，我们仍会维持这样的做法，我们保费

收入忽上忽下并不代表我们在这个市场来来去去，事实上我们是这个市场最稳定的

参与者，随时作好准备，只要价格合理，我们愿意不计上限签下任何高额的保单，

不像其它业者一下子进入这个市场，一下子又退出，所以当其它同业因资金不足或

慑于巨大的损失退出市场时，保户会大量涌向我们，且会发现我们早已作好准备，

反之当所有业者抢进市场，大幅杀价甚至低于合理成本时，客户又会受到便宜的价

格所吸引，离开我们投入竞争对手的怀抱，我们对于价格的坚持，对客户来说一点

困扰也没有，当他发现有更便宜的价格时，随时可以离去，同样地对我们的员工也

不会造成困扰，我们不会因为景气循环一时的低潮就大幅裁员，奉行不裁员的政

策，事实上这也是为了公司好，否则担心业务量减少而被裁员的员工可能会想尽办

法弄一些有的没有的业务进来给公司，这在国家保险公司所从事的汽车保险与一般

责任保险最可以看出，同业是如何一会儿贪生怕死，一会儿又勇往前进，在1984年

的最后一季，该公司平均月保费收入是500万美元，大约维持在正常的水准，但到了

1986年的第一季，却大幅攀升至3,500万美元，之后又很快地减少到每月2,000万元的

水准，相信只要竞争者持续加入市场，并杀价竞争，该公司的业务量还会继续减

少，讽刺的是部份新加入保险公司的经理人，就是几年前让原本几家旧有保险公司

破产倒闭的那批原班人马，不可思议的是我们竟然还要透过政府强制的保证基金机

制，来分摊他们部份的损失

这种我们称之为高风险的险种在1986年大幅成长，且在未来也会扮演相当重要的角

色，通常一次所收取的保费就可能超过百万美元，有的甚至还更高，当然承保最后

的结果可能会两极化，不管是保费收入或是承保获利，但我们雄厚的财务实力与高

度的承保意愿(只要价格合理)使我们在市场上相当有竞争力，另一方面，我们在结构

清偿业务则因为现在的价格不理想而接近停摆，1986年损失准备的变动详附表，数

字显示我们在1985年底所犯的估计错误，在今年已渐渐浮现，就像去年我提醒各位

的，我们所提的负债准备与事实有很大的出入，而造成连续三年一连串的错误，若

照木偶奇遇记的标准，我的鼻子可能早已能够吸引众人的目光

当保险公司主管事后补提适当的损失准备，他们通常会解释成”加强”损失准备，

以冠上合理的说法，理直气壮地好象的是真要在已经健全的财务报表上再多加一层

保障，事实上并非如此，这只是修正以前所犯错误的婉转说法而已，(虽然可能是无

心的) ，在1986年我们特别花了一番功夫在这上面做调整，但只有时间能告诉我们先

前所作的损失准备预测是否正确，而尽管在预测损失与产品行销上我们遭遇极大的

挑战，我们仍乐观地预期我们的业务量能够成长并获取不少利润，只是前进的步伐

可能会不太规则，甚至有时还会出现令人不太愉快的结果发生，这是一项变化多端

的行业，所以必须更加小心谨慎，我们时时谨记伍迪艾伦所讲的，一只羊大可以躺

在狮子的旁边，但你千万不要妄想好好地睡一觉，在保险业我们拥有的优势是我们

的心态与资本，同时在人员素质上也渐入佳境，此外，利用收得保费加以好好运

用，更是我们竞争的最大利基，在这个产业也唯有多方条件配合，才有机会成功

由Berkshire 持有41%股权的GEICO公司，在1986年表现相当突出，就整个产业而

言，个人险种的承保表现一般来说不如商业险种，但以个人险种为主要业务的

GEICO其综合比率却降低到96.9，同时保费收入亦成长了16%，另外该公司也持续买

回自家公司的股份，总计一年下来流通在外的股份减少了5.5%，我们依投资比例所

分得的保费收入已超过五亿美元，大约较三年前增加一倍，GEICO的帐是全世界保

险公司中最好的，甚至比Berkshire本身都还要好，GEICO之所以能够成功的重要因

素，在于该公司从头到脚彻底地精简营运成本，使得它把其它所有车险公司远远拋

在脑后，该公司去年的费用损失占保费收入的比例只有23.5%，许多大公司的比例甚

至比GEICO还要多出15%，即使是像Allstate 与 State Farm等车险直销业者成本也

比GEICO高出许多

若说GEICO是一座价值不菲且众所仰望的商业城堡，那么其与同业间的成本与费用

差异就是它的护城河，没有人比Bill，也就是GEICO的主席，更懂得如何去保护这

座城堡，靠着持续降低成本开支，他不断地将这个护城河加大，使得这城堡更加稳

固，过去两年间，GEICO创造了23.5%超低成本率，展望未来，这项比率仍将持续下

降，若能够同时再兼顾产品品质与客户服务的话，这家公司的前途将无可限量，另

外GEICO这一飞冲天的火箭，同时由负责投资部门的副主席Lou Simpson点燃第二

节燃料仓，比起Lou Simpson于1979年接掌该公司投资部门后的绩效，身为母公司

Berkshire投资主管的我，实在觉得有点汗颜，而也因为我们拥有这家公司大部分的

股权，使我在向各位报告以下数字时，能够稍微心安理得一些

必须再次强调的是以上的数字不但是漂亮极了，更由于其稳定成长的态势，Lou能

够不断地找到价值被低估的股票加以投资，所以风险相对很低，也很少会产生损

失，总而言之GEICO是一家由好的经理人经营的好公司，我们很容幸能与他们一起

共事

GEICO's Equities S&P500

1980 23.7% 32.3%

1981 5.4% -5.0%

1982 45.8% 21.4%

1983 36.0% 22.4%

1984 21.8% 6.2%

1985 45.8% 31.6%

1986 38.7% 18.6%

有价证券

在去年我们的保险公司总计买近了七亿美元的免税政府公债，到期日分别在八到十

二年之间，或许你会觉得这样的投入表示我们对于债券情有独钟，不幸的是事实并

非如此，债充其量券只不过是个平庸的投资工具，他们不过是选择投资标的时看起

来最不碍眼的投资替代品，虽然现在看起来也是，我突然发现我与Mae West的喜好

完全相反，她曾说：「我只爱两种男人，本国人或是外国人」，现在的我对股票与

债券皆不感兴趣

在保险公司随着资金持续涌入，我们当然必须将有价证券列入投资组合，一般来说

我们只有五种选择：

(1) 长期股票投资(2)长期固定收益债券(3)中期固定收益债券(4)短期约当现金(5)短

期套利交易

在其中股票算是最有乐趣的，当状况好时，我是说找到经营得当，业绩蒸蒸日上但

价值被低估的公司，很有机会你会挥出大满贯的全垒打，不过很不幸的是目前我们

根本找不到类似这样的标的，这不代表我们要预测未来的股市，事实上我们从来就

不知道股市接下来到底是会涨还是会跌，不过我们确知的是贪婪与恐惧这两种传染

病在股市投资世界里，会不断地发生上演，只是发生的时点很难准确预期，而市场

波动程度与状况一样不可捉摸，所以我们要做的事很简单，当众人都很贪心大作

时，尽量试着让自己觉得害怕；反之当众人感到害怕时，尽量让自己贪心一点

而当我在写这段文章时，整个华尔街几乎嗅不到一丝的恐惧，反而到处充满了欢乐

的气氛，没有理由不这样啊?有什么能够比在牛市中，股东因股票大涨赚取比公司本

身获利更多的报酬而感到更高兴的事，只是我必须说很不幸的是，股票的表现不可

能永远超过公司本身的获利表现，反倒是股票频繁的交易成本与投资管理费用，将

使得投资人所获得的报酬无可避免地远低于其所投资公司本身的获利，以美国企业

来说，平均投资报酬率为12%，这表示其投资人平均所能获得的报酬将低于此数，

牛市可以暂时模糊数学算术，但却无法推翻它

第二种投资选择是长期债券，除非在特殊情况下，就像是我们在1984年年报曾提到

的华盛顿功用电力系统所发行的公司债，(截至年底我们拥有该公司债券的未摊销成

本为二亿一千万美元，市价则为三亿一千万美元)，否则债券这种投资标的实在很难

引起我们的兴趣

我们对于长期债券没有兴趣的原因在于对于未来十几年通货膨胀可能再度肆虐的潜

在恐惧，长期而言，汇率的演变将取决于立法诸公的态度，这会威胁到汇率的稳

定，进而影响到长期债券投资人的利益，我们持续将资金运用在套利之上，然而不

像其它套利客，每年从事几十个案子，我们只锁定在少数几个个案，我们限制自己

只专注在几个已经公布消息的大案子，避开尚未明朗化的，虽然这样会让我们的获

利空间减小，但相对的只要运气不要太差，我们预期落空的机率也会减少许多，到

年底为止，手上只有一个案子Lear-Siegler，另外还有一笔一亿四千五百万的应收款

项，这是联合利华用来买下庞氏欠我们的款项

套利是除了政府债券以外，短期资金运用的替代品，但风险与报酬相对都比较高，

到目前为止，这些套利投资的报酬确实比政府债券要来的好的多，不过即便如此，

一次惨痛的经验将使总成绩猪羊变色

另外虽然有些不情愿，我们也将目光摆在中期的免税债券之上，买下这类债券我们

将承担钜额损失的风险，若可能的话我们在到期之前就会把它们卖掉，当然这样的

风险也提供我们相对的报酬，到目前为止未实现的获利还是比短期债券要来的好的

多，不过这种高报酬在扣除可能承担损失的风险与额外的税负，其实报酬好不了多

少，更何况还有可能估计错误，不过即便我们真的发生损失，其程度还是比我们不

断在短期债券上打滚来的好

不如何，大家必须有个体认那就是以目前的市场状况，我们在债券或股票的预期报

酬都不会太高，目前我们可以做的，顶多是认赔处分一些债券，然后重新将资金投

入到未来可能好一点的股票投资上，债券会发生损失的原因在于利率高涨，当然这

同样也会压缩股票的价格

下表是我们截至1986年底金额超过二千五百万以上股票的投资组合，不包含Wesco

与NFM在内

Company Name Shares Cost Market Unrealized

Capital Cities/ABC 515,775 801,694 285,919

GEIGO Corporation 6,850,000 45,713 674,725 629,012

Handy & Harman 2,379,200 27,318 46,989 19,671

Lear Siegler 44,064 44,587 523

The Washington Post

Company 1,727,765 9,731 269,531 259,800

All Other Common

Stock 12,763 36,507 23,744

Total Common Stock 655,364 1,874,033 1,218,669

Incremantal 295,458

大家要特别注意的是我们会将三项投资列为永久的投资组合，分别是资本城/ABC、

GEICO与华盛顿邮报，即便这些股票目前的价格看起来有些高估，我们也不打算把

它们卖掉，就像即使有人出再高的价格，我们也不打算卖喜斯糖果或水牛城报纸一

样，这种态度现今看起来有点老套过时，现在当红的基金经理人所谓的企业组合，

大多是为了迎合华尔街的喜好，列出适合再造的对象，(奇怪的是企业再造的定义范

围却只限于拋弃被锁定的企业，但却不包含其经理人与负责人本身，侲恨罪恶却深

爱犯罪者，这种理论在财富五百大企业流传地跟救世军一样普遍

基金经理人更是肾上腺素分泌过多，他们的行为在股票交易时间大声叫嚣让不断念

经的苦行僧看起来显得安静许多，事实上机构投资人这个名词听起来，跟超级大虾

米、女性泥巴摔角手、收费便宜的律师，同时并列自相矛盾的修饰名词

尽管这种对于购并案的乐衷横扫整个美国金融界与企业界，但我们还是坚持这种至

死不分离的政策，这是查理跟我唯一能够感到自在的方式，事实证明这种方式长期

下来让我们有不错的获利，也让我们的经理人与被投资公司专注于本业之上而免于

分心

去年我们投资了二千三百多万在NHP50%股权，这是一家房屋租赁发展与整合商，

不过若所有主管股票认股权都行使的话，我们的权益大概会降到45%左右

该公司有段非凡的历史血统，1967年美国总统詹森指定Kaiser带领一个由民间与企

业领袖所组成特别小组，研究如何满足中低收入家庭市场的生活所需，最后有两个

小组因此具体成形，而目前这两者皆由NHP所拥有，在其中有一条特殊的规定，那

就是该公司有三席董事必须由总统指定，并经参议院同意，依法每年还须提供年度

报告给总统，

超过260个美国大企业，非以营利为出发点，集资四千二百万成立两个合伙组织，透

过与房屋使用者合伙形式，由政府补助租赁房屋，典型的合伙是持有一个房地产单

位，附带一个抵押贷款，大部分的资金来源系由一群有租税减免需求的有限合伙人

提供，NHP担任一般合伙人并买下所有合伙事业一小部份的出资权，

后来政府房屋计画政策有所转向，所以NHP有必要转型扩展在主流市场-即非补助房

屋租赁，此外NHP的一个子公司也在华盛顿特区建造了一个单亲家庭之家，年营业

收入五千万美元，NHP目前管理五百个合伙产业，遍布全美四十个州、哥伦比亚特

区与波多黎各，总计有八万个家庭户数，这些产业的总值超过25亿美元，同时管理

相当良好，NHP直接管理其中五万五千户，其余透过监督方式进行，公司管理的收

入每年约一千六百万美元，而且还在持续成长中

除了公司所投资的部份合伙事业的权益，NHP在产业处分后也可分得部份利益，虽

然部份补助较多的产业无利可图，但有些的利润还不错，尤其当通货膨胀高张时，

1986年通过的租税改革法案已使这些对于以租税由导向的投资人受到阻断，NHP目

前的大方向是好好运用这些合伙权益与非补助租赁产业，强化其质与量，在这类计

画中，NHP通常与大型的投资法人合作，NHP会持续寻求各种方法来发展中低收入

房屋计画，当然除非政府政策修改，否则以目前情况很难真正成功

除了我们以外，NHP的大股东还有Weyerhauser持有25%的股权，其余则由经营团队

与其它60多家大企业持有

税负

1986年通过的租税改革法案对我们旗下许多事业影响的层面非常的广，虽然整体而

言我们对于这项法案褒多于贬，但实际上对于Berkshire财务投资来说却是负面的，

新制将使得我们企业价值未来的成长率减少几个百分点，对于我们股东的负面影响

更大，Berkshire的价值每成长一美元，假设完全反应在公司的股票价格之上，股东

在扣除相关税负后真正拿到手的，相较于旧制约有八十美分，新制可能只剩下七十

二美分，主要是因为个人资本所得的上限税率由20%调高到28%的缘故，

兹将对Berkshire所有影响列示如下

o企业一般收入的税率由46%减少到34%，这个变化对我们的影响颇为正面，同时包

含几个主要的被投资事业资本城/ABC与华盛顿邮报在内

会这样说是基于多年来一直存在在不同政党间，到底是企业或是消费者在支付所得

税的争论，这种争论最后通常导致企业税负增加而不是减少，反对调涨税率的一派

认为，不管税率有高，企业总是有办法将税负成本转嫁到消费者身上，导致产品价

格调高，以弥补税负上的支出，反之调降税率并不会增加企业的获利，而是会使产

品价格下跌

另一派则认为企业不但要支付税负，同时还要吸收调涨的税负成本，所以对消费者

来说一点影响都没有，

事实到底是怎样呢?当企业税率减少，Berkshire、华盛顿邮报或是资本城公司他们自

己真的可能将所有获利放到自己口袋，或是将利益透过降价与客户一起分享吗?这对

投资人、经理人或是政策制定者来说，都是一个很重要的问题

最后我们自己得到的结论是部份企业会将减税的利益全部或是大部交到企业与其股

东的手上，另一部份的企业则是将利益流到消费者或是客户的身上，主要的关键还

在于企业本身的竞争优势与其获利能力是否受到政府管制等因素

举例来说，当强势企业如电力事业，其获利程度受到法规管制，税率调降将直接立

即反应在电力价格而非电力公司获利数字之上，反之亦然，虽然调涨的速度较慢，

另外像价格竞争激烈的产业也会有同样的结果，这类型的企业通常竞争力薄弱，不

得不透过自由竞争市场慢慢地反应到产品价格之上，这种价格反应机制与前面所提

的公用电力事业相类似，税负减少对价格的影响，远大于对获利的影响

不过另外一方面，在强势且较不受政府规范的企业，情况就完全相反了，企业与其

背后的股东将会是最大的受益者，许多我们百分之百或部份持有的事业都属于此一

类型，所有降税的好处最后都落到我们而非消费者的口袋里，虽然这样讲有点冒

昧，却很难加以否认，若你一时无法接受这项事实，看看你周围那些名医或是名律

师，难道你会认为这些专业人士(也算是个人强势的事业)会因为个人所得税率减少而

调降其收费标准吗? 不过大家不要高兴的太早，因为预计在1988年实施的减税方案对

我们一点来说有点不太切实际，因为可以预期的是这些减税方案将会造成未来华府

的财政困难，进而对物价稳定有严重影响，所以可预期的在未来五年之内，高税率

或是高通膨将会再现，且很有可能两者都会同时发生

O企业资本利得税率从1987年起将从原来的28%调高到34%，这种改变对于Berkshire

来说将有重大影响，因为我们预期未来被投资企业的价值，如同过去一般会反应在

企业的资本利得之上，例如我们主要的三大投资资本城、GEICO与华盛顿邮报，目

前总市值已高达17亿美元，约占Berkshire净值的七成五强，但每年反应在公司帐上

的收益却只有九百万美元，其余大部分的盈余都保留在公司，继续发挥其投资效

益，最终为我们带来大量的资本利得

新法案增加所有未来实现的资本利得税负，包含过去新法修正之前已存在的未实现

利益，到年底为止，我们帐上有高达12亿未实现股票投资利得，原来以28%估算预

计应付所得税，不久之后，若改成34%的税率，将会使得公司净值减少七千三百万

美元，直接加到应付政府的所得税之上，

O保险事业收到的股利与利息收入的税负将比过去为重，首先企业从国内公司收到

的股利税率将从15%增加到20%，第二是有关产物意外险业者剩下的80%的股利，若

股票是在1986年八月以后取得的，还要再加课15%的所得税，第三也是与产物意外

险业者相关，也就是在1986年八月以后取得的免税债券，将只有85%的比例可以免

税

后面两项的变动非常重要，代表我们在以后年度，投资所得将会比以前旧制来的

少，我个人估计影响获利能力约有十个百分点，

O新税法也会大幅影响产物意外险公司支付税负的时点，新规定要求我们在报税时

将所提列的损失准备打折，此举将使得我们的课税所得增加，另外在未来六年内，

要求我们将20%未赚取的保费列入课税所得中，

虽然两者并不影响报表中应付所得税的数字，但却都会大幅加速我们支付税金的时

点，意谓过去不必马上支付的税负，现在却都有可能要面临缴纳，这对我们的获利

将有相当大的影响，这好比当你21岁成年时，便被要求要对你一生所能赚得的收入

预先课税，则你往后一辈子个人的财富与身家将会比原来你死时再课税要来的少的

多

细心的读者可能会发现一项与我们先前所说不一致的地方，刚刚提到在价格竞争激

烈的产业，我们认为税负的增减，只会将变化移转到客户的身上，对公司的获利影

响有限，不过以目前正处在激烈竞争的产物意外险业来说，税负的增加直接影响的

却是公司的获利能力，主要原因在于并非所有的保险业者都适用同样的税法规定，

由于一些公司先前帐上有相当大的亏损可供往后年度的获利扣抵，有一些则因为并

进亏损的非保险部门享有租税上优惠，使得不同产险公司的实际税率不一而足，这

与其它价格竞争激烈的产业，诸如汽车、铝业、百货业，主要竞争对手税率差异不

大的情况，完全不一样，

税负成本基础不一，导致差异无法完全反应到客户的身上，保险公司本身必须吸收

部份的税务负担，另外部份负担可被"fresh start"所吸收，虽然当我们在1986年提列

的损失准备，依照新税法规定，在1987年认列时将被打折，(当然在给各位的财务报

告上的数字仍维持不变) ，不过由于重复扣抵的结果，将会使得净影响数较以前增加

这项净值增加的影响尚未反应在年度的资产负债表上，依照现行的一般公认会计原

则，这项影响数将会陆续反应在未来的损益表的减税利益上，我们预期这项重新的

调整将会使得公司净值增加三、四千万美元，不过须特别注意的是，这种优惠只是

一时的，不过其它不利的税负增加却是永久的，

公用事业原则在新税法实施后将被取消，意思是说在1987年以后，对于企业的清算

其税负将加倍，一个是在企业阶段，一则是在股东个人阶段，在过去企业阶段的税

负可透过适当方法予以规避，举例来说，假设今天我们把Berkshire清算，(当然这是

不可能的事) ，在新制之下，公司股东所能收到的清算收入，将比过去旧制时代少了

很多，虽然这只是假设，但事实上却影响到许多准备清算的公司，同样也会影响我

们对投资标的的评估，如石油业、媒体业、或不动产业等等，虽然公司实际经营状

况并没有多大改变，但其处分价值却因税法的修订而有极大的变动，

个人认为一般投资人或基金经理人可能尚未完全了解其严重性，虽然我不爱提，但

我还是必须向各位报告以上复杂难解的内容，总之我只能说新法对Berkshire来说，

绝对会有不利的影响，至于详细的数字是多少，以目前的情况实在很难详细的估算

其它事项

去年公司新添购了一架飞机，没错一架对很少到远处旅行的我们来说，算是相当昂

贵且豪华的飞机，这架飞机不仅所费不贷，还要花许多钱在保养之上，一架1,500万

美元的新飞机，每年光是帐上的资金成本与折旧提列就要三百万美金，比起先前那

架85万美元二手飞机，每年只会产生二十万美元的费用，确实有极大的差别，虽然

充分了解其中的差异，不幸地你们的主席还是对于企业专用飞机发表了许多不当的

言论，因此在购买之前，我不得已暂时变身成为伽利略，突然间得到一项反启示，

原来旅行可以比过去来的容易多了，只是也变得比过去更贵了，到底Berkshire会不

会因为这架飞机而受益，目前尚无定论，但我个人一定会将部份企业的成功因素归

诸于它(不管别人如何地怀疑) ，我很害怕富兰克林打电话告诉我说，没错!人类身为

一种有理性的动物实在是太方便了，只要他想要做的，随时可以找一个理由来解释

它

大约有97%的股东参加了去年的股东指定捐赠计画，透过这项计画去年我们总共捐

出了四百万美元给1,934个不同的慈善团体机构，

我们促请新加入的股东赶快看一看相关的计画，若你在未来年度也想要参加，务必

确认将股份登记在自己而非信托公司的名下

* * *

去年总计有450位股东参加年度的股东会，(去年约有250位，十年前则只有十几

位) ，我很期望各位在五月十九日都能到奥玛哈来参加今年的股东会，查理与我会很

乐意为各位回答所有有关公司经营的问题，去年所有股东总共提了65个问题，其中

有许多相当好的意见，去年股东会结束后，两位分别来自纽泽西与纽约的股东到内

布拉斯加家具店花了五千元向B太太各买了一套市价一万元的地毯，B太太相当高兴

但却不甚满意，所以今年股东会后，B太太将在店内等待各位，希望各位能够打败去

年的记录，否则我可能会有麻烦，所以各位请帮帮忙，不要忘了顺道去看看她

华伦巴菲特

董事会主席

1987年2月27日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million, or

19.5%. Over the last 23 years (that is, since present management

took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to

$2,477.47, or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.

本公司在1978年的净值增加了四亿六千四百万，较去年增加了19.5%，

而过去23年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现

在的2,477美元，年复合成长率约为23.1%。

What counts, of course, is the rate of gain in per-share

business value, not book value. In many cases, a corporation's

book value and business value are almost totally unrelated. For

example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin-United

published yearend audits showing their book values to be $652

million and $397 million, respectively. Conversely, Belridge Oil

was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6 billion although its book

value was only $177 million.

真正重要的当然是企业每股实际价值，而非帐面价值的增加，在许多情

况下一家公司的帐面与其实际价值一点关连都没有，举例来说，LTV与

鲍德温联合公司就在宣布破产之前的会计师签证的年度报告还显示，

帐面各有净值六亿与四亿美金，但是另一个公司Belridge石油在1979年

以36亿美元高价卖给壳牌石油之时，帐面净值却不到两亿。

At Berkshire, however, the two valuations have tracked

rather closely, with the growth rate in business value over the

last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in book value.

This good news continued in 1987.

不过在波克夏两者成长的趋势倒是蛮相近的，过去十年公司的实际价值

成长率略高于帐面价值成长率，很高兴这种好现象在今年也能持续维持。

Our premium of business value to book value has widened for

two simple reasons: We own some remarkable businesses and they

are run by even more remarkable managers.

我们企业价值对帐面价值的差距，因为以下二个简单的原因又扩大了一点

，一是我们拥有优秀的企业，一是这些企业皆由最优秀的经理人在管理。

各位有理由对第二个原因表示意见，因为一家企业的总经理很少会告诉公司

股东说，你们所投资的公司是由一群笨蛋组成的经营阶层来管理，而也就是

为了要避免露出马脚，所以常常使得一些公司常常会出现相当诡异的财务报表

You have a right to question that second assertion. After

all, CEOs seldom tell their shareholders that they have assembled

a bunch of turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so

makes for some strange annual reports. Oftentimes, in his

shareholders' letter, a CEO will go on for pages detailing

corporate performance that is woefully inadequate. He will

nonetheless end with a warm paragraph describing his managerial

comrades as "our most precious asset." Such comments sometimes

make you wonder what the other assets can possibly be.

通常在致股东的报告中，CEO会花一大篇幅详细描述过去企业的表现是如何

的不当，最后不可免俗地会以感性的语气来形容其所带领的公司干部实在是

公司最珍贵的资产，这种形容有时会让人搞不清楚那其它的资产到底又算是什么?

At Berkshire, however, my appraisal of our operating

managers is, if anything, understated. To understand why, first

take a look at page 7, where we show the earnings (on an

historical-cost accounting basis) of our seven largest nonfinancial

units: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska

Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies,

and World Book. In 1987, these seven business units had combined

operating earnings before interest and taxes of $180 million.

不过在波克夏，我个人对于管理干部任何的称赞都是很容易让人理解的，

首先请看看第七页，显示本公司七个非金融业的主要企业-水牛城报纸、

费区海默西服、寇比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具、史考特飞兹集团、喜斯糖果

与世界百科全书的获利状况(以历史成本会计基础)，1987年这七家公司的

年度在扣除利息与所得税前的获利高达一亿八千万美元

By itself, this figure says nothing about economic

performance. To evaluate that, we must know how much total

capital - debt and equity - was needed to produce these earnings.

Debt plays an insignificant role at our seven units: Their net

interest expense in 1987 was only $2 million. Thus, pre-tax

earnings on the equity capital employed by these businesses

amounted to $178 million. And this equity - again on an

historical-cost basis - was only $175 million.

单独这数字本身并不足以说明其特殊性，但若你知道他们利用多少资金就

达到这项成果时，你就知道他们是如何地了不起了，事实上这些公司的负债

比例都非常的低，去年的利息费用总共加起来也不过只有二百万美元，所以

合计税前获利一亿七千八百万，而帐列的历史投资股本竟只有一亿七千五百万！

If these seven business units had operated as a single

company, their 1987 after-tax earnings would have been

approximately $100 million - a return of about 57% on equity

capital. You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone

at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage. Here's a

benchmark: In its 1988 Investor's Guide issue, Fortune reported

that among the 500 largest industrial companies and 500 largest

service companies, only six had averaged a return on equity of

over 30% during the previous decade. The best performer among

the 1000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%.

若把这七家公司视作是单一个体公司，则税后净利约为一亿美元，股东权益

投资报酬率更将高达57%，即使财务杠杆再高，你也很难在一般公司看到这

种比率，根据财星杂志在1988年出版的投资人手册，在全美五百大制造业与

五百大服务业中，只有六家公司过去十年的股东权益报酬率超过30%，最高

的一家也不过只有40.2%。

Of course, the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven

units are not as high as their underlying returns because, in

aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to

underlying equity capital. Overall, these operations are carried

on our books at about $222 million above the historical

accounting values of the underlying assets. However, the

managers of the units should be judged by the returns they

achieve on the underlying assets; what we pay for a business does

not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with.

(If, to become a shareholder and part owner of Commerce Clearing

House, you pay, say, six times book value, that does not change

CCH's return on equity.)

当然Berkshire真正从这些公司赚得的报酬并没有那么地高，因为当初买下

这些公司时，支付了相当的溢价才取得这些股份，经过统计我们在这些公司

原始投资超过其帐列的股权净值的溢价金额约为二亿二千二百万美元，当然

要判断这些公司经理人的绩效应该是要看他们创造的盈余是靠多少资产所产生的，

至于我们用多少钱买下这些公司与经理人的绩效并无关联，就算你用高于净值

六倍的价钱买下一家公司，同样也不会影响该公司的股东权益报酬率。

Three important inferences can be drawn from the figures I

have cited. First, the current business value of these seven

units is far above their historical book value and also far above

the value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet.

Second, because so little capital is required to run these

businesses, they can grow while concurrently making almost all of

their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities.

Third, these businesses are run by truly extraordinary managers.

The Blumkins, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph

Schey all meld unusual talent, energy and character to achieve

exceptional financial results.

以上所提数字代表着三项重要的指针，首先现在这七家企业的真正价值远高于

其帐面净值，同样也远高于Berkshire帐列的投资成本，第二因为经营这些事业

并不需要太多的资金，所以这些公司利用所赚取的盈余便足以支应本身业务的发展，

第三这些事业都由非常能干的经理人在经营，像是Blumkins家族、Heldmans、

Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey与Ralph Schey皆兼具才干、精力与品格，

将旗下事业经营的有声有色。

For good reasons, we had very high expectations when we

joined with these managers. In every case, however, our

experience has greatly exceeded those expectations. We have

received far more than we deserve, but we are willing to accept

such inequities. (We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed

upon receiving an acting award: "I don't deserve this, but then,

I have arthritis and I don't deserve that either.")

也因此当初这些明星经理人加入时，我们并抱持着极高的期待，事后证明得到的

结果远高于预期，我们获得远高于我们所应得的，当然我们很乐意接受这样不公平的对待，

我们借用杰克班尼在获得最佳男主角时的感言：「我不应该得到这个奖项，

但同样地我也不应该得到关节炎。」

Beyond the Sainted Seven, we have our other major unit,

insurance, which I believe also has a business value well above

the net assets employed in it. However, appraising the business

value of a property-casualty insurance company is a decidedly

imprecise process. The industry is volatile, reported earnings

oftentimes are seriously inaccurate, and recent changes in the

Tax Code will severely hurt future profitability. Despite these

problems, we like the business and it will almost certainly

remain our largest operation. Under Mike Goldberg's management,

the insurance business should treat us well over time.

除了这七个圣徒之外，我们还有一项主要的事业-保险，同样地我也认为

它的价值远高于其帐列的资产，只是要评估一家产物意外险公司的价值

就没有办法那么明确了，这个产业变动很大，报表所列的获利数字有时

会有很大的偏差，而且最近税法修正对我们未来年度的获利有很大的影响，

尽管如此保险事业仍会是我们经营事业的最大重心，在Mike Goldberg的管理之下，

保险事业的报酬仍可期待。

With managers like ours, my partner, Charlie Munger, and I

have little to do with operations. in fact, it is probably fair

to say that if we did more, less would be accomplished. We have

no corporate meetings, no corporate budgets, and no performance

reviews (though our managers, of course, oftentimes find such

procedures useful at their operating units). After all, what can

we tell the Blumkins about home furnishings, or the Heldmans

about uniforms?

有这些优秀的专业经理人，在事业的日常营运上，查理孟格跟我实在是

没有什么好费心思的地方，事实上，平心而论我们管的越多，可能只会把事情搞砸，

在Berkshire我们没有企业会议，也没有年度预算，更没有绩效考核

(当然各个企业单位因应自身所需，有自己的一套管理办法) ，但总的来说，

我们实在没有什么可以告诉指导Blumkin如何去卖家具事业或是指导

Heldman家族如何经营制服事业。

Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries

is applause. But it is not the indiscriminate applause of a

Pollyanna. Rather it is informed applause based upon the two

long careers we have spent intensively observing business

performance and managerial behavior. Charlie and I have seen so

much of the ordinary in business that we can truly appreciate a

virtuoso performance. Only one response to the 1987 performance

of our operating managers is appropriate: sustained, deafening

applause.

我们对于这些所属事业单位最重要的支持就是适时地给予掌声，但这绝对不是在

做烂好人，相反地这是长久下来我们深入观察这些企业的经营结果与管理当局的

作为所给予的正面肯定，我们两个人这些年来看过太多平庸企业的表现，所以我们

是真正地珍惜他们艺术级的演出，对于1987年旗下子公司整体的表现，

我们只能报以热烈的掌声，而且是震耳欲聋的掌声。

Sources of Reported Earnings

盈余的来源

下表显示Berkshire主要盈余的来源，其中商誉的摊销与购买法的会计调整数，

特别从各个企业挑出汇总成单独一栏，事实上这样的目的是为了让旗下事业的

经营绩效，不因我们买下他们而有所影响，在1983与1986年的年报中，

我已不只一次的解释这样的表达方式会比依照一般公认会计原则更符合

管理当局与投资者的需要，当然最后加总结算的数字，还是会与会计师

出具的财务报表上的盈余数字完全一致。

The table on the following page shows the major sources of

Berkshire's reported earnings. In the table, amortization of

Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments

are not charged against the specific businesses to which they

apply but, instead, are aggregated and shown separately. In

effect, this procedure presents the earnings of our businesses as

they would have been reported had we not purchased them. In

appendixes to my letters in the 1983 and 1986 annual reports, I

explained why this form of presentation seems to us to be more

useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP

presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a

business-by business basis. The total net earnings we show in

the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP figures in our

audited financial statements.

In the Business Segment Data on pages 36-38 and in the

Management's Discussion section on pages 40-44 you will find much

additional information about our businesses. In these sections

you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis.

I urge you to read that material, as well as Charlie Munger's

letter to Wesco shareholders, describing the various businesses

of that subsidiary, which starts on page 45.

在后面的部门别信息中，大家可以找到个别事业的详细信息，除此之外，

我也强烈建议大家一定要看查理写给Wesco股东叙述其旗下事业情况的一封信

1987

Unit:

US'000

Earnings Before

Income Tax

After

Income

Tax

PercentTotal

Berkshire

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

Underwriting (55,429) (20,696)

Net Investment Income 152,483 136,658

Buffalio News 39,410 21,304

Fechheimer 13,332 6,580

Kirby 22,408 12,891

Nebraska Furniture Mart 16,837 7,554

Scott Fetzer-Diversified 30,591 17,555

See's Candies 31,693 17,363

Wesco Financial Corporation-

Parent 6,209 4,978

World Book 25,745 15,136

Amortization of Goodwill (2,862) (2,862)

Interest on Debt (11,474) (5,905)

Shareholder's Contribution (4,938) (2,963)

Other 16,914 7,152

0 280,919 　 214,745

Realized Securities Gain 27,319 19,807

Total Earnings-all entities 0 308,238 　 234,552

Gypsy Rose Lee在她晚年的一场生日宴会上宣布：「我还是拥有去年所有的一切，

现在唯一的差别是全部都矮了两吋。」

如同本表所示，在1987年几乎我们所有的事业都又成长的一岁。

Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one of her later birthdays: "I

have everything I had last year; it's just that it's all two

inches lower." As the table shows, during 1987 almost all of our

businesses aged in a more upbeat way.

我们旗下这些事业实在是没有什么新的变化可以特别提出报告的，

所谓没有消息就是好消息，剧烈的变动通常不会有特别好的绩效，

当然这与大部分的投资人认为的刚好相反，大家通常将最高的本益比

给予那些擅长画大饼的企业，这些美好的远景会让投资人不顾现实经营的情况，

而一昧幻想未来可能的获利美梦，对于这种爱做梦的投资人来说，任何路边的野花，

都会比邻家的女孩来的具吸引力，不管后者是如何贤慧。

There's not a lot new to report about these businesses - and

that's good, not bad. Severe change and exceptional returns

usually don't mix. Most investors, of course, behave as if just

the opposite were true. That is, they usually confer the highest

price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out

the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors

fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's

business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date

is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how

desirable she may be.

经验显示，能够创造盈余新高的企业，现在做生意的方式通常与其五年前

甚至十年前没有多大的差异，当然管理当局绝对不能够太过自满，因为

企业总有不断的机会可以改善本身的服务、产品线、制造能力等等，

且绝对必须要好好把握，不过一家公司若是为了改变而改变，反而可能

增加犯错的机会，讲的更深入一点，在一块动荡不安的土地之上，是不太

可能建造一座固若金汤的城堡，而具有这样稳定特质的企业却是持续创造

高获利的关键。

Experience, however, indicates that the best business

returns are usually achieved by companies that are doing

something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten

years ago. That is no argument for managerial complacency.

Businesses always have opportunities to improve service, product

lines, manufacturing techniques, and the like, and obviously

these opportunities should be seized. But a business that

constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances

for major error. Furthermore, economic terrain that is forever

shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a

fortress-like business franchise. Such a franchise is usually

the key to sustained high returns.

先前提到财星杂志的研究，可以充分支持我的论点，在1977年到1986年间，

总计1,000家中只有25家能够达到连续十年平均股东权益报酬率达到20%的标准，

且没有一年低于15%的双重标准，而这些优质企业同时也是股票市场上的宠儿，

在所有的25家中有24家的表现超越S&P500指数。

The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view.

Only 25 of the 1,000 companies met two tests of economic

excellence - an average return on equity of over 20% in the ten

years, 1977 through 1986, and no year worse than 15%. These

business superstars were also stock market superstars: During the

decade, 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.

这些财富之星可能让你大开眼界，首先相对于本身支付利息的能力，

他们所运用的财务杠杆极其有限，一家真正好的公司是不需要借钱的，

第二除了有一家是所谓的高科技公司，另外少数几家属于制药业以外，

大多数的公司产业相当平凡普通，大部分现在销售的产品或服务与十年前

大致相同，(虽然数量或是价格、或是两者都有，比以前高很多)，

这些公司的记录显示，充分运用现有产业地位，或是专注在单一领导的

产品品牌之上通常是创造企业暴利的不二法门。

The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects. First,

most use very little leverage compared to their interest-paying

capacity. Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow.

Second, except for one company that is "high-tech" and several

others that manufacture ethical drugs, the companies are in

businesses that, on balance, seem rather mundane. Most sell nonsexy

products or services in much the same manner as they did ten

years ago (though in larger quantities now, or at higher prices,

or both). The record of these 25 companies confirms that making

the most of an already strong business franchise, or

concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually

produces exceptional economics.

事实上我们在Berkshire的经验正是如此，我们的专业经理人所以能够

缔造优异的成绩，所从事的业务相当平凡，但重点是把它们做到极致，

经理人致力于保护企业本身、控制成本，基于现有能力寻找新产品与

新市场来巩固既有优势，他们从不受外界诱惑，钜细靡遗地专注于

企业之上，而其成绩有目共睹。

Berkshire's experience has been similar. Our managers have

produced extraordinary results by doing rather ordinary things -

but doing them exceptionally well. Our managers protect their

franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and

markets that build on their existing strengths and they don't get

diverted. They work exceptionally hard at the details of their

businesses, and it shows.

以下是近况报导

Here's an update:

克里思蒂小姐嫁给一位考古学家，她曾说︰「配偶最理想的职业就是考古学家，

因为你越老，他就越有兴趣」，事实上应该是商学院而非考古学系的学生，

需要多多研究B太太-这位NFM高龄94岁的负责人。

o Agatha Christie, whose husband was an archaeologist, said

that was the perfect profession for one's spouse: "The older you

become, the more interested they are in you." It is students of

business management, not archaeologists, who should be interested

in Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), the 94-year-old chairman of Nebraska

Furniture Mart.

五十年以前B太太以五百块美金创业，到如今NFM已是全美远近驰名的家具量贩店，

但是B太太还是一样从早到晚，一个礼拜工作七天，掌管采购、销售与管理，

我很确定她现在正蓄势待发，准备在未来的五到十年内，全力冲刺再创高峰，

也因此我已说服董事会取消一百岁强迫退休的年龄上限，(也该是时候了，

随着时光的流逝，越来我越相信这个规定是该修改了)

Fifty years ago Mrs. B started the business with $500, and

today NFM is far and away the largest home furnishings store in

the country. Mrs. B continues to work seven days a week at the

job from the opening of each business day until the close. She

buys, she sells, she manages - and she runs rings around the

competition. It's clear to me that she's gathering speed and may

well reach her full potential in another five or ten years.

Therefore, I've persuaded the Board to scrap our mandatory

retirement-at-100 policy. (And it's about time: With every

passing year, this policy has seemed sillier to me.)

去年(1987年) NFM的销货净额是一亿四千多万美元，较前一年度成长8%，

这是全美独一无二的一家店，也是全美独一无二的家族，B太太跟她三个儿子

拥有天生的生意头脑、品格与冲劲，且分工合作，团结一致。

Net sales of NFM were $142.6 million in 1987, up 8% from

1986. There's nothing like this store in the country, and

there's nothing like the family Mrs. B has produced to carry on:

Her son Louie, and his three boys, Ron, Irv and Steve, possess

the business instincts, integrity and drive of Mrs. B. They work

as a team and, strong as each is individually, the whole is far

greater than the sum of the parts.

B太太家族的杰出表现，不但让身为股东的我们受益良多，NFM的客户们

更受惠更大，只要选择NFM的产品据估计光是1987年就可省下至少三千万美元，

换句话说若客户到别处去买可能要贵上这么多钱。

The superb job done by the Blumkins benefits us as owners,

but even more dramatically benefits NFM's customers. They saved

about $30 million in 1987 by buying from NFM. In other words,

the goods they bought would have cost that much more if purchased

elsewhere.

去年我接到一封无名氏所写的相当有趣的信︰「很遗憾看到Berkshire第二季

的获利下滑，想要提高贵公司的获利吗? 有一个不错的法子，去查查NFM

的产品售价，你会发现他们把一、两成的获利空间白白奉送给客户，

算算一年一亿四千万的营业额，那可是二千八百万的利润，这个数字

实在是相当可观，再看看别家家具、地毯或是电器用品的价格，

你就会发现把价格调回来是再合理不过了

谢谢

一位竞争同业留」

You'll enjoy an anonymous letter I received last August:

"Sorry to see Berkshire profits fall in the second quarter. One

way you may gain back part of your lost. (sic) Check the pricing

at The Furniture Mart. You will find that they are leaving 10%

to 20% on the table. This additional profit on $140 million of

sells (sic) is $28 million. Not small change in anyone's pocket!

Check out other furniture, carpet, appliance and T.V. dealers.

Your raising prices to a reasonable profit will help. Thank you.

/signed/ A Competitor."

NFM will continue to grow and prosper by following Mrs. B's

maxim: "Sell cheap and tell the truth."

展望未来NFM在B太太「价格公道实在」的座右铭领导下，必将继续成长茁壮。

o在全美相同规模(或甚至更大)的报纸中，水牛城报纸有两个特点

第一、它在平时与假日的普及率最高(即订户数在该地区家户数的比率)，

第二是新闻比率最高(新闻版面占总版面的比率)

o Among dominant papers of its size or larger, the Buffalo

News continues to be the national leader in two important ways:

(1) its weekday and Sunday penetration rate (the percentage of

households in the paper's primary market area that purchase it);

and (2) its "news-hole" percentage (the portion of the paper

devoted to news).

事实上一份报纸能够同时拥有这两项特色绝对不是巧合，因为新闻内容越丰富，

也就越能吸引更广泛的读者，从而提高普及率，当然除了量之外，新闻品质

也很重要，这不但代表要有好的报导与编辑，也代表要有实时性与关联性，

为了让报纸成为读者们不可或缺的东西，它必须能够马上告诉读者许多他们

想要知道的事情，而不是等读者们都已知道后，事后报纸才刊登出来。

It may not be coincidence that one newspaper leads in both

categories: an exceptionally "newsrich" product makes for broad

audience appeal, which in turn leads to high penetration. Of

course, quantity must be matched by quality. This not only

means good reporting and good writing; it means freshness and

relevance. To be indispensable, a paper must promptly tell its

readers many things they want to know but won't otherwise learn

until much later, if ever.

以水牛城日报来说我们平均每24小时出七个版本，每次内容都会更新，

举一个简单的例子就足以让人感到惊奇，光是每天的讣文就会更新七次，

也就是说每则新增的讣文会在报纸上连续刊登七个版。

At the News, we put out seven fresh editions every 24 hours,

each one extensively changed in content. Here's a small example

that may surprise you: We redo the obituary page in every edition

of the News, or seven times a day. Any obituary added runs

through the next six editions until the publishing cycle has been

completed.

当然一份新闻也必须要有有深度的全国与国际性新闻，但一份地区性的

报纸也必须及时并广泛地报导社区动态，要把这点做好除了必须要有

足够的空间，并加以有效地运用。

It's vital, of course, for a newspaper to cover national and

international news well and in depth. But it is also vital for

it to do what only a local newspaper can: promptly and

extensively chronicle the personally-important, otherwiseunreported

details of community life. Doing this job well

requires a very broad range of news - and that means lots of

space, intelligently used.

如同往年，去年(1987年)我们的新闻比大约是50%，若是我们把这比率

砍到一般40%的水准，我们一年约可省下四百万美金的新闻成本，

但我们从来都不会考虑如此做，就算哪一天我们的获利大幅缩减也是一样。

Our news hole was about 50% in 1987, just as it has been

year after year. If we were to cut it to a more typical 40%, we

would save approximately $4 million annually in newsprint costs.

That interests us not at all - and it won't interest us even if,

for one reason or another, our profit margins should

significantly shrink.

基本上查理跟我都不太相信营业预算，像是「间接费用必须缩减，

因为预估营业收入不若以往」之类的说法，。如果有一天我们必须

降低新闻比率或是牺牲喜斯糖果的品质与服务，以提升疲弱不振的

获利表现，或是相反地因为Berkshire太多钱以致现金花不完，

就去聘请经济分析师、公关顾问等对公司一点帮助都没有的人。

这些做法一点道理都没有，我们完全不了解为何有些公司因为公司

赚太多钱就增加一些没有用的人来消化预算，或是因为获利不佳

就砍掉一些关键的人事，这种变来变去的方式既不符合人性也不符合商业原则，

我们的目标是不论如何都要做对Berkshire的客户与员工有意义的事，

(你可能会问那公司专机又是怎么一回事??嗯!我想有时一个人总会有忘了原则的时候)

Charlie and I do not believe in flexible operating budgets,

as in "Non-direct expenses can be X if revenues are Y, but must

be reduced if revenues are Y - 5%." Should we really cut our news

hole at the Buffalo News, or the quality of product and service

at See's, simply because profits are down during a given year or

quarter? Or, conversely, should we add a staff economist, a

corporate strategist, an institutional advertising campaign or

something else that does Berkshire no good simply because the

money currently is rolling in?

That makes no sense to us. We neither understand the adding

of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor

the cutting of essential people or activities because

profitability is shrinking. That kind of yo-yo approach is

neither business-like nor humane. Our goal is to do what makes

sense for Berkshire's customers and employees at all times, and

never to add the unneeded. ("But what about the corporate jet?"

you rudely ask. Well, occasionally a man must rise above

principle.)

虽然水牛城新闻的营收最近几年只有些微的成长，但在发行人Stan Lipsey

杰出的管理之下，获利却反而大幅成长，有好几年我甚至错误地预测该报

的获利会下滑，而同样地今年我也不会让大家失望，1988年不管是毛利

或者是获利都会缩水，其中新闻印刷成本的飞涨是主要的原因。

Although the News' revenues have grown only moderately since

1984, superb management by Stan Lipsey, its publisher, has

produced excellent profit growth. For several years, I have

incorrectly predicted that profit margins at the News would fall.

This year I will not let vou down: Margins will, without

question, shrink in 1988 and profit may fall as well.

Skyrocketing newsprint costs will be the major cause.

o Fechheimer Bros. Company is another of our family

businesses - and, like the Blumkins, what a family. Three

generations of Heldmans have for decades consistently, built the

sales and profits of this manufacturer and distributor of

uniforms. In the year that Berkshire acquired its controlling

interest in Fechheimer - 1986 - profits were a record. The

Heldmans didn't slow down after that. Last year earnings

increased substantially and the outlook is good for 1988.

费区海默兄弟公司是我们旗下另一个家族企业，而就像Blumkins一样

是个非常杰出的家族，Heldmans家族三代几十年来，努力不懈地建立了

这家制服制造与销售公司，而在Berkshire取得所有权的1986年，

该公司的获利更创新高，此后Heldmans家族并未停下脚步，

去年(1987年)盈余又大幅增加，而展望今年(1988年)前景更是看好。

在制服事业大概没有什么出奇的事，唯一的惊奇就是Heldmans家族，

Bob、George、Gary、Roger跟Fred，对于这行业熟的不能再熟，

同时也乐在其中，我们何其有幸能与他们一起合作共事。

There's nothing magic about the Uniform business; the only

magic is in the Heldmans. Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred know

the business inside and out, and they have fun running it. We

are fortunate to be in partnership with them.

o Chuck Huggins continues to set new records at See's, just as

he has ever since we put him in charge on the day of our purchase

some 16 years ago. In 1987, volume hit a new high at slightly

Under 25 million pounds. For the second year in a row, moreover,

same-store sales, measured in pounds, were virtually unchanged.

In case you are wondering, that represents improvement: In each

of the previous six years, same-store sales had fallen.

Chuck Huggins持续为喜斯糖果缔造新猷，自从十六年前我们买下这家公司，

并请他主掌这项事业时，便一直是如此，在1987年糖果销售量创下

近二千五百万英镑的新高，同时连续第二年单店平均营业额维持不坠，

你可能会觉得没什么了不起，事实上这已是相当大的改善，因为过去连续

六年数字都呈现下滑的趋势。

Although we had a particularly strong 1986 Christmas season,

we racked up better store-for-store comparisons in the 1987

Christmas season than at any other time of the year. Thus, the

seasonal factor at See's becomes even more extreme. In 1987,

about 85% of our profit was earned during December.

虽然1986年的圣诞节特别旺，但1987年的记录比86年还要好，

使得季节因素对喜斯糖果来说越来越重要，经统计去年一整年

约有85%的获利是在十二月单月所创造的。

糖果店是个很好玩的地方，但对大部分的老板来说就不那么有趣了，

就我们所知，这几年来除了喜斯赚大钱之外，其它糖果店的经营皆相当惨淡，

所以很明显的喜斯搭的并不是顺风车，它的表现是扎扎实实的。

Candy stores are fun to visit, but most have not been fun

for their owners. From what we can learn, practically no one

besides See's has made significant profits in recent years from

the operation of candy shops. Clearly, Chuck's record at See's

is not due to a rising industry tide. Rather, it is a one-of-akind

performance.

这项成就当然需要优秀的产品，这个倒不是问题，因为我们确实拥有，

但除此之外它还需要对客户衷心的服务，Chuck可以说是百分之百地

为客户设想，而他的态度更直接感染到公司上下所有的员工。

His achievement requires an excellent product - which we

have - but it also requires genuine affection for the customer.

Chuck is 100% customer-oriented, and his attitude sets the tone

for the rest of the See's organization.

以下是一个具体的例证，在喜斯我们通常会定期增添新的口味并删除旧的

口味以维持大约一百种组合，去年我们淘汰了14种口味，结果其中有两种

让我们的客户无法忘怀，而不断地表达他们对我们这种举动的不满，

「愿喜斯所有做出这种卑鄙决定的相关人士嘴巴流脓长疮；愿你们新的

巧克力糖在运送途中融化；愿你们吃到酸掉的糖果；愿你们的亏大钱；

我们正试图寻求要求你们恢复供应原有口味的法院强制令」，

总计最后我们收到好几百封的抱怨信。

Here's an example of Chuck in action: At See's we regularly

add new pieces of candy to our mix and also cull a few to keep

our product line at about 100 varieties. Last spring we selected

14 items for elimination. Two, it turned out, were badly missed

by our customers, who wasted no time in letting us know what they

thought of our judgment: "A pox on all in See's who participated

in the abominable decision...;" "May your new truffles melt in

transit, may they sour in people's mouths, may your costs go up

and your profits go down...;" "We are investigating the

possibility of obtaining a mandatory injunction requiring you to

supply...;" You get the picture. In all, we received many hundreds of

letters.

为此Chuck不但重新推出原来的口味，他还将危机化为转机，所有来信

的客户都得到完整且诚实的回复，信上是这样写的︰「虽然我们做出错误的决定，

但值得庆幸的是最后得以以喜剧收场」，随信还附赠一个特别的小礼物。

Chuck not only reintroduced the pieces, he turned this

miscue into an opportunity. Each person who had written got a

complete and honest explanation in return. Said Chuck's letter:

"Fortunately, when I make poor decisions, good things often

happen as a result...;" And with the letter went a special gift

certificate.

See's increased prices only slightly in the last two years.

In 1988 we have raised prices somewhat more, though still

moderately. To date, sales have been weak and it may be

difficult for See's to improve its earnings this year.

过去两年喜斯糖果仅稍微地涨价，在今年(1988年)我们仍会继续调涨价格

，幅度还算合理，只是截至目前为止销售持续低迷，预计今年公司盈余

将难再有继续成长的可能性。

o World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group

are all under the management of Ralph Schey. And what a lucky

thing for us that they are. I told you last year that Scott

Fetzer performance in 1986 had far exceeded the expectations that

Charlie and I had at the time of our purchase. Results in 1987

were even better. Pre-tax earnings rose 10% while average

capital employed declined significantly.

世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与史考特费兹制造集团皆由Ralph所领导，

很高兴我们能做这样的安排，去年我曾告诉各位史考特费兹集团在我们

买下公司的当年度-1986年的表现超乎预期，但去年1987年的表现更出色，

税前获利成长了10%，但所耗费的资金却较前年大幅缩减。

Ralph's mastery of the 19 businesses for which he is

responsible is truly amazing, and he has also attracted some

outstanding managers to run them. We would love to find a few

additional units that could be put under Ralph's wing.

Ralph同时掌管19项事业的方式实在是令人叹为观止，同时他也吸引了

一群优秀的经理人协助他经营事业，我们很乐意在多找一些事业交到Ralph旗下去经营。

The businesses of Scott Fetzer are too numerous to describe

in detail. Let's just update you on one of our favorites: At the

end of 1987, World Book introduced its most dramatically-revised

edition since 1962. The number of color photos was increased

from 14,000 to 24,000; over 6,000 articles were revised; 840 new

contributors were added. Charlie and I recommend this product to

you and your family, as we do World Book's products for younger

children, Childcraft and Early World of Learning.

由于史考特费兹的事业范围过于繁杂，在此不便详述，这里谨就其中一项

我们的最爱-世界百科全书加以介绍，去年底世界百科全书推出自1962年

以来改版最多的最新版本，全套书中的彩色照片从14,000祯增加到24,000祯，

超过6,000篇文章从新编写，840位作者参与；查理跟我衷心向您与您的家庭

推荐包含世界百科全书与儿童工艺等一系列的套书。

In 1987, World Book unit sales in the United States

increased for the fifth consecutive year. International sales

and profits also grew substantially. The outlook is good for

Scott Fetzer operations in aggregate, and for World Book in

particular.

在去年该套书在美国地区销售量连续第五年成长，国外地区的销量与获利

亦大幅增加，史考特费兹集团前景看好，尤其世界百科全书更是如此。

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table

presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

下表是我们惯用保险业主要指数的最近更新数字

Yearly

Change

in Combined Ratio

Yearly

Change

GNP

Deflators

Premiums Written Incurred Loss

1981 3.8% 106.0% 6.5% 9.7%

1982 4.4% 109.8% 8.4% 6.4%

1983 4.6% 112.0% 6.8% 3.9%

1984 9.2% 117.9% 16.9% 3.8%

1985 22.1% 116.5% 16.1% 3.3%

1986(Rev.) 22.2% 108.0% 13.5% 2.6%

1987(Est.) 8.7% 104.7% 6.8% 3.0%

综合比率代表所有保险成本(发生损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，一百

以下表示有承保的获利，一百以上则有承保的损失，若考量保险公司利用

保费收入(浮存金)所赚取的投资收益列入计算，则107到111之间大约是

损益两平点，当然这是不包含公司自有资金所运用的收益。

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses

incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A

ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above

100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer

earns from holding on to policyholders' funds ("the float") is

taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range

typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of

earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

保险事业的数字，若以上面那张简表来说明，事实上并不会太复杂，

当同业平均保费收入年成长只在4%或5%徘徊，则当年承保损失一定会上升，

原因不在于车祸、火灾、暴风等意外事件发生更频繁，也不是因为一般

通货膨胀的关系。主要的祸首在于今天社会与司法过度膨胀，法律诉讼费用暴增，

一方面是因为诉讼更频繁，一方面是由于陪审团与法官倾向扩大保险单上的

保险理赔范围，若这种乱象不能加以抑止，则保险公司每年至少要有10%以上的

保费收入年成长，才有办法收支打平，即使在通货膨胀相对温和的状况下也是如此。

The math of the insurance business, encapsulated by the

table, is not very complicated. In years when the industry's

annual gain in revenues (premiums) pokes along at 4% or 5%,

underwriting losses are sure to mount. That is not because auto

accidents, fires, windstorms and the like are occurring more

frequently, nor has it lately been the fault of general

inflation. Today, social and judicial inflation are the major

culprits; the cost of entering a courtroom has simply ballooned.

Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts, and

part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the

coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the

insurer when the policies were written. Seeing no let-up in

either trend, we continue to believe that the industry's revenues

must grow at about 10% annually for it to just hold its own in

terms of profitability, even though general inflation may be

running at a considerably lower rate.

过去三年来保费收入的大幅成长几乎可以确定今年同业的绩效都会相当不错，

事实证明也是如此，不过接下来的情况可就不太妙了，根据Best's统计预估，

1988年的每季的成长率将由12.9%按季逐渐下滑至11.1%、5.7%、5.6%，

可以确定的是1988年的保费成长一定会低于10%的损益两平点，很明显的

好日子已经不多了。

The strong revenue gains of 1985-87 almost guaranteed the

industry an excellent underwriting performance in 1987 and,

indeed, it was a banner year. But the news soured as the

quarters rolled by: Best's estimates that year-over-year volume

increases were 12.9%, 11.1%, 5.7%, and 5.6%. In 1988, the

revenue gain is certain to be far below our 10% "equilibrium"

figure. Clearly, the party is over.

然而盈余数字却不会马上滑落，这个产业具有递延的现象，因为大部分的保单

都是一年期，所以对于损益的影响会在往后的一年之间陆续浮现，因此打个比方，

在party结束、酒吧关门之前，你还可以把手上的那杯喝完了再走，

假设往后几年没有发生什么天灾地变，我们预期1988年的同业平均综合比率

将会微幅上扬，紧接下来的几年则会大幅攀升。

However, earnings will not immediately sink. A lag factor

exists in this industry: Because most policies are written for a

one-year term, higher or lower insurance prices do not have their

full impact on earnings until many months after they go into

effect. Thus, to resume our metaphor, when the party ends and

the bar is closed, you are allowed to finish your drink. If

results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe, we predict a

small climb for the industry's combined ratio in 1988, followed

by several years of larger increases.

保险业最近受到几项不利的经济因素所困而前景黯淡，数以百计的竞争对手、

进入障碍低、无法大幅差异化的产品特性，在这种类似商品型产业之中，

只有营运成本低的公司或是一些受到保护的利基产品才有可能有长期获利

成长的机会。

The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal

economic characteristics that make for a poor long-term outlook:

hundreds of competitors, ease of entry, and a product that cannot

be differentiated in any meaningful way. In such a commoditylike

business, only a very low-cost operator or someone operating

in a protected, and usually small, niche can sustain high

profitability levels.

当产品供给短缺时，即使是商品化产业也能蓬勃发展，不过在保险业界，

这种好日子早就已经过去了，资本主义最讽刺的地方就是商品型产业大部分的

经理人都痛恨商品短缺不足，但偏偏这是唯一可能让这些公司有获利的机会，

当短缺出现时，经理人便会迫不及待地想要扩充产能，这无异是将源源不断

流入现金的水龙头关掉一样，这就是过去三年保险公司经理人的最佳写照，

再次验证Disraeli的名言：「我们唯一从历史得到的教训就是我们从来无法

从历史得到教训！」

When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses

flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed that kind of climate

for a while but it is now gone. One of the ironies of capitalism

is that most managers in commodity industries abhor shortage

conditions - even though those are the only circumstances

permitting them good returns. Whenever shortages appear, the

typical manager simply can't wait to expand capacity and thereby

plug the hole through which money is showering upon him. This is

precisely what insurance managers did in 1985-87, confirming

again Disraeli's observation: "What we learn from history is that

we do not learn from history."

在Berkshire，我们努力避免自己的公司成为商品化的企业，首先我们凭借着

自己强大的资金实力，来凸显我们产品的不同，但这种效果实在是有限，

尤其在个人险的部份，因为即使是其所投保的保险公司倒闭(事实上这种状况还不少)，

汽车险或或房屋险的购买者仍可获得理赔，在商业险的部份也是如此，当情况好时，

许多大企业投保户与保险掮客都不太关心保险业者的财务状况，即使是比较复杂的案件，

顶多拖个三、五年，最后还是有办法可以解决，

(眼不见为净的结果，可能会让你的口袋落空)

At Berkshire, we work to escape the industry's commodity

economics in two ways. First, we differentiate our product by our

financial strength, which exceeds that of all others in the

industry. This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness.

It means nothing in the personal insurance field: The buyer of

an auto or homeowners policy is going to get his claim paid even

if his insurer fails (as many have). It often means nothing in

the commercial insurance arena: When times are good, many major

corporate purchasers of insurance and their brokers pay scant

attention to the insurer's ability to perform under the more

adverse conditions that may exist, say, five years later when a

complicated claim is finally resolved. (Out of sight, out of mind

- and, later on, maybe out-of-pocket.)

不过一段期间保户会偶尔想起富兰克林所说的空沙包很难站的直挺，

并了解寻找一个可靠稳定的保险公司的重要性，这时我们发挥优势的机会就来了，

当客户认真想到往后五到十年，若是面对景气不佳同时又碰上金融市场低迷，

再保业者倒闭频繁等景象时，而怀疑保险公司是否仍有能力轻松地支付

一千万美元理赔金时，那么他可以挑选的保险公司其实是相当有限的，

在所有的沙包之中，Berkshire无疑是站得最直挺的一个。

Periodically, however, buyers remember Ben Franklin's

observation that it is hard for an empty sack to stand upright

and recognize their need to buy promises only from insurers that

have enduring financial strength. It is then that we have a

major competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on

whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer

five or ten years down the road, and when he takes into account

the possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then

coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults by

reinsurer, he will find only a few companies he can trust.

Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.

Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the total

indifference to volume that we maintain. In 1989, we will be

perfectly willing to write five times as much business as we

write in 1988 - or only one-fifth as much. We hope, of course,

that conditions will allow us large volume. But we cannot

control market prices. If they are unsatisfactory, we will

simply do very little business. No other major insurer acts with

equal restraint.

我们第二个方法是试着让我们完全不理会签发保单的数量，在下一个年度

我们很愿意一口气签出比前一年多五倍的保单，但若是只能签发五分之一

的保单也无所谓，当然情况若许可我们希望是越多越好，但我们实在是

无法掌握市场价格，若价格不理想，我们就会暂时退出市场少做一点生意，

在同业中再没有其它任何一家保险公司有我们如此高的自制力。

Three conditions that prevail in insurance, but not in most

businesses, allow us our flexibility. First, market share is not

an important determinant of profitability: In this business, in

contrast to the newspaper or grocery businesses, the economic

rule is not survival of the fattest. Second, in many sectors of

insurance, including most of those in which we operate,

distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily

entered: Small volume this year does not preclude huge volume

next year. Third, idle capacity - which in this industry largely

means people - does not result in intolerable costs. In a way

that industries such as printing or steel cannot, we can operate

at quarter-speed much of the time and still enjoy long-term

prosperity.

在保险业普遍存在的第三种情况，(这在其它产业并不多见)使得我们能保持

相当的弹性，第一市场占有率并不绝对等于获利率，不像新闻业或是零售业，

最后能够存活的不一定是最肥的那个人，第二许多的保险类种，

其中也包含我们所从事的主要险种，销售通路并非只有唯一管道，

所以进入障碍低，今年业绩不多，不代表明年就一定会很少，第三闲置的产能，

在保险业来说主要是在于人力，这部份并不会造成太大的负担，

在印刷或是钢铁业的话就不是如此，我们可以在保持慢速前进的同时，

随时蓄势待发准备向前冲刺。

We follow a price-based-on-exposure, not-on-competition

policy because it makes sense for our shareholders. But we're

happy to report that it is also pro-social. This policy means

that we are always available, given prices that we believe are

adequate, to write huge volumes of almost any type of propertycasualty

insurance. Many other insurers follow an in-and-out

approach. When they are "out" - because of mounting losses,

capital inadequacy, or whatever - we are available. Of course,

when others are panting to do business we are also available -

but at such times we often find ourselves priced above the

market. In effect, we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a

large reservoir of standby capacity.

我们完全以价格为导向(而非竞争)来决定我们的风险部位，因为如此对于

股东投资者才有意义，但同时我们也很高兴，因为这对社会同样也有助益，

这个原则代表我们随时准备就绪，只要市场价格合理，我们愿意随时进场

承接任何产物意外险的保单，配合许多保险同业遵循的进出策略，

当他们因为损失扩大、资本不足等原因退出市场时，我们随时可以接替，

当然当一些同业进来杀价抢食市场时，虽然我们也愿意继续服务大众，

但由于我们的报价高于市场价格，所以只好暂时退出观望，基本上我们

扮演的是市场供需调节的角色。

One story from mid-1987 illustrates some consequences of our

pricing policy: One of the largest family-owned insurance

brokers in the country is headed by a fellow who has long been a

shareholder of Berkshire. This man handles a number of large

risks that are candidates for placement with our New York office.

Naturally, he does the best he can for his clients. And, just as

naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in

1987 he found prices at other insurers lower than we were willing

to offer. His reaction was, first, to place all of his business

elsewhere and, second, to buy more stock in Berkshire. Had we

been really competitive, he said, we would have gotten his

insurance business but he would not have bought our stock.

1987年中的一个事件可以充分说明我们的价格政策，在纽约有一家家族

经营的保险经纪公司是由一个Berkshire多年资深的老股东所领导，

这老兄手上有许多客户是我们所想要交往的，但基于职业道德他仍然必须

为他的客户争取到最好的权益，所以当保险市场价格大幅滑落，

他发现我们的保费比起其它同业贵了许多时，他第一个反应就是赶快

把他客户的保单从Berkshire转移到别的保险公司，接下来第二的动作

就是买进更多Berkshire的股票，他说要是那一天Berkshire也一样

以降价竞争作为因应，那么他就会把生意给Berkshire做，但他可能

就会把Berkshire的股票卖光。

Berkshire's underwriting experience was excellent in 1987,

in part because of the lag factor discussed earlier. Our

combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured

settlements and financial reinsurance) was 105. Although the

ratio was somewhat less favorable than in 1986, when it was 103,

our profitability improved materially in 1987 because we had the

use of far more float. This trend will continue to run in our

favor: Our ratio of float to premium volume will increase very

significantly during the next few years. Thus, Berkshire's

insurance profits are quite likely to improve during 1988 and

1989, even though we expect our combined ratio to rise.

Berkshire 1987年的承保表现实在是好极了，一方面是因为先前提到的

递延效应，我们的综合比率是105(泛指一般保单，不包含私下协议与

金融再保部份)，虽然这个数字比起1986年的103来说略微逊色，

但我们在1987年的获利却由于有更多的浮存金运用而大幅增进，

这种好现象将会持续保持，在往后几年我们浮存金对保费收入的比例

还是继续增加，所以展望Berkshire1988年与1989年的获利仍将大幅成长，

即便综合比率预估亦会增加。

Our insurance business has also made some important nonfinancial

gains during the last few years. Mike Goldberg, its

manager, has assembled a group of talented professionals to write

larger risks and unusual coverages. His operation is now well

equipped to handle the lines of business that will occasionally

offer us major opportunities.

我们的保险事业去年在非财务数字面亦有重大的斩获，我们组织了一支

训练有素的专业团队，专门承保特殊钜额的风险，他们已准备好帮助

我们处理任何可能遇到庞大的商机。

Our loss reserve development, detailed on pages 41-42, looks

better this year than it has previously. But we write lots of

"long-tail" business - that is, policies generating claims that

often take many years to resolve. Examples would be product

liability, or directors and officers liability coverages. With a

business mix like this, one year of reserve development tells you

very little.

有关损失准备提列的情况，详附表，今年的状况比前几年好一点，

但由于我们签下了许多长期的生意，许多理赔申请可以要花上好几年才能解决，

就像是产品责任保险，或专业经理人责任险，在这种特殊的产业，

一年的损失准备其实无法是代表最后结果。

You should be very suspicious of any earnings figures

reported by insurers (including our own, as we have unfortunately

proved to you in the past). The record of the last decade shows

that a great many of our best-known insurers have reported

earnings to shareholders that later proved to be wildly

erroneous. In most cases, these errors were totally innocent:

The unpredictability of our legal system makes it impossible for

even the most conscientious insurer to come close to judging the

eventual cost of long-tail claims.

大家应该对保险公司的盈余数字时时抱持怀疑的态度，(当然也包含我们公司本身，

事实证明确是如此) ，过去十年来的记录显示，有许多显赫一时的保险公司

报告给股东亮丽的盈余数字最后证明只不过是一场空，在大部分的情况下，

这种错误是无心的，我们诡谲多变的司法制度，使得就算是最有良知的保险公司

都无法准确预测这类长期保险的最终成本。

Nevertheless, auditors annually certify the numbers given

them by management and in their opinions unqualifiedly state that

these figures "present fairly" the financial position of their

clients. The auditors use this reassuring language even though

they know from long and painful experience that the numbers so

certified are likely to differ dramatically from the true

earnings of the period. Despite this history of error, investors

understandably rely upon auditors' opinions. After all, a

declaration saying that "the statements present fairly" hardly

sounds equivocal to the non-accountant.

但奇怪的是，会计师每年就是有办法为就这些管理阶层给的数字背书，

并出具无保留的意见表示这些数字允当表达该公司，也就是他们的客户

的财务状况，而事实上他们自己深知过去惨痛的经验告诉他们，

这些经过验证的数字与最后可能结算出来的可能会有天壤之别，

但却还是仍然使用这种坚定的语言，而从另一方面来说，

就算是历史殷鉴在前，投资人却还是相当仰赖会计师的意见，

对于会计门外汉来说，他根本就不懂得「该财务报表允当表达」，

所代表的真正含意是什么。

The wording in the auditor's standard opinion letter is

scheduled to change next year. The new language represents

improvement, but falls far short of describing the limitations of

a casualty-insurer audit. If it is to depict the true state of

affairs, we believe the standard opinion letter to shareholders

of a property-casualty company should read something like: "We

have relied upon representations of management in respect to the

liabilities shown for losses and loss adjustment expenses, the

estimate of which, in turn, very materially affects the earnings

and financial condition herein reported. We can express no

opinion about the accuracy of these figures. Subject to that

important reservation, in our opinion, etc."

会计师标准无保留意见查核报告的遣词用语在明年将有重大改变，

新的用语有相当的改进，但还是很难充分说明产物意外险公司

在查核时所受到的限制，如果一个人想要描述一件事情的真相，

我们认为给产物意外险公司股东的标准无保留意见报告中应这样写︰

「我们仰赖管理当局提供损失准备与损失费用调整产生财务报表，

而这些估计数字事实上影响公司盈余与财务状况甚巨，受限于损失准备

的提列先天信息的不足与我们必须提出的意见，我们完全无法

对这些数字的正确性表达看法，等等」

If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate

financial statements (which they do), auditors will definitely

say something of that sort in court anyway. Why should they not

be forthright about their role and its limitations from the

outset?

假若有人对这种完全不正确的财务报表提出诉讼官司(事实上就有)，

会计师一定会在法庭上做类似的辩解，那么他们为什么不一开始

就坦白地说明他们真实的角色与所受的限制呢??

We want to emphasize that we are not faulting auditors for

their inability to accurately assess loss reserves (and therefore

earnings). We fault them only for failing to publicly

acknowledge that they can't do this job.

我们想要强调的是我们并不是怪罪会计师没有办法准确地评估损失准备

(当然这会影响到最后的盈余数字)，我们无法原谅的是他们没有公开地

承认做不到这一点。

From all appearances, the innocent mistakes that are

constantly made in reserving are accompanied by others that are

deliberate. Various charlatans have enriched themselves at the

expense of the investing public by exploiting, first, the

inability of auditors to evaluate reserve figures and, second,

the auditors' willingness to confidently certify those figures as

if they had the expertise to do so. We will continue to see such

chicanery in the future. Where "earnings" can be created by the

stroke of a pen, the dishonest will gather. For them, long-tail

insurance is heaven. The audit wording we suggest would at least

serve to put investors on guard against these predators.

从各种不同的角度来看，这种不断在提列损失准备时所犯无心的错误，

往往也伴随着许多故意的过失，许多骗徒就是看准会计师没有能力

评估这些数字，同时又愿意配合为这些数字背书，假装好象他们真的

有这个能力，靠着这种方式来欺骗投资大众赚大钱，在往后的日子

我们仍将看到这样的骗局持续上演，只要大笔一挥，盈余便可凭空生出，

前述我们建议的查核报告措词，至少可以让无知的投资人提高警觉避免

遭到这些掠食者的坑杀。

The taxes that insurance companies pay - which increased

materially, though on a delayed basis, upon enactment of the Tax

Reform Act of 1986 - took a further turn for the worse at the end

of 1987. We detailed the 1986 changes in last year's report. We

also commented on the irony of a statute that substantially

increased 1987 reported earnings for insurers even as it

materially reduced both their long-term earnings potential and

their business value. At Berkshire, the temporarily-helpful

"fresh start" adjustment inflated 1987 earnings by $8.2 million.

去年在年报中详述刚通过的税负改革法案，使得保险公司支付的税负

以递延渐进的形式大幅增加，这种情况在1987年更加恶化，讽刺的是

虽然这个法案大大地影响到保险公司长期的获利与价值，却让保险公司

短期的盈余数字格外亮丽，光是在Berkshire1987年的盈余就增加了八百多万美金。

In our opinion, the 1986 Act was the most important economic

event affecting the insurance industry over the past decade. The

1987 Bill further reduced the intercorporate dividends-received

credit from 80% to 70%, effective January 1, 1988, except for

cases in which the taxpayer owns at least 20% of an investee.

就我们个人的看法，1986年的法案是近十多年来保险业界最重要的经济事件，

1987年的新法案进一步将企业间股利可扣抵的比率由80%减为70%，

除非被投资公司有超过20%的股权是由一般投资人所拥有。

Investors who have owned stocks or bonds through corporate

intermediaries other than qualified investment companies have

always been disadvantaged in comparison to those owning the same

securities directly. The penalty applying to indirect ownership

was greatly increased by the 1986 Tax Bill and, to a lesser

extent, by the 1987 Bill, particularly in instances where the

intermediary is an insurance company. We have no way of

offsetting this increased level of taxation. It simply means

that a given set of pre-tax investment returns will now translate

into much poorer after-tax results for our shareholders.

投资人透过中间企业法人(除了专业投资公司外)持有的股份或债券，

先天上本来就比直接持有这些有价证券要来的不利的多，尤其是在1986年

租税改革法案通过后，这种租税惩罚更为明显，(虽然1987年的情况稍微好转一点，

尤其是对保险公司来说)，我们没有任何方法可以规避这项增加的税负成本，

简而言之，现在同样的税前获利，在扣除税负成本后最后所得到的税后净利，

要比过去要来得少的多。

All in all, we expect to do well in the insurance business,

though our record is sure to be uneven. The immediate outlook is

for substantially lower volume but reasonable earnings

improvement. The decline in premium volume will accelerate after

our quota-share agreement with Fireman's Fund expires in 1989.

At some point, likely to be at least a few years away, we may see

some major opportunities, for which we are now much better

prepared than we were in 1985.

不论如何，我们的保险事业应该可以做的不错，只是最后的成绩可能无法

像过去那么好，目前的展望是保费收入将减少，尤其是消防人员基金

在1989年到期后，但盈余可略微改善，之后我们可能可以再遇到好机会，

不过那可能要好几年以后，届时我们应该可以作好更万全的准备。

Marketable Securities - Permanent Holdings

有价证券-永恒的持股

每当查理跟我为Berkshire旗下的保险公司买进股票(扣除套利交易，

后面会再详述)，我们采取的态度就好象是我们买下的是一家私人企业一样，

我们着重于这家公司的经济前景、经营阶层以及我们支付的价格，

我们从来就没有考虑再把这些股份卖出，相反地只要能够预期这家公司的价值

能够稳定地增加，我们愿意无限期地持有这些股份，在投资时我们从不把

自己当作是市场的分析师、总体经济分析师或是证券分析师，而是企业的分析师。

Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's

insurance companies (leaving aside arbitrage purchases, discussed

later) we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a

private business. We look at the economic prospects of the

business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we

must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale.

Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we

expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a

satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business

analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts,

and not even as security analysts.

我门的方式在交易热络的股票市场相当管用，因为市场三不五时就会

突然浮现令人垂涎三尺的投资机会，但这价格其实并不太重要，

因为就算是我们持有的股票停止交易很长一段时间我们也不在意，

就像是世界百科全书或是费区海默同样没有每天的报价，最后一点，

我们的经济利益取决于我们所拥有的公司本身的经济利益，

不管我们持有的是全部或者是部份股权都一样。

Our approach makes an active trading market useful, since it

periodically presents us with mouth-watering opportunities. But

by no means is it essential: a prolonged suspension of trading in

the securities we hold would not bother us any more than does the

lack of daily quotations on World Book or Fechheimer.

Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic

fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or

total.

班哲明．葛拉汉是我的老师，也是我的朋友，很久以前讲过一段有关

对于市场波动心态的谈话，是我认为对于投资获利最有帮助的一席话，

他说投资人可以试着将股票市场的波动当作是一位市场先生每天给你的报价，

他就像是一家私人企业的合伙人，不管怎样，市场先生每天都会报个价格

要买下你的股份或是将手中股份卖给你。

Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the

mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be

most conducive to investment success. He said that you should

imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably

accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a

private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and

names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell

you his.

即使是你们所共同拥有的合伙企业经营稳定变化不大，市场先生每天还是

会固定提出报价，同时市场先生有一个毛病，那就是他的情绪很不稳定，

当他高兴时，往往只看到合伙企业好的一面，所以为了避免手中的股份被你买走，

他会提出一个很高的价格，甚至想要从你手中买下你拥有的股份；但有时候，

当他觉得沮丧时，眼中看到的只是这家企业的一堆问题，这时他会提出

一个非常低的报价要把股份卖给你，因为他很怕你会将手中的股份塞给他。

Even though the business that the two of you own may have

economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations

will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has

incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can

see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in

that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears

that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains.

At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble

ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he

will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will

unload your interest on him.

市场先生还有一个很可爱的特点，那就是他不在乎受到冷落，若今天他

提出的报价不被接受，隔天他还是会上门重新报价，要不要交易完全由你自主，

所以在这种情况下，他的行为举止越失措，你可能得到的好处也就越多。

Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't

mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you

today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are

strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic

depressive his behavior, the better for you.

但就像辛蒂瑞拉参加的化妆舞会一样，你务必注意午夜前的钟响，

否则马车将会变回番瓜，市场先生是来给你服务的，千万不要受他的诱惑

反而被他所导引，你要利用的是他饱饱的口袋，而不是草包般的脑袋，

如果他有一天突然傻傻地出现在你面前，你可以选择视而不见或好好地加以利用，

但是要是你占不到他的便宜反而被他愚蠢的想法所吸引，则你的下场可能会很凄惨；

事实上若是你没有把握能够比市场先生更清楚地衡量企业的价值，

你最好不要跟他玩这样的游戏，就像是打牌一样，若是你没有办法在30分钟内

看出谁是肉脚，那么那个肉脚很可能就是你！

But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning

or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is

there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not

his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day

in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him

or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you

fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you

understand and can value your business far better than Mr.

Market, you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If

you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the

patsy is, you're the patsy."

葛拉汉的市场先生理论在现今的投资世界内或许显得有些过时，

尤其是在那些大谈市场效率理论、动态避险与beta值的专家学者眼中更是如此，

他们会对那些深奥的课题感到兴趣是可以理解的，因为这对于渴望投资建议的追求者来说，

是相当具吸引力的，就像是没有一位名医可以单靠「吃两颗阿斯匹宁」

这类简单有效的建议成名致富的。

Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's

investment world, in which most professionals and academicians

talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their

interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques

shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of

investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever

achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins"?

这当然是股市秘籍存在的价值，但就我个人的看法，投资成功不是靠

晦涩难解的公式、计算机运算或是股票行情板上股票上下的跳动，

相反地投资人要能成功，惟有凭借着优异的商业判断同时避免自己的想法、

行为，受到容易煽动人心的市场情绪所影响，以我个人的经验来说，

要能够免除市场诱惑，最好的方法就是将葛拉汉的市场先生理论铭记在心。

The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment

advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success

will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or

signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets.

Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business

judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior

from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the

marketplace. In my own efforts to stay insulated, I have found

it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr. Market concept firmly in mind.

追随葛拉汉的教诲，查理跟我着眼的是投资组合本身的经营成果，

以此来判断投资是否成功，而不是他们每天或是每年的股价变化，

短期间市场或许会忽略一家经营成功的企业，但最后这些公司终将

获得市场的肯定，就像葛拉汉所说的：「短期而言，股票市场是一个投票机，

但长期来说，它却是一个体重机」一家成功的公司是否很快地就被发现并不是重点，

重要的是只要这家公司的内在价值能够以稳定地速度成长才是关键，

事实上越晚被发现有时好处更多，因为我们就有更多的机会以便宜的价格买进它的股份。

Following Ben's teachings, Charlie and I let our marketable

equities tell us by their operating results - not by their daily,

or even yearly, price quotations - whether our investments are

successful. The market may ignore business success for a while,

but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run,

the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a

weighing machine." The speed at which a business's success is

recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the

company's intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate.

In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us

the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.

当然有时市场也会高估一家企业的价值，在这种情况下，我们会考虑把股份出售，

另外有时虽然公司股价合理或甚至略微低估，但若是我们发现有更被低估的

投资标的或是我们觉得比较熟悉了解的公司时，我们也会考虑出售股份。

Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be

more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In

such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will

sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because

we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one

we believe we understand better.

然而我们必须强调的是我们不会因为被投资公司的股价上涨或是因为

我们已经持有一段时间，就把它们给处分掉，在华尔街名言中，

最可笑的莫过于是「赚钱的人是不会破产的」，我们很愿意无限期的持有

一家公司的股份，只要这家公司所运用的资金可以产生令人满意的报酬、

管理阶层优秀能干且正直，同时市场对于其股价没有过度的高估。

We need to emphasize, however, that we do not sell holdings

just because they have appreciated or because we have held them

for a long time. (Of Wall Street maxims the most foolish may be

"You can't go broke taking a profit.") We are quite content to

hold any security indefinitely, so long as the prospective return

on equity capital of the underlying business is satisfactory,

management is competent and honest, and the market does not

overvalue the business.

但是这不包含我们保险公司所拥有的三家企业，即使它们的股价再怎么涨，

我们也不会卖，事实上我们把这些投资与前面那些具控制权的公司一样地看待，

它们不像是一般的商品可以卖来卖去，反而像是Berkshire企业的一部份，

不管市场先生提出再怎么高的天价也一样，只是在此我要加一条但书，

除非因为我们的保险公司发生钜额亏损，必须出售部份的持股来弥补亏损，

当然我们会尽所能避免这种情况发生。

However, our insurance companies own three marketable common

stocks that we would not sell even though they became far

overpriced in the market. In effect, we view these investments

exactly like our successful controlled businesses - a permanent

part of Berkshire rather than merchandise to be disposed of once

Mr. Market offers us a sufficiently high price. To that, I will

add one qualifier: These stocks are held by our insurance

companies and we would, if absolutely necessary, sell portions of

our holdings to pay extraordinary insurance losses. We intend,

however, to manage our affairs so that sales are never required.

当然查理跟我决定要拥有并持有一家公司的股份，是同时综合了个人想法

与财务方面的考量，对某些人来说，我们这样的做法可能有点不合常规，

(查理跟我长期以来一直遵从奥美广告创办人大卫奥美的建议，

在年轻时发展出你自己的特异风格，这样子等你到老时，人们就不会觉得

你是个怪胎)，的确，近年来在交易频繁的华尔街，我们的态度看起来有些

特立独行，在那个竞技场内，所有的公司与股份，都不过是交易的筹码而已。

A determination to have and to hold, which Charlie and I

share, obviously involves a mixture of personal and financial

considerations. To some, our stand may seem highly eccentric.

(Charlie and I have long followed David Oglivy's advice: "Develop

your eccentricities while you are young. That way, when you get

old, people won't think you're going ga-ga.") Certainly, in the

transaction-fixated Wall Street of recent years, our posture must

seem odd: To many in that arena, both companies and stocks are

seen only as raw material for trades.

但是我们的态度完全符合我们本身的人格特质，这就是我们想要过的生活，

丘吉尔曾经说过，我们很清楚我们要如何去塑造我们想要的模式，

因此我们宁愿跟我们喜欢与推崇的对象往来，就算是因此，

会比跟一些我们讨厌或是不喜欢的人打交道，少得到一些投资报酬也没有关系，

我想我们是大概不可能再遇到像这三家主要的被投资公司组成份子一样，

令我们所喜爱与推崇。

以下所列就是我们永恒的持股

Our attitude, however, fits our personalities and the way we

want to live our lives. Churchill once said, "You shape your

houses and then they shape you." We know the manner in which we

wish to be shaped. For that reason, we would rather achieve a

return of X while associating with people whom we strongly like

and admire than realize 110% of X by exchanging these

relationships for uninteresting or unpleasant ones. And we will

never find people we like and admire more than some of the main

participants at the three companies - our permanent holdings -

shown below:

No. of Shares Cost Market

------------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ........... $517,500 $1,035,000

6,850,000 GEICO Corporation .................. 45,713 756,925

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ........9,731 323,092

在这些公司上，我们实在看不出买下并控制一家企业或是购买部份股权

有什么基本上的差异，每次我们都试着买进一些长期看好的公司，

我们的目标是以合理的价格买到绩优的企业，而不是以便宜的价格买进平庸的公司，

查理跟我发现买到货真价实的东西才是我们真正应该做的。

We really don't see many fundamental differences between the

purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable

holdings such as these. In each case we try to buy into

businesses with favorable long-term economics. Our goal is to

find an outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre

business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that

making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do; with

sow's ears, we fail.

(It must be noted that your Chairman, always a quick study,

required only 20 years to recognize how important it was to buy

good businesses. In the interim, I searched for "bargains" - and

had the misfortune to find some. My punishment was an education

in the economics of short-line farm implement manufacturers,

third-place department stores, and New England textile

manufacturers.)

必须特别注意的是，本人虽然以反应快速著称，不过却花了二十年才明白

要买下好企业的重要性，刚开始我努力寻找便宜的货色，不幸的是真的让我找到了一些，

所得到的教训是在农具机械、三流百货公司与新英格兰纺织工厂等经济形态上上了一课。

Of course, Charlie and I may misread the fundamental

economics of a business. When that happens, we will encounter

problems whether that business is a wholly-owned subsidiary or a

marketable security, although it is usually far easier to exit

from the latter. (Indeed, businesses can be misread: Witness the

European reporter who, after being sent to this country to

profile Andrew Carnegie, cabled his editor, "My God, you'll never

believe the sort of money there is in running libraries.")

当然查理跟我确实会误判一家企业的基础竞争力，结果是我们面临了一大堆问题与挑战，

不管是买下全部或是部份的股权，当然后者要脱身相对容易一点，

(确实企业很可能会被误判，一位欧洲记者被派驻到美国采访卡内基，

发了一封电报给他的编辑主管说到，老天你一定不敢相信经营博物馆竟然可以赚那么多钱)

In making both control purchases and stock purchases, we try

to buy not only good businesses, but ones run by high-grade,

talented and likeable managers. If we make a mistake about the

managers we link up with, the controlled company offers a certain

advantage because we have the power to effect change. In

practice, however, this advantage is somewhat illusory:

Management changes, like marital changes, are painful, timeconsuming

and chancy. In any event, at our three marketable-but

permanent holdings, this point is moot: With Tom Murphy and Dan

Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and

Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post, we simply

couldn't be in better hands.

在进行取得控制权或是部份股权投资时，我们不但试着去找一家好公司，

同时最好是能够由品格才能兼具且为我们喜爱的管理者经营，如果是看错了人，

在具控制权的情况下，我们还有机会发挥影响力来改变，事实上这种优势有点不太实际，

因为更换管理阶层，就像是结束婚姻关系一样，过程是相当地费时痛苦且要看运气，

不论如何，我们三家永恒的股权投资在这点是不太可能发生的，有Tom Murphy 和

Dan Burke 在资本城, Bill Snyder 和 Lou Simpson 在盖可保险 Kay Graham 和

Dick Simmons 在华盛顿邮报，我们实在想不出有更有的接替人选。

我必须说明控制一家公司有二个主要的优点，首先当我们控制一家公司

我们便有分配资金与资源的权力，相较之下，若是部份股权投资则完全没有说话的余地，

这点非常重要，因为大部分的公司经营者，并不擅长于做资金分配，

之所以如此并不让人讶异，因为大部分的老板之所以能够成功是靠着他们在行销、

生产、工程、行政管理方面的专长。

I would say that the controlled company offers two main

advantages. First, when we control a company we get to allocate

capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say

about this process with marketable holdings. This point can be

important because the heads of many companies are not skilled in

capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most

bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such

as marketing, production, engineering, administration or,

sometimes, institutional politics.

而一旦成为CEO之后，他们马上必须面临许多新的责任与挑战，包括要做资金分配的决策，

这是一项他们以前从未面对艰巨且重要的任务，打个比方，这就好象是一位

深具天分的音乐家，没有安排让他到卡内基音乐厅演奏，却反而任命他为

联邦准备理事会主席一般。

Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They

now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that

they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To

stretch the point, it's as if the final step for a highly

talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but,

instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.

CEO缺乏资金分配的能力可不是一件小事，一家公司若是每年保留10%的盈余在公司的话，

经过十年后，他所要掌管的资金等于增加了60%。

The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation

is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose

company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will

have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all

the capital at work in the business.

某些体认到自己缺乏这方面能力的CEO(当然也有很多不这样认为)，会转向部属、

管理顾问或是投资银行家寻求建议，查理跟我时常观察这种帮忙最后的结果，

总的来说，我们认为大多数的情况并不能解决问题，反而是让问题变得更严重。

CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills

(which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to

their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers.

Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such

"help." On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the

capital-allocation problem than to solve it.

结果你就会发现在美国企业一大堆不明智的资本分配决策一再重复的发生

(这也是为什么你常常听到组织重整再造的原因)，然而在Berkshire我们算是

比较幸运，在一家我们不具控制权的股权投资方面，大部分的公司资金运用还算得当，

有的甚至还相当的杰出。

In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes

place in corporate America. (That's why you hear so much about

"restructuring.") Berkshire, however, has been fortunate. At the

companies that are our major non-controlled holdings, capital has

generally been well-deployed and, in some cases, brilliantly so.

第二项优点是相较于部份投资，取得控制权的投资享有租税上的优惠，

Berkshire身为一家控股公司，在投资部份股权时，必须吸收相当大的租税成本，

相较之下，持有控制股权的投资则没有这种情况，这种租税弱势发生在我们身上由来已久，

但过去几年的税法修订，使得这种情形更雪上加霜，同样的获利，

若发生在我们持有80%以上股权的公司，要比其它部份股权投资的效益要高出50%以上。

The second advantage of a controlled company over a

marketable security has to do with taxes. Berkshire, as a

corporate holder, absorbs some significant tax costs through the

ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership

is 80%, or greater. Such tax disadvantages have long been with

us, but changes in the tax code caused them to increase

significantly during the past year. As a consequence, a given

business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that

are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80%-or-greater

holding rather than from a lesser holding.

不过这种劣势有时可以由另一项优势所抵消掉，有时候股票市场让我们可以

以不可思议的价格买到绩优公司部份的股权，远低于协议买下整家公司

取得控制权的平均价格，举例来说，我们在1973年以每股5.63元买下

华盛顿邮报的股票，该公司在1987年的每股盈余是10.3元，同样地，

我们分别在1976、1979与1980年以每股6.67元的平均价格买下盖可保险的部份股权，

到了去年其每股税后的营业利益是9.01元，从这些情况看来，市场先生

实在是一位非常大方的好朋友。

The disadvantages of owning marketable securities are

sometimes offset by a huge advantage: Occasionally the stock

market offers us the chance to buy non-controlling pieces of

extraordinary businesses at truly ridiculous prices -

dramatically below those commanded in negotiated transactions

that transfer control. For example, we purchased our Washington

Post stock in 1973 at $5.63 per share, and per-share operating

earnings in 1987 after taxes were $10.30. Similarly, Our GEICO

stock was purchased in 1976, 1979 and 1980 at an average of $6.67

per share, and after-tax operating earnings per share last year

were $9.01. In cases such as these, Mr. Market has proven to be a

mighty good friend.

一个矛盾又有趣的会计现象，从上面的表你可以看到，我们在这三家公司

的股权投资市值超过20亿，但是他们在1987年总共贡献给Berkshire帐面

税后盈余却只有一千一百万美元。

An interesting accounting irony overlays a comparison of the

reported financial results of our controlled companies with those

of the permanent minority holdings listed above. As you can see,

those three stocks have a market value of over $2 billion. Yet

they produced only $11 million in reported after-tax earnings for

Berkshire in 1987.

会计原则规定我们必须在这些公司分配股利的时候才能认列利益，

这通常要比公司实际所赚的数字要少的多，以这三家公司合计，

1987年可以分配到的盈余数字高达一亿美元，另一方面，会计原则

规定这三家公司的股份若是有保险公司所持有，则其帐面价值应该要以

其市场价格列示，结果是一般公认会计原则要求我们在资产负债表上

秀出这些被投资事业的实际价值，却不准让我们在损益表是反应他们

实质的获利能力。

Accounting rules dictate that we take into income only the

dividends these companies pay us - which are little more than

nominal - rather than our share of their earnings, which in 1987

amounted to well over $100 million. On the other hand,

accounting rules provide that the carrying value of these three

holdings - owned, as they are, by insurance companies - must be

recorded on our balance sheet at current market prices. The

result: GAAP accounting lets us reflect in our net worth the upto-

date underlying values of the businesses we partially own, but

does not let us reflect their underlying earnings in our income

account.

In the case of our controlled companies, just the opposite

is true. Here, we show full earnings in our income account but

never change asset values on our balance sheet, no matter how

much the value of a business might have increased since we

purchased it.

在我们具有控制权的投资事业，情况却刚好相反，我们可以在损益表上

充分表示其获利状况，但不管这些资产在我们买下之后，价值在无形间如何地增加，

我们也无法在资产负债表上做任何的变动。

Our mental approach to this accounting schizophrenia is to

ignore GAAP figures and to focus solely on the future earning

power of both our controlled and non-controlled businesses.

Using this approach, we establish our own ideas of business

value, keeping these independent from both the accounting values

shown on our books for controlled companies and the values placed

by a sometimes foolish market on our partially-owned companies.

It is this business value that we hope to increase at a

reasonable (or, preferably, unreasonable) rate in the years

ahead.

我们对于这种会计精神分裂症的调整心态方式就是不去理会一般公认会计原则

所编制的数字，而只专注于这些具控制权或者是部份股权的公司，其未来的获利能力，

采用这种方法，我们依自己的概念建立一套企业价值的评价模式，它有别于会计帐上

所显示的具控制权的帐面投资成本以及有的时候高的离谱的部份股权投资市值，

这才是我们真正想要在未来年度持续稳定增加的数字(当然若能以不合理的速度成长的话更好)。

Marketable Securities – Other

其它有价证券

除了上述的三家重要投资事业，我们的保险公司也持有大量的有价证券，

主要可以分为五个类型，分别为：

(1)长期股票投资(2)长期固定收益债券(3)中期固定收益债券(4)短期约当现金(5)短期套利交易

In addition to our three permanent common stock holdings, we

hold large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance

companies. In selecting these, we can choose among five major

categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) mediumterm

fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed income

securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term

arbitrage commitments.

对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找

最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，

我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from

these categories. We just continuously search among them for the

highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical

expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment

alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing

to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal,

rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

首先谈谈普通股投资，1987年股市的表现精彩连连，但最后指数却没有太大的进展，

道琼整个年度只涨了2.3%，你知道这就好象是在坐云霄飞车一样，

市场先生在十月以前爆跳如雷，但之后却突然收敛了下来。

o Let's look first at common stocks. During 1987 the stock

market was an area of much excitement but little net movement:

The Dow advanced 2.3% for the year. You are aware, of course, of

the roller coaster ride that produced this minor change. Mr.

Market was on a manic rampage until October and then experienced

a sudden, massive seizure.

市场上有所谓专业的投资人，掌管着数以亿万计的资金，就是这些人造成市场的动荡，

他们不去研究企业下一步发展的方向，反而专研于其它基金经理人下一步的动向，

对他们来说，股票只不过是赌博交易的筹码，就像是大富翁里的棋子一样。

We have "professional" investors, those who manage many

billions, to thank for most of this turmoil. Instead of focusing

on what businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious

money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers

to do in the days ahead. For them, stocks are merely tokens in a

game, like the thimble and flatiron in Monopoly.

他们的做法发展到极致，便形成所谓的投资组合保险，一个在1986到1987年间

广为基金经理人所接受的一种策略，这种策略只不过是像投机者停损单一样，

当投资组合或是类似指数期货价格下跌时就必须处分持股，这种策略不管如此，

只要下跌到一定程度便会涌出一大堆卖单，根据一份研究报告显示：

有高达600亿到900亿的股票投资在1987年十月中面临一触即发的险境。

An extreme example of what their attitude leads to is

"portfolio insurance," a money-management strategy that many

leading investment advisors embraced in 1986-1987. This strategy

- which is simply an exotically-labeled version of the small

speculator's stop-loss order dictates that ever increasing

portions of a stock portfolio, or their index-future equivalents,

be sold as prices decline. The strategy says nothing else

matters: A downtick of a given magnitude automatically produces a

huge sell order. According to the Brady Report, $60 billion to

$90 billion of equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid-

October of 1987.

若是你认为投资顾问是被请来投资的，那你就大错特错了，在买下一家农场后，

一个理性的主人会不会叫其不动产经纪人开始寻求可能的买主，只因为隔壁的农场

最近卖出的价格更低一些?或是你会不会一早起来就想要把你的房子卖掉，

只因为几分钟前你听到隔壁的房子以比以前便宜的价格脱手。

If you've thought that investment advisors were hired to

invest, you may be bewildered by this technique. After buying a

farm, would a rational owner next order his real estate agent to

start selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property

was sold at a lower price? Or would you sell your house to

whatever bidder was available at 9:31 on some morning merely

because at 9:30 a similar house sold for less than it would have

brought on the previous day?

这样的举动正是投资组合风险理论告诉退休基金或是学术单位当他们持有福特

或是通用电气部份股权时，应该要做的动作，因为这些公司的价值越被低估，

你就越应该赶快把他们处分掉，根据逻辑推论，这种方法还要求投资机构

在股价反弹时再把他们买回来，一想到有这么多的资金，掌握在整天沉溺在

爱莉丝梦游仙境般的经理人手中，也难怪股票市场会有如此不寻常的表现。

Moves like that, however, are what portfolio insurance tells

a pension fund or university to make when it owns a portion of

enterprises such as Ford or General Electric. The less these

companies are being valued at, says this approach, the more

vigorously they should be sold. As a "logical" corollary, the

approach commands the institutions to repurchase these companies

- I'm not making this up - once their prices have rebounded

significantly. Considering that huge sums are controlled by

managers following such Alice-in-Wonderland practices, is it any

surprise that markets sometimes behave in aberrational fashion?

然而许多评论家在观察最近所发生的事时，归纳出一个不正确的结论，

他们喜欢说由于股票市场掌握在这些投资大户手上，所以小额投资人

根本一点机会也没有，这种结论实在是大大地错误，不管资金多寡，

这样的市场绝对有利于任何投资者，只要他能够坚持自己的投资理念，

事实上由手握重金的基金经理人所造成的市场波动，反而使得真正的

投资人有更好的机会可以去贯彻其明智的投资行动，只要他在面临股市波动时，

不会因为财务或心理因素而被迫在不当的时机出脱手中持股，他就很难会受到伤害。

Many commentators, however, have drawn an incorrect

conclusion upon observing recent events: They are fond of saying

that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated

by the erratic behavior of the big boys. This conclusion is dead

wrong: Such markets are ideal for any investor - small or large -

so long as he sticks to his investment knitting. Volatility

caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge

sums will offer the true investor more chances to make

intelligent investment moves. He can be hurt by such volatility

only if he is forced, by either financial or psychological

pressures, to sell at untoward times.

在Berkshire过去几年，我们在股票市场实在没有什么可以发挥的地方，

在十月的那段期间，有几支股票跌到相当吸引我们的价位，不过我们没有

能够在他们反弹之前买到够多的股份，在1987年底除了永久的持股与

短期的套利之外，我们并没有新增任何主要的股票投资组合(指5,000万美元以上)，

不过你大可以放心，一旦市场先生一定会给我们机会的时候，我们一定会好好把握住的。

At Berkshire, we have found little to do in stocks during

the past few years. During the break in October, a few stocks

fell to prices that interested us, but we were unable to make

meaningful purchases before they rebounded. At yearend 1987 we

had no major common stock investments (that is, over $50 million)

other than those we consider permanent or arbitrage holdings.

However, Mr. Market will offer us opportunities - you can be sure

of that - and, when he does, we will be willing and able to

participate.

至于我们主要的资金避风港-中期的免税债券，在去年我已经解释过其特点，

虽然在1987年间我们也有进出，但整个部位变化不大，总金额约在9亿美元左右，

大部分的债券是属于1986年税务改革法案中祖父级的债券，不同于现在

保险公司新买进的债券，他们享有百分之百免税的优惠。

o In the meantime, our major parking place for money is

medium-term tax-exempt bonds, whose limited virtues I explained

in last year's annual report. Though we both bought and sold

some of these bonds in 1987, our position changed little overall,

holding around $900 million. A large portion of our bonds are

"grandfathered" under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means

they are fully tax-exempt. Bonds currently purchased by

insurance companies are not.

当作短期约当现金的替代品，中期免税债券的表现还算不错，他们贡献了不少

额外的投资报酬，且目前的价值也略高于我们当初投资的成本，但不管之后

他们的市价高或低，只要我们找到更好的投资机会，我们随时都有可能把他们给处分掉。

As an alternative to short-term cash equivalents, our

medium-term tax-exempts have - so far served us well. They have

produced substantial extra income for us and are currently worth

a bit above our cost. Regardless of their market price, we are

ready to dispose of our bonds whenever something better comes

along.

我们持续避免去碰长期债券(也有可能因为没有对中期免税债券保持距离而犯下大错)，

债券没有比他们表彰的货币来得好，在过去十年以即可预见的未来，

我们看不出我们会对美国债券有太大的兴趣。

o We continue to have an aversion to long-term bonds (and may

be making a serious mistake by not disliking medium-term bonds as

well). Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are

denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year - or past

decade - makes us enthusiastic about the long-term future of U.S.

currency.

我们钜额的贸易逆差，使得我们必须面临许多不同形式的支票帐单，

这包含外国人持有的美国政府与企业公债、银行存款等，以惊人的速度累积成长，

一开始我们的政府所采取的方式，就像是欲望街车的角色布兰奇所说的，

我总是依赖陌生人的同情心而活，当然本案的陌生人依靠的主要是债务人的可靠性，

虽然贬值的美元也让他们必须付出高昂的代价。

Our enormous trade deficit is causing various forms of

"claim checks" - U.S. government and corporate bonds, bank

deposits, etc. - to pile up in the hands of foreigners at a

distressing rate. By default, our government has adopted an

approach to its finances patterned on that of Blanche DuBois, of

A Streetcar Named Desire, who said, "I have always depended on

the kindness of strangers." In this case, of course, the

"strangers" are relying on the integrity of our claim checks

although the plunging dollar has already made that proposition

expensive for them.

外国人对我们的信心可能有点所托非人，因为当要付的支票帐单持续的增加，

而债务人又能够无限制地主导自己的购买能力时，美钞发行人增加流通货币

来稀释其货币价值的情况铁定会发生，对于债务国政府来说，通货膨胀这项武器

就好象是经济战争中威力强大的氢弹一样，很少有国家可以让全世界充斥着

以自己货币计价的债券，不过由于我们国家过去不错的财政记录，使得我们能够

打破这项限制，只是这样的宽容使得我们通膨的压力只会增加不会减少，

而一旦我们屈服于这样的压力，不只是持有美国债权的外国人遭殃，

连带的我们也会受到影响。

The faith that foreigners are placing in us may be

misfounded. When the claim checks outstanding grow sufficiently

numerous and when the issuing party can unilaterally determine

their purchasing power, the pressure on the issuer to dilute

their value by inflating the currency becomes almost

irresistible. For the debtor government, the weapon of inflation

is the economic equivalent of the "H" bomb, and that is why very

few countries have been allowed to swamp the world with debt

denominated in their own currency. Our past, relatively good

record for fiscal integrity has let us break this rule, but the

generosity accorded us is likely to intensify, rather than

relieve, the eventual pressure on us to inflate. If we do

succumb to that pressure, it won't be just the foreign holders of

our claim checks who will suffer. It will be all of us as well.

当然在债务问题失控之前，美国政府也会试着采取一些方法来抑制贸易逆差，

(有关于这点，下滑的美元汇率或许会有帮助，只是同样地它又会造成另一种伤害)，

目前我们政府的做法跟乱世佳人里郝思佳的态度差不多一样，「明天再想办法吧!」，

而几乎无可避免的对于财政问题的处理耽搁将会造成通货膨胀的后果。

Of course, the U.S. may take steps to stem our trade deficit

well before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand. (In

that respect, the falling dollar will help, though unfortunately

it will hurt in other ways.) Nevertheless, our government's

behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with

its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally: "I'll think about it

tomorrow." And, almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up

to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences.

只是这些后果发生的时点与影响我们实在无从去预测，不过无法去量化

或是锁定这种风险不代表我们就可以忽视它的存在，当然我们的推论也许会不准确，

目前的利率水准或可弥补通货膨胀所带来的损失，只是我们对于长期的债券

仍报以持续的戒心。

Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are

unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or time the risk

does not mean we should ignore it. While recognizing the

possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates

may adequately compensate for the inflationary risk, we retain a

general fear of long-term bonds.

然而我们仍愿意把一部份资金摆在这上头，如果在某些特定的有价证券上有特殊的利益，

就像是我在1984年年报中曾经提到我们在华盛顿公用电力系统债券上的投资，

在1987年我们又持续加码投资，总计到年底我们持有的这类帐面未摊销成本为2.4亿美元债券，

市价约为3.16亿美元，还外加每年三千四百万美元的免税利息收入。

We are, however, willing to invest a moderate portion of our

funds in this category if we think we have a significant edge in

a specific security. That willingness explains our holdings of

the Washington Public Power Supply Systems #1, #2 and #3 issues,

discussed in our 1984 report. We added to our WPPSS position

during 1987. At yearend, we had holdings with an amortized cost

of $240 million and a market value of $316 million, paying us

tax-exempt income of $34 million annually.

o We continued to do well in arbitrage last year, though - or

perhaps because - we operated on a very limited scale. We enter

into only a few arbitrage commitments each year and restrict

ourselves to large transactions that have been publicly

announced. We do not participate in situations in which greenmailers

are attempting to put a target company "in play."

我们持续在短期套利交易上有所斩获，虽然我们从事的规模有限，每年我们限制

自己只专注在几个少数已公开信息的大型交易案，我们不介入那些已被投机套利客锁定的个案。

We have practiced arbitrage on an opportunistic basis for

decades and, to date, our results have been quite good. Though

we've never made an exact calculation, I believe that overall we

have averaged annual pre-tax returns of at least 25% from

arbitrage. I'm quite sure we did better than that in 1987. But

it should be emphasized that a really bad experience or two -

such as many arbitrage operations suffered in late 1987 - could

change the figures dramatically.

我们从事机率套利已有好几十年的经验，到目前为止，我们的成果还算不错，

虽然我们从来没有仔细去算过，我相信我们在套利投资方面的税前年报酬率应该有25%左右，

我确信1987年的成绩甚至比以前好的多，但必须强调的是只要发生一、两次

像今年其它几个套利惨痛的经验，就可能使得整个结果猪羊变色。

Our only $50 million-plus arbitrage position at yearend 1987

was 1,096,200 shares of Allegis, with a cost of $76 million and a

market value of $78 million.

今年我们新增5,000万美元以上的套利案只有斥资7,600万美元投资100万股Allegis，

目前的市价约为7,800万美元。

o We had two other large holdings at yearend that do not fit

precisely into any of our five categories. One was various

Texaco, Inc. bonds with short maturities, all purchased after

Texaco went into bankruptcy. Were it not for the extraordinarily

strong capital position of our insurance companies, it would be

inappropriate for us to buy defaulted bonds. At prices

prevailing after Texaco's bankruptcy filing, however, we regarded

these issues as by far the most attractive bond investment

available to us.

我们在年底还有其它二个主要的投资组合不在前述五个范围之内，一项是Texaco短期债券，

全都是在它破产之后才买进，要不是因为我们旗下保险公司的财务实力雄厚，

我们实在不太适合去买这种已发生问题的债券，不过以这些债券在Texaco倒闭后的低廉价格，

这是目前我们可以找得到最吸引我们的投资标的。

On a worst-case basis with respect to the Pennzoil

litigation, we felt the bonds were likely to be worth about what

we paid for them. Given a sensible settlement, which seemed

likely, we expected the bonds to be worth considerably more. At

yearend our Texaco bonds were carried on our books at $104

million and had a market value of $119 million.

考量其所牵涉的诉讼案件，在最坏的情况之下，我们认为应该还是可以将投资成本回收，

而若是官司可以和解收场，我们预期债券的价值将会更高，截至年底Texaco债券

在我们帐面上的成本约为一亿美元，目前的市值则约为1.2亿美元。

By far our largest - and most publicized - investment in

1987 was a $700 million purchase of Salomon Inc 9% preferred

stock. This preferred is convertible after three years into

Salomon common stock at $38 per share and, if not converted, will

be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31, 1995.

From most standpoints, this commitment fits into the medium-term

fixed-income securities category. In addition, we have an

interesting conversion possibility.

在投资银行业，我们当然没有特殊的远见能够预知其未来发展的方向与获利能力，

就产业特性而言，投资银行业比起我们其它主要投资的行业更难预测，

这也是为什么我们选择以可转换特别股的方式投资。

We, of course, have no special insights regarding the

direction or future profitability of investment banking. By

their nature, the economics of this industry are far less

predictable than those of most other industries in which we have

major Commitments. This unpredictability is one of the reasons

why our participation is in the form of a convertible preferred.

当然我们对于所罗门公司的CEO -John Gutfreund的能力与品格有不错的印象，

查理与我都很尊崇且信赖他，我们是在1976年开始认识他，

当时他在协助GEICO汽车保险免于破产的命运时出了不少力，

之后我们看到他好几次引导客户免于愚蠢的交易，虽然这使得所罗门

因此损失许多顾问费收入，这种以客户服务至上的表现在华尔街并不多见。

What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and

integrity of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon Inc. Charlie and I

like, admire and trust John. We first got to know him in 1976

when he played a key role in GEICO's escape from near-bankruptcy.

Several times since, we have seen John steer clients away from

transactions that would have been unwise, but that the client

clearly wanted to make - even though his advice provided no fee

to Salomon and acquiescence would have delivered a large fee.

Such service-above-self behavior is far from automatic in Wall

Street.

如同查理在50页上所陈述的理由，截至年底我们将在所罗门公司的投资价值

定在面额的98%，大约比我们的投资成本少1,400万，

不过我们仍然相信这家公司在高品质资本筹募与市场创造营运，

将可为我们的投资创造不错的盈余，若果真如此，我们可转换为股权的权利将会非常有价值。

For the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50, at yearend we

valued our Salomon investment at 98% of par, $14 million less

than our cost. However, we believe there is a reasonable

likelihood that a leading, high-quality capital-raising and

market-making operation can average good returns on equity. If

so, our conversion right will eventually prove to be valuable.

最后关于我们有价证券的投资再补充两点，第一照例我还是给诸位一个提醒，

相较于去年底的持股内容，我们现在的投资组合又有变动，

而且在没有知会大家的情况下，还会继续变动。

Two further comments about our investments in marketable

securities are appropriate. First, we give you our usual

warning: Our holdings have changed since yearend and will

continue to do so without notice.

这二点跟前面也有相关，跟前几年一样，在1987年媒体不时在猜测我们进出的投资标的，

这些报导有时是真的，有时是半真半假，有时根本就不是事实，

有趣的是，我发现媒体的规模与声誉和报导的真实性一点相关都没有，

曾经有一家全美举足轻重的媒体杂志刊登一项完全错误的谣言，

另外一家出版业者则将一桩短期的套利投资误当做是一项长期的投资，

(之所以没有公布名字，是因为古有名训，遇到整桶整桶买墨水的人，

最好不要跟他发生争吵)

The second comment is related: During 1987, as in some

earlier years, there was speculation in the press from time to

time about our purchase or sale of various securities. These

stories were sometimes true, sometimes partially true, and other

times completely untrue. Interestingly, there has been no

correlation between the size and prestige of the publication and

the accuracy of the report. One dead-wrong rumor was given

considerable prominence by a major national magazine, and another

leading publication misled its readers by writing about an

arbitrage position as if it were a long-term investment

commitment. (In not naming names, I am observing the old warning

that it's not wise to pick fights with people who buy ink by the

barrel.)

You should understand that we simply don't comment in any

way on rumors, whether they are true or false. If we were to

deny the incorrect reports and refuse comment on the correct

ones, we would in effect be commenting on all.

大家应该知道我们从来不会对任何的谣言加以评论，不管是真或是假，

因为若是我们否认不实的报导，或是拒绝对真实的事件发表评论，

都等于间接表达了我们的立场。

In a world in which big investment ideas are both limited

and valuable, we have no interest in telling potential

competitors what we are doing except to the extent required by

law. We certainly don't expect others to tell us of their

investment ideas. Nor would we expect a media company to

disclose news of acquisitions it was privately pursuing or a

journalist to tell his competitors about stories on which he is

working or sources he is using.

在现在这个社会，大型的投资机会相当的稀少且弥足珍贵，

除非法令特别要求，我们不可能向潜在的竞争对手透露我们的动向，

就像我们也不可能期待对手告诉我们他的想法，同样地我们也不期待

媒体能够揭露他们独家采访得到的购并消息，就像是一个记者不可能

向他的同业透露他正在努力追踪的独家新闻。

I find it uncomfortable when friends or acquaintances

mention that they are buying X because it has been reported -

incorrectly - that Berkshire is a buyer. However, I do not set

them straight. If they want to participate in whatever Berkshire

actually is buying, they can always purchase Berkshire stock.

But perhaps that is too simple. Usually, I suspect, they find it

more exciting to buy what is being talked about. Whether that

strategy is more profitable is another question.

我特别觉得很不高兴，当我的朋友或是旧识告诉我说他们买进X公司的股票，

因为报纸错误地报导说Berkshire已经买进这家公司的股票，

不过后来我发现事情没有那么单纯，他们会买的原因主要是因为这些股票实在太热门，

至于是否能够真正获利则是另外一回事。

Financing

财务方面

Shortly after yearend, Berkshire sold two issues of

debentures, totaling $250 million. Both issues mature in 2018

and will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund

operations that begin in 1999. Our overall interest cost, after

allowing for expenses of issuance, is slightly over 10%. Salomon

was our investment banker, and its service was excellent.

在年度结束后不久，Berkshire发行了两期的债券，总共的金额是2.5亿美元，

到期日皆为2018年并且会从1999年开始慢慢分期由偿债基金赎回，

包含发行成本在内，平均的资金成本约在10%上下，

负责这次发行债券的投资银行就是所罗门，他们提供了绝佳的服务。

Despite our pessimistic views about inflation, our taste for

debt is quite limited. To be sure, it is likely that Berkshire

could improve its return on equity by moving to a much higher,

though still conventional, debt-to-business-value ratio. It's

even more likely that we could handle such a ratio, without

problems, under economic conditions far worse than any that have

prevailed since the early 1930s.

尽管我们对于通货膨胀抱持悲观的看法，我们对于举债的兴趣还是相当有限，

虽然可以肯定的是Berkshire可以靠提高举债来增加投资报酬，

即使这样做我们的负债比例还是相当的保守，

且就算如此我们很有信心应该可以应付比1930经济大萧条更坏的经济环境。

But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our

obligations; we wish that to be certain. Thus we adhere to

policies - both in regard to debt and all other matters - that

will allow us to achieve acceptable long-term results under

extraordinarily adverse conditions, rather than optimal results

under a normal range of conditions.

但我们还是不愿意这种大概没有问题的做法，我们要的是百分之百的确定，

因此我们坚持一项政策，那就是不管是举债或是其它任何方面，

我们希望是能够在最坏的情况下得到合理的结果，而不是预期在乐观的情况下，

得到很好的利益。

Good business or investment decisions will eventually

produce quite satisfactory economic results, with no aid from

leverage. Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and

improper to risk what is important (including, necessarily, the

welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and

employees) for some extra returns that are relatively

unimportant. This view is not the product of either our

advancing age or prosperity: Our opinions about debt have

remained constant.

只要是好公司或是好的投资决策，不靠投资杠杆，最后还是能够得到令人满意的结果，

因此我们认为为了一点额外的报酬，将重要的东西(也包含政策制定者与员工福祉)

暴露在不必要的风险之下是相当愚蠢且不适当的。

However, we are not phobic about borrowing. (We're far from

believing that there is no fate worse than debt.) We are willing

to borrow an amount that we believe - on a worst-case basis -

will pose no threat to Berkshire's well-being. Analyzing what

that amount might be, we can look to some important strengths

that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our

economy: Berkshire's earnings come from many diverse and wellentrenched

businesses; these businesses seldom require much

capital investment; what debt we have is structured well; and we

maintain major holdings of liquid assets. Clearly, we could be

comfortable with a higher debt-to-business-value ratio than we

now have.

当然我们不会畏惧借贷(我们还不至于认为借钱是万恶不赦的)，

我们还是愿意在估计不会损及Berkshire利益的最坏情况下，进行举债，

至于这个限度在哪里，我们就必须评估自己本身的实力，

Berkshire的获利来自于许多不同且扎实的产业，这些产业通常不需要额外大量的投资，

负债的部份也相当健全，同时我们还保有大量的流动资产，很明显的，

我们大可以承担比现在更高的负债比例。

One further aspect of our debt policy deserves comment:

Unlike many in the business world, we prefer to finance in

anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it. A business

obtains the best financial results possible by managing both

sides of its balance sheet well. This means obtaining the

highest-possible return on assets and the lowest-possible cost on

liabilities. It would be convenient if opportunities for

intelligent action on both fronts coincided. However, reason

tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case: Tight

money conditions, which translate into high costs for

liabilities, will create the best opportunities for acquisitions,

and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky. Our

conclusion: Action on the liability side should sometimes be

taken independent of any action on the asset side.

我们举债政策还有一向特点值得说明，不像其它公司，

我们比较希望能够预先准备而不是事后补救，一家公司若能够

同时管好资产负债表的两侧，就会有不错的成绩，

这代表一方面要能够将资产的报酬率提高，一方面要能够将负债的资金成本降低，

若是两边都能碰巧的兼顾那就太好了，不过事实告诉我们，

通常情况正好相反，当资金吃紧时，代表负债的成本上升，

这正是对外购并的最好时机，因为便宜的资金有时会将竞标的资产飙到天价，

我们的结论是，在举债方面的动作，有时应该要跟购置资产方面的动作分开做。

Alas, what is "tight" and "cheap" money is far from clear at

any particular time. We have no ability to forecast interest

rates and - maintaining our usual open-minded spirit - believe

that no one else can. Therefore, we simply borrow when

conditions seem non-oppressive and hope that we will later find

intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which - as we

have said - are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt

market are clearly oppressive. Our basic principle is that if

you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always

carry a loaded gun.

当然何谓吃紧﹖何谓便宜的资金﹖很难有一个清楚的分野，

我们无法去预测利率的走向，所以我们随时保持开放的心态，

随机地在市场还没有那么悲观时借钱，期望之后可以找到合适的购并或投资标的，

而通常如同我们先前所提到的，大概是会在债市情况悲观时出现，

我们一个基本的原则就是，如果你想要猎捕那种罕见且移动迅速的大象，

那么你的枪枝就要随时上膛准备。

Our fund-first, buy-or-expand-later policy almost always

penalizes near-term earnings. For example, we are now earning

about 6 1/2% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a

disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per week.

This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us

to stretch for either acquisitions or higher-yielding short-term

instruments. If we find the right sort of business elephant

within the next five years or so, the wait will have been

worthwhile.

我们这种先准备资金，之后再买进扩张的政策，虽然会对我们短期间的盈余造成影响，

例如我们之前取得10%成本的2.5亿美元，现在大概只能赚得6.5%的收益，

中间的利差损失每个礼拜大概是16万美元，这对我们来说，只是个小数目，

也不会迫使我们去从事一些短期高风险的投资，只要我们能在未来五年内

找到理想的目标猎物，这一切等待都是值得的。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones

we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that

fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望能够找到更多像我们现在拥有的企业，当然这需要一些帮助，

如同你知道有公司符合以下的条件，打电话或者最好是写信给我。

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣

(通常不超过五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的

内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。

我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，

对于那些好的公司与好的经营阶层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。

另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，

包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案

(那些说你们要是能过碰一下面，一定会感兴趣之类的) 。

在此重申我们对这些一点兴趣都没有。

Here's what we're looking for:

(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax

earnings),

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future

projections are of little interest to us, nor are

"turnaround" situations),

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while

employing little or no debt,

(4) management in place (we can't supply it),

(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology,

we won't understand it),

(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time

or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,

about a transaction when price is unknown).

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise

complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily

within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer

to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive

as much in intrinsic business value as we give. We invite

potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom

we have done business in the past. For the right business - and

the right people - we can provide a good home.

On the other hand, we frequently get approached about

acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: new

ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular

(among brokers) "I'm-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-peopleget-

to-know-each-other." None of these attracts us in the least.

Besides being interested in the purchases of entire

businesses as described above, we are also interested in the

negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of

stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We

have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a

long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股份，

就像我们在资本城与所罗门这两个Case一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买

所罗门一样的可转换特别股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。

* * *

接下来是一点记忆回顾，大部分Berkshire的大股东是在1969年

清算巴菲特合伙事业时取得本公司股份的，这些合伙的伙伴可能

还记得当初在1962年，我曾经在巴菲特合伙事业所投资控制的

Dempster-一家帮浦与农用机具制造公司，面临经营上重大的难题。

And now a bit of deja vu. Most of Berkshire's major

stockholders received their shares at yearend 1969 in a

liquidating distribution from Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Some of

these former partners will remember that in 1962 I encountered

severe managerial problems at Dempster Mill Manufacturing Co., a

pump and farm implement manufacturing company that BPL

controlled.

在当时我带着我无法解决的问题去找查理，就像是现在一样，

查理建议我在加州他有一位朋友叫Harry Bottle非常脚踏实地，

或许可以帮得上忙，我在当年四月去洛杉矶拜访他，一个礼拜后，

他就被请到内布拉斯加州来管理Dempster，此后问题立刻获得解决，

记得在1962年的年报中，我还特地将Harry封为年度风云人物。

At that time, like now, I went to Charlie with problems that

were too tough for me to solve. Charlie suggested the solution

might lie in a California friend of his, Harry Bottle, whose

special knack was never forgetting the fundamental. I met Harry

in Los Angeles on April 17, 1962, and on April 23 he was in

Beatrice, Nebraska, running Dempster. Our problems disappeared

almost immediately. In my 1962 annual letter to partners, I

named Harry "Man of the Year."

24年后，场景搬到Berkshire 另外一家子公司K & W公司，

一家专门生产自动机具的小公司，过去这家公司做得还不错，

不过到了1985-1986年却突然发生状况，盲目追求达不到的东西，

却放弃现有可以做的产品，负责管理监督K & W的查理，

知道可以不必知会我，直接找到现年68岁的Harry，任命他为CEO，

然后就静待结果出来，事实上他没有等多久，到了1987年隔年，

K & W的获利就创下新高，比1986年成长三倍，由于获利提升，

该公司所需的资金也就跟着减少，该公司的应收及存货水准减少了20%。

Fade to 24 years later: The scene is K & W Products, a small

Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. For

years K & W did well, but in 1985-86 it stumbled badly, as it

pursued the unattainable to the neglect of the achievable.

Charlie, who oversees K & W, knew there was no need to consult

me. Instead, he called Harry, now 68 years old, made him CEO,

and sat back to await the inevitable. He didn't wait long. In

1987 K & W's profits set a record, up more than 300% from 1986.

And, as profits went up, capital employed went down: K & W's

investment in accounts receivable and inventories has decreased

20%.

所以要是在往后的十年、二十年，我们的被投资事业又发生问题时，

你就知道谁的电话又会响了。

If we run into another managerial problem ten or twenty

years down the road, you know whose phone will ring.

* * *

About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in

Berkshire's 1987 shareholder-designated contributions program.

Contributions made through the program were $4.9 million, and

2,050 charities were recipients.

大约有97.2%的有效股权参与1987年的股东指定捐赠计划，

总计约490万美元捐出的款项分配给2,050家慈善机构

最近一项研究显示约有50%的美国大公司的捐赠计画是由董事会所决定，

这等于是由代表公司所有股东的一小群人来决定公司资金捐给他们所偏爱

的慈善机构，却从来不会去管股东们的意见，(我很怀疑若情况刚好相反，

由股东们来决定这些董事口袋里的钱要捐给谁时，他们会有什么样的反应)，

当甲从乙的身上拿钱给丙时，若甲是立法者，则这个过程叫做课税，

若甲是企业的主管或是经理人时，这就叫做是慈善，我们仍然坚信除非

是捐给那些很明显对于公司有助益的单位时，应该要先征询股东们而非

仅仅是经理人或是董事的意见。

A recent survey reported that about 50% of major American

companies match charitable contributions made by directors

(sometimes by a factor of three to one). In effect, these

representatives of the owners direct funds to their favorite

charities, and never consult the owners as to their charitable

preferences. (I wonder how they would feel if the process were

reversed and shareholders could invade the directors' pockets for

charities favored by the shareholders.) When A takes money from B

to give to C and A is a legislator, the process is called

taxation. But when A is an officer or director of a corporation,

it is called philanthropy. We continue to believe that

contributions, aside from those with quite clear direct benefits

to the company, should reflect the charitable preferences of

owners rather than those of officers and directors.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，

如果在未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记

在自己而不是受托人的名下，必须在1988年9月30日之前完成登记，

才有权利参与1988年的计画。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our

shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on

pages 54 and 55. If you wish to participate in future programs,

we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are

registered in the name of the actual owner, not in "street" name

or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, l988

will be ineligible for the 1988 program.

* * *

去年总共有450位股东参加年度股东会，总计提出了60个左右精彩的问题，

在许多公司股东会只是浪费时间，因为大多流于形式，不过我们的股东会

却不一样，股东们非常具有建设性且带来了许多欢乐。

Last year we again had about 450 shareholders at our annual

meeting. The 60 or so questions they asked were, as always,

excellent. At many companies, the annual meeting is a waste of

time because exhibitionists turn it into a sideshow. Ours,

however, is different. It is informative for shareholders and

fun for us. (At Berkshire's meetings, the exhibitionists are on

the dais.)

This year our meeting will be on May 23, 1988 in Omaha, and

we hope that you come. The meeting provides the forum for you to

ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep

answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio

activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt

with.

今年的股东会将在1988年5月23日在奥玛哈举行，我们希望你们都能来参加，

这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一直

回答到所有股东都满意为止(除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的人)

Last year we rented two buses - for $100 - to take

shareholders interested in the trip to the Furniture Mart. Your

actions demonstrated your good judgment: You snapped up about

$40,000 of bargains. Mrs. B regards this expense/sales ratio as

on the high side and attributes it to my chronic inattention to

costs and generally sloppy managerial practices. But, gracious

as always, she has offered me another chance and we will again

have buses available following the meeting. Mrs. B says you must

beat last year's sales figures, and I have told her she won't be

disappointed.

去年我们花了100元租两台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到家具广场，

大家的行动展现了明智的抉择，总共买下了约4万美元的东西，

B太太认为这样的营业费用比例太高，认为这都是我个人长久以来

对于成本没有概念、管理松散的缘故，不过还是一样大方，

今年她再次给我机会，在会后还是会有巴士等着各位，B太太希望我

一定要打破去年的记录，而我也已经答应她不会让她失望。

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1988年2月29日

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

February 29, 1988

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569 million, or

20.0%. Over the last 24 years (that is, since present management

took over), our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to

$2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.

本公司1988年的净值增加了五亿六千九百万美元，较去年增加了20.0%，而

过去24年以来(自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现在的

2,974美元，年复合成长率约为23.0%。

Wee emphasized in past reports that what counts, however,

is intrinsic business value - the figure, necessarily an

estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are

worth. By our calculations, Berkshire intrinsic business value

significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years,

business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in

1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.

在过去的年报中我们一再强调真正重要的是企业的真实价值，它代表着我们旗下

企业组成份子到底值多少钱？这个数字绝对是个估计数，根据我们内部的估算，

目前Berkshire真实的价值已大幅超越其帐面价值，过去24年以来，企业价值

成长的速度一直要比帐面价值成长的幅度要高一点，但在1988年情况有点不

同，后者增加的幅度略高于前者。

Berkshire past rates of gain in both book value and

business value were achieved under circumstances far different

from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences

makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to

judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the

basis of his lifetime batting average.

过去Berkshire真实与帐面价值成长的背景，与现在有很大的不同，若搞不清楚

其间的差异，就好象是一位棒球教练在判断高龄42岁的中外野手未来潜力时，

以他一生的平均打击率作为判断依据。

Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a

less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past

24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of

investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the

acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington

Post Company - Berkshire three permanent investments,

constituting about one-half of our net worth - that range from

slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to

ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and

strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside

potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it

did some years ago.

今日我们所面临不利的因素主要有︰(1)目前的股票市场过热，股价相对偏高(2)

企业投资利益的税负过高(3)企业被购并的价格偏高(4) Berkshire主要三大投资

事业(约占本公司净值的一半) 资本城/ABC、GEICO汽车保险与华盛顿邮报，

个别的产业状况多多少少不若以往，虽然这些公司有杰出的管理与强势的资产，

但以目前的股价来看，他们向上成长的潜力相对有限。

The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital

base. Youe heard that from us before, but this problem, like

age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with

age, it better to have this problem continue to grow rather

than to have it olved.?

然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说

明，不过这个问题就好象是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流

逝，问题也越严重，(当然在这种情况下，我们是希望这个问题越严重越好)

Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9

billion to achieve a 15% annual return over the decade then

ahead. Today, for the next decade, a 15% return demands profits

of $10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to

Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should

that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in

future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior

partner.)

四年前我曾告诉各位若在未来十年，Berkshire想要每年维持15%的报酬，我们

总共约要有39亿美元的获利，时至今日，这个数字暴增到103亿美元，对查

理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，(当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大

家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人)

As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital

base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now

that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up

in a textile business with inescapably poor economic

characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some

really exceptional businesses.

虽然资金规模会影响到最后的投资报酬率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有

的优势，过去我们大部分的资金都被绑在没有多大经济效益的纺织事业之上，如

今部份的资金已转移到一些相当不错的事业。

去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒水牛城日报、费区海默、寇比吸尘器、内布拉

斯加家具量贩店、史考特费兹制造集团、喜斯糖果及世界百科全书等，今年七圣

徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实

在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股东权益报酬率高达67%。

Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven:

Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott

Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See, and World Book. In 1988 the

Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary

their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost

financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the

Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no

benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on

average equity capital.

In most cases the remarkable performance of these units

arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all

cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The

contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.

虽然其中一部分的企业本身就是属于强势的企业，但优良的管理却是绝对必要的

条件，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。

In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will

continue to produce superb returns. Wel need these: Without

this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15%

goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver;

the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can

effectively employ the funds that they generate.

根据我个人的判断，这些企业总的来说，应该还会持续有好的表现，我们想要在

往后年度继续维持15%报酬率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于

查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的资金。

In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early

in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim, a

jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in

this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding

business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It a great

way to start the year.

在这点我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥玛哈Borsheim珠宝80%

的股权，这项购并案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由

我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营，今年有一个好的开始。

Accounting Changes

会计原则变动

We have made a significant accounting change that was

mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990.

When we move figures around from year to year, without any change

in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of

accounting is necessary.

1988年开始有一项重要的会计原则变动开始适用，展望1990年还会有一项变

动，当经济现况没有改变，但会计帐面却必须将数字搬来搬去，我们一定会花一

番工夫讨论一下影响层面。

首先我习惯性的提出拒绝声明，虽然一般公认会计原则确有缺点，但我却必须坦

承没有能力重新订出一套新的规则，虽然这套原则确有其先天性的限制，却不必

就此废除，CEO大可以也应该将一般公认会计原则当作是对股东与债权人尽告

知义务的开始而非结束；若他们只是提供阳春的财务报表，却没有附上经营分析

所必要的关键讯息，部门经理人会发现会被总经理修理的很惨，同样的母公司的

总经理是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东所有人，报告必要有用的信息。

First, Il offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the

shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),

I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules.

The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be

inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning

rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and

creditors - and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a

subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported

barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his

boss, the parent corporation CEO. Why, then, should the CEO

himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses - the

shareholder-owners of the corporation?

What needs to be reported is data - whether GAAP, non-GAAP,

or extra-GAAP - that helps financially-literate readers answer

three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company

worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future

obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given

the hand they have been dealt?

真正需要的是资料不管是一般公认、非一般公认或是一般公认以外，可以帮助

财务报表使用者可以了解三个问题︰(1)这家公司大概价值多少?(2)它达到未来

目标的可能性有多大?(3)在现有条件下，经理人的工作表现如何?

In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are

somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the

minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too

complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe

economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those

operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.

大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界实在很难用

一套简单的规则有效地来解释企业的经济实质状况，尤其是像Berkshire这种由

许多各种不同产业组成集团。

Further complicating the problem is the fact that many

managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an

obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly

assist them. (.ow much,?says the client, s two plus two??

Replies the cooperative accountant, .hat number did you have in

mind?? Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes

stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will

more appropriately describe their performance. Both the

smoothing of earnings and the .ig bath?quarter are hite lie?

techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.

更复杂的是许多管理阶层不把一般公认会计原则当作是应该达到的标准，而是应

该要克服的阻碍，且大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等

于几?配合的会计师可能会回答︰「那要看你想要多少?」即使是诚实且正直

的管理阶层有时也会超越一般公认会计原则，以使得报表数字更符合他们认为应

该有的表现，不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季特别突出，都是还算正直的经营阶

层经常运用的做帐技巧。

Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and

defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP

results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules

maginatively?and record business transactions in ways that

technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic

illusion to the world.

另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用一般公认会计原则来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很

清楚许多投资人与债权人把一般公认会计原则当作圣经朝拜，所以这些骗徒运用

丰富的想象力技巧性让交易记录符合一般公认会计原则，但却与实际的经济实质

背道而驰。

As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated

institutions - place fancy valuations on reported .arnings?that

march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and

promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter

what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have

observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of

the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been

censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen

than small sums with a gun.

只要投资人，包含看起来复杂的专业投资机构，迷信稳定向上攀升的盈余数字，

我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用一般公认会计

原则来满足投资人的需求，多年以来查理跟我看到许多会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因

此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。

Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have

been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our

balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual

Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company

that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby

products) were consolidated on a .ne-line?basis. That meant we

(1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a singleentry

asset on Berkshire consolidated balance sheet and (2)

included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a

single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of

earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset

and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each

item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.

1988年一般公认会计原则有一个很重大的转变，依新规定Berkshire必须将子

公司与关系企业的资产与损益完全并到母公司的财务报表之上，在过去互助储贷

与史考特费兹金融(主要从事世界百科全书与寇比吸尘器分期付款的信用公

司)，只须一次认列投资损益即可，意思是说(1)仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例

以投资权益显示在Berkshire的合并资产负债表之上(2)仅将被投资公司年度损

益按投资比例以投资利益显示在Berkshire的合并损益表之上，但是现在我们必

须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。

This change underscores the need for companies also to

report segmented data: The greater the number of economically

diverse business operations lumped together in conventional

financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and

the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed

earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated

figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the

other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.

这项转变低估了公司也要报告部门别信息，企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财

务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个

问题，事实上在Berkshire我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是要符合外部规

定，查理跟我看的则是另一套部门别的信息。

Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP

statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary

information that we think will help you measure both business

value and managerial performance. (Berkshire ability to

discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we

listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In

these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow

GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will

attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid

analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give

you important information in a form that we would wish to get it

if our roles were reversed.

现在我们被要求在财务报表上将更多的数字混在一起，我们现在决定公布更多的

补充信息，有助于帮助各位来衡量企业价值与管理当局的表现，Berkshire将责

任转移给债权人的能力我们提到的第三个问题，应该很明确，不管是在看什么

样的报表，在这些补充信息中，我们不一定会依照一般公认会计原则，甚至不会

以公司别来区分，相反地我们会试着将同性质的企业汇总有助于大家分析而不是

被一大堆信息所掩没，我们的目标是设身处地的为各位设想，给各位我们认为重

要的讯息。

On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and

earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in financetype

operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer

Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major

investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing

and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating

assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an allother

category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily

marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as

various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent

companies.

下表我们依(1)金融事业，包含互助储贷与史考特财务公司(2)保险事业，依投资

部位分门别类(3)制造、出版、零售事业，去除某些非营业资产与购买法会计调

整数(4)其它项目，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)及Wesco与

Berkshire母公司所持有的资产与负债

If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four

segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP

statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new

presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors,

who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don.

want to ask.)

如果将以上四类的盈余与净值加总，你将得到与一般公认会计原则一致的总数，

但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师看过，最好是不要，因

为他们要是看到这种报表，一定会被吓个半死。

I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is

expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of

deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so

much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was

postponed for a year.

先前我曾提到在1990年会有另一项会计原则的重大变动，主要与递延所得税有

关，这原则相当的复杂且极具争议性，以致于原定计画于1989年实施延后一年。

When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various

ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we

calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized

appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.

当这项原则开始实施后，对我们有几个方面，最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修

正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得，其计算递延所得税负债的方式，

Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized

appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2

billion, we have booked a 28% tax liability. For the unrealized

appreciation built up since, $600 million, the tax liability has

been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax

rates that went into effect in 1987.

原先我们在这方面的负债分作好几层，对于1986年以前帐列未实现利益，大约

在12亿美元左右，系以28%的税率估算，对于1986年之后的帐列未实现利益，

大约在6亿美元左右，系以34%的税率估算，1987年起调整税率的差异反应税

负的差异。

It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will

require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990,

taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in

tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that

year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The

proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet,

but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and

net worth.

现在看起来，新的会计原则要求我们从1990年开始必须将所有未实现利益的预

估税率订在34%，经估算光是这一项做法就会使得我们的年度盈余与净值减少

七千多万美元，还不包含其它大大小小的影响。

We have no strong views about the desirability of this

change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out,

however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely

depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to

sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.

其实我们不认为这样转变有其必要性，因为对于Berkshire来说不管税率是28%

或是34%，都不能反应我们公司的实质现况，因为我们从来不考虑出售我们具

有庞大未实现利益的股票。

To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I

apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do

not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily

because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our

money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your

gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the

record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing

necessarily wrong with this kind of aith?approach to

investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an .nalysis?

approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our

own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches

give us the same answer.

对于那些对会计不感兴趣的人，很抱歉耽误各位的时间，我很清楚你们当中有很

多根本不会仔细去看数字，但却仍持续支持我们，因为你们知道(1)查理跟我本

身的身家也都在里面(2)我们绝对会与各位共享荣枯(3)到目前为止先前的记录还

算令人满意。事实上这种完全信任的投资方法并没有什么不好，但也有一些股东

比较喜欢深入分析的方式，因此我们也有必要提供足够的信息给他们，至于

Berkshire本身在做投资时，则是两种方法并用，重点在于能不能得到满意的答

案。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector

accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources

of Berkshire reported earnings just as we have in the past.

除了提供给各位最新四个部门的会计资料，我们一如往常还是会提列出

Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源

In the following table, amortization of Goodwill and other

major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged

against the specific businesses to which they apply but are

instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you

view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been

reported had we not purchased them. Ie explained in past

reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more

useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP

presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a

business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in

the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our

audited financial statements.

在下表商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加

总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所

影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则，不

管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经

会计师查核的数字一致。

Further information about these businesses is given in the

Business Segment section on pages 32-34, and in the Management

Discussion section on pages 36-40. In these sections you also

will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For

information on Wesco businesses, I urge you to read Charlie

Munger letter, which starts on page 52. It contains the best

description I have seen of the events that produced the present

savings-and-loan crisis. Also, take special note of Dave

Hillstrom performance at Precision Steel Warehouse, a Wesco

subsidiary. Precision operates in an extremely competitive

industry, yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested

capital. Though data is lacking to prove the point, I think it

is likely that his performance, both in 1988 and years past,

would rank him number one among his peers.

年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可

以看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含我看过对储贷机构危机事件写得最贴切的

一篇文章，另外也可以顺便看看Precision钢铁厂，这家Wesco的子公司所处

的产业竞争相当激烈，但经理人Dave仍然努力创造相当不错的绩效，虽然手头

上缺乏资料来证明，但我相信他的表现绝对不比其它同侪逊色。

1988 Unit:US'000

Earnings Before Income Tax After Income Tax

Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share

Earnings from Operation

Insurance Group

Underwriting #DIV/0! (11,081) (1,045)

Net Investment Income #DIV/0! 231,250 197,779

Buffalio News #DIV/0! 42,429 25,462

Fechheimer 14,152 7,720

Kirby 26,891 17,842

Nebraska Furniture Mart #DIV/0! 18,439 9,099

Scott Fetzer-Diversified 28,542 17,640

See's Candies #DIV/0! 32,473 19,671

Wesco Financial Corporation-Parent #DIV/0! 16,133 10,650

World Book 27,890 18,021

Amortization of Goodwill (2,806) (2,806)

Interest on Debt (35,613) (23,212)

Shareholder's Contribution (4,966) (3,217)

Other 34,717 19,837

0 418,450 　 313,441

Realized Securities Gain 131,671 85,829

Total Earnings-all entities 0 550,121 　 399,270

*不包含史考特飞兹金融集团的利息费用

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group.

我们旗下各项营运事业所创造的盈余，不管是依绝对值或是与同业相较，实在是

相当出色，对此我们衷心感谢这些辛苦的经理人，你我应该感到庆幸能与他们一

起共事。

The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are

superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of

their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You

and I are fortunate to be associated with them.

At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We

do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have

attained a specified age - whether the traditional 65, or the 95

reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb

managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because

a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with

newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic

records always look terrific and the candidates always know just

what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment

to the company and general business savvy. It difficult to

teach a new dog old tricks.

在Berkshire，这样的关系可以维持相当长久，我们不会因为这些杰出优秀的明

星经理人年纪到了一定程度就把他们给换掉，不管是65岁或是B太太在1988

年所打破的95岁上限，明星的经理人实在是可遇不可求的稀罕珍宝，他们就像

是插满蜡烛的蛋糕，如何叫人舍得把他们丢弃，相较之下，我们对于新进的MBA

企管硕士的评价就没有那么高了，他们的学术经历看起来总是很吓人，讲起话来

头头是道，但个人对于企业长期发展的投入却相当有限，实在是很难去教菜狗那

套老伎俩。

Here an update on our major non-insurance operations:

以下是我们非保险部门的最新营运状况︰

o At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her

cart roll on and on. She been the boss for 51 years, having

started the business at 44 with $500. (Think what she would have

done with $1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years

away.

在内布拉斯加家具店方面，B太太坐着她的轮椅持续运转，自从44岁那年以500

块美金开始创业当老板，至今已有51个年头，(要是当初是用1,000块的话，

现在可能更不得了)，对于B太太来说，就是再多十岁也不嫌老。

The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the

country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a

detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our

ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.

这家全美最大的家具量贩店到现在还在持续成长，去年秋天，又新开了一家占地

20,000平方英呎的清洁用品中心，让我们的产品线不论是各种价格都应有尽有。

Recently Dillard, one of the most successful department

store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In

many of its stores, Dillard runs a full furniture department,

undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in

Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company,

announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he,

referring to NFM: .e don. want to compete with them. We think

they are about the best there is.?

最近Dillard一家在全美地区经营相当成功的百货公司打算进军奥玛哈地区，在

它其它主要的分店都设有家具部门，事实上他们在这方面也做的相当成功，不过

就在其奥玛哈分店开幕的前夕，Dillard总裁William先生却宣布这家分店决定

不卖家具，他特别提到NFM，表示你绝对不会想要与它竞争，我想它在当地已

经是最强的了。

At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and

our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over

the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in

the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in

the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no

other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings

operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we

also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux

City and Kansas City - always with good results. It truly does

pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to

offer.

水牛城报纸我们赞扬广告的价值，而我们在NFM的政策则是证明我们所宣扬的

确实可行，过去三年来，NFM是奥玛哈世界先锋报的最大广告客户，(ROP是指

直接印在报纸而非夹报式的广告)，据我所知，除此之外没有一家报纸的主要广

告客户是家具商，同时我们也在堪萨斯等地区刊登广告，所得到的反应也相当不

错，广告当然有其效果，只要你所要介绍的东西值得推荐。

Mrs. B son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the

winning Blumkin team. It a joy to work with this family. All

its members have character that matches their extraordinary

abilities.

B太太的儿子路易，还有他几个小孩组成了一支梦幻队伍，跟他们一起共事实在

是一种享受，所有的成员品格与才能兼具。

o Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at

The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have

proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger.

But Stan Lipsey - bless him - has managed to make me look

foolish.

去年我曾明确地表示水牛城日报1988年的税前盈余一定会下滑，事实证明要不

是有Stan Lipsey，结果可能会如我所预测，与其它同规模的报纸同样地沉沦，

很高兴Stan让我看起来很愚蠢。

Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry

average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates

rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins

a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial

record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper

that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe

that our .ewshole?percentage - the portion of the paper devoted

to news - is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our

size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in

1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the

level or trend of profit margins.

虽然我们去年我们调涨的价格较同业水准略低，同时印刷与工资成本调整的幅度

与同业一致，但Stan还是硬生生让毛利率又扩大一些，在新闻业没有其它人可

以像他这样有更好的经营绩效，且同时还能够让读者得到如此丰富的新闻，我们

相信我们自己的新闻比率，绝对是同样规模或甚至更大报纸中最高的，1988年

49.5%，不管获利状况如此，我们一定会努力将这个比率维持在50%上下。

Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we

were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the

12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray

Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he

has made us proud of the paper ever since.

查理跟我在年轻的时候就很热爱新闻事业，而买下水牛城报纸的12年来，让我

们渡过许多快乐时光，我们很幸运能够找到像Murray这样杰出的总编辑，让我

们一入主水牛城报纸后，便深深引以为傲。

o See Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988.

Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent

Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in

1987, turned the tide.

喜斯糖果在1988年总共销售了2,510万磅重的糖果，本来在十月前整个销售

前景看起来不太乐观，但拜圣诞节旺季特别旺所致，整个局势跟着扭转。

As wee told you before, See business continues to become

more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company earned a

record 90% of its full-year profits in December: $29 million out

of $32.5 million before tax. (It enough to make you believe in

Santa Claus.) December deluge of business produces a modest

seasonal bulge in Berkshire corporate earnings. Another small

bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals

are sold.

就像我们以前告诉各位的，喜斯的糖果旺季越来越向圣诞节集中，去年光是12

月的税前获利2,900万就占全年度3,250万的90%，(如此你应该相信圣诞老

公公真的存在了吧)，十二月的旺季使得Berkshire第四季的盈余看起来相当不

错，另外第一季则是因为世界百科全书年度出版所以也会有一波小高潮。

Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See about

five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his

record, you may wonder what took us so long.

查理跟我是在买下喜斯糖果五分钟之后，决定为Chuck Huggins负责这家公司

的管理，在看过他这些年来的绩效之后，你可能会怀疑为何我们要考虑那么久！

o At Fechheimer, the Heldmans - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and

Fred - are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither

furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently

attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional

managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And

that exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer

Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his

father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: .here

a lot of heredity in that family.?

在费区海默，Heldmans家族就好象是B太太家族的辛辛那提版，不管是家具

业或者是制服业都不会很有吸引力的行业，也只有好的管理才能让股东们获得好

的投资报酬，这正是Heldmans五位家族成员为Berkshire所作的贡献，身为

职棒大都会队的发言人，Ralph Kiner曾说比较该队投手Steve Trout与他的父

亲Dizzy Trout也是老虎队名投手，你就会发现虎父无犬子。

Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988.

Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the

Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at

it. There are very few managements anywhere - including those

running the top tier companies of the Fortune 500 - in which we

would exhibit similar confidence.

费区海默在1988年进行了一项规模颇大的购并案，查理跟我对于他们相当有信

心，所以我们连看都没有看就同意了这项交易，很少有经营阶层，即便是财星五

百大企业也好，能得到我们这样的信任。

Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth,

sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.

因为这项购并案与内部本身的成长，费区海默的营业额可望大幅成长。

o All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey - World Book,

Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group - performed

splendidly in 1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph

continue to be exceptional.

所有Ralph Schey所管理的事业，包含世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与史考特费

兹制造集团，在1988年的表现皆相当出色，投资其上的资金也获得相当不错的

报酬。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly

fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell

Hausfeld. This company, the country leading producer of small

and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings

since 1986.

在史考特费兹制造集团当中，又以Campbell家用器具最突出，这家全美最大的

中小型压缩机自从1986年来每年盈余都呈倍数成长。

Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up

significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong.

World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September,

when that country largest American book store opened in Moscow.

Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.

寇比吸尘器与世界百科全书的1988年销售数量都大幅成长，尤其在外销部份更

是强劲，世界百科全书在九月配合莫斯科当地最大的一家美国百货公司开幕，正

式在苏联推出，成为该店唯一展示的一套百科全书。

Ralph personal productivity is amazing: In addition to

running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The

Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a

venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based

companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire

are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.

Ralph个人的工作效率真是惊人，除了同时经营19项事业之外，他还投入相当

的时间在克里夫兰医院、Ohio大学等单位，另外还负责一个创投，创设了16

家位于Ohio的新公司，他可以称的上是Ohio与Berkshire之宝。

Borsheim

波仙珠宝

It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in

The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by

neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have

thought of: re there any more at home like you??Last month I

corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch

of the family.

Berkshire是在1983年买下内布拉斯加家具店80%的股权，当时我忘了问B

太太一个连小学生都会想到的问题，你还有没有其它兄弟姊妹，上个月我补救了

这个错误，现在我们又成为另一个家族分支80%的股东。

After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and

five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded

her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her

husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a

journey as perilous as Mrs. B earlier odyssey to the east

through Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha

they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an

extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm

for work - and that all they needed. They have since proved

themselves invincible.

当B太太1917年从苏俄往东经满州一路逃到美国之后，她的双亲与五位兄弟姊

妹也陆续来到美国，其中她有一个姊妹Rebecca在1922年跟着丈夫Friedman

冒着生命危险往西途经拉脱维亚，当家族在奥玛哈重新团聚时大家一无所有且身

无分文，然而只要身具智能、品格与热情一切就已足够，后来证明他们所向无敌。

In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim, a small Omaha

jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in

1950 and, as the years went by, Ike son, Alan, and his sons-inlaw,

Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.

1948年Friedman先生买下奥玛哈地区一家叫波仙的小珠宝店，后来他的儿子

与女婿陆续加入。

You won. be surprised to learn that this family brings to

the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the

Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for

both enterprises is Mrs. B creed: .ell cheap and tell the

truth.?Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single

store operations featuring huge inventories that provide

customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2)

daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover,

(4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The

combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer

everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to

matching.

你应该不难预料，这个家族为当地珠宝业所带来的影响与B太太的情况相近，两

家店共同的特色就是东西实在又价美物廉，另外共通的特色还有(1)单店经营，

但货品样式价格种类齐全，满足消费者各式需求(2)老板每天专心经营(3)货品周

转快速(4)精明的采购(5)费用开销难以想象地低。后面三项特点让店内产品的售

价，全美其它地方都得比。

Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other

matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry.

They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule

makes sense: If you don. know jewelry, know the jeweler.

大部分的人们不管在其它行业多么学有专精，但是遇到买珠宝首饰时，就像是迷

失在森林里的小孩子一样，不会判断东西的品质好坏与价格高低，对这些人来

说，只要记住一条，不懂珠宝没有关系，只要认识珠宝商就好。

I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike

Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in

which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate

testimonial. Borsheim had no audited financial statements;

nevertheless, we didn. take inventory, verify receivables or

audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so -

- and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a

large check.

我敢保证大家只要放心交给Friedman家族，一定不会让各位失望，我们购买波

仙股权的方式就是最好的证明，波仙没有会计师查核报告，也没有盘点存货、验

证应收帐款或是做任何方式的查核，他们只是简单地告诉我们如何如何，于是双

方就草拟的一页简单的合约，并由我们开出一大笔金额的支票。

Business at Borsheim has mushroomed in recent years as the

reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come

to the store from all over the country. Among them have been

some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for

getting them there.

随着Friedman家族声誉的远播，近年来波仙珠宝的生意越做越大，客户从美国

各地远道而来，其中也包含我一些从东西两岸来的朋友，他们也都很感谢我能带

他们去参观波仙。

Borsheim new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the

way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family

will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I

will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say .ll

members,?the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at

88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of

Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a

fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.

波仙的营运模式并不会因为Berkshire的加入而有所改变，所有的家族成员仍将

持续在各自的岗位上奋斗，查理跟我会站在旁边默默支持，事实上所有的成员包

含高龄88岁与87岁的老先生与老太太，仍然每天到店里工作，其它儿子媳妇

也是从早忙到晚，家族的第四代已正准备开始学习接班。

It is great fun to be in business with people you have long

admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success

because they have deserved success. Both families focus on

what right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out

well for them, also. We couldn. have better partners.

跟你所欣赏的人一起共事实在是一件很大的乐趣，Friedmans家族的成功就像

是B太太家族的成功一样，实至名归，两个家族都坚持对客户有益的事之上，同

时对他们自己也有很大的益处，这是我们最好的事业伙伴。

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table

presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

下表是有关保险事业的几项主要的数据更新

Statutory

Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate

in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by

Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%)

------------- ---------------- ------------ ----------------

1981 ..... 3.8 106.0 6.5 9.6

1982 ..... 3.7 109.6 8.4 6.4

1983 ..... 5.0 112.0 6.8 3.8

1984 ..... 8.5 118.0 16.9 3.7

1985 ..... 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.2

1986 ..... 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.7

1987 ..... 9.4 104.6 7.8 3.3

1988 (Est.) 3.9 105.4 4.2 3.6

Source: A.M. Best Co.

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses

incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A

ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above

100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer

earns from holding on to policyholders?funds (.he float? is

taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range

typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of

earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代

表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除

股东权益部份所产生的盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概

是在107-111之间。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the

industry incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in

years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium

growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting

losses will mount, though the industry tendency to underreserve

when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As

the table shows, the industry underwriting loss grew in 1988.

This trend is almost certain to continue - and probably will

accelerate - for at least two more years.

基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期

保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10%以

上，损失一定会增加，虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏

起来，如附表所示，1988年产业整体的损失确实增加，而这个趋势应该会继续

持续下去，甚至在未来两年还会加速恶化。

The property-casualty insurance industry is not only

subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam

Goldwyn philosophized: n life, one must learn to take the

bitter with the sour.? One of the ironies of business is that

many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by

inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate

customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are

spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.

产险业的获利情况不但是相当的低，而且也是不太受尊重的行业，(就像是山姆

高德温曾说一个人要学会体验人生的苦与乐，不过这行很讽刺的是，做的要死要

活的同时，还要被客户糟蹋，不像有些赚翻了的行业，东西明明贵的要死，却是

一个愿打，一个愿挨)

Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested

capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry

(which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at

five times book value and most large insurers sell close to

book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases,

few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet

not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise

prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases,

customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it clearly

better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto

insurance.

以早餐麦片为例，它的资产报酬率是汽车保险业的一倍(这也是为什么家乐氏与

通用磨坊的股价净值比是五倍，而保险业者的股价净值比仅为一倍)，麦片公司

常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变，但消费者却连一个屁都不吭一

声，但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是反映成本稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就

会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，最好是选择去卖高价的玉米片，而不是低价的

汽车保险。

The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can

have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California

initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance

prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The

price cut has been suspended while the courts review the

initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not

been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers

are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California.

(Thank heavens the citizenry isn. mad at bonbons: If Proposition

103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See would be forced

to sell its product for $5.76 per pound. rather than the $7.60 we

charge - and would be losing money by the bucketful.)

一般大众对于保险业的敌视会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一项103

提案，虽然成本一再上涨，却还威胁要将汽车保费价格大幅压低，所幸法院后来

检视这项提案予以搁置，但这次投票所带来的冲击未曾稍减，保险业者在加州已

很难再有营运获利的空间，(感谢老天还好加州人没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，

若是103提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜斯可能被迫以每磅5.76元而不

是现在的每磅7.6元，果真如此，喜斯可能就要亏大钱了)

The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the

initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit

in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the

vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect

GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its

premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO

is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in

other states, through either initiatives or legislation.

对Berkshire来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现

行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接

影响到我们持有44%股权的GEICO，约有10%2的保费收入系来自加州，更具

威胁的是若其它州，不管是透过提案或是立法的方式，也跟进采取类似的行动，

If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost,

it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can

subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers

can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty

companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for

shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the

industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have

little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by

government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO,

because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on

equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn,

so do we.

若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府直接来负

责，股东或可暂时支应保户，但只有纳税人可以长久地给予支助，对大部分的产

物意外险业者来说，社会化的汽车保险对于其股东不会有太大影响，因为由于这

个产业是属于大众产品，保险业者所赚的投资报酬平平，所以若因此被政府强迫

退出市场，也不会有太大的商誉损失，但GEICO就不一样了，由于它的成本低，

相对地可以获得高报酬，所以可能会有很大的潜在商誉损失，而这当然会连带影

响到我们。

At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall,

and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special

reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business

of Fireman Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will

return to Fireman Fund the unearned premiums we hold that

relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in

our remiums written?account as a negative $85 million or so

and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar.

However, the termination of this contract will not have a

significant effect on profits.

在1988年Berkshire的保费收入持续减少，到了1989年我们预期保费收入还

会大幅下滑，一方面是因为消防人员退休基金即将于八月底到期，届时依合约我

们必须将未到期的保费退还，估计总共退回的金额8,500万美元，这将使得我

们第三季的数字看起来有点奇怪，当然这对于我们公司本身的获利不会造成太大

的影响。

Berkshire underwriting results continued to be excellent

in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding

structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104.

Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row,

after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory.

Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on

pages 36-38.

Berkshire 1988年的承保表现依旧相当不错，我们的综合比率(依照法定基础扣

除和解与财务再保)大约在104，损失准备提列在前几年不佳后，连续两年情况

还算良好)

Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to

run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for

profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire,

we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the

expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when

we expect a gain.

我们的保费收入规模预计在未来几年内都会维持在相当低的水平，因为有利可图

的生意实在是少之又少，随它去，在Berkshire我们不可能在知道明明会亏钱的

情况下，还去硬接生意，光是接看起来有赚头的生意，就让我们的麻烦够多了。

Despite - or perhaps because of - low volume, our profit

picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably

brighter than the industry. We are sure to have an exceptional

amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well

for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums

ratio to be at least three times that of the typical

property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from

Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial

team, has positioned us well in that respect.

尽管(也或许正因为如此)我们的保单量少，可以预期的我们的获利情况在未来几

年内也会比同业来的出色，相较于保单量我们有高比例的浮存金，通常这代表着

获利，在1989与1990这两年内，我们的浮存金/保费收入比例至少会是同业

水准的三倍以上，Mike Goldberg在Ajit Jain等人的协助下，加上国家产险的

经营团队使我们站在相当有利的位置。

At some point - we don. know when - we will be deluged with

insurance business. The cause will probably be some major

physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience

an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and

increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with

their recognition that they are far underreserved. in the

meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our

capital, and try not to make major mistakes.

有一点我们不知道什么时候，我们会被保险事业拖垮，有可能会是一些重大的天

然或是经济上的意外，但我们也有可能会遇到像1985年一样爆炸性的成长，因

为当其它同业因长期杀价抢单，一夕之间损失突然爆发，才发现损失提列准备远

远不足，在那种情况下，我们一定会稳固好我们的专业人员与资本并尽量避免犯

下重大的错误。

Marketable Securities

有价证券投资

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance

companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) longterm

common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income

securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term

cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择(1)长期股票

投资(2)长期固定收益债券(3)中期固定收益债券(4)短期约当现金(5)短期套利交

易

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from

these categories. We just continuously search among them for the

highest after-tax returns as measured by athematical

expectation,?limiting ourselves always to investment

alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing

to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal,

rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的

税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与

短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。

o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over

$100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be

discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to

subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，(不包含套利交易，这部份我们后

面会再谈)，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. .............. $517,500 $1,086,750

14,172,500 The Coca-Cola Company ........... 592,540 632,448

2,400,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage

Corporation Preferred* ............ 71,729 121,200

6,850,000 GEICO Corporation ..................... 45,713 849,400

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ... 9,731 364,126

*Although nominally a preferred stock, this security is

financially equivalent to a common stock.

Our permanent holdings - Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO

Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - remain unchanged.

Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their

managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder

and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The

Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent

and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.

我们永久的持股-资本城/ABC、GEICO汽车保险与华盛顿邮报依旧不变，同样

不变的是我们对于这些管理阶层无条件的敬仰，不管是资本城/ABC的Tom

Murphy 与 Dan Burke、GEICO汽车保险的Bill Snyder 与Lou Simpson，

还有华盛顿邮报的Kay Graham与 Dick Simmons，查理跟我对于他们所展现

的才能与品格同感敬佩。

Their performance, which we have observed at close range,

contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have

fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs

clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions,

nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business

management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep

his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.

他们的表现，就我们最近距离的观察，与许多公司的CEO截然不同，所幸我们

能与后者保持适当的距离，因为有时这些CEO实在是不适任，但却总是能够坐

稳其宝座，企业管理最讽刺的就是不适任的老板要比不适任的部属更容易保住其

位置。

If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing

ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable

of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time.

There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily

measured; and if you can. make the grade, youe out.

Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient

business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not

be accepted as a substitute for orders.

假设一位秘书在应征时被要求一分钟要能够打80个字，但录取之后被发现一分

钟只能打50个字，很快地她就可能会被炒鱿鱼，因为有一个相当客观的标准在

那里，其表现如何很容易可以衡量的出来；同样的，一个新进的业务，若是不能

马上创造足够业绩，可能立刻就要走路，为了维持纪律，很难允许有例外情形发

生。

However, a CEO who doesn. perform is frequently carried

indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his

job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may

be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls

are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots

the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the

bullseye around the spot where it lands.

但是一个CEO表现不好，却可以无限期的撑下去，一个原因就是根本没有一套

可以衡量其表现的标准存在，就算真的有，也是写的很模糊，或是含混解释过去，

即便是错误与过失一再发生也是如此，有太多的公司是等老板射箭出去后，再到

墙上把准心描上去。

Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction

between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no

immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured.

The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales

force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate

self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes.

Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who

has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.

另外一个很重要但却很少被提起老板与员工之间的差别是老板本身没有一个直

接可以衡量判断其表现的上司，业务经理不可能让一颗老鼠屎一直留在他那一锅

粥之内，他一定会很快地把它给挑出来，否则可能连他自己都会有问题，同样的

一个老板要是请到一位无能的秘书，也会有相同的动作。

But the CEO boss is a Board of Directors that seldom

measures itself and is infrequently held to account for

substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake

in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the

company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will

probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board

members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)

但CEO的上司也就是董事会却很少检视其绩效，并为企业表现不佳负责，就算

董事会选错了人，而且这个错误还持续存在又怎样？即使因为这样使得公司被接

收，通常交易也会确保被逐出的董事会成员有丰厚的利益(且通常公司越大，甜

头越多)

Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are

expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the

CEO performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of

belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from

critically evaluating the substandard typist.

最后董事会与CEO之间的关系应该是要能够意气相投，在董事会议当中，对于

CEO表现的批评就好象是在社交场合中打嗝一样不自然，但却没有一位经理人

会被禁止不准严格地审核打字员的绩效。

These points should not be interpreted as a blanket

condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and

hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the

management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful

that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent

holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners,

and they exude integrity and ability.

以上几点不是要一杆子打翻一条船，大部分的CEO或是董事会都相当努力、能

干，有一小部份更是特别的杰出，但查理跟我在看过很多失败的例子之后，更加

对于我们能够与前面三家公司优秀的经理人共事感到非常幸运，他们热爱他们的

事业，想法跟老板一致，且散发出才气与品格。

o In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan

Mortgage Pfd. (.reddie Mac? and Coca Cola. We expect to hold

these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions

of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our

favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of

those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform

well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint.

Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and

watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum

allowed by law, and are extensively described by Charlie in his

letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are

carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by

Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.

1988年我们做出两项重大的决定，大笔买进联邦家庭贷款抵押公司(Freddie

Mac)与可口可乐，我们打算要持有这些股票很长的一段期间，事实上当我们发

现我们持有兼具杰出企业与杰出经理人的股权时，我们最长的投资期间是永久，

我们跟那些急着想要卖出表现不错的股票以实现获利却顽固地不肯出脱那些绩

效差的股份的那群人完全相反。彼得林区生动地将这种行为解释成砍除花朵来当

作野草的肥料，我们持有Freddie Mac的股份比例是法令规定的上限，这部份

查理在后面会详加为各位说明，因为他们是属于共同储贷-我们一家非保险的子

公司所投资，所以在我们的合并资产负债表当中，这些持股将以成本而非市价列

示。

We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few

companies that we try to understand well. There are only a

handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term

convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to

participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: .oo

much of a good thing can be wonderful.?

我们持续将投资集中在少数我们能够了解的公司之上，只有少部份是我们想要长

期投入的，因为当我们好不容易找到这样的公司时，我们会想要达到一定的参与

程度，我们同意Mae West的看法，好东西当然是多多益善。

o We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by

about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were

acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by

property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the .ax-exempt?

interest earned is subject to tax.

去年我们减少在中期免税债券约一亿美元的投资，所有卖出的债券都是在1986

年之后才取得的，当这些债券由产险公司所持有的时候，其中15%的利息收入

是要课税的。

The $800 million position we still hold consists almost

entirely of bonds .randfathered?under the Tax Reform Act of

1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales

produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an

average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than

carrying value.

剩下我们仍持有约8亿美元的债券，都是属于适用1986年租税改革法案完全

免税的祖父级债券，出售的债券将有些许的获利，而继续持有的债券平均到期日

大概是六年，其市价大概略高于帐面价值。

Last year we described our holdings of short-term and

intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy.

During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax

profit of about $22 million. This sale explains close to $100

million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our

balance sheet.

去年我们曾提及我们所持有的已破产的Texaco短期与中期公司债券，1988年

我们已经将所有的部位处分，获利约2,200万美元，此举将使得我们在固定收

益债券的投资部位减少1亿美元。

We also told you last year about our holdings of another

security whose predominant characteristics are those of an

intermediate fixed-income issue: our $700 million position in

Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This preferred has a

sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments

from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For

reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market

value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at

the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.

去年我们还提到了另外一个深具固定收益特色的投资：亦即所罗门公司9%可转

换特别股，这种特别股特别要求公司提拨偿债基金，自1995年到1999年间分

批赎回，Berkshire将这些投资以成本列示在帐上，基于查理所提的原因，现在

的估计市价以从前一年度略低于成本，转变为1988年的略高于成本。

The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO

of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration

for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the

near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment

banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to

forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe

that our conversion privilege could well have important value

over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming

portion of the preferred value resides in its fixed-income

characteristics, not its equity characteristics.

我们与所罗门CEO- John Gutfreund之间良好的关系，随着几年来的合作日益

增进，但我们还是无法判断投资银行业的前景，不管是短期、中期或是长期皆然，

这是一个难以预估未来获利程度的产业，我们仍然相信我们所拥有的转换权利会

在其有效期间内，对我们产生相当大的贡献，然而这种特别股的价值主要还是来

自于其固定收益，而不是股权特性之上。

o We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will

become enthused about such securities only when we become

enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the

purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn. in

the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too

many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasingpower

stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of

Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our

WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of

their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a

few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our

balance sheet at $247 million and have a market value of about

$352 million.

我们对于长期债券的规避依旧不变，唯有当我们对于货币的长期购买力有信心

时，我们才会对这类的债券有兴趣，但这种稳定却根本没办法预期，因为不管是

社会或是选出来的官员实在是有太多的优先事项是与购买力的稳定性相冲突

的。所以目前我们唯一持有的长期债券就是WPPSS华盛顿功用电力供应系统，

其中有些属于短期，有一些则是分几年赎回的高票息，目前资产负债表上帐列成

本为2.47亿美元，目前市价约为3.52亿美元。

We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983

annual report, and are pleased to tell you that this commitment

has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most

of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no

ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were

rated AA- by Standard & Poor. They now sell at levels only

slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.

我们在1983年年报中曾经解释过购买WPPSS的理由，现在很高兴跟大家报告结果完全符合我们

当初的预期，在买进的时候，债券的评等被暂时取消，估计税后的投资报酬率约为17%，最近它

被史坦普评等机构评为AA-等级，目前的市价大概只有比最高等级债信的投资报酬好一点。

In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS

purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned

out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the

general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both

are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns

achieved through 1988.

在1983年的年报中，我们比较了投资WPPSS与一般企业的差异，结果显示这

次的投资要比当时同期间所从事购并案还要好，假设两者皆以为无财务杠杆的基

础下进行。

Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter

our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us

hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose

troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the

market.

不过我们在WPPSS的愉快经验并未能改变我们对于长期债券的负面看法，除非

再让我们碰到暂时僵住的大案子，因为短暂的问题使得其市价严重的被低估。

Arbitrage

套利

In past reports we have told you that our insurance

subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to

holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to

make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash

than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises

much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important,

cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for longterm

investments. (Charlie sign off after wee talked about

an arbitrage commitment is usually: .kay, at least it will keep

you out of bars.?

在过去的报告中我曾经告诉各位保险子公司有时也会从事套利的操作，以作为短

期资金的替代，当然我们比较喜欢长期的投入，但可惜资金总是多过于点子，与

此同时，套利的报酬有时会多过于政府公债，同时很重要的一点是可以稍微缓和

我们对于寻找长期资金去处的压力，(每次在我们谈完套利投资之后，查理总是

会附带一句，这样也好，至少能让你暂时远离市场)

During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage,

measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pretax

gain was about $78 million on average invested funds of about

$147 million.

在1988年我们在套利部份斩获不少，不论是金额或是投资报酬率，总计投入

1.47亿美元的资金，赚取7,800万美元的获利。

This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of

arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word

applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities

or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to

exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say,

Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in

London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this

scalping; it won. surprise you that practitioners opted for the

French term, arbitrage.

如此的成绩使我们值得详细的描述一下，所谓的套利是指在不同的市场同时买卖

相同的有价证券或是外汇，目的是为了撷取两者之间微小的差距，例如阿姆斯特

丹的荷兰币、英国的英镑或是纽约的美元，有些人将此行为称之为剃头皮，但通

常这一行的人惯用法国的字汇-套利。

Since World War I the definition of arbitrage - or isk

arbitrage,?as it is now sometimes called - has expanded to

include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event

such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization,

reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the

arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the

stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that

the announced event won. happen.

自从第一次世界大战之后，套利或者说风险套利的定义，已延伸包括从已公开的

企业购并、重整再造、清算等企业活动中获利，大部分的情况下，套利者期望不

管股市变动如何皆能获利，相对的他面临的主要风险是宣布的事件未如预期般发

生。

Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the

arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24

and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co.,

a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited

profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941

when cocoa was selling for 50 cents per pound. In 1954 a

temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over

60 cents. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable

inventory - quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa

had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to

a 50% tax on the proceeds.

有些特别的套利机会也会偶尔出现，我记得在24岁时当时我在纽约的葛拉罕-

纽曼公司上班，Rockwood一家在布鲁克林生产巧克力的公司，原则该公司自

1941年开始就采用后进先出制的存货评价方式，那时可可亚每磅是50美分，

到了1954年可可亚因为暂时缺货价格大涨至64美分，因此Rockwood想要

把帐上价值不菲的可可亚存货在价格滑落之前变卖掉，但若是直接将这批货卖

掉，所得的收益可能要支付50%左右的税金，但1954的税务法令及时公布，

其中有一项不太为人知的规定，就是如果企业不是把这些存货卖掉而是直接分配

给股东间接减少营运规模的话，就可以免税，因此Rockwood决定停止其贩卖

可可亚奶油的业务，并将1,300万磅的可可亚豆子发还给股东，同时公司也愿

意以可可亚豆子换买回部份股份，换算下来，每股可以换得80磅的豆子。

The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an

arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO

profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a

plan reducing the scope of a corporation business. Rockwood

decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa

butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory

was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company

offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans

it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.

For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and

made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock

certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and

my only expense was subway tokens.

有好几个礼拜我整天忙着买进股票、换豆子，再把豆子拿去卖，并常常跑到

Schroeder信托公司拿着股票凭证换取仓库保管单，获利算下来还不错，而唯一

的成本费用就是地铁车票。

The architect of Rockwood restructuring was an unknown,

but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If youe

familiar with Jay subsequent record, you won. be surprised to

hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood continuing

shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly

after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though

the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes

there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.

Rockwood改造计画的规划者是32岁没有名气但相当优秀的芝加哥人Jay

Pritzker，若你知道Jay后来的记录，你应该就不会讶异这个动作对于公司股东

有多大的益处了，在这项提议推出不久之后，虽然公司营运呈现亏损，但

Rockwood的股价却从15美元涨到100美元，有时股票的价格会远远超过合

理的本益比之外。

In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved

takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever

rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with

bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered

mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the

trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been eing

There.?In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: .ive a

man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to

arbitrage and you feed him forever.?(If, however, he studied at

the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state

institution that supplies his meals.)

近几年来，大部分的套利操作都牵涉到购并案，不管是友善的或是敌意的皆然，

在购并案狂热之时，几乎感觉不到托拉斯法的存在，投标的竞价履创天价，在当

时套利客大行其道，在这行不需要太多的才能，唯一的技巧就像是Peter Sellers

的电影那样，只要轧一脚就行，华尔街有一句经过改编的俗话，给一个人一条鱼，

你只能养活他一餐，教他如何套利，却可以养活他一辈子，(当然要是他到学校

学习套利，可能就要靠州政府过活了)

To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four

questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will

indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What

chance is there that something still better will transpire - a

competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if

the event does not take place because of anti-trust action,

financing glitches, etc.?

在评估套利活动时，你必须要能回答四个问题(1)已公布的事件有多少可能性确

实会发生?(2)你的资金总计要投入多久?(3)有多少可能更好的结果会发生，例如

购并竞价提高(4)因为反托拉斯或是财务意外状况发生导致购并案触礁的机率有

多高?

Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage

experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business.

On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle

to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR),

then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the

printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing

going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to

10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to

expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9

million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata

was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed

the interest rate that should apply to the period between the

taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling

legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a

much higher and compounded rate.

Arcata公司我们最曲折离奇的购并经验，说明了企业的曲曲折折，1981年9

月28日该公司的董事同意将公司卖给KKR公司，一家在当时同时也是现在最

大的融资买断公司，Arcata所从事的是印刷与森林产品，但其中值得注意的是

在1978年美国政府决定征收该公司所有10,700公顷的红木林，以扩增国家公

园的范围，为此政府决定分期支付该公司总金额9,790万美元的征收款，但

Arcata公司却认为金额太少，同时双方也对适用的利率也争议，Arcata极力争

取更高的赔偿金与适用的利率。

Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized

claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the

claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this

problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of

any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood

lands.

买下一家具有高度争议的公司将会让公司在谈判过程中，会增加许多的难度，不

管诉讼案件是不利或是有利于公司皆然，为了化解这个难题，KKR决定支付

Arcata每股37美元再加上政府额外赔偿款的三分之二，作为购并的条件。

Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask

ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since,

among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining

atisfactory financing.?A clause of this kind is always

dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor

whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we

were not particularly worried about this possibility because

KKR past record for closing had been good.

在评估过这项投资机会之后，我们自问KKR能否真正完成这项交易的关键在于

他们是否能够顺利取得融资，这对卖方来说永远是风险最高的一项条款，追求者

在提出求婚到正式结婚的这段期间，要落跑是很容易的一件事，不过在这个案子

我们却不太担心，原因在于KKR过去的记录还算不错。

We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR

deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably

comfortable: Arcata management and directors had been shopping

the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell.

If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though

of course, the price might be lower.

我们还必须扪心自问若是KKR真的失败会如何，在这点我们觉得还好，Arcata

的董事会与经营阶层已经在外兜售好一段时间了，显示该公司却有决心要出售，

如果KKR跑掉，Arcata一定还会再找新的买主，当然届时的价格可能会差一点。

Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim

might be worth. Your Chairman, who can. tell an elm from an

oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim

at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.

最后我们还必须问自己，那块红木林的价值到底有多少？坦白说我虽然个人连榆

树跟橡木都分不出来，但对于这个问题我的处理方式倒很简单，反正就是介于零

到一大笔钱之间就对了。

We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50, on

September 30 and in eight weeks purchased about 400,000 shares,

or 5% of the company. The initial announcement said that the

$37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything

had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of

return of about 40% - not counting the redwood claim, which would

have been frosting.

后来我们开始从九月开始以每股33.5元买进Arcata股票，八个礼拜之内总共

买进40万股，约占该公司5%的股权，隔年一月第一次对外公布股东每股可以

拿到37元，换算年投资报酬约为40%，这还不包含可以的红木林赔偿损失。

All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that

the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive

agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our

stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our

holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our

willingness to pay up - even though the closing had been

postponed - reflected our leaning toward . whole lot?rather

than .ero?for the redwoods.

然而过程中不太顺利，到了12月宣布交易可能会延后，尽管如果1月铁定会签

约，受到这项鼓励，我们决定再加码以38元每股至65.5万股，约7%的股权，

我们的努力终于获得回报，虽然有点拖延，但结果却相当令人满意。

Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a

econd look?at financing terms ?in view of the severely

depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata outlook.?

The stockholders?meeting was postponed again, to April. An

Arcata spokesman said he id not think the fate of the

acquisition itself was imperiled.?When arbitrageurs hear such

reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: .e lied like

a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.?

接着在2月25日融资银行说有鉴于房地产景气不佳，连带对Arcata的前景可

能有所疑虑，故有关融资条件可能还要再谈，股东临时会也因此再度延期到四月

举行，同时Arcata公司发言人表示他不认为购并案已触礁，但是当套利客听到

这种重申时，脑中便闪过一句老话︰他说谎的方式就好象是即将面临汇率崩盘的

财政部长一样。

On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn. work, first

cutting its offer to $33.50, then two days later raising it to

$35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down

and accepted another group offer of $37.50 plus one-half of any

redwood recovery. The shareholders okayed the deal, and the

$37.50 was paid on June 4.

3月12日KKR宣布先前的约定无效，并将报价砍至33.5美元一股，两天后再

调高至35美元，然而到了3月15日董事会拒绝了这项提议，并接受另一家集

团37.5美元外加红木林一半的收益，股东会迅速通过这项交易，并于6月4日

收到现金。

We received $24.6 million versus our cost of $22.9 million;

our average holding period was close to six months. Considering

the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of

return excluding any value for the redwood claim - was more than

satisfactory.

总计我们花了近六个月的时间，投资2,290万美元，最后收回2,460万美元，

但若是加计这项交易中间所经历的风风雨雨，则15%的年报酬率(未包含红木林

潜在收益)还算令人满意。

But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two

commissions, one to look at the timber value, the other to

consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first

commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the

second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of

return working out to about 14%.

不过好戏还在后头，承审法院指派两个委员会来解决这项纷争，一个负责认定红

木林的价值，一个则负责应该适用的利率，隔年1月委员会认定红木林的价值

为2.75亿美元，适用的复利率应为14%。

In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which

meant a net amount of about $600 million would be due Arcata.

The government then appealed. In 1988, though, before this

appeal was heard, the claim was settled for $519 million.

Consequently, we received an additional $29.48 per share, or

about $19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.

到了八月法官裁定这项决议，这代表政府需要再支付高达6亿美元的赔偿金，

联邦政府立刻提出上诉，而就在上诉即将宣判结果时，双方以5.19亿美元达成

和解，因此我们又额外收到1,930万美元，相当于每股29.48美元的大红包，

之后还可以再拿到80万美元的进帐。

Berkshire arbitrage activities differ from those of many

arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually

very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into

a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many

irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring

both the progress of deals and the market movements of the

related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our

lives. (What the sense in getting rich just to stare at a

ticker tape all day?)

Berkshire的套利活动与其它套利客有些不同，首先相较于一般套利客一年从事

好几十个案子，每年我们只参与少数通常是大型的交易案，有这么多锅子同时在

煮，他们必须花很多时间在监控交易的进度与相关股票的股价变动，这并不是查

理跟我想要过的生活方式，(为了致富，整天盯着计算机屏幕到底有何意义?)

Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable

or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from

arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation.

So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we

will - and when it happens wel report the gory details to you.

也因为我们只专注在少数几个案子，所以一个特别好或是特别差的案子，可能会

大大地影响到我们一整年的套利成绩，所幸到目前为止，Berkshire还没有遇到

什么惨痛的经验，一旦发生我一定会一五一十的向各位报告。

The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is

that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly

announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover

candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of

the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.

另有一点不同的是我们只参与已经公开对外宣布的案子，我们不会仅靠着谣言或

是去预测可能被购并的对象，我们只看报纸，思考几项关键因素，并依照我们判

断的可能性做决定。

At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000

shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8 million and a market

value of $304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to

roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our

position. About three million shares were accepted when we

tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the

returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax

profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.

到了年底，我们剩下唯一的套利投资是334.2万股的RJR Nabisco，投资成本

2.82亿美元，目前市价3.04亿美元，今年一月我们增加持股到400万股，接

着在二月全部出清。有300万股是KKR决定购并RJR后，我们卖给KKR的，

获利6,400万美元略高于预期。

Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding

contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that

made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; t was deja vu

all over again.?

稍早之前，另外一个竞争对手Jay Pritzker-第一波士顿集团浮现加入对RJR的

竞争行列，提出以租税规划为导向的提案，套句Yogi Berra的说法:这感觉识曾

相识！

During most of the time when we normally would have been

purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted

because of Salomon participation in a bidding group.

Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon,

are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition

work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would

do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit

Berkshire arbitrage operations.

大部分的时间我们买进RJR相当大的限制，由于我们在也是竞争者的所罗兄公司

有投资，虽然查理跟我都是所罗门的董事，但我们却与整个购并案的所有信息隔

绝，而我们认为这样也好，额外的信息对我们不见得就有好处，事实上，有时还

会妨碍到Berkshire进行套利的投资。

However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon

proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be

fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire purchases of

RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days

immediately following management announcement of buyout plans,

before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the

RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could

not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire

significant money.

然而由于所罗门的提案规模相当的大，以致于所有的董事都必须完全被知会并参

与，因此Berkshire总共只有两个时点可以进行买进RJR的动作，第一次是当

RJR经营阶层宣布整个购并计画的几天内，当时所罗门还未宣布加入竞标，另外

是后来RJR董事会决定优先考虑KKR的提案，也因为所罗门的董事职务，使得

Berkshire的投资成本大大提高。

Considering Berkshire good results in 1988, you might

expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect

to be on the sidelines.

看到1988年如此丰硕的套利成果，你可能会觉得我们应该继续朝这方面加强，

但事实上，我们决定采取观望的态度。

One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down -

because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a

very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this

report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment

about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they

reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for

specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never

will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest

rates, or business activity will be a year from now.

一个好的理由是因为我们决定大幅提高在长期股权方面的投资，所以目前的现金

水位已经下降，常常读我们年报的人可能都知道，我们的决定不是基于短期股市

的表现，反而我们注重的是个别企业的长期经济展望，我们从来没有、以后也不

会对短期股市、利率或企业活动做任何的评论。

Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in

arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in

the takeover field. As Dorothy says: .oto, I have a feeling

wee not in Kansas any more.?

然而就算是我们现金满满，我们在1989年可能也不会从事太多的套利交易，购

并市场的发展已经有点过头了，就像桃乐斯所说的:「奥图，我觉得我们好象已

经不是在堪萨斯市了！」

We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we

know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and

buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence

with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence

with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire

to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled - and, in

our view, often unwarranted - optimism of both buyers and

lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb

Stein: f something can. go on forever, it will end.?

我们不太确定这种过热的现象会持续多久，包含参与热潮的政府、金主与买家的

态度会如何转变，不过我们可以确定的是，当别人越没有信心参与这些活动时，

我们的信心也就越高，我们不愿意参与那些反应买方与金主无可救药的乐观，通

常我们认为那是无保障的，在此我们宁愿注重Herb Stein的智能，若一件事不

能持久不衰，那么它终将结束。

Efficient Market Theory

效率市场理论

The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small

discussion of .fficient market theory?(EMT) also seem relevant.

This doctrine became highly fashionable - indeed, almost holy

scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it

said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public

information about them was appropriately reflected in their

prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a

corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone

throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio

having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest,

most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced

not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and

corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market

was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly

that it was always efficient. The difference between these

propositions is night and day.

前面提到的套利活动使得我们有必要讨论一下市场效率理论，这理论在近年来变

得非常热门，尤其在1970年代的学术圈被奉为圣旨，基本上它认为分析股票是

没有用的，因为所有公开的信息皆已反应在其股价之上，换句话说，市场永远知

道所有的事，学校教市场效率理论的教授因此做了一个推论，比喻说任何一个人

射飞镖随机所选出来的股票组合可以媲美，华尔街最聪明、最努力的证券分析师

所选出来的投资组合，令人惊讶的是市场效率理论不但为学术界所拥抱，更被许

多投资专家与企业经理人所接受，正确地观察到市场往往是具有效率的，他们却

继续下了错误的结论，市场永远都具有效率，这中间的假设差异，简直有天壤之

别。

In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience

of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire

illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There plenty of other

evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its

earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of

the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year.

Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham arbitrage principles,

first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though Ie not

made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that

the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I

operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben; he had

1929-1932 to contend with.)

就我个人的看法，就我个人过去在葛拉罕-纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙企业与

Berkshire公司连续63年的套利经验，说明了效率市场理论有多么的愚蠢(当然

还有其它一堆证据)，当初在葛拉罕-纽曼公司上班时，我将该公司1926年到

1956年的套利成果做了一番研究，每年平均20%的投资报酬率，之后从1956

年开始我在巴菲特合伙企业与之后的Berkshire公司，运用葛拉罕的套利原则，

虽然我并没有仔细地去算，但1956年到1988年间的投资报酬率应该也有超过

20%，(当然之后的投资环境比起葛拉罕当时要好的许多，因为当时他遇到过

1929-1932年的景气大萧条)。

All of the conditions are present that are required for a

fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations

traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-

year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate

experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or

develop keen insights about products or managements - we simply

acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage

positions were a clearly identified universe - they have not been

selected by hindsight.

所有的条件皆以具备来公平测试投资组合的表现(1)三个公司63年来买卖了上

百种不同的股票证券(2)结果应该不会因为某个特别好的个案所扭曲(3)我们不需

要故意隐瞒事实或是宣扬我们的产品优秀或是经营者眼光独到，我们只是从事高

度公开的个案(4)我们的套利部份可以很容易就被追查到，他们并不是事后才特

别挑选出来的

Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a

10% annual return, including dividends. That means $1,000 would

have grown to $405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20%

rate of return, however, would have produced $97 million. That

strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that

might, conceivably, arouse one curiosity.

过去63年来，大盘整体的投资报酬(加计股利)大概只有10%，意思是说若当初

投入1,000美元的话，现在可以获得405,000美元，但是若投资报酬率改为

20%的话，现在却会变成9,700万美元，统计上如此大的差异使得我们不禁好

奇的想要怀疑，然而理论支持者从来就不会去注意理论与现实如此地不相符，确

实现在他们讲话已不如过去那么大声，但据我所知却没有任何一个人愿意承认错

误，不管他们已经误导了多少个学生，市场效率理论还是继续在各个企管名校间

列为投资课程的重要教材之一，很显然的，死不悔改、甚而曲解神意，不是只有

神学家才做的出来。

Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in

discordant evidence of this type. True, they don. talk quite as

much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my

knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many

thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT,

moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment

curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance

to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not

limited to theologians.

Naturally the disservice done students and gullible

investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an

extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In

any sort of a contest - financial, mental, or physical - it an

enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that

it useless to even try. From a selfish point of view,

Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual

teaching of EMT.

自然而然，这些遇人不淑的学生与被骗的投资专家在接受市场效率理论后，对于

我们与其它葛拉罕的追随者实在有莫大的帮助，在任何的竞赛中，不管是投资、

心智或是体能方面，要是遇到对手被告知思考与尝试是没有用的，对我们来说等

于是占尽了优势，从一个自私的观点来看，葛拉罕学派应该祈祷市场效率理论

能够在校园中永为流传。

All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has

looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that

guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of

any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of

the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63-

year period, many more were foregone because they seemed

properly-priced.

说了那么多，最后还是要提出一个警告，最近套利看起来相当容易，但它却不是

永远都保证有20%报酬的投资活动，现在的市场比起过去来的有效率许多，除

了我们过去63年所真正掌握的套利活动之外，还有更多是因为价格合理而因此

被舍弃掉的。

An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by

simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He

can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously

exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per

se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by

throwing darts.

一个投资者很难只靠单一一种投资类别或投资风格而创造超人的利益，他只能靠

着仔细评估事实并持续地遵照原则才能赚取超额利润，就套利投资本身而言，并

没有比选择利用飞镖选股的策略好到哪里去。

New York Stock Exchange Listing

纽约证券交易所挂牌

Berkshire shares were listed on the New York Stock

Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the

letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.

Berkshire的股份于1988年11月29日正式在纽约证券交易所挂牌，后面附

有我们写给股东有关挂牌的正式声明。

Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter:

Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any

number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.

除了那封信之外，我个人还有一点要说明，虽然我们在交易所的基本交易单位是

10股，但只要是1股以上还是一样可以进行买卖。

As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to

reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being

achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price

on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the

over-the-counter market.

另外如同信中所提到的，我们之所以决定挂牌的主要目的是要降低交易成本，而

我相信这目的也已经达到，一般来说，在NYSE买卖之间的价差会比在柜台买卖

要来得小的多。

Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is

the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its

progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for $500 on

September 8, 1861. (Recently, seats were selling for about

$625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks

second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased

when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with

the firm performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally

manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better

hands.

负责买卖Berkshire股份的是Henderson兄弟公司-交易所中一家老牌专家，

它的前身William Thomas Henderson，是在1861年以500块美金买下一个

交易所的席位(最近一个席位的成交价大约是62.5万美金)，在所有54家交易

公司当中，HBI共被分配到第二多的83种股票，我们很高兴Berkshire能够被

分配给HBI负责交易，到目前为止对于他们的服务感到相当满意，该公司负责人

Jim Maguire亲自负责Berkshire的交易，他是我们可以找到的最佳人选。

In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from

those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to

maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish

instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic

business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable - or,

better yet, unreasonable - rate). Charlie and I are bothered as

much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation.

Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many

shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire business

results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors

business value, each of our shareholders will receive an

investment result that roughly parallels the business results of

Berkshire during his holding period.

有两点是我们与其它挂牌公司最大不同的地方，第一我们不希望Berkshire的股

价过高，主要是希望它能够反应的实质价值范围内交易(当然我们希望实质价值

能够以合理的速度增加，当然能够不合理的增加更好)，查理跟我都不希望，股

价被过分高估或是被过分低估，两者都会使Berkshire的股东的获利与公司本身

经营获利状况不相当，所以如果Berkshire的股价持续地反应企业实质的价值，

则我们可以确定每个股东在他持有公司股份的期间所获得的利益，都能与公司本

身营运的获利成等比。

Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran

a private business with a few passive partners, we would be

disappointed if those partners, and their replacements,

frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public

company, we feel the same way.

第二我们希望交易量越少越好，如果我们经营的是一家只有几位合伙人的私人企

业，我们也不希望合伙人时常进进出出合伙事业，经营一家公开上市公司也是同

样的道理。

Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of

purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan

instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don. understand the

CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved

only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other

organization - school, club, church, etc. - do leaders cheer when

members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood

depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you

could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of

activity, as in: .here hasn. been much going on in Christianity

for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.?

我们希望能够吸引具有远见的投资人，在买进股份时，抱着打算与我们永远同在

而不是订有卖出价格的时间表，我们实在不能理解为何有公司的CEO希望自己

公司的股份交易量越多越好，这代表公司的股东组合会变来变去，在其它如学

校、俱乐部、教堂等社会机构当中，没有主持人希望自己的组织成员离开的，(然

而偏偏就有营业员就是要靠着说服成员离开组织来维生，你有没有听过有人劝你

反正最近基督教也没有什么搞头，不如下礼拜大家改信佛教试一试)。

Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell

from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay

them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies,

performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who

understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure

us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this

sort of shareholder - and, just as important, can continue to be

uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic

expectations - Berkshire shares should consistently sell at

prices reasonably related to business value.

当然还是有些Berkshire股东需要或是想要偶尔把他持有的股份卖掉，而我们希

望能够找到合适的人以适当的价格来接手，因此我们试着透过我们的政策、表现

与沟通，吸引真正了解我们营运、认同我们理念并用同样的方式来对待我们的新

股东，如果我们能够持续地吸引这种类型的股东，同时很重要的，让那些短视近

利的投资人远离我们，相信Berkshire一定能够持续地以合理的价格交易买卖。

David L. Dodd

大卫．陶德

Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last

year at age 93. Most of you don. know of him. Yet any longtime

shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of

the indirect influence he had upon our company.

与我相交38年亦师亦友的大卫．陶德，于去年以高龄93岁过世，大多数的人

可能都不知道他是谁，但是许多Berkshire的老股东却因为他对本公司的间接影

响而受益良多。

Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and

he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the

moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and

educated me; one influence was as important as the other.

Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made

sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my

education right up until his death.

大卫终其一生在哥伦比亚大学教书，同时他也与葛拉罕合作著述「证券分析」一

书，自从我到哥伦比亚之后，大卫不时地鼓励与教导我，给我的影响一个接着一

个，他所教导我的很一件事，不论是直接或透过他的著作都非常有道理，后来毕

业后，透过不断往来的信件，他给我的教育持续到他逝世之前。

I have known many professors of finance and investments but

I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match

of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students:

No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have

achieved unusual success.

我认识许多财经与投资学的教授，除了葛拉罕以外，没有人可以比得上大卫，最

好的证明就是他学生的成绩，没有其它投资学的教授可以造就出那么多杰出的英

才。

When students left Dave classroom, they were equipped to

invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he

taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these

may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles

embodying them has been rare.

当学生离开大卫的教室，就代表着他们一生将具备有投资智能，因为他所教导的

原则是如此的简单、完整有用且持久，虽然这些特点看起来并不显著，但要将这

些原则教导给学生却不是一件容易的事。

It particularly impressive that Dave could practice as

well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his

academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed,

his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began

as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory)

and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was

right from the start.

让我印象最深刻的是大卫总是言行一致，就像凯恩斯运用自己研究出的学术观点

来致富，大卫也是如此。事实上他在财务操作上的表现远比凯恩斯来得出色，凭

借着企业与信用循环理论，之后再演变成价值投资，大卫一开始就选择了正确的

方向。

In Berkshire investments, Charlie and I have employed the

principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the

fruit of their intellectual tree.

查理跟我运用大卫与葛拉罕所教的原则，在Berkshire的投资之上，我们的成功

正代表着他们心血的结晶。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones

we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that

fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以透过大家的协

助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我，

Here what wee looking for:

(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax

earnings),

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections

are of little interest to us, nor are .urnaround?

situations),

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing

little or no debt,

(4) management in place (we can. supply it),

(5) simple businesses (if there lots of technology, we won.

understand it),

(6) an offering price (we don. want to waste our time or that

of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a

transaction when price is unknown).

我们想要找

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过

五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样

多，否则不考虑发行股份。

我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望

能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往

常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意

的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise

complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily

within five minutes - as to whether wee interested. We prefer

to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive

as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-

Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company ownermanagers

wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes

for themselves, but often for their families or inactive

shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain

significant owners who continue to run their companies just as

they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit

for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to

check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business

in the past.

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions

that don. come close to meeting our tests: Wee found that if

you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will

call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in

new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be

expressed by another Goldwynism: lease include me out.?

另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍

卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆

人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有高德温的另一句话

可以形容，请把我排除在外。

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as

described above, we are also interested in the negotiated

purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock

comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a

special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a longterm

investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股

份，就像我们在资本城与所罗门这两个Case一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买

所罗门一样的可转换特别股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。

* * *

We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard &

Poor raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest

rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or propertycasualty

companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.

几个礼拜以前，我们接到了一个好消息，史坦普评等机构将我们的债信等级调高

的三A的最高标准，相较于1980年的28家，目前全美只有15家公司可以拥

有此殊荣。

Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few

years from .vent risk.?This term refers to the overnight

degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged

purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial

policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of

takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations

present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise

bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.

过去几年企业公司债的持有人在事件风险上跌了一大跤，意思是说一家原本财务

操作保守的公司，因为进行高杠杆购并或是重整再造，使得公司在一夜之间被大

幅调降信用评等，购并的世界之中，除了少数经营权与所有权一致的公司之外，

大部分的公司都会面临这样的风险，但Berkshire绝对不会，查理跟我保证给债

券持有人与股东一样的承诺。

* * *

About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in

Berkshire 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program.

Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319

charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business

results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.

大约有97.4%的有效股权参与1988年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约500万美

元捐出的款项分配给2,319家慈善机构，若经营情况许可，我们计画在1989年

扩大这项捐赠计画。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our

shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on

pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we

strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are

registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee

name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered

on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在

未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是

受托人的名下，必须在1989年9月30日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1989

年的计画。

* * *

Berkshire annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday,

April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides

the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may

have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing

with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have

been dealt with.

今年的股东会将在1989年4月24日星期一在奥玛哈举行，我们希望大家都能

来参加，这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一

直回答到所有股东都满意为止(除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的

人)

After the meeting we will have several buses available to

take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike

Friedman at Borsheim. Be prepared for bargains.

会后我们将安排几台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到B太太的家具广场与波仙珠宝

店，准备大捡便宜货吧！

Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B

during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday

hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely

allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the

store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is

not open on Sunday.

外地来的股东可以会选择提早一点来，B太太的店星期天会从中午开到下午五

点，只有五个小时可能不够B太太暖身，她可能希望还是能够像平日一样从早上

10点到晚上9点，另外波仙珠宝星期天并不开门营业。

Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet

prices. She will confide to you - as she does to everyone - how

she does it:  can sell so cheap .ause I work for this dummy

who doesn. know anything about carpet.?

记得问B太太地毯价格为什么会如此便宜的秘密，她一定会向跟所有人一样地偷

偷跟你讲她是如何办到的，(我之所以能够卖的这么便宜是因为我的老板对于地

毯根本就一无所知！)

Warren E. Buffett

February 28, 1989 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1989年2月28日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or

44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management

took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to

$4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

本公司1989年的净值增加了15亿1千5百万美元，较去年增加了44.4%，

过去25年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长到现

在的4,296美元，年复合成长率约为23.8%。

What counts, however, is intrinsic value - the figure

indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally

worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by

taking all future cash flows of a business - in and out - and

discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all

businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of

cellular phones, become economic equals.

然而真正重要的还是实质价值-这个数字代表组合我们企业所有份子合理的价

值，根据精准的远见，这个数字可由企业未来预计的现金流量(包含流进与流

出)，并以现行的利率予以折现，不管是马鞭的制造公司或是行动电话的业者都

可以在同等的地位上，据以评估其经济价值。

Back when Berkshire's book value was $19.46, intrinsic

value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied

up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was

carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their

carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a

premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has

compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual

growth in book value.

当Berkshire的帐面价值是19.46美元之时，由于主要的资产多属于纺织事业，

所以实质的价值大概比帐面价值要少一点，但时至今日我们企业的价值却早已较

帐面价值多的多，这代表着Berkshire实质价值成长的速度要比帐面价值每年平

均23.8%的复合成长率还要再高一些。

The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is

another. A large portion of our book value is represented by

equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our

balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these

securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own

intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past.

One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the

virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas

once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not

now.

后照镜是一回事，雨刷又是另外一回事，我们帐面价值大部分是反应我们所持有

的有价证券，而这些有价证券除了少数的例外，又大多以市价在资产负债表上列

示，在去年年底这些有价证券较之过去，又以比实质价值呈现更高的价格，一方

面当然是因为1989年股市的飙涨，另一方面则是这些有价证券的价值得到大家

的认同，也就是说过去他们的股价曾经相当的低，但这种情况如今已不复存在。

We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how

they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This 'tildeath-

do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these

holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up

Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past. In

other words, our performance to date has benefited from a doubledip:

(1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our

portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we

realized as the market appropriately "corrected" the prices of

these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of

the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains

in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies

will make. But our "catch-up" rewards have been realized, which

means we'll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.

我们仍然会保有我们主要的持股，不管相较于实质价值，他们现在的市场价格是

多少，我们对于他们至死不分离的态度加上这些股份现在的价位，意味者他们在

未来可能无法再像先前那样将Berkshire的净值大幅向上推升，换句话说，我们

能有现在的表现主要受惠于两方面(1)我们旗下的公司所创造出的实质价值增长

(2)由于市场对于这些公司的股价，相较于一般企业所做合理的修正所带来的额

外红利。

在未来我们有信心仍然可以享受公司所创造出来的价值，但是对于先前补涨的利

益则因为大都已实现，这意味着我们将来只能靠前者来受惠。

We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth

rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is

taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But

when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate

eventually forges its own anchor.

此外我们还面临到另一项挑战，在有限的世界里，任何高成长的事物终将自我毁

灭，若是成长的基础相对较小，则这项定律偶尔会被暂时打破，但是当基础膨胀

到一定程度时，好戏就会结束，高成长终有一天会被自己所束缚。

Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon,

musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing

into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: "That means four doublings

an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only

about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of

wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a

mountain...in two days, more than the sun - and before very long,

everything in the universe will be made of bacteria." Not to

worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of

exponential growth. "The bugs run out of food, or they poison

each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public."

Carl Sagan曾经开玩笑地解释这种现象，假设有一种细菌每15分钟可以分裂

一次，亦即代表每一小时复制四次，一天可复制96次，虽然单一个细菌其重量

只有一兆分之一公克重，但是只要经过一天无止尽的无性生殖，其重量可能会比

一座山还重，经过两天后，甚至会比太阳还重，要不了多久所有的宇宙都将由这

种细菌所组成，不过Sagan又说，大家不必担心，上天一定会安排障碍来阻止

其倍数成长，有可能他会耗尽食物，或是毒死自己，或是有可能羞于在大庭广众

之下复制。

Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire's Vice Chairman

and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium.

Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its

net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit

shy about reproducing - financially - in public. Nevertheless,

Sagan's observations apply. From Berkshire's present base of $4.9

billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to

average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average

23.8% from the $22 million we began with.

即使是在最坏的情况下，查理孟格(Berkshire的副主席兼主要合伙人)，与我都

不认为Berkshire会像细菌一样无止尽地成长，当然更不可能像细菌那样找到每

15分钟就能够复制一次的方法，虽然我们不会像细菌那般羞于在公开场合进行

复制，不过Sagan的观察还是对的，相较于刚开始的2,200万，以Berkshire

目前的49亿美元的净值基础，我们实在很难像过去那样每年以15%以上的成长

率增加。

Taxes

租税

Our 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after we took a

charge of about $712 million for income taxes. In addition,

Berkshire's share of the income taxes paid by its five major

investees totaled about $175 million.

事实上，1989年Berkshire 15亿美元的增加净值还是已扣除7.12亿美元估计

应付所得税后的净额，此外这还不包含其五个主要被投资公司合计已缴1.75亿

美元的所得税。

Of this year's tax charge, about $172 million will be paid

currently; the remainder, $540 million, is deferred. Almost all

of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in

unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this

increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.

在今年的所得税费用中，大约有1.72亿美元是马上要支付的，剩下的5.4亿则

可以记帐递延处理，大部分是由于1989年我们持有的股票未实现利益，以34%

的预估税率计算出来的数字。

We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized

profits generated in 1987 and 1988. But, as we explained last

year, the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987 - about $1.2

billion - carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then

prevailed.

另外我们也1987年及1988年的未实现资本利得依照前项税率补提准备，但如

同去年解释过的，我们在1987年所累积的未实现利益约12亿美元仍依照当时

28%的税率提列准备。

A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will

require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax

rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would

increase our deferred tax liability, and decrease our net worth,

by about $71 million - the result of raising the reserve on our

pre-1987 gain by six percentage points. Because the proposed rule

has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear,

we have not yet made this change.

新的会计原则有可能会要求公司将所有的利得以现行的税率估算(不管实际可能

会是多少)，若以34%来计(等于将税率提高6个百分点)，这样的规则可能会大

幅增加我们帐列递延所得税的数字，并使我们的帐面净值减少约7,100万美元，

由于新提出的规定引发相当大的争议，最后的结果尚难定论，所以目前公司帐上

尚未做此反应。

As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would

owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our

securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion

liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability

payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year?

Obviously not - despite the fact that both items have exactly the

same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.

大家可以从资产负债表上看到，若是年底我们一口气将所有的有价证券按市价全

部出清，则我们要支付的所得税将高达11亿美元，但这11亿的负债真的就跟

15天后要付给厂商的货款，一样或是相近吗? 很显然的并非如此，虽然在财务

报表上计算的净值的方式都一样，只是很简单地减掉11亿美元。

On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a

meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be

triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we

have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.

从另一个角度来看，难道这项估计所得税负债，会因为我们从来没有意愿要把股

票卖掉，所以政府课不到所得税，就表示它不具重大的意义吗? 答案很显然也不

是。

In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free

loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election

(unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are

realized). This "loan" is peculiar in other respects as well: It

can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular,

appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size - daily as market

prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect,

this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large

transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one

asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings

in 1989, incurring about $76 million of "transfer" tax on $224

million of gains.

就经济实质而言，这种所得税负债就好象是美国国库借给我们的无息贷款，且到

期日由我们自己来决定，(当然除非国会把课税时点提早到未实现时)，这种贷款

还有一项很奇怪的特点，它只能被用来购买某些特定涨价的股票，而且额度会随

时市场价格来变动，有时也会因为税率变动而改变，事实上这种递延所得税其实

有点类似于资产移转时所要缴交的交易税，事实上我们在1989年只做了一小部

份的变动，总共产生了2.24亿的资本利得，因此发生了7,600万的交易税。

Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle

style of investing that we favor - if successful - has an

important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let's

look at an extreme comparison.

由于税法运作的方式，如果情况许可的话，我们偏爱李伯大梦式的投资，因为较

之疯狂短线进出的方法，它有一个很重要的利基点，让我们举一个很极端的例子

来做说明。

Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a

security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine

further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this

process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time.

At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we

would have paid on the profits from each sale would have

delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left

with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single

fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20

years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash

out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with

about $692,000.

假设Berkshire只有1块美金的投资，但它每年却可以有一倍的报酬，假设我

们将卖掉后所得的资金，用同样的方式再重复19年，结果20年下来，依照34%

的税率总共贡献给国库13,000美元，而我们自己则可以拿到25,250美元，看

起来还不错，然而要是我们简单一点，只做一项不变的投资，但是它同样可以赚

每年一倍，则最后的金额却高达1,048,576美元，在扣除34% 356,500的所

得税之后，实得约692,000美元。

The sole reason for this staggering difference in results

would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the

government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1

ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though,

admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.

之所以会有如此大的差异唯一的理由就是所得税支付的时点，有趣的是政府从后

面那种情况所抽的税金还比前者高，当然政府必须等到最后才能拿到这笔税金。

We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy

favoring long-term investment commitments because of these

mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater aftertax

returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to

another. Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.

必须强调的是我们并不是因为这种简单的算术就倾向采用长期投资的态度，没错

经常性的变动有可能会使我们的税后报酬高一些，事实上在几年之前，查理跟我

就是这样在做的。

Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly

lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid

business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we

want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly

easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce

good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results.

Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give

up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for

time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human

qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying

for money - a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one

is already rich.

但现在我们觉得一动不如一静，虽然这样的投资报酬看起来可能会少一点，其中

的理由很简单，我们已经找到相当难得的商业合作关系，并珍惜我们彼此间所发

展出来的情感，做这种决定对我们来说一点都不困难，因为我们相信这样的关系

一定会让我们有一个满意的投资成果，虽然它可能不是最佳的。也因此我们觉得

实在没有意义要舍弃原来我们熟悉欣赏的人，而把时间浪费在我们不认识且人格

可能会在水准以下的人身上，那不等于一个有钱人竟然还为了金钱而结婚，这未

免有些精神错乱。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's

reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill

and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not

charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but

are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets

you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been

reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past

reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more

useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally

accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchaseprice

adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The

total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical

to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

Further information about these businesses is given in the

Business Segment section on pages 37-39, and in the Management's

Discussion section on pages 40-44. In these sections you also

will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For

information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to read Charlie

Munger's letter, which starts on page 54. In addition, we have

reprinted on page 71 Charlie's May 30, 1989 letter to the U. S.

League of Savings Institutions, which conveyed our disgust with

its policies and our consequent decision to resign.

年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可

以看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含查理在1989年5月写给美国储贷联盟

的一封公开信，信中传达对于其推行政策的不满并做出辞去在其组织中的职位。

(000s omitted)

----------------------------------------------

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

---------------------- ----------------------

1989 1988 1989 1988

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............ $(24,400) $(11,081) $(12,259) $ (1,045)

Net Investment Income ... 243,599 231,250 213,642 197,779

Buffalo News .............. 46,047 42,429 27,771 25,462

Fechheimer ................ 12,621 14,152 6,789 7,720

Kirby ..................... 26,114 26,891 16,803 17,842

Nebraska Furniture Mart ... 17,070 18,439 8,441 9,099

Scott Fetzer

Manufacturing Group .... 33,165 28,542 19,996 17,640

See's Candies ............. 34,235 32,473 20,626 19,671

Wesco - other than Insurance 13,008 16,133 9,810 10,650

World Book ................ 25,583 27,890 16,372 18,021

Amortization of Goodwill .. (3,387) (2,806) (3,372) (2,806)

Other Purchase-Price

Accounting Charges ........ (5,740) (6,342) (6,668) (7,340)

Interest Expense* ......... (42,389) (35,613) (27,098) (23,212)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions .......... (5,867) (4,966) (3,814) (3,217)

Other ..................... 23,755 41,059 12,863 27,177

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Operating Earnings .......... 393,414 418,450 299,902 313,441

Sales of Securities ......... 223,810 131,671 147,575 85,829

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Total Earnings - All Entities $617,224 $550,121 $447,477 $399,270

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and

Mutual Savings & Loan.

*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用

We refer you also to pages 45-51, where we have rearranged

Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond

to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help

you calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Shown on these pages

are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our

insurance operations, with their major investment positions

itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing

businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and

purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries

engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and

Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that

includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable

securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase

price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the

Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

在后面我会提到重新将Berkshire的部门分类为四大项，这是查理跟我认为可以

帮助大家计算本公司实质价值的最好方式，以下的资产负债表与盈余表就是依此

分类表示(1)保险事业，并将主要投资部位归类(2)制造、出版与零售事业，扣除

非本业资产与购买法的会计调整(3)金融业的子公司-诸如联合储贷与史考特飞

兹财务公司(4)其它项目，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)与购买法调

整，还有Wesco与Berkshire母公司一些其它的资产与负债。

If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four

segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP

statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category

presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors,

who in no way bless it.

如果你将这四个部门的盈余与净值加总，会得到与经会计师依公认会计原则查核

的数字一致，然而我还是必须强调这种表达方式并未经过会计师的检视，我想他

宁可选择不要看的好。

In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from

significant earnings of investees that standard accounting rules

do not permit us to report. On page 15, we list five major

investees from which we received dividends in 1989 of about $45

million, after taxes. However, our share of the retained earnings

of these investees totaled about $212 million last year, not

counting large capital gains realized by GEICO and Coca-Cola. If

this $212 million had been distributed to us, our own operating

earnings, after the payment of additional taxes, would have been

close to $500 million rather than the $300 million shown in the

table.

除了帐列盈余数字之外，实际上我们受惠于会计原则不能认列的盈余，后面我烈

示出五家主要被投资公司在1989年收到的税后现金股利收入合计是4,500万

美元，然而若依照投资比例我们可以分得的税后盈余却高达2.12亿美元，这还

不包含我们在GEICO与Coca-Cola身上所获得的资本利得，而若将这应得的

2.12亿盈余分给我们，则在扣除应付的所得税之后，公司帐列的盈余可能会大

幅增加为5亿美元，而不是现在的3亿美元。

The question you must decide is whether these undistributed

earnings are as valuable to us as those we report. We believe

they are - and even think they may be more valuable. The reason

for this a-bird-in-the-bush-may-be-worth-two-in-the-hand

conclusion is that earnings retained by these investees will

be deployed by talented, owner-oriented managers who

sometimes have better uses for these funds in their own

businesses than we would have in ours. I would not make such a

generous assessment of most managements, but it is appropriate in

these cases.

你应该判断的关键在于这些未分配的盈余与我们帐上已经列示的盈余同样的珍

贵，甚至我们相信他们以后可能还更有价值，这一鸟在林更是两鸟在手的道理，

就像是与其把盈余交到我们手中，还不如留给我们信任有才干的经理人继续运用

发挥，通常我对一般的经理人不会有这么高的评价，但以这几家公司来说，的确

是实至名归。

In our view, Berkshire's fundamental earning power is best

measured by a "look-through" approach, in which we append our

share of the operating earnings retained by our investees to our

own reported operating earnings, excluding capital gains in both

instances. For our intrinsic business value to grow at an average

of 15% per year, our "look-through" earnings must grow at about

the same pace. We'll need plenty of help from our present

investees, and also need to add a new one from time to time, in

order to reach this 15% goal.

就我们的观点，Berkshire的基本获利能力可以用直接法来衡量，也就是我们将

被投资公司真正应分给我们的盈余加到帐列的营业利益之上，同时扣除我们在这

些投资已实现的资本利得，所以如果说我们想要让企业的实质价值每年平均以

15%的速度成长，我们的直接盈余也必须要以同等的速度增加，因此我们相当需

要现有的被投资公司给予我们更多的支持，同时也需要时时增加新进的成员才有

办法达到这15%的目标。

Non-Insurance Operations

非保险营运

In the past, we have labeled our major manufacturing,

publishing and retail operations "The Sainted Seven." With our

acquisition of Borsheim's early in 1989, the challenge was to

find a new title both alliterative and appropriate. We failed:

Let's call the group "The Sainted Seven Plus One."

在过去我们将主要的制造、出版与零售业昵称为七个圣徒，在1989年波仙珠宝

加入后，马上面临的一个问题就是要找到一个贴切又好听的名词，但到目前为止

我们还没有想到，现在姑且将他们称作为「七加一个圣徒」吧。

This divine assemblage - Borsheim's, The Buffalo News,

Fechheimer Bros., Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer

Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, World Book - is a collection

of businesses with economic characteristics that range from good

to superb. Its managers range from superb to superb.

这神圣的组合-波仙珠宝、水牛城日报、费区海默、寇比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家

具、史考特费兹、喜斯糖果与世界百科全书等公司，可以说是模范企业的绝佳组

合，他们的管理人也可以说是好的不能再好了。

Most of these managers have no need to work for a living;

they show up at the ballpark because they like to hit home runs.

And that's exactly what they do. Their combined financial

statements (including those of some smaller operations), shown on

page 49, illustrate just how outstanding their performance is. On

an historical accounting basis, after-tax earnings of these

operations were 57% on average equity capital. Moreover, this

return was achieved with no net leverage: Cash equivalents have

matched funded debt. When I call off the names of our managers -

the Blumkin, Friedman and Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stan

Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - I feel the same glow that Miller

Huggins must have experienced when he announced the lineup of his

1927 New York Yankees.

大部分的管理人根本就不需要为了讨生活而工作，他们参加球队的原因只是为了

要击出全垒打，事实上这正是他们常常有的表现，他们合并的财务报表(加上一

些较小的事业)，显示他们的表现是如此的优异，以历史投资成本做基准，他们

现在每年的税后盈余高达平均股东权益的57%，更甚者，他们并不靠举债，帐

上所拥有的现金就足以清偿所有的借款，当我念到这些管理人的名字- the

Blumkin, Friedman, Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey 与

Ralph Schey，这感觉就好象是名教练Miller Huggins 在宣布1927纽约洋基

队的先发阵容一样。

Let's take a look, business by business:

现在让我们逐一来检视。

o In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim's met all

expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably

better than twice what they were four years ago when the company

moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the

move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim's managing

genius - and I mean that - has only one speed: fast-forward.

在波仙珠宝加入Berkshire的第一年，它达到我们所有的预期目标，营业额大幅

成长，较四年前刚搬到现址的时候要好上一倍，事实上在搬来之的六年前，它的

业绩早已成长了一倍，Ike Friedman 波仙珠宝的管理天才，只有一种速度，那

就是全速前进！

If you haven't been there, you've never seen a jewelry store

like Borsheim's. Because of the huge volume it does at one

location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all

price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio

to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering

comparable merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses,

accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer

prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in

turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes 'round

and 'round. The end result is store traffic as high as 4,000

people on seasonally-busy days.

如果你还没有到过那里，你一定没有看过有珠宝店像波仙那样，由于销量非常

大，所以在那里你可以看到各式各样、各种价格的种类，同样的理由，它的营业

费用开销大概只有一般同类型珠宝店的三分之一，对于费用的严格控管，加上优

异的采购能力，使得它所贩售的商品要比其它珠宝店要来的便宜许多，而便宜的

价格又吸引更多的顾客上门，良性循环的结果，使得该店在忙季的单日人潮流量

高达四千人。

Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great

showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business

without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus

side. "If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler" makes sense

whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.

Ike Friedman 不但是个优秀的商人、表演者，更是品格高尚的人，买下这家店

时，我们没有查帐，事后所有的惊奇完全都是正面的，有句话说不懂珠宝没有关

系，但你一定要有认识的珠宝商，这句话真的好有道理，不管是你要买一颗小小

的钻石或是要买下一整家店都一样。

A story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much: Every two

years I'm part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and

explore a few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop's Lodge

in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come

by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business.

有一段故事可以说明为何我个人如此喜爱Ike，每两年我都会参加一个非正式的

聚会，大家一起同乐并探索新事物，去年九月，在圣塔菲与主教会面，我邀请Ike

跟他的太太与儿子为大家讲解珠宝。

Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha

about $20 million of particularly fancy merchandise. I was

somewhat apprehensive - Bishop's Lodge is no Fort Knox - and I

mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening

before his presentation. Ike took me aside. "See that safe?" he

said. "This afternoon we changed the combination and now even the

hotel management doesn't know what it is." I breathed easier. Ike

went on: "See those two big fellows with guns on their hips?

They'll be guarding the safe all night." I now was ready to

rejoin the party. But Ike leaned closer: "And besides, Warren,"

he confided, "the jewels aren't in the safe."

Ike为了加深大家的印象，所以特地从奥玛哈带了总值超过2,000万美元的各式

珠宝，当时我个人有点担心，因为主教的住所并非像福克斯堡那般坚固，所以当

晚在活动开始之前，我特别向Ike表达个人的关切，Ike把我拉到一旁说，看到

那保险箱没?? 下午时我们早已掉过包，所以根本没有人可能分得清真或假，听

到这话，我放心多了，Ike接着又说，看到旁边那两个腰配枪枝的彪形大汉没?? 他

们会整晚守护着这只保险箱，正当我舒口气准备会到宴会中时，Ike小声说到更

重要的，真正的珠宝并不在保险箱里！

How can we miss with a fellow like that - particularly when

he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan,

Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.

我们怎么能够错过这样一号人物呢?? 尤其是当他背后还有一个兼具才能与活力

的家族。

o At See's Candies we had an 8% increase in pounds sold, even

though 1988 was itself a record year. Included in the 1989

performance were excellent same-store poundage gains, our first

in many years.

喜斯糖果去年糖果的销售磅数再创新高，比前一年度又增加了8%，而且单店的

平均销售磅数经过好几年来，首次呈现正成长。

Advertising played an important role in this outstanding

performance. We increased total advertising expenditures from $4

million to $5 million and also got copy from our agency, Hal

Riney & Partners, Inc., that was 100% on the money in conveying

the qualities that make See's special.

广告在这家杰出的企业中扮演着很重要的角色，去年我们的广告预算从原先的

400万增加到500万美元，透过我们的广告代理商Hal Riney 将钱百分之百花

在传达喜斯糖果之所以能够如此特别的品质之上。

In our media businesses, such as the Buffalo News, we sell

advertising. In other businesses, such as See's, we are buyers.

When we buy, we practice exactly what we preach when we sell. At

See's, we more than tripled our expenditures on newspaper

advertising last year, to the highest percentage of sales that I

can remember. The payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal

Riney and the power of well-directed newspaper advertising for

this result.

在我们的媒体事业，像是水牛城报纸，我们贩售广告，在其它的事业，像是喜斯

糖果，我们是广告客户，反而变成买主，然而当我们买广告时，我们做事的方式

跟我们当初在卖广告的诉求是一致的，去年喜斯糖果在报纸广告上的花费增加了

有三倍之多，是我印象之中占营业额的最高比例，不过所得到的回报却更是惊人，对于能有这样

的成绩，我们相当感谢Hal Riney与报纸的宣传效果。

See's splendid performances have become routine. But there

is nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins: His

daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales

imparts a quality-and-service message to the thousands of

employees we need to produce and distribute over 27 million

pounds of candy annually. In a company with 225 shops and a

massive mail order and phone business, it is no small trick to

run things so that virtually every customer leaves happy. Chuck

makes it look easy.

喜斯杰出的表现好象变得很自然，但Chuck Huggins的管理却绝对不是侥幸，

每天他都全心全意专注于生产与销售各个环节，将品质与服务的观念传达给公司

上上下下几千位员工，每年销售超过2,700万磅的糖果，在一家拥有225家店

面，再加上一个邮购与电话中心，要让每个客户都能够满心欢喜的离去，实在不

是一件简单的事，不过这差事到了Chuck的手上，总是让人感觉轻松自在。

o The Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent

earnings in 1989, but there was one sad note. Mrs. B - Rose

Blumkin, who started the company 52 years ago with $500 - quit in

May, after disagreeing with other members of the Blumkin

family/management about the remodeling and operation of the

carpet department.

内布拉斯加家具店的业绩与盈余在1989年又创新高，但是这伴随着一项坏消

息，52年前以500美元创立这家店的B太太，由于与家族其它成员在内部改装

与地毯部门的营运上意见不合，在五月决定离职。

Mrs. B probably has made more smart business decisions than

any living American, but in this particular case I believe the

other members of the family were entirely correct: Over the past

three years, while the store's other departments increased sales

by 24%, carpet sales declined by 17% (but not because of any lack

of sales ability by Mrs. B, who has always personally sold far

more merchandise than any other salesperson in the store).

B太太可能是现存美国人中最聪明的生意人，但在这件事上我却必须站在家族其

他成员的这一边，过去三年来，当店内其它部门营收平均成长24%之时，地毯

销售却减少17%，(这并不是代表B太太的销售技巧退步，因为她个人卖的商品

绝对比店内其它营业员要多的多)。

You will be pleased to know that Mrs. B continues to make

Horatio Alger's heroes look like victims of tired blood. At age

96 she has started a new business selling - what else? - carpet

and furniture. And as always, she works seven days a week.

大家应该很高兴B太太让Horatio Alger笔下的英雄看起来像是浴血奋战后的失

败者，以96岁的高龄，她却执意再另创新事业，而且还是一样，卖家具跟地毯，

同样地，每个礼拜工作七天。

At the Mart Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin continue to propel

what is by far the largest and most successful home furnishings

store in the country. They are outstanding merchants, outstanding

managers, and a joy to be associated with. One reading on their

acumen: In the fourth quarter of 1989, the carpet department

registered a 75.3% consumer share in the Omaha market, up from

67.7% a year earlier and over six times that of its nearest

competitor.

在原来的家具店，B太太的子孙们还是继续支撑这家全美最大也最成功的家具事

业，他们实在是相当优秀的生意人，管理者，跟他们一起相处实在是很愉快的一

件事。有一件事可以显示他们的聪明才智，在1989年第四季，地毯部门在奥玛

哈地区的市场占有率从前一年度的67.7%增加到75.3%，相当于第二名竞争者

的六倍。

NFM and Borsheim's follow precisely the same formula for

success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one

location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the

shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes

purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below

competitors'; and (5) friendly personalized service with family

members on hand at all times.

NFM与波仙遵循的是相同的成功模式(1)商品种类齐全、应有尽有(2)营运成本极

低(3)大量采购进货成本低(4)毛利高但售价因销量压低(5)亲切的服务与家族式

的管理。

Another plug for newspapers: NFM increased its linage in the

local paper by over 20% in 1989 - off a record 1988 - and remains

the paper's largest ROP advertiser by far. (ROP advertising is

the kind printed in the paper, as opposed to that in preprinted

inserts.) To my knowledge, Omaha is the only city in which a home

furnishings store is the advertising leader. Many retailers cut

space purchases in 1989; our experience at See's and NFM would

indicate they made a major mistake.

另外提供一则新闻插播，NFM在1989年增加20%的报纸广告量，依旧是当地

报纸的最大广告客户，(ROP是指印在报纸上的广告，与事先印好的夹报有别)，

就我所知，奥玛哈是唯一一个以家具业者为最大报纸广告客户的地区，许多客户

在1989年都大砍广告量，但是就我们在喜斯糖果与NFM的经验来说，这实在

是个天大的错误。

o The Buffalo News continued to star in 1989 in three

important ways: First, among major metropolitan papers, both

daily and Sunday, the News is number one in household penetration

- the percentage of local households that purchase it each day.

Second, in "news hole" - the portion of the paper devoted to news

- the paper stood at 50.1% in 1989 vs. 49.5% in 1988, a level

again making it more news-rich than any comparable American

paper. Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major

papers, the News set its seventh consecutive profit record.

水牛城日报在1989年有三点特别值得一提，首先在所有主要的都会报纸中(不

管是平时或是假日)，水牛城的家庭渗透率是最高的(即当地家庭每天订购报纸的

户数)，第二是新闻比率(报纸所有版面中，新闻所占的比率)，相较于1988年的

49.5%，1989年则是50.1%，这比率代表水牛城报纸的新闻内容要比其它同类

型的报纸要来的丰富许多，第三在同业获利频频下滑之际，水牛城的获利连续第

七年成长。

To some extent, these three factors are related, though

obviously a high-percentage news hole, by itself, reduces profits

significantly. A large and intelligently-utilized news hole,

however, attracts a wide spectrum of readers and thereby boosts

penetration. High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper

particularly valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk

to the entire community through a single "megaphone." A lowpenetration

paper is a far less compelling purchase for many

advertisers and will eventually suffer in both ad rates and

profits.

某种程度而言，这三个因素是相关的，虽然很明显的高新闻比率会大幅减少获

利，一个精彩丰富的新闻能够吸引广大的读者，从而增加渗透率，而高的渗透率

回头来又会使得报纸成为广告商喜爱的对象，因为这等于让他们可以透过一个单

一的管道，对整个社区进行宣传，相对的一家渗透率低的报纸对于广告商的吸引

力就大大的降低，到最后一定会使得广告费收入与获利节节下滑。

It should be emphasized that our excellent penetration is

neither an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County,

home territory of the News, has been falling - from 1,113,000 in

1970 to 1,015,000 in 1980 to an estimated 966,000 in 1988.

Circulation figures tell a different story. In 1975, shortly

before we started our Sunday edition, the Courier-Express, a

long-established Buffalo paper, was selling 207,500 Sunday copies

in Erie County. Last year - with population at least 5% lower -

the News sold an average of 292,700 copies. I believe that in no

other major Sunday market has there been anything close to that

increase in penetration.

必须强调的是我们的渗透率并不是个意外抑或是自然而然的一件事，以水牛城报

纸的大本营Erie市来说，当地的人口数从1970年的111万人一路减少到1980

年的101万，乃至于1988年的96.6万人，但报纸发行量的变化却完全相反，

1975年在我们刚准备开始发行周日版之前，Courier-Express一家水牛城当地

相当悠久的报纸每周的发行量约为20万份，去年在总人口比当初还少5%的情

况下，水牛城的发行份数却将近有30万份，我相信在美国没有其它地区能够像

我们这样成长的。

When this kind of gain is made - and when a paper attains an

unequaled degree of acceptance in its home town - someone is

doing something right. In this case major credit clearly belongs

to Murray Light, our long-time editor who daily creates an

informative, useful, and interesting product. Credit should go

also to the Circulation and Production Departments: A paper that

is frequently late, because of production problems or

distribution weaknesses, will lose customers, no matter how

strong its editorial content.

当我们能够如此成长同时又得到家乡父老如此的支持，一定有人居功厥伟，我想

总编辑Murray Light应该是当之无愧，是他日复一日创造出如此发人深省、有

用且有趣的产品，当然发行与生产部门也一样功不可没，一家报纸若是因为印刷

或配送问题而时常误点，不管他的内容有多精彩丰富，一定会影响客户订阅的意

愿的。

Stan Lipsey, publisher of the News, has produced profits

fully up to the strength of our product. I believe Stan's

managerial skills deliver at least five extra percentage points

in profit margin compared to the earnings that would be achieved

by an average manager given the same circumstances. That is an

amazing performance, and one that could only be produced by a

talented manager who knows - and cares - about every nut and bolt

of the business.

Stan Lipsey报纸的发行人，利用获利来加强我们的产品竞争力，我相信Stan

管理能力至少让我们报纸的营业利益增加五个百分点以上，这真是令人赞叹的表

现，这只有完全熟悉企业大大小小事物的优秀经理人才有办法做到这样的成绩。

Stan's knowledge and talents, it should be emphasized,

extend to the editorial product. His early years in the business

were spent on the news side and he played a key role in

developing and editing a series of stories that in 1972 won a

Pulitzer Prize for the Sun Newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have

worked together for over 20 years, through some bad times as well

as good, and I could not ask for a better partner.

Stan的知识与才能也延伸到编辑出版之上，早期他个人的生涯多花在新闻采访

之上，曾经花了相当多的时间报导一系列的故事，并在1972年为奥玛哈太阳报

赢得新闻界的最高荣誉-普立兹奖，Stan与我已经共事长达20年之久，一起经

历各种风雨、患难与共，实在很难再找到像他这么好的伙伴。

o At Fechheimer, the Heldman clan - Bob, George, Gary,

Roger and Fred - continue their extraordinary performance. Profits

in 1989 were down somewhat because of problems the business

experienced in integrating a major 1988 acquisition. These

problems will be ironed out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested

capital at Fechheimer remains splendid.

在费区海默，Heldman家族继续他们不凡的表现，1989年的获利因为1988

年的一件大的购并案出了点问题而略受影响，所幸问题及时获得解决，所以费区

海默的投资报酬还是相当不错。

Like all of our managers, the Heldmans have an exceptional

command of the details of their business. At last year's annual

meeting I mentioned that when a prisoner enters San Quentin, Bob

and George probably know his shirt size. That's only a slight

exaggeration: No matter what area of the country is being

discussed, they know exactly what is going on with major

customers and with the competition.

像我们其它的管理人，Heldmans家族对于其事业的了解钜细靡遗，去年的年度

股东会时我曾经半开玩笑的说，只要犯人一进到监狱，Bob就可以马上只到他的

身材Size是多少，不管你跟他们提到全美那一个地区，他们都相当清楚当地的

市场与竞争对手的状况。

Though we purchased Fechheimer four years ago, Charlie and I

have never visited any of its plants or the home office in

Cincinnati. We're much like the lonesome Maytag repairman: The

Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is

never needed.

虽然我们是在四年之前买下费区海默的，但查理跟我却从来没有去参观过他们的

工厂或是位在辛辛那提的总部，我们有点像是无聊的Maytag维修工人，由

Heldman所管理的东西因为太好根本不会坏，以致于我们从来就没有接过叫修

的电话。

o Ralph Schey continues to do a superb job in managing

our largest group - World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer

Manufacturing Companies. Aggregate earnings of these businesses

have increased every year since our purchase and returns on

invested capital continue to be exceptional. Ralph is running an

enterprise large enough, were it standing alone, to be on the

Fortune 500. And he's running it in a fashion that would put him

high in the top decile, measured by return on equity.

Ralph Schey还是继续发挥他的长才，为我们管理-世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器

与史考特飞兹所组成的大集团，自从我们买下这些企业以来，他们的总盈余年年

都成长，投资的报酬相当可观，Ralph所领导的企业集团真是够大，单单他旗下

事业加总起来就足以名列财星五百大，而若以投资报酬的角度来看，大概可以让

他排在前十名。

For some years, World Book has operated out of a single

location in Chicago's Merchandise Mart. Anticipating the imminent

expiration of its lease, the business is now decentralizing into

four locations. The expenses of this transition are significant;

nevertheless profits in 1989 held up well. It will be another

year before costs of the move are fully behind us.

有好几年，世界百科全书只在芝加哥的一个商业广场集中营运，有鉴于租约即将

到期，未来它将分散成四个据点，搬迁的费用相当的庞大，不过尽管如此1989

年的获利还是会增加，这项搬迁的费用要经过好几年的时间才会慢慢地消化吸收

掉。

Kirby's business was particularly strong last year,

featuring large gains in export sales. International business has

more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled in the

past four; its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%. Our

largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby, in

preparation for a major model change in 1990.

寇比的生意去年特别的旺，尤其是在外销方面的成长惊人，近两年来的业绩已成

长了一倍，累计四年来成长了四倍，市场占有率从5%增加到20%，我们1989

年最大的资本支出就花在寇比身上，预计在1990年会有一次大改款。

Ralph's operations contribute about 40% of the total

earnings of the non-insurance group whose results are shown on

page 49. When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986, our

acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our

acquisition of the businesses. In addition to generating

extraordinary earnings, Ralph also manages capital extremely

well. These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that, in

turn, have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments.

Ralph的事业部门所贡献的盈余大概占非保险部门的四成左右，当我们在1986

年初买下史考特飞兹时，能将Ralph一并挖过来当经理人，跟我们当初买下这

家公司一样地重要，除了贡献可观的盈余之外，Ralph管理资金也是一把罩。这

些能力使得Berkshire能够获得源源不绝的资金，让我们回头可以再做更多更好

的投资。

And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees.

以上就是我们的职棒先发阵容!

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table

presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance

industry:

下表是产物意外险业的几项重要的指数

Statutory

Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate

in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by

Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%) ------------- ------------------

------------- ----------------

1981 3.8 106.0 6.5 9.6

1982 3.7 109.6 8.4 6.5

1983 5.0 112.0 6.8 3.8

1984 8.5 118.0 16.9 3.8

1985 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.0

1986 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.6

1987 9.4 104.6 7.8 3.1

1988 4.4 105.4 5.5 3.3

1989 (Est.) 2.1 110.4 8.7 4.2

Source: A.M. Best Co.

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses

incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A

ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above

100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer

earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken

into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically

produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on

the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，比率在100

以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保

险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100

以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部份所产生的

盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107-111之间。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the

industry's incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in

years when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Actually,

over the last 25 years, incurred losses have grown at a still

faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags

that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the

industry's tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may

obscure their size for a time.

基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期

保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10%以

上，损失一定会增加，(事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11%的速度在成

长)，虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来。

Last year we said the climb in the combined ratio was

"almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for

at least two more years." This year we will not predict

acceleration, but otherwise must repeat last year's forecast.

Premium growth is running far below the 10% required annually.

Remember also that a 10% rate would only stabilize the combined

ratio, not bring it down.

去年我们曾说若综合比率八成会继续上升，甚至在未来两年内还会加速，今年我

们不再做加速的预期，不然的话还会再重复去年的预测，保费收入成长的幅度远

低于每年最低10%成长的要求，而且大家要记住，10%只表示能抑止综合比率

上升的情况，却不能使它下降。

The increase in the combined ratio in 1989 was a little more

than we had expected because catastrophes (led by Hurricane Hugo)

were unusually severe. These abnormalities probably accounted for

about two points of the increase. If 1990 is more of a "normal"

year, the combined ratio should rise only minimally from the

catastrophe-swollen base of 1989. In 1991, though, the ratio is

apt to climb by a greater degree.

1989年的综合比率增加的幅度略高于我们的预期，原因在于意外灾害(主要是

Hugo飓风)特别严重，这部份造成的影响大约占了2个百分点，假若1990年

能够回到正常情况，相较于1989年略微膨胀的基础，综合比率可能只会增加一

点点，然后到了1991年可能又会提高增加的幅度。

Commentators frequently discuss the "underwriting cycle" and

speculate about its next turn. If that term is used to connote

rhythmic qualities, it is in our view a misnomer that leads to

faulty thinking about the industry's fundamental economics.

产业评论家常常会讨论到承保循环并预测它下一次反转的时点，若那个名词是用

来暗示有节奏性的本质，则我们认为那他们就有点张冠李戴的把这个产业情况搞

错了。

The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry

and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel

fashion. At that time, the combined ratio fluctuated

rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags. First, data

from the past were analyzed and then used to set new "corrected"

rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all

insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then

issued for a one-to three-year term - which meant that it took a

considerable time for mispriced policies to expire - delayed the

impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made

combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile,

the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that

industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be

satisfactory.

这个名词在几十年前当产业界与政府单位通力合作维持一个类似卡特尔组织时

或许还适用，在那个年代，综合比率只因两个原因上下变动，两者都具有递延性，

第一是过去的信息会被分析然而据以订定新的费率，一体适用于所有的保险业者

之上；第二所有的保单通常是一次以三年为期，这代表着一张有问题的保单通常

要花三年才能解决，所以新费率的实施影响有其递延性，这两个因素使得综合比

率的变化有脉络可循，同时没有价格的竞争通常就保证可以有稳定的获利，意味

着整个循环下来可以获致满意的报酬。

The cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has

hundreds of participants selling a commodity-like product at

independently-established prices. Such a configuration - whether

the product being sold is steel or insurance policies - is

certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but

one: a shortage of usable capacity. Just how often these periods

occur and how long they last determines the average profitability

of the industry in question.

不过卡特尔的年代早已过去，现在的产业有几百家公司在销售同一种商品，价格

各自独立，在这种情况下，不管所卖的商品是钢铁或是保单，除了产能短缺的情

况之外，整体同业的获利一定很可怜，不过却须视所处产业的获利情况来决定短

缺情况的发生时点与期间长短。

In most industries, capacity is described in physical terms.

In the insurance world, however, capacity is customarily

described in financial terms; that is, it's considered

appropriate for a company to write no more than X dollars of

business if it has Y dollars of net worth. In practice, however,

constraints of this sort have proven ineffective. Regulators,

insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to discipline

companies that strain their resources. They also acquiesce when

companies grossly overstate their true capital. Hence, a company

can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it

is so inclined. At bottom, therefore, the amount of industry

capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental

state of insurance managers.

在大部分的产业，产能是以具体的事物来呈现，不过在保险的世界里，产能所代

表的却是指财务数字，亦即假设一家公司的净值有Y，那么他可以承接的保单大

概就只能有X，就实务而言，做这样的限制其实效果相当有限，主管机关、保险

掮客与客户对于其节制背后的保险公司的反应都很慢，而且就算真正的资本有被

夸大的情况，他们也给予姑息，因此一家资本额不大的保险公司若他们愿意，照

样可以接下一大堆保单，因此整个保险业的供给能量，主要还是视保险公司经理

人本身的心态而定。

All this understood, it is not very difficult to

prognosticate the industry's profits. Good profits will be

realized only when there is a shortage of capacity. Shortages

will occur only when insurers are frightened. That happens rarely

- and most assuredly is not happening now.

在了解内情之后，大家不难预知这个产业未来的获利情况，获利要好只有当供给

短缺时才有可能发生，而供给短缺只有当保险业者感到害怕时才有可能发生，而

偏偏这种情况又很少见，且可以确定短期之内不会出现。

Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes

recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's

catastrophes - Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake -

will cause prices to strengthen significantly. We disagree. These

adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write

business at present prices. Therefore, premium volume won't grow

by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend will

not reverse.

有些分析师认为最近刚实施的保险业新税法过于繁重，同时加上Hugo飓风与加

州的地震，将会是保险费率大幅提高，我们并不认同这样的看法，因为这些负面

的因素并不会迫使同业不以现在的价格接受保单，因此1990年的保费收入应该

无法成长10%以上，也就是说整体的承保绩效可能还会继续恶化。

The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to

achieve profitability matching that of the average American

business. Of course it does. So does the steel business. But

needs and desires have nothing to do with the long-term

profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals

determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will improve only

when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite

higher prices. And we're a long way from that point.

业者同时也会宣称保险业需要调高价格才能维持一般美国企业的获利水平，当然

事实确是如此，钢铁业也一样，但需要与想要与产业长期的获利并无绝对相关，

反而是经济实质现况才是决定结果的关键因素，保险业的获利要改进，只有靠所

有业者通力合作，除非价格合理否则就不接生意，但现在离那样的情况还很远。

Berkshire's premium volume may drop to $150 million or so in

1990 (from a high of $1 billion in 1986), partly because our

traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the

contract under which we received 7% of the business of Fireman's

Fund expired last August. Whatever the size of the drop, it will

not disturb us. We have no interest in writing insurance that

carries a mathematical expectation of loss; we experience enough

disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an

expectation of profit.

Berkshire 1990年的保费收入可能会降至1.5亿美元左右，(相较于1986年的

10亿美元高点)，一方面是因为我们传统的业务持续在萎缩，一方面是消防人员

退休基金这项业务在去年八月已到期，但不管业务量减少多少，一点都不影响我

们，我们完全没有兴趣去接那种一看就会赔钱的保单，光是那些看起来有赚头的

生意就够我们受的了。

However, our appetite for appropriately-priced business is

ample, as one tale from 1989 will tell. It concerns "CAT covers,"

which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance companies

(and also reinsurers themselves) buy to protect themselves

against a single catastrophe, such as a tornado or hurricane,

that produces losses from a large number of policies. In these

contracts, the primary insurer might retain the loss from a

single event up to a maximum of, say, $10 million, buying various

layers of reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the

retained amount, the reinsurer typically pays 95% of the excess

up to its contractual limit, with the primary insurer paying the

remainder. (By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5% of each

layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each

loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the

reinsurer's money.)

然而我们对于价格合理的生意胃口却很足够，1989年有一件事可以说明，那就

是CAT防护，也就是一般保险公司(也包含再保公司本身)都会向再保公司签约

买下再保合约，来免于承担像是龙卷风或是飓风等单一意外事件所可能引发钜额

损失的风险，在这些再保合约中，原始的保险公司可能会保留一个单一的损失上

限，例如1,000万美金，然后在此之上买进好几层的再保险，当损失超过自留

的部份时，再保公司依规定就要支付超过的部份，最高比例可达95%，(之所以

要求保险公司本身每层保留5%，是为了让保险公司与再保公司站在同一阵线，

避免保险公司慷再保公司之凯)。

CAT covers are usually one-year policies that also provide

for one automatic reinstatement, which requires a primary insurer

whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a

second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying

another premium. This provision protects the primary company from

being "bare" for even a brief period after a first catastrophic

event. The duration of "an event" is usually limited by contract

to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary company. Under

this definition, a wide-spread storm, causing damage for three

days, will be classified as a single event if it arises from a

single climatic cause. If the storm lasts four days, however, the

primary company will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive

hours during which it suffered the greatest damage. Losses that

occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a

separate event.

CAT防护的保单通常是一年期，一般可以自动延长一年，这样的条款主要是保

护保险公司避免因为重大灾害发生后，投保的空窗期，事件发生的持续期间通常

由合约限定在72小时以内，在这种定义之下，一场持续三天的大风暴所造成的

损害，可被归类为单一事件。要是大风暴持续四天以上，则保险公司可以切割出

其受害最惨重的72小时，超过的部份则必须视为另一个独立的事件。

In 1989, two unusual things happened. First, Hurricane Hugo

generated $4 billion or more of insured loss, at a pace, however,

that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly

more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the

Caribbean. Second, the California earthquake hit within weeks,

causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate, even well

after the event. Slammed by these two - or possibly three - major

catastrophes, some primary insurers, and also many reinsurers

that had themselves bought CAT protection, either used up their

automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had

done so.

1989年有两件特殊的事件发生，第一Hugo飓风造成40亿美元的损失，不过

之后不久72小时，又在加勒比海发生相同规模的灾害；第二加州大地震在几个

礼拜内又接连发生，造成难以估计的损失，受到这两个事件严重的打击，或者应

该说是三个，许多有买CAT防身的保险公司及再保公司，立刻使用第二次投保

权。

At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount

of money - perhaps twice because of the reinstatements - and not

taken in much in premiums. Depending upon many variables, a CAT

premium might generally have run 3% to 15% of the amount of

protection purchased. For some years, we've thought premiums of

that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business.

在当时许多卖CAT保单的业者亏了一屁股，尤其是第二次投保部份，根本收不

到足够的保费，由于有许多变量，保费通常会是在保额的3%到15%不等，有好

几年，我们认为这种保费收入并不合理，所以没有介入这个市场。

But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either

actually or possibly bare, and also left most CAT writers licking

their wounds, there was an immediate shortage after the

earthquake of much-needed catastrophe coverage. Prices instantly

became attractive, particularly for the reinsurance that CAT

writers themselves buy. Just as instantly, Berkshire Hathaway

offered to write up to $250 million of catastrophe coverage,

advertising that proposition in trade publications. Though we did

not write all the business we sought, we did in a busy ten days

book a substantial amount.

但是1989年的大灾害使得许多CAT业者穷于填补保险客户的伤口，使得地震

灾后保单供给发生短缺，保费价格很快地就回到相当吸引人的水准，尤其是再保

公司本身自己所买的保单，若有需要，Berkshire可以马上就签下2.5亿美元以

上的保单，虽然并不是所有上门的生意都接，但忙个十天下来所签的保单金额也

是相当可观。

Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a

loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer

in the world. There are, of course, companies that sometimes

write $250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage. But

they do so only when they can, in turn, reinsure a large

percentage of the business with other companies. When they can't

"lay off" in size, they disappear from the market.

世界上再没有其它再保公司会像我们一样，愿意一口气接受如此大金额的投保，

当然也有保险公司偶尔会愿意接下二亿五美金的灾害理赔保险，但是其提通常是

他们可以再向其它保险公司分保出去，当他们找不到分散风险的再保公司时，他

们会马上退出市场。

Berkshire's policy, conversely, is to retain the business we

write rather than lay it off. When rates carry an expectation of

profit, we want to assume as much risk as is prudent. And in our

case, that's a lot.

相反地Berkshire的政策则是保留大部分的保额而不是把他们给分配掉，当保险

费率看起来有利可图，我们很愿意承担更多的风险，以外界的标准而言，那应该

是个大数字。

We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account

than any other company because of two factors: (1) by the

standards of regulatory accounting, we have a net worth in our

insurance companies of about $6 billion - the second highest

amount in the United States; and (2) we simply don't care what

earnings we report quarterly, or even annually, just as long as

the decisions leading to those earnings (or losses) were reached

intelligently.

我们之所以愿意承担比一般保险公司更多的风险，主要有两个原因: (1)以会计原

则的规范标准，我们的保险公司净值高达60亿美金，位居全美第二(2)我们并不

在乎每季的短期盈余数字，就算是每年也无所谓，只要长期而言，这些决策是基

于稳健获利的立场所作的明智决定。

Obviously, if we write $250 million of catastrophe coverage

and retain it all ourselves, there is some probability that we

will lose the full $250 million in a single quarter. That

probability is low, but it is not zero. If we had a loss of that

magnitude, our after-tax cost would be about $165 million. Though

that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter, the

damage would be a blow only to our pride, not to our well-being.

很明显地如此我们接下二亿五的灾害保险，并自留大部分的保额，很有可能我们

会在一夕之间损失这二亿五，这种机率虽然很低，却并不表示没有可能，若真的

发生那样的损失，我们的税后损失大概会是1.65亿，相较于Berkshire每季所

赚的盈余来说，只能算是个小数字，虽然会我们会丢了面子，但还不至于失了里

子。

This posture is one few insurance managements will assume.

Typically, they are willing to write scads of business on terms

that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity. But they

do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing singlequarter

loss, even if the managerial strategy that causes the

loss promises, over time, to produce superior results. I can

understand their thinking: What is best for their owners is not

necessarily best for the managers. Fortunately Charlie and I have

both total job security and financial interests that are

identical with those of our shareholders. We are willing to look

foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly.

这种态度在保险业界来说实在是少之又少，通常一般的保险公司会愿意接下很多

的保单以确定公司每年可以获得一定的利益，但他们却不愿意公司在某一个单季

发生大额的损失，虽然这种短期损失可以获致更长远的利益；我想我能够体谅他

们的立场，对股东最有利的事并一定对经理人最好，很幸运的查理跟我的工作保

障与身家利益与所有的股东皆一致，我们愿意被人当作是傻子，只要我们自己知

道我们不是个傻子。

Our method of operation, incidentally, makes us a

stabilizing force in the industry. We add huge capacity when

capacity is short and we become less competitive only when

capacity is abundant. Of course, we don't follow this policy in

the interest of stabilization - we follow it because we believe

it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action.

Nevertheless, our behavior steadies the market. In this case,

Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised.

事实上我们这样的经营策略让我们成为市场上的稳定力量，当供给短缺时，我们

可以马上进场满足大家的需求，而当市场过于饱和时，我们又会立即退出市场观

望，当然我们这样的做法并不只是为了达到市场的稳定而已，我们之所以会这样

做是因为我们认为这样才是最合理、对大家最有利的做法，当然这样的做法间接

达到稳定市场的效果，也符合亚当．史密斯所提市场有一只看不见的手的说法。

Currently, we hold an exceptional amount of float compared

to premium volume. This circumstance should produce quite

favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as

it did in 1989. Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and

our investment income from policyholder funds large. This

pleasant situation, however, will gradually deteriorate as our

float runs off.

现阶段相较于保费收入，我们自留的大部分的浮存金，这样的情形应该可以让我

们往后几年的获利像1989年那样不错的结果，承保损失应该还可以接受，相较

之下我们靠投资所赚得的利益却更为惊人，只是这种好现象可能会随着浮存金的

流失而渐渐光芒不再。

At some point, however, there will be an opportunity for us

to write large amounts of profitable business. Mike Goldberg and

his management team of Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain,

Phil Urban, and Don Wurster continue to position us well for this

eventuality.

不过在其它方面，还是有机会能够让我们找到大额且有利可图的生意，Mike

Goldberg与其经营团队，长期而言可以为我们创造有利的地位。

Marketable Securities

有价证券投资

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance

companies, we generally choose among five major categories: (1)

long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed income

securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term

cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择(1)长期股票

投资(2)长期固定收益债券(3)中期固定收益债券(4)短期约当现金(5)短期套利交

易。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from

these categories; we just continuously search among them for the

highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical

expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment

alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to

do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal,

rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的

税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们自认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让

与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。

o Below we list our common stock holdings having a value

of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs

to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关

系企业所持有)。

12/31/89

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ......... .......... $ 517,500 $1,692,375

23,350,000 The Coca-Cola Co. ................. ........ 1,023,920 1,803,787

2,400,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor..... 71,729 161,100

6,850,000 GEICO Corp. .................. .. ... ........... 45,713 1,044,625

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ......... 9,731 486,366

This list of companies is the same as last year's and in

only one case has the number of shares changed: Our holdings of

Coca-Cola increased from 14,172,500 shares at the end of 1988 to

23,350,000.

表上的投资组合与去年几乎相同，只有一项投资的持股有变动，我们将可口可乐

的持股数由去年的1,417万股提高到今年的2,335万股。

This Coca-Cola investment provides yet another example of

the incredible speed with which your Chairman responds to

investment opportunities, no matter how obscure or well-disguised

they may be. I believe I had my first Coca-Cola in either 1935 or

1936. Of a certainty, it was in 1936 that I started buying Cokes

at the rate of six for 25 cents from Buffett & Son, the family

grocery store, to sell around the neighborhood for 5 cents each.

In this excursion into high-margin retailing, I duly observed

the extraordinary consumer attractiveness and commercial

possibilities of the product.

这次的可口可乐投资，提供了一个机会来证明你们的董事长快速反应投资机会，

不管这些机会是如何的不明确或是被隐藏，我记得我是在1935年或1936年第

一次喝到可口可乐的，不过可以确定的是，我从1936年开始以25分钱半打从

巴菲特兄弟杂货店批货后，在以每罐5分钱卖给邻居街坊，作为我个人从事高

毛利零售业的开端，我也深深观察到这项产品给消费者特殊的吸引力及背后所代

表庞大的商机。

I continued to note these qualities for the next 52 years as

Coke blanketed the world. During this period, however, I

carefully avoided buying even a single share, instead allocating

major portions of my net worth to street railway companies,

windmill manufacturers, anthracite producers, textile businesses,

trading-stamp issuers, and the like. (If you think I'm making

this up, I can supply the names.) Only in the summer of 1988 did

my brain finally establish contact with my eyes.

在往后的52年内当可口可乐席卷全世界的同时，我也持续地注意到这种特质，

然而在同一段期间，由于我个人过于小心谨慎以致于竟然连一股都没有买，反而

将大部分的个人资产投注在街车公司、纺织公司、煤炭公司与邮票公司之类的股

票之上，(如果你认为这是我编造的笑话，我可以再告诉大家确实的公司名称)，

终于到了1988年的夏天，我的大脑与眼睛完成了联机动作。

What I then perceived was both clear and fascinating. After

drifting somewhat in the 1970's, Coca-Cola had in 1981 become a

new company with the move of Roberto Goizueta to CEO. Roberto,

along with Don Keough, once my across-the-street neighbor in

Omaha, first rethought and focused the company's policies and

then energetically carried them out. What was already the world's

most ubiquitous product gained new momentum, with sales overseas

virtually exploding.

一时之间，我的观感与眼界大开，在1970年代一度委靡不振之后，可口可乐在

1981年新任总裁古崔塔的带领下，焕然一新，古崔塔加上Don Keough(曾经

是我在奥玛哈的对街邻居)，经过思考并厘清公司的政策后，切实地加以执行，

使得本来就已是全世界最独一无二的产品又平添新动力，尤其是来自海外的营收

更呈现爆炸性的成长。

Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial

skills, Roberto has maximized both the growth of his product and

the rewards that this growth brings to shareholders. Normally,

the CEO of a consumer products company, drawing on his natural

inclinations or experience, will cause either marketing or

finance to dominate the business at the expense of the other

discipline. With Roberto, the mesh of marketing and finance is

perfect and the result is a shareholder's dream.

利用其行销与财务方面的两把利刃，古崔塔将可口可乐产品的成长与股东的利益

极大化，通常一家消费性商品的CEO，基于个人过去的经验与个性，会偏向公

司的行销或财务任何一边，但是古崔塔却能够将两者调和到极致的境界，这样的

结果实在是股东们前世修来的好福气。

Of course, we should have started buying Coke much earlier,

soon after Roberto and Don began running things. In fact, if I

had been thinking straight I would have persuaded my grandfather

to sell the grocery store back in 1936 and put all of the

proceeds into Coca-Cola stock. I've learned my lesson: My

response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be

slashed to well under 50 years.

当然我们应该在古崔塔与Don开始接掌公司时，就早点买进该公司的股票，事

实上，要是我有足够的远见，早在1936年我就应该说服我爷爷干脆卖掉杂货

店，然后将钱全部用来买进可口可乐的股票，这次我终于学到了教训，不过照这

种情况看来，距离下一次我灵光一现的时间，可能要再等上个50年以上吧！

As I mentioned earlier, the yearend prices of our major

investees were much higher relative to their intrinsic values

than theretofore. While those prices may not yet cause

nosebleeds, they are clearly vulnerable to a general market

decline. A drop in their prices would not disturb us at all - it

might in fact work to our eventual benefit - but it would cause

at least a one-year reduction in Berkshire's net worth. We think

such a reduction is almost certain in at least one of the next

three years. Indeed, it would take only about a 10% year-to-year

decline in the aggregate value of our portfolio investments to

send Berkshire's net worth down.

就像是我上次所提到的，相较于过去，我们这些被投资公司的股价已高于其实质

价值，虽然目前以这种价位不会造成我们流鼻血，但难免会受到大盘波动的影响

，当然股价下挫一点都不会造成我们的困扰，甚至反而对我们有利，但不可避免

地可能会造成Berkshire年度净值的减少，只要在未来的两、三年间，我们的投

资组合市值平均每年减少10%，就有可能会发生这种状况。

We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our

portfolio companies. They are high-grade, talented, and

shareholder-oriented. The exceptional results we have achieved

while investing with them accurately reflect their exceptional

personal qualities.

我们持续受惠于这些被投资公司经理人，他们高品格、能力佳且设身处地为股东

着想，我们能够有这么好的投资绩效，可以说是完全仰赖这些经理人不凡的人格

特质。

o We told you last year that we expected to do little in

arbitrage during 1989, and that's the way it turned out.

Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short-term cash

equivalents, and during part of the year we held relatively low

levels of cash. In the rest of the year we had a fairly goodsized

cash position and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage.

The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic

sense to us; arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing

the greater-fool game. (As Wall Streeter Ray DeVoe says: "Fools

rush in where angels fear to trade.") We will engage in arbitrage

from time to time - sometimes on a large scale - but only when we

like the odds.

去年我曾向各位报告今年可能会减少在套利投资方面的活动，结果正是如此，套

利投资是短期资金的替代去处，有时我们手头上没有太多的现金，就算是有我们

也宁愿选择不参与套利，主要的原因是因为最近这些企业活动实在是没有太大的

经济意义，从事这类的套利交易就好象是在比谁比较笨，华尔街人士Ray DeVoe

所说天使回避但傻瓜趋之若骛，我们三不五时会从事大型的套利交易，但只有当

我们觉得胜算颇大时，才会考虑进场。

o Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in

the next section, we substantially reduced our holdings in both

medium- and long-term fixed-income securities. In the long-terms,

just about our only holdings have been Washington Public Power

Supply Systems (WPPSS) bonds carrying coupons ranging from low to

high. During the year we sold a number of the low-coupon issues,

which we originally bought at very large discounts. Many of these

issues had approximately doubled in price since we purchased them

and in addition had paid us 15%-17% annually, tax-free. Our

prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical highgrade

tax-exempts then commanded. We have kept all of our highcoupon

WPPSS issues. Some have been called for redemption in 1991

and 1992, and we expect the rest to be called in the early to

mid-1990s.

除了后面会提到的三项可转换特别股投资之外，我们大幅减少在中长期的固定收

益债券部位，尤其是长期部份，大概就只剩下华盛顿公用电力系统债券，去年我

们处分了部份当初以相当低折价买进的低收益债券，处分价格与一般信用评等佳

的债券差不多，是原始投资成本的一倍，外加每年15%到17%的免税利息，至

于高收益的债券则予以保留，有些即将在1991年或1992年到期，剩下的则会

在1990年中期到期赎回。

We also sold many of our medium-term tax-exempt bonds during

the year. When we bought these bonds we said we would be happy to

sell them - regardless of whether they were higher or lower than

at our time of purchase - if something we liked better came

along. Something did - and concurrently we unloaded most of these

issues at modest gains. Overall, our 1989 profit from the sale of

tax-exempt bonds was about $51 million pre-tax.

同时我们也卖了不少中期的免税债券，当初买下这些债券时就曾说过，只要时机

成熟找到更好的投资标的，我们会很高兴地把他们给处分掉，不管届时的价格是

高或是低于我们的投资成本，如今时机确实成熟了，所以我们便将大部分的债券

出清，所得的报酬还算不错，总结下来我们1989年从出售免税债券所获得的税

前收益大概在5,100万左右。

o The proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash

at the beginning of the year and that generated later through

earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred

stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we

purchased $600 million of The Gillette Co. preferred with an 8

3/4% dividend, a mandatory redemption in ten years, and the right

to convert into common at $50 per share. We next purchased $358

million of USAir Group, Inc. preferred stock with mandatory

redemption in ten years, a dividend of 9 1/4%, and the right to

convert into common at $60 per share. Finally, late in the year

we purchased $300 million of Champion International Corp.

preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years, a 9 1/4%

dividend, and the right to convert into common at $38 per share.

我们将出售债券所得的收入连同期初帐上的现金与年中所赚取的盈余，通通买进

三种可转换特别股，第一种是在7月我们投资6亿美金在吉列刮胡刀年利率8

又3/4%十年强制赎回的可转换特别股，转换价格订为50美元；之后我们又花

了3.58亿美金投资美国航空年利率9又1/4%十年强制赎回的可转换特别股，

转换价格订为60美元；最后我们在年底又以3亿美金投资冠军企业年利率9又

1/4%十年强制赎回的可转换特别股，转换价格订为38美元。

Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks, the issues we

own are either non-salable or non-convertible for considerable

periods of time and there is consequently no way we can gain from

short-term price blips in the common stock. I have gone on the

board of Gillette, but I am not on the board of USAir or

Champion. (I thoroughly enjoy the boards I am on, but can't

handle any more.)

不像一般的可转换特别股，这次我们所拥有的在限定时间内不得出售或转换的，

所以短期间我们要靠普通股反转而获利的机会不大，我并且已经加入吉列的董事

会，至于美国航空或是Champion公司则没有，(我很喜欢现有加入的董事会，

但可是由于分身乏术可能无法再加入其它公司的董事会)。

Gillette's business is very much the kind we like. Charlie

and I think we understand the company's economics and therefore

believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess about its

future. (If you haven't tried Gillette's new Sensor razor, go

right out and get one.) However, we have no ability to forecast

the economics of the investment banking business (in which we

have a position through our 1987 purchase of Salomon convertible

preferred), the airline industry, or the paper industry. This

does not mean that we predict a negative future for these

industries: we're agnostics, not atheists. Our lack of strong

convictions about these businesses, however, means that we must

structure our investments in them differently from what we do

when we invest in a business appearing to have splendid economic

characteristics.

吉列这家公司与我们喜爱的类型非常相近，查理跟我都熟悉这个产业的环境，因

此我们相信可以对这家公司的未来做一个合理的预估，(若是没有试过吉列新的

感应式刮胡刀，赶紧去买一个来试试！)，但是我们就没法子来预测投资银行业、

航空业或是造纸业的未来前景，(我们在1987年买下所罗门公司的可转换债

券) ，当然这并不表示他们的未来就是个负数，基本上我们是不可知论者，而不

是无神论者。所以由于我们在这些产业上缺乏强而有力的论点支持我们，因此我

们在这些产业上所采的投资方式就必须与那些显而易见的好公司好产业有所不

同。

In one major respect, however, these purchases are not

different: We only want to link up with people whom we like,

admire, and trust. John Gutfreund at Salomon, Colman Mockler, Jr.

at Gillette, Ed Colodny at USAir, and Andy Sigler at Champion

meet this test in spades.

不过在另一方面，有一点还是很重要，我们只跟我们喜欢、欣赏且信任的人打交

道，像是所罗门的John Gutfreund、吉列的Colman Mockler二世、美国航空

的Ed Colodny与Champion企业的Andy Sigler都算是符合我们的标准。

They in turn have demonstrated some confidence in us,

insisting in each case that our preferreds have unrestricted

voting rights on a fully-converted basis, an arrangement that is

far from standard in corporate finance. In effect they are

trusting us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow

instead of today, just as we are trusting them to be intelligent

managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.

同时他们对我们也相当的信任，坚持给我们无限制的转换权利，这在一般美国大

企业融资案里头并不多见，事实上他们相信我们是聪明的老板，看的是未来而不

是现在，就像我们相信他们是聪明的经理人一样，不但会看未来同时也会顾及现

在。

The preferred-stock structures we have negotiated will

provide a mediocre return for us if industry economics hinder the

performance of our investees, but will produce reasonably

attractive results for us if they can earn a return comparable to

that of American industry in general. We believe that Gillette,

under Colman's management, will far exceed that return and

believe that John, Ed, and Andy will reach it unless industry

conditions are harsh.

这种可转换特别股的投资方式可以确保即便是我们的被投资公司面临产业前景

不佳的环境时，仍能确保我们可以得到稳定的收益，同时若被投资公司表现不错

时，我们又可以获得比投资一般美国企业更好的报酬，我们相信吉列在Colman

的领导之下，一定会有不错的表现，另外John与Andy即使是面临产业不佳的

前景，应该也不会让我们失望。

Under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to

return us our money plus dividends. If that is all we get,

though, the result will be disappointing, because we will have

given up flexibility and consequently will have missed some

significant opportunities that are bound to present themselves

during the decade. Under that scenario, we will have obtained

only a preferred-stock yield during a period when the typical

preferred stock will have held no appeal for us whatsoever. The

only way Berkshire can achieve satisfactory results from its four

preferred issues is to have the common stocks of the investee

companies do well.

不管在任何情况之下，我们预期这些可转换特别股都可以让我们收回本金加上股

利无虞，然而若是我们真的只能收回这些，那么这样的结果毋宁是相当令我们失

望的，因为我们必须被迫牺牲流动性，这友可能让我们在往后的十年内错失更好

的投资机会，在这种情况下，我们就只能获得一般特别股所能获得的利益，而后

者却是我们根本就不会想要去投资的，所以唯一对Berkshire最有益处的是我们

的被投资公司本身的普通股也能有优异的表现。

Good management and at least tolerable industry conditions

will be needed if that is to happen. But we believe Berkshire's

investment will also help and that the other shareholders of each

investee will profit over the years ahead from our preferred

stock purchase. The help will come from the fact that each

company now has a major, stable, and interested shareholder whose

Chairman and Vice Chairman have, through Berkshire's investments,

indirectly committed a very large amount of their own money to

these undertakings. In dealing with our investees, Charlie and I

will be supportive, analytical, and objective. We recognize that

we are working with experienced CEOs who are very much in command

of their own businesses but who nevertheless, at certain moments,

appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone without

ties to their industry or to decisions of the past.

这需要靠好的经营团队再加上可以忍受的产业环境，不过我们相信Berkshire本

身对这四家公司的资金挹注，也能够对这些公司与其股东的长远利益有所帮助，

这是由于他们可以确信现在这些公司的背后有一个稳定又关心公司的大股东在

默默地支持他们，再与我们被投资公司相处时，我们通常会采取支持、客观并给

予分析建议的态度，我们了解这些公司的CEO对于其所处的产业都相当的清

楚，但我想他们应该有会很珍惜我们这些与产业背景完全不相关的客观人士所给

他们的经验交流。

As a group, these convertible preferreds will not produce

the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful

economic prospects that is unappreciated by the market. Nor will

the returns be as attractive as those produced when we make our

favorite form of capital deployment, the acquisition of 80% or

more of a fine business with a fine management. But both

opportunities are rare, particularly in a size befitting our

present and anticipated resources.

这些可转换特别股的报酬当然比不上那些具有经济优势却还没被市场发现的好

股票，或许也比不上那些我们可以买下80%以上股权的优良企业购并案，但大

家要知道后面这两种投资机会相当的稀少，实在是可遇不可求，尤其是以我们现

在的资金规模，实在是很难找的到适合的投资标的。

In summation, Charlie and I feel that our preferred stock

investments should produce returns moderately above those

achieved by most fixed-income portfolios and that we can play a

minor but enjoyable and constructive role in the investee

companies.

总而言之，查理跟我认为这类的可转换特别股投资应该可以让我们获得比一般固

定收益债券更好的投资利益，同时我们也可以在这些被投资公司扮演好具建设性

的少数关键角色。

Zero-Coupon Securities

零息债券

In September, Berkshire issued $902.6 million principal

amount of Zero-Coupon Convertible Subordinated Debentures, which

are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Salomon Brothers

handled the underwriting in superb fashion, providing us helpful

advice and a flawless execution.

去年九月，Berkshire发行了9亿美元的零息可转换次顺位债券，目前并已在纽

约证券交易所挂牌交易，由所罗门公司负责本次的债券承销工作，提供了我们宝

贵的建议与完美无缺的执行结果。

Most bonds, of course, require regular payments of interest,

usually semi-annually. A zero-coupon bond, conversely, requires

no current interest payments; instead, the investor receives his

yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from

maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the

original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of time

between issuance and maturity.

大部分的债券当然需要按时支付利息，通常是每半年一次，但是零息债券却不须

要马上支付利息，而是由投资人在以相当大的折价幅度在取得债券时预先扣除，

实质的利率则取决于发行的债券价格、到期面值与发行时间的长短而定。

In our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity

value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the

bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% current

payment compounded semi-annually. Because we received only

44.31 cents on the dollar, our proceeds from this offering were

$400 million (less about $9.5 million of offering expenses).

以我们这次发行的债券来说，发行价是面额的44.314%，十五年到期，对于买

下这次债券的投资人，约可获得相当于5.5%的年报酬率，因为我们只拿到44.31

每分，所以这次扣除950万美元的发行费用，我们实得的款项是4亿美元。

The bonds were issued in denominations of $10,000 and each

bond is convertible into .4515 shares of Berkshire Hathaway.

Because a $10,000 bond cost $4,431, this means that the

conversion price was $9,815 per Berkshire share, a 15% premium to

the market price then existing. Berkshire can call the bonds at

any time after September 28, 1992 at their accreted value (the

original issue price plus 5.5% compounded semi-annually) and on

two specified days, September 28 of 1994 and 1999, the

bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their

accreted value.

这次发行的债券面额是10,000美元，每张债券可以申请转换为0.4515股的

Berkshire股份，因为每张债券的发行价大约是4,431美元，所以代表转换为

Berkshire的价格大概是9,815美元，约为现在市价15%的溢价，同时Berkshire

有权在1992年9月28日以后加计利息(5.5%的年利率)赎回这些债券，至于债

券持有人也有权在1994年与1999年的9月28日要求公司加计利息买回其所

持有的债券。

For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5%

interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to

the bondholders. Thus the net effect to us, resulting from the

reduced taxes, is positive cash flow. That is a very significant

benefit. Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating

our exact effective rate of interest, but under all circumstances

it will be well below 5.5%. There is meanwhile a symmetry to the

tax law: Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year

on the 5.5% interest, even though he receives no cash.

就税负的观点而言，虽然没有马上支付利息，但Berkshire每年仍可享受5.5%

利息支出的所得税扣抵，由于减少了税负支出，所以就现金流量的角度而言，我

们每年还有现金净流入，这是一项不错的好处，当然一些不可知的变处，使我们

无法确定这次发行真正的资金成本，但不管怎样，应该都低于5.5%，而相对的

债券持有人每年还是要支付5.5%的利息所得税，虽然他们根本没有收到任何的

现金利息收入。

Neither our bonds nor those of certain other companies that

issued similar bonds last year (notably Loews and Motorola)

resemble the great bulk of zero-coupon bonds that have been

issued in recent years. Of these, Charlie and I have been, and

will continue to be, outspoken critics. As I will later explain,

such bonds have often been used in the most deceptive of ways and

with deadly consequences to investors. But before we tackle that

subject, let's travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple had

not yet been bitten.

去年我们与其它公司所发行的类似债券(尤其是Loews与摩托罗拉公司)，与这

几年盛行的零息债券有相当大的差异，对于后者，查理跟我一直有相当的意见，

后面我会再详加说明，我们认为这些债券隐藏着欺骗行为，对买下他们的投资人

有相当不利的影响，不过在谈论这个话题之前，让我们回溯时光到亚当还未引诱

夏娃啃下苹果之前的时代。

If you're my age you bought your first zero-coupon bonds

during World War II, by purchasing the famous Series E U. S.

Savings Bond, the most widely-sold bond issue in history. (After

the war, these bonds were held by one out of two U. S.

households.) Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero-coupon

bond, a term in fact that I doubt had been invented. But that's

precisely what the Series E was.

如果你像我这样的年纪曾在二次世界大战期间第一次买进最有名的E系列美国

储蓄零息债券，(这种广为流传的债券几乎每两个家庭最会有人持有)，当然在当

时没有人会把它当作是零息债券的一种，因为这名词根本就还未出现，但基本上

它就是一种零息债券。

These bonds came in denominations as small as $18.75. That

amount purchased a $25 obligation of the United States government

due in 10 years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual

return of 2.9%. At the time, this was an attractive offer: the

2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on Government

bonds and the holder faced no market-fluctuation risk, since he

could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction

in interest.

这种债券的面额最小的只有18.75美元，买下10年后美国政府必须偿还25美

元，投资人大概可以获得2.9%的年投资报酬率，在当时这是相当不错的一项投

资，2.9%的年利率远高于普通的政府债券利率，且持有人不必担心利率波动的

风险，而且他可以随时予以变现，利息不会被打折太多。

A second form of zero-coupon U. S. Treasury issue, also

benign and useful, surfaced in the last decade. One problem with

a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate -

say 10% - the holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10%

return will be realized. For that rate to materialize, each semiannual

coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is received. If

current interest rates are, say, only 6% or 7% when these coupons

come due, the holder will be unable to compound his money over

the life of the bond at the advertised rate. For pension funds or

other investors with long-term liabilities, "reinvestment risk"

of this type can be a serious problem. Savings Bonds might have

solved it, except that they are issued only to individuals and

are unavailable in large denominations. What big buyers needed

was huge quantities of "Savings Bond Equivalents."

第二种形式的美国国库零息债券出现在十几年前，也相当的不错，一般的债券有

一个很大的问题，那就是虽然它的票面是10%，但持有人却不一定能够保证就

能得到10%的报酬率，因为要能获得10%的话就必须所收到的10%利息收入也

能再运用投资也能得到10%以上才行，若是所得的利息之后只能得到6%或7%

的报酬，则最后结算的报酬率可能没有办法达到10%的预定利率，这对于退休

基金或是其它具有长期负债的投资者来说，再投资所可能遇到的风险可能是一个

很严重的问题，储蓄债券则可以解决这样的问题，只可惜它只能发行给个人而且

面额都不大，对于大买家来说，它们需要的是类似这种储蓄债券的替代品。

Enter some ingenious and, in this case, highly useful

investment bankers (led, I'm happy to say, by Salomon Brothers).

They created the instrument desired by "stripping" the semiannual

coupons from standard Government issues. Each coupon, once

detached, takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond

since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future. For

example, if you strip the 40 semi-annual coupons from a U. S.

Government Bond due in the year 2010, you will have 40 zerocoupon

bonds, with maturities from six months to 20 years, each

of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity

and marketed. If current interest rates are, say, 10% for all

maturities, the six-month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity

value and the 20-year issue will sell for 14.20%. The purchaser

of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a compounded rate of 10%

for his entire holding period. Stripping of government bonds has

occurred on a large scale in recent years, as long-term

investors, ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts,

recognized these high-grade, zero-coupon issues to be well suited

to their needs.

这时创意十足的银行家就适时出现了，(我很高兴的向各位报告那就是所罗门兄

弟公司)，它们从标准的政府债券中，分拆出大家所想要的零息债券，每一张债

券都跟储蓄债券一样，在未来的某一天到期后可以拿回完整的一笔钱，举例来说

如果你可以将20年期每半年付息的债券，分拆成40张到期日分别为半年到20

年不等的零息债券，之后再将到期日相同的债券并起来对外出售，假设现行的殖

利率为10%，半年期的价格大概是95.24%，20年期的则只有14.20%，如此

一来所有购买这种债券的投资者就可以明确的确保它可以获得的报酬率，分拆债

券这几年因符合长期的退休基金与个人的IRA帐户投资者需求，广受欢迎而大

量流行。

But as happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise

do in the beginning, fools do in the end. In the last few years

zero-coupon bonds (and their functional equivalent, pay-in-kind

bonds, which distribute additional PIK bonds semi-annually as

interest instead of paying cash) have been issued in enormous

quantities by ever-junkier credits. To these issuers, zero (or

PIK) bonds offer one overwhelming advantage: It is impossible to

default on a promise to pay nothing. Indeed, if LDC governments

had issued no debt in the 1970's other than long-term zero-coupon

obligations, they would now have a spotless record as debtors.

但就像是华尔街经常会发生的，不管什么好东西到最后都会变质，最近几年来零

息债券(以及功能类似的pay-in-kind债券，只发放PIK债券取代现金)，有一大

部份是垃圾债券等级，对这些发行公司来说，零息债券有一个很大的好处，因为

在发行后直到到期日前根本就不必付出任何资金所以根本就不有无法偿付的情

况，事实上，LDC政府在1970年后除了长期零息债券之外就没有发行过其它

债券，所以就一个债务人来说，它们到现在还拥有完美无暇的记录。

This principle at work - that you need not default for a

long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time

- has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking

to finance ever-shakier deals. But its acceptance by lenders took

a while: When the leveraged buy-out craze began some years back,

purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis, in

which conservatively-estimated free cash flow - that is,

operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less

normalized capital expenditures - was adequate to cover both

interest and modest reductions in debt.

这原则实在是管用，你大可以正经八百的说你一定不会还不出钱，原因是因为你

有好长一段时间可以不必支付一毛钱，直到支持者与投资银行家再发明出更刺激

的融资方式之前，不过债权人也要花好长一段时间才能支持这种做法，当融资购

并热开始风行的几年之前，投资者只能借到一点钱，因为债权人会保守地估计其

未来的现金流量，亦即营业收益加计折旧与摊销再扣除资本支出，必须要能够确

保未来的利息支出与本金的支付。

Later, as the adrenalin of deal-makers surged, businesses

began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow

necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest. That

left nothing for the paydown of debt. In effect, a Scarlett

O'Hara "I'll think about it tomorrow" position in respect to

principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a new

breed of lender, the buyer of original-issue junk bonds. Debt now

became something to be refinanced rather than repaid. The change

brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful

borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank's lending officer

and gushes: "I don't know how I'll ever repay you."

之后随着肾上腺素升高，买价持续飙高使得所有的预估现金流量都必须被分配用

来支付利息，至于本金的部份根本就不在预计偿付范围之内，接着贷款者对于本

金偿还的态度就变得像乱世佳人中的郝思佳一样，「管他的，明天再说吧！」，

而更离谱的是偏偏就有借钱者愿意吃这一套，那就是专门买垃圾债券的投资者，

债务从此以后只要再融资即可，根本就不用考虑要偿还，这种心态的转变在纽约

客卡通中描写的罪贴切，一个贷款人痛哭零涕地握着银行员的手说到，「我实在

不知道该如何”偿还”你对我的恩情。」

Soon borrowers found even the new, lax standards intolerably

binding. To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions,

they introduced an abomination, EBDIT - Earnings Before

Depreciation, Interest and Taxes - as the test of a company's

ability to pay interest. Using this sawed-off yardstick, the

borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it

did not require a current cash outlay.

很快的其它借款人又找到更新、更宽松的约束方式，为了拐骗金主借钱来从事更

离谱的交易，这群人又引进了一个新名词叫做扣除折旧、利息与税负前的盈余

EBDIT，来衡量一家公司偿债的能力，利用这种较低的标准，借款人故意忽略了

折旧也是一种费用，虽然它不会马上有现金的支出。

Such an attitude is clearly delusional. At 95% of American

businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly

approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as

real an expense as labor or utility costs. Even a high school

dropout knows that to finance a car he must have income that

covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also

realistically-calculated depreciation. He would be laughed out of

the bank if he started talking about EBDIT.

这样的态度摆明了就是掩耳盗铃，95%的美国企业，长期而言其资本支出大概与

平时提列的累积折旧费用相当，所花的每一分钱都与日常的劳工薪资或水电成本

一样实在，即使是中学的中辍生也知道养一台车子不只是要负担利息与日常油钱

保养费用而已，还必须精确地考量到每月实际摊销的折旧，若是他跑到银行摆出

EBDIT这一套说法，保证一下子就会被轰出来。

Capital outlays at a business can be skipped, of course, in

any given month, just as a human can skip a day or even a week of

eating. But if the skipping becomes routine and is not made up,

the body weakens and eventually dies. Furthermore, a start-andstop

feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy

organism, human or corporate, than that produced by a steady

diet. As businessmen, Charlie and I relish having competitors who

are unable to fund capital expenditures.

在企业资本支出当然可以暂时不去考虑，就像是一个人可以一天或甚至一个礼拜

不吃东西，但若是这种情况便做是一种坏习惯的话，身体很快就会发生不适的状

况，甚至有死亡的危险，更甚者，有一餐没一餐的做法比起稳定的进食习惯，更

可能使得一个健康的人身体机能变差，不管是人体或是企业都是如此，身为一个

生意人，查理跟我对于竞争对手可能没有资金进行资本支出来感到欣喜。

You might think that waving away a major expense such as

depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a

good one hits the limits of Wall Street's ingenuity. If so, you

haven't been paying attention during the past few years.

Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier

acquisitions. Otherwise, they risked - heaven forbid! - losing

deals to other promoters with more "imagination."

或许你会认为排除一项主要的费用诸如折旧等使得原本一桩很烂的交易变成不

错的交易，是华尔街聪明才智极致的表现，，那你可能是完全没有注意到华尔街

过去几年的发展，支持者必须再找到一个更有看头的做法，来合理解释价格更离

谱的购并案，不然的话，他们就必须冒犯最严重的天条-被其它更有”创意”的支

持者把生意抢走。

So, stepping through the Looking Glass, promoters and their

investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured

against cash interest only, which meant that interest accruing on

zero-coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the financial

feasibility of a transaction was being assessed. This approach

not only relegated depreciation expense to the let's-ignore-it

corner, but gave similar treatment to what was usually a

significant portion of interest expense. To their shame, many

professional investment managers went along with this nonsense,

though they usually were careful to do so only with clients'

money, not their own. (Calling these managers "professionals" is

actually too kind; they should be designated "promotees.")

所以穿过外面的那道玻璃，支持者与其投资银行宣称EBDIT应该可以只跟要付

的利息做比较就好，意思是说在评估一项投资案的时候，那些记帐不须马上支付

的利息根本就可以不必纳入考量，这样的方式不但是把折旧丢到没人注意的角落

边，还将大部分的利息费用用同样的方式对待，可耻的是，许多专业投资银行家

竟然昧着良心附和，反正只要确定这是客户而不是他们自己的钱就好，(称呼这

群人为专业人士实在是太恭维他们了，他们应该被归类为抬轿者)。

Under this new standard, a business earning, say, $100

million pre-tax and having debt on which $90 million of interest

must be paid currently, might use a zero-coupon or PIK issue to

incur another $60 million of annual interest that would accrue

and compound but not come due for some years. The rate on these

issues would typically be very high, which means that the

situation in year 2 might be $90 million cash interest plus $69

million accrued interest, and so on as the compounding proceeds.

Such high-rate reborrowing schemes, which a few years ago were

appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon became models of

modern finance at virtually all major investment banking houses.

在这种新的标准之下，一家公司假设税前有1亿美元的获利，同时最近一年有9

千万的利息支出，大可以运用零息债券或是PIK债券来额外负担6千万只要记

帐却不须马上支付利息与本金，而这种债券的利率通常非常高，到了第二年，公

司可能要承担9千万的付现息与6,900万的记帐息，之后随着复利记帐息持续

增加，而这种高利率的融资计画，在刚开始几年还能获得有效控制，但不久之后

就变成所有大型投资银行必备推荐给客户的标准融资工具。

When they make these offerings, investment bankers display

their humorous side: They dispense income and balance sheet

projections extending five or more years into the future for

companies they barely had heard of a few months earlier. If you

are shown such schedules, I suggest that you join in the fun:

Ask the investment banker for the one-year budgets that his own

firm prepared as the last few years began and then compare these

with what actually happened.

当他们推出这样的新案子时，投资银行展现他们幽默的一面，他们将损益表与资

产负债表的预估展延为五年或甚至更长的一段期间，虽然在几个月之前，他们可

能连这家公司的名字都没听过，我想如果你那天碰到这种预估表，我建议你可以

参与这样的游戏：跟这位投资银行家要一份他们自己公司的过去几年的年度预

算，然后跟他们实际的结果必较一下，你就知道是什么回事了。

Some time ago Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful

The Great Crash, coined a new economic term: "the bezzle,"

defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement. This

financial creature has a magical quality: The embezzlers are richer

by the amount of the bezzle, while the embezzlees do not yet feel

poorer.

许久以前Ken Galbraith在他的名著「大恐慌」中，发明了一个新的经济名词

-Bezzle，用来代表现有未被发现的贪污舞弊，这种财经现象有一个很奇特的特

质，那就是贪污舞弊者因为贪污舞弊而发大财，但问题是受害者却一点也没有被

剥夺变穷的感觉。

Professor Galbraith astutely pointed out that this sum

should be added to the National Wealth so that we might know the

Psychic National Wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel

enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to

embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, "wealth"

would balloon though not an erg of productive work had been done.

Galbraith教授真知卓见地点出大家应该把这个数字统计一下，加进国民财富当

中，从而我们可以知道心理上的国民财富为多少，理论上一个社会若想要觉得自

己经济繁荣发展就应该多多鼓励人民去贪污舞弊，并试着不要去揭发它，透过这

种方式，一个国家的财富可以大幅地增长，虽然实际上它什么有生产力的事都没

做。

The satirical nonsense of the bezzle is dwarfed by the realworld

nonsense of the zero-coupon bond. With zeros, one party to

a contract can experience "income" without his opposite

experiencing the pain of expenditure. In our illustration, a

company capable of earning only $100 million dollars annually -

and therefore capable of paying only that much in interest -

magically creates "earnings" for bondholders of $150 million. As

long as major investors willingly don their Peter Pan wings and

repeatedly say "I believe," there is no limit to how much

"income" can be created by the zero-coupon bond.

但是这种不合理的贪污舞弊，在现实社会中却被零息债券给比了下去，利用这些”

零”一家公司可以大大方方靠着这纸签约，利用借款享受所带来的收入，但另外

一方面却不知承担支付支出的痛苦，以我们先前提到的例子，一家每年可以赚1

亿美元的公司，利用这种方法，在债券投资人的面前，却可以把膨胀到1亿5,000

万美元，只要投资人愿意充当彼得潘，不断地说「我相信你」，只要你愿意零息

债券所创造的收入是没有上限的。

Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm

less-enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the plow.

Here, finally, was an instrument that would let the Street make

deals at prices no longer limited by actual earning power. The

result, obviously, would be more transactions: Silly prices will

always attract sellers. And, as Jesse Unruh might have put it,

transactions are the mother's milk of finance.

华尔街以热情拥抱这项新的发明，后知后觉的人可能就准备等着卷铺盖走路，终

于在这里大家找到一个可以不必理会公司实际获利能力的融资方法，结果很明

显，当然就会有更多的生意上门，离谱的价格一定有卖家愿意出，就像Jesse

Unruh可能会说的一句话，交易就像是金融世界的母奶。

The zero-coupon or PIK bond possesses one additional

attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that

the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched out.

This is no small benefit. If the period before all costs must be

faced is long, promoters can create a string of foolish deals -

and take in lots of fees - before any chickens come home to roost

from their earlier ventures.

此外零息与PIK债券还有一项特点使得支持者与银行家更愿意推行，就是东窗事

发的时间可以再延长，这点可是相当的重要，如果交易所衍生的后果要很长一段

时间才会浮现，那么支持者就可以在这段期间做更多的交易，从中赚取更多的手

续费，直到事件东窗事发之前。

But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or

financial, fails. A base business can not be transformed into a

golden business by tricks of accounting or capital structure. The

man claiming to be a financial alchemist may become rich. But

gullible investors rather than business achievements will usually

be the source of his wealth.

不过到最后，炼金术，不管是冶金的或是财务上的，终究是会落空，一个烂公司

不可能只靠着会计或财务技巧而摇身一变成为好公司，那个宣称会炼金术的财务

专业人士或许会发大财，但他靠的却是容易上当的投资人而不是企业经营。

Whatever their weaknesses, we should add, many zero-coupon

and PIK bonds will not default. We have in fact owned some and

may buy more if their market becomes sufficiently distressed.

(We've not, however, even considered buying a new issue from a

weak credit.) No financial instrument is evil per se; it's just

that some variations have far more potential for mischief than

others.

不过这些债券有多少缺点，但我们却必须承认许多零息与PIK债券应该不会还不

出钱来，事实上我们自己也投资了一些，而且若是债券市场情况再变差一点，我

们可能还会买的更多，(当然我们从来就不会考虑去买那些新发行债信又差的垃

圾债券)，就本质而言，没有一项财务工具是不对的，只是有一些含有相当高程

度的可能伤害在里面。

The blue ribbon for mischief-making should go to the zerocoupon

issuer unable to make its interest payments on a current

basis. Our advice: Whenever an investment banker starts talking

about EBDIT - or whenever someone creates a capital structure

that does not allow all interest, both payable and accrued, to be

comfortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital

expenditures - zip up your wallet. Turn the tables by suggesting

that the promoter and his high-priced entourage accept zerocoupon

fees, deferring their take until the zero-coupon bonds

have been paid in full. See then how much enthusiasm for the deal

endures.

所有的罪过应该归咎于债券发行者没有办法在现在就立即支付利息，我们的建议

是当任何投资银行家在开始提到EBDIT之前，或是任何人在对你提议一项可以

不必支付任何利息的金融工具时，为了你自己的现金流量着想，赶快把你的荷包

看紧，换个角度建议这些推销者是否也能接受等这些零息债券真正偿还本金之

后，再缴交手续费，看看这些人的热情还能支撑多久。

Our comments about investment bankers may seem harsh. But

Charlie and I - in our hopelessly old-fashioned way - believe

that they should perform a gatekeeping role, guarding investors

against the promoter's propensity to indulge in excess.

Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercised the same

judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have

exercised in accepting liquor. At a minimum, therefore, the

banker's conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender

who, when necessary, refuses the profit from the next drink to

avoid sending a drunk out on the highway. In recent years,

unfortunately, many leading investment firms have found bartender

morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard. Lately, those

who have traveled the high road in Wall Street have not

encountered heavy traffic.

我们对于这些投资银行家的批判或许是激烈了一点，但查理跟我以我们这种无可

救药的保守作风，相信他们确实应该要做好把关的工作，保护投资人免于这些推

销者过度的引诱，因为推销者对于佣金的饥渴就像是酗酒者对于酒精的沉溺一

样，最低限度，投资银行家也要肩负起吧台调酒师的角色，必要的时候，就算少

赚一杯酒钱，也要劝客户少喝一点，不幸的是最近几年来，许多大型的投资银行

都认为这样的基本道德规范是一项很严重的限制，因为其它很多大胆的业者，可

以更自由的大行其道。

One distressing footnote: The cost of the zero-coupon folly

will not be borne solely by the direct participants. Certain

savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds,

using cash that came from FSLIC-insured deposits. Straining to

show splendid earnings, these buyers recorded - but did not

receive - ultra-high interest income on these issues. Many of

these associations are now in major trouble. Had their loans to

shaky credits worked, the owners of the associations would have

pocketed the profits. In the many cases in which the loans will

fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill. To paraphrase Jackie

Mason, at these associations it was the managers who should have

been wearing the ski masks.

最后还有一个令人不平的附带说明，零息债券的代价并不只由直接参与者自己承

担而已，一些储贷机构由于是这些垃圾债券的大买家，利用由联邦政府所保险的

人民储蓄存款来投资，为了尽量美化帐面盈余数字，这些单位将这些即使还没有

收到的超高利息收入全部认列，许多储贷机构现在却因此面临严重的问题，若是

他们那些债信不佳的债务人付出本金，当然状况就可以顺利解决，但问题是通常

他们都付不出本金，到最后还是必须由整体纳税义务人来买单，套句Jackie

Mason的话，应该是由这些储贷机构的经理人来戴区棍球面罩。

Mistakes of the First Twenty-five Years (A Condensed Version)

头25年所犯的错误(浓缩版)

To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy

fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before

lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience.

Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before

committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25

years.

套用Robert Benchley的名言：「要一只狗教小孩子忠诚、忍耐，并此能够滚

三圈再在地上躺好」，这就是经验传承的难处，不过不论如何，再犯下一错误之

前，最好能够先反省一下以前的那些错误，所以让我们花点时间回顾一下过去

25年的经验。

o My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of

Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing -

to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked

cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably

rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came

along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not

ideal.

首先我所犯的第一个错误，当然就是买下Berkshire纺织的控制权，虽然我很清

楚纺织这个产业没什么前景，却因为它的价格实在很便宜而受其所引诱，虽然在

早期投资这样的股票确实让我获利颇丰，但在1965年投资Berkshire后，我就

开始发现这终究不是个理想的投资模式。

If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will

usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives

you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the longterm

performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the

"cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the

street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a

smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.

如果你以很低的价格买进一家公司的股票，应该很容易有机会以不错的获利出脱

了结，虽然长期而言这家公司的经营结果可能很糟糕，我将这种投资方法称之为

「烟屁股」投资法，在路边随地可见的香烟头捡起来可能让你吸一口，解一解烟

瘾，但对于隐君子来说，也不过是举手之劳而已。

Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying

businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price

probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a

difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another

surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen.

Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded

by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you

buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for

$10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a

high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business

is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has

annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time

is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the

mediocre.

不过除非你是清算专家，否则买下这类公司实在是属于傻瓜行径，第一长期而

言，原来看起来划算的价格到最后可能一点都不值得，在经营艰困的企业中，通

常一个问题才刚解决不久，另外一个问题就又接踵而来，厨房里的蟑螂绝对不会

只有你看到的那一只而已，第二先前的价差优势很快地就会被企业不佳的绩效所

侵蚀，例如你用800万美元买下一家清算价值达1,000万美元的公司，若你能

马上把这家公司给处理掉，不管是出售或是清算都好，换算下来你的报酬可能会

很可观，但是若这家公司要花上你十年的时间才有办法把它给处理掉，而在这之

前你只能拿回一点点可怜的股利的话，相信我时间虽然是好公司的朋友，但却是

烂公司最大的敌人。

You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to

learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times

over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore

department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company

called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I

bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were

first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real

estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could

I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the

business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate

marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the

husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best

Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."

或许你会认为这道理再简单不过了，不过我却必须经历惨痛的教训才真正的搞

懂，在买下Berkshire不久之后，我又买了巴尔的摩百货公司、Hochschild Kohn

与一家叫多元零售公司(后来与Berkshire合并)，我以相当的折价幅度买下这些

公司，经营的人也属一流，整个交易甚至还有额外的利益，包含未实现的房地产

增值利益与后进先出法的存货会计原则，我到底还漏掉了什么? 还好三年之后，

算我走狗运，能够以成本价左右的价格脱身，在跟Hochschild Kohn公司结束

关系之后，我只有一个感想，就像一首乡村歌曲的歌词所述的，「我的老婆跟我

最要好的朋友跑了，我是多么地怀念他!」

I could give you other personal examples of "bargainpurchase"

folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far

better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair

company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I

was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common

stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by firstclass

managements.

我可以给各位另外一个个人经验，以合理的价格买下一家好公司要比用便宜的价

格买下一家普通的公司来的好的多，像查理老早就明白这个道理，我的反应则比

较慢，不过现在当我们投资公司或股票时，我们不但选择最好的公司，同时这些

公司还要有好的经理人。

o That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will

do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both

Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and

honest people running them. The same managers employed in a

business with good economic characteristics would have achieved

fine records. But they were never going to make any progress

while running in quicksand.

从这里我们又学到了一课，好的马还要搭配好骑师才能有好成绩，像Berkshire

纺织与Hochschild, Kohn也都有才能兼具的人在管理，很不幸的他们所面临的

是流沙般的困境，若能将这些人摆在体质更好的公司相信他们应该会有更好的成

绩。

I've said many times that when a management with a

reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation

for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that

remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in

creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae

West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."

我曾说过好几次，当一个绩效卓著的经理人遇到一家恶名昭彰的企业，通常会是

后者占上风，但愿我再也没有那么多精力来创造新的例子，我以前的行为就像是

Mae West曾说的︰「曾经我是个白雪公主，不过如今我已不再清白。」

o A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of

buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and

I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What

we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been

successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot

hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired

any ability to clear seven-footers.

另外还学到一个教训，在经历25年企业管理与经营各种不同事业的岁月之后，

查理跟我还是没能学会如此去解决难题，不过我们倒学会如何去避免他们，在这

点我们倒做的相当成功，我们专挑那种一呎的低栏，而避免碰到七呎的跳高。

The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and

investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick

with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On

occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we

started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great

investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business

encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case

many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall,

however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying

them.

这项发现看起来似乎是不太公平，不管是在经营企业或是投资通长坚持在容易又

明显的好公司会比死守在有问题的公司要来的好，当然有时困难的问题也有被解

决的机会，像是我们刚开始在经营水牛城报纸一样，或是有时一家好公司也会有

暂时的难关，像是以前美国运通与GEICO都曾经一度发生状况，不过总的来说，

我们尽量做到回避妖龙，而不是冒险去屠龙。

o My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in

business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional

imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the

imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it

when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent,

intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make

rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't

so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional

imperative comes into play.

我最意外的发现是企业一种看不到的巨大影响力，我们称之为"系统规范"，在学

校时没有人告诉我这种规范的存在，而我也不是一开始进入商业世界就知道有这

回事，我以为任何正当、聪明有经验的经理人都会很自动的做这样的决策，但慢

慢地我发现完全就不是这么一回事，相反的理性的态度在系统规范的影响下都会

慢慢地变质。

For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of

Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current

direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time,

corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up

available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however

foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and

strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of

peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting

executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.

举例来说(1)就好象是受牛顿第一运动定律所规范，任何一个组织机构都会抵抗

对现有方向做任何的改变(2)就像拥有会有工作来填满所有的时间，企业的计画

或购并案永远有足够的理由将资金耗尽(3)任何一个崇拜领导者的组织，不管有

多离谱，他的追随者永远可以找到可以支持其理论的投资评估分析报告(4)同业

的举动，不管是做扩张、购并或是订定经理人待遇等都会在无意间彼此模仿。

Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set

businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After

making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the

imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways

that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have

attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear

alert to the problem.

是组织的动力而非腐败或愚蠢，误导他们走上这些路子，也因为我忽略了这种规

律的力量，使我为这些所犯的错误付出高昂的代价，之后我便试图组织管理

Berkshire尽量让这种规律降低其影响程度，同时查理跟我也试着将我们的投资

集中在对于这种问题有相当警觉的公司之上。

o After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business

only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted

before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A secondclass

textile or department-store company won't prosper simply

because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see

your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can

accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such

people in businesses that possess decent economic

characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers

who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the

prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a

good deal with a bad person.

再犯下其它几个错误之后，我试着尽量只与我们所欣赏喜爱与信任的人往来，就

像是我之前曾提到的，这种原则本身不会保证你一定成功，二流的纺织工厂或是

百货公司不会只因为管理人员是那种你会想把女儿嫁给他的人就会成功的，然而

公司的老板或是投资人却可以因为与那些真正具有商业头脑的人打交道而获益

良多，相反地我们不会希望跟那些不具令人尊敬的特质为伍，不管他的公司有多

吸引人都一样，我们永远不会靠着与坏人打交道而成功。

o Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These

were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and

yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside

one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really

big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I

was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders,

myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.

其实有些更严重的错误大家根本就看不到，那是一些明明我很熟悉了解的股票或

公司，但却因故没有能完成投资，错失一些能力之外的大好机会当然没有罪，但

是我却白白错过一些自动送上门，应该把握却没有好好把握的好买卖，对于

Berkshire的股东，当然包括我自己本身在内，这种损失是难以估计的。

o Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear

to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect,

it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional,

leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably

better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually

averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be

a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but

good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that

some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a

conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere

between temporary anguish and default.

另外我们一贯保守财务政策可能也是一种错误，不过就我个人的看法却不认为如

此，回想起来，很明显的我们只要能够再多用一点财务杠杆操作(虽然较之他人

还是很保守)，就可以得到远比现在每年平均23.8%还要高的投资报酬率，即使

是在1965年我们也可以百分之九十九地确定高一点的财务杠杆绝对只有好处

没有坏处，但同时我们可能也会有百分之一的机会，不管是从内部或是外部所引

发令人异想不到的因素，使得我们负债比率提高到介于一时冲高到负债倒闭之

间。

We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A

small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be

offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are

sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such

cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I

have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more

than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those

also.

我们一点都不会想要有那种99比1的可能性，以后也不会，一点挫败或是侮辱

小小的可能性永远没有办法可以用很有可能大捞一笔的大好机会来弥补，只要你

的行为合理，你就一定能够得到好的结果，在大部分的状况下，融资杠杆顶多只

会让你移动的更快，查理跟我从来都不会着急，我们享受过程更甚于结果，虽然

我们也必须学会去承担后者。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the

first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on

this section occupying many more pages than it does here.

我们希望25年后还能向各位报告Berkshire头50年所犯的错误，我想公元

2015年的年报，大家应该可以确定这一部份将占据更多的版面。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones

we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that

fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以透过大家的协

助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我。

Here's what we're looking for:

(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax

earnings),

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future

projections are of little interest to us, nor are

"turnaround" situations),

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while

employing little or no debt,

(4) management in place (we can't supply it),

(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we

won't understand it),

(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or

that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,

about a transaction when price is unknown).

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise

complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily

within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer

to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive

as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-

Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's ownermanagers

wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes

for themselves, but often for their families or inactive

shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain

significant owners who continue to run their companies just as

they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit

for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to

check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business

in the past.

我们想要找的企业条件

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过

五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样

多，否则不考虑发行股份。

我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望

能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往

常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意

的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions

that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if

you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will

call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in

new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be

expressed by a Goldwynism: "Please include me out."

另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机

股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有

一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有高德温的另

一句话可以形容，请把我排除在外。

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as

described above, we are also interested in the negotiated

purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock

comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette,

USAir and Champion. Last year we said we had a special interest

in large purchases of convertible preferreds. We still have an

appetite of that kind, but it is limited since we now are close

to the maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of

investment.

除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股

份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空与冠军企业这几个Case一样

的公司，去年我曾告诉各位我们对于买进大笔金额的可转换特别股相当有兴趣，

到现在这种态度还是没改变，只不过由于目前这部份的部位已经接近我们认为适

当的水位。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Two years ago, I told you about Harry Bottle, who in 1962

quickly cured a major business mess at the first industrial

company I controlled, Dempster Mill Manufacturing (one of my

"bargain" purchases) and who 24 years later had reappeared to

again rescue me, this time from problems at K&W Products, a small

Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. As I

reported, in short order Harry reduced capital employed at K&W,

rationalized production, cut costs, and quadrupled profits. You

might think he would then have paused for breath. But last year

Harry, now 70, attended a bankruptcy auction and, for a pittance,

acquired a product line that is a natural for K&W. That company's

profitability may well be increased 50% by this coup. Watch this

space for future bulletins on Harry's triumphs.

两年前，我曾跟各位提到Harry Bottle这个人，他在1962年曾帮我解决我个

人所控制的第一家公司Dempster纺织制造公司(又是一个便宜货)，一个大难

题，接着在24年后又重出江湖来拯救我，那次换做K&W一家Berkshire所属

专门生产自动组件的小公司，就像我曾提到的，Harry很快地就有效地降低K&W

的资金负担、大砍成本使获利倍增，你或许认为任务完成后，他铁定要休息一下

喘口气，但是去年高龄70岁的他，又参与一家破产公司的拍卖，以极少数的资

金取得符合K&W使用的产品线，经过这次斩获，公司的获利又因此将增加50%

以上，请大家好好拭目以待，这个专门替Harry准备的专栏。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

With more than a year behind him of trading Berkshire's

stock on the New York Stock Exchange, our specialist, Jim Maguire

of Henderson Brothers, Inc. ("HBI"), continues his outstanding

performance. Before we listed, dealer spreads often were 3% or

more of market price. Jim has maintained the spread at 50 points

or less, which at current prices is well under 1%. Shareholders

who buy or sell benefit significantly from this reduction in

transaction costs.

Henderson 兄弟公司的Jim Maguire是纽约证交所专门帮我们买卖Berkshire

股票的交易员，一年下来他的表现相当称职，在Berkshire上市挂牌之前，公司

股份买卖的价差多在3%甚至以上，但Jim却能将价差维持在50点以下，这使

得股东在买卖本公司股份的交易成本降到1%以下。

Because we are delighted by our experience with Jim, HBI and

the NYSE, I said as much in ads that have been run in a series

placed by the NYSE. Normally I shun testimonials, but I was

pleased in this instance to publicly compliment the Exchange.

因为我们与Jim、NYSE与纽约证交所这次合作愉快的经验，使我尽可能在纽约

证交所安排的活动中免费帮他们打广告，通常我种场合我是能免则免，但这次我

很高兴能够公开地赞扬交易所的表现。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we purchased for

$850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for $6.7

million. Those of you who recall the mathematics of the

multiplying bacteria on page 5 will understandably panic: If our

net worth continues to increase at current rates, and the cost of

replacing planes also continues to rise at the now-established

rate of 100% compounded annually, it will not be long before

Berkshire's entire net worth is consumed by its jet.

去年夏天我们把三年前以85万美元买的公司专机给卖掉，另外又以670万美

元买了一架二手飞机，大家只要想到先前我提过的细胞复制的数字游戏就会觉得

很惊讶，如果我们公司的净值持续以相同速度增长，而更换飞机的成本同样也以

每年100%的速度上升，大家会发现，Berkshire庞大的净值很快就会被这架飞

机给吃光光。

Charlie doesn't like it when I equate the jet with bacteria;

he feels it's degrading to the bacteria. His idea of traveling in

style is an air-conditioned bus, a luxury he steps up to only

when bargain fares are in effect. My own attitude toward the jet

can be summarized by the prayer attributed, apocryphally I'm

sure, to St. Augustine as he contemplated leaving a life of

secular pleasures to become a priest. Battling the conflict

between intellect and glands, he pled: "Help me, Oh Lord, to

become chaste - but not yet."

查理对于我将飞机比喻成细菌的做法不太高兴，他认为这样岂不污辱了细菌，他

个人最理想的旅行方式是坐有空调冷气的巴士，这还是当车票有打折时才有的奢

侈做法。对于这架专机我个人一贯的态度是圣奥古斯丁当初想要脱离世俗的富裕

生活出家去到教士一样，在理智与荣耀的中间天人交战，他乞求上天，救救我吧，

让我成为一个圣洁的人，不过不是现在！

Naming the plane has not been easy. I initially suggested

"The Charles T. Munger." Charlie countered with "The Aberration."

We finally settled on "The Indefensible."

替这架飞机命名可不是一件简单的事，一开始我建议取名叫做查理孟格号，查理

反击说应该叫神经有问题号，最后双方妥协决定称它为「无可辩解号」。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 96.9% of all eligible shares participated in

Berkshire's 1989 shareholder-designated contributions program.

Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million, and

2,550 charities were recipients.

大约有96.9%的有效股权参与1989年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约590万美

元捐出的款项分配给2,550家慈善机构。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our

shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on

pages 52-53. If you wish to participate in future programs, we

strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are

registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee

name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on

August 31, 1990 will be ineligible for the 1990 program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在

未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是

受托人的名下，必须在1990年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1990

年的计画。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The annual meeting this year will take place at 9:30 a.m. on

Monday, April 30, 1990. Attendance grew last year to about 1,000,

very close to the seating capacity of the Witherspoon Hall at

Joslyn Museum. So this year's meeting will be moved to the

Orpheum Theatre, which is in downtown Omaha, about one-quarter of

a mile from the Red Lion Hotel. The Radisson-Redick Tower, a much

smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from the

Orpheum. Or you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which is in

west Omaha, about 100 yards from Borsheim's. We will have buses

at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting

and return after it ends.

今年的股东会预计在1990年4月30日，星期一早上9点30分举行，去年股

东会参加人数突破一万人，差点超过开会场地的座位容量，所以今年的会场将会

移到奥玛哈市中心的Orpheum中心，对街有一家不错的旅馆叫

Radisson-Redick，另外距离红狮旅馆约有1英理远，当然你也可以选择离波

仙珠宝店100公尺远的Marriott，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返股东会会场。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can

make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the

quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual

meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of

intelligent, owner-related questions.

查理跟我一直都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可

由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的

股东像Berkshire的股东一样由高智能水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting.

Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have

lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The

attachment also contains information about them.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说

明供大家参考。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska

Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you

to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will

allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both

stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart

any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on

Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays.

一如往常，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭

店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天

到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星

期日则从中午开到下午5点30分。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open

for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday,

April 29th. Ike likes to put on a show, and you can rely on him

to produce something very special for our shareholders.

波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别破例，4月29日星期天从中

午开到下午6点，Ike特地为股东们准备了一场秀，相信他一定可以让大家见识

到一些特别的东西。

In this letter we've had a lot to say about rates of

compounding. If you can bear having your own rate turn negative

for a day - not a pretty thought, I admit - visit Ike on the

29th.

今年我们提到很多次有关复利的事，若是你能忍受个人净值暂时倒退一天的话，

虽然不建议常常这样做，记得在29号去看看Ike的秀吧！

Warren E. Buffett

March 2, 1990 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1990年3月2日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Last year we made a prediction: "A reduction [in Berkshire's net worth]

is almost certain in at least one of the next three years." During much

of 1990's second half, we were on the road to quickly proving that

forecast accurate. But some strengthening in stock prices late in the

year enabled us to close 1990 with net worth up by $362 million, or

7.3%. Over the last 26 years (that is, since present management took

over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,612.06,

or at a rate of 23.2% compounded annually.

去年我们曾经预测过，Berkshire的净值在未来的三年内有可能会减少，结果在

1990年的下半年我们差点就证明了这项预测的真实性，还好年底前股票价格的

上涨使得我们公司的净值，还是较前一个年度增加7.3%，约3.62亿美元；而

总计过去26年以来(也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后)，每股净值从19元成长

到现在的4,612美元，年复合成长率约为23.2%。

　　　　　 Our growth rate was lackluster in 1990 because our four major

common stock holdings, in aggregate, showed little change in market

value. Last year I told you that though these companies - Capital

Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, GEICO, and Washington Post - had fine

businesses and superb managements, widespread recognition of these

attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels. The

market prices of the two media companies have since fallen

significantly - for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry

developments that I will discuss later - and the price of Coca-Cola

stock has increased significantly for what I also believe are good

reasons. Overall, yearend 1990 prices of our "permanent four," though

far from enticing, were a bit more appealing than they were a year

earlier.

1990年成长之所以减缓的原因主要是因为我们四个主要的股票投资市值加总

并没有多大的变动所致，去年我曾向各位表示，虽然这些公司-资本城/ABC、可

口可乐、GEICO保险与华盛顿邮报等，拥有良好的企业体质与经营阶层，但是

因为这些特点现在已广为投资大众所认同，所以也促使公司股价推升到一个颇高

的价位；另外其中两家媒体事业之后的股价又大幅滑落，原因在于后面我会再详

细叙述该产业革命性的演进，另外可口可乐的股价也因为我个人也相当认同的原

因为大众所接受而大涨，不过总的来说，目前这四大天王的股价，虽然不够吸引

人，但比起一年以前来说，要算是合理的多。

　　　　　 Berkshire's 26-year record is meaningless in forecasting future

results; so also, we hope, is the one-year record. We continue to aim

for a 15% average annual gain in intrinsic value. But, as we never tire

of telling you, this goal becomes ever more difficult to reach as our

equity base, now $5.3 billion, increases.

Berkshire过去26年来辉煌的记录并不足以确保未来也会如此发展，当然我们

也希望过去一年惨痛的记录也不能代表未来的结果就是如此，我们还是依旧将目

标订在每年15%的实质价值成长率，只是还有一点是过去从未向各位报告的，

以我们现在的股权规模，要完成这项任务的门槛是53亿美金!

　　　　　 If we do attain that 15% average, our shareholders should fare well.

However, Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for

a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same

relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them. For

example, if you buy at a 10% premium to intrinsic value; if intrinsic

value subsequently grows at 15% a year; and if you then sell at a 10%

premium, your own return will correspondingly be 15% compounded.

(The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid.) If, however, you

buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium, your results will be

somewhat inferior to those achieved by the company.

要是我们真的能够达到这样的目标，那么我们的股东一定赚翻了，因为

Berkshire的企业获利将会为那些买卖价格与公司实质价值一致的投资人创造

相同的获利，举例来说，如果你以实质价值10%的溢价买进Berkshire股份，

假设后来公司实质价值每年成长了15%，而之后你同样以实质价值10%的溢价

卖出所持有的股份，则你的投资年报酬率应该也会是15%(这个例子假设期间公

司并未发放任何股利)，当然要是后来你以低于10%的溢价卖出股份的话，那么

你最后所得到的投资报酬率可能就会低于公司同期间15%的报酬率。

　　　　　 Ideally, the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely

mirror those of the company during his period of ownership. That is

why Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I

hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value. We

prefer such steadiness to the value-ignoring volatility of the past two

years: In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value, which was

up 44%, while the market price rose 85%; in 1990 book value and

intrinsic value increased by a small amount, while the market price fell

23%.

在理想的情况下，Berkshire所有的股东的投资报酬，在其拥有公司部份所有权

的期间，应该会与公司本身的经营成果相符，这也是为什么查理孟格-Berkshire

的副主席，也是主要的合伙人，和我本身都希望Berkshire的股价能与其所代表

的实质价值维持一定关系的原因，相较于过去两年股市默视价值的任意波动，我

们宁愿Berkshire股价稳定一点，1989年的实质价值约成长幅度远低于帐面价

值44%的增加幅度，与股价85%的大涨；到了1990年，帐面价值与实质价值

都略微增加，但同期间的本公司的股票价格却下跌了23%。。

　　　　　 Berkshire's intrinsic value continues to exceed book value by a

substantial margin. We can't tell you the exact differential because

intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate; Charlie and I might, in fact,

differ by 10% in our appraisals. We do know, however, that we own

some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than

the values at which they are carried on our books.

截至目前为止，Berkshire的实质价值仍与帐面价值仍有一段不小的差距，不过

我们无法告诉你实际的数字是多少，因为实质价值本身就是一个估计数，事实上

光是查理与我自己本身所估出来的数字就可能有超过10%的差距，不过可以确

信的是，我们所拥有一些优秀的企业其实际的价值远高于列示在公司帐上的投资

成本。

　　　　　 Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been

created by the managers now running them. Charlie and I feel free to

brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing

the skills they possess: These superstars just came that way. Our job is

merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in

which they can do their stuff. Having done it, they send their cash to

headquarters and we face our only other task: the intelligent

deployment of these funds.

我们的被投资公司之所以能够拥有这么多额外的价值，完全要归功于经营它们的

这批优秀经理人，查理跟我可以很自在地夸耀这支团队，因为他们之所以能够拥

有这些才能与我们一点关系都没有，这些超级经理人一直都是如此，而我们的工

作只不过是发掘这些有才能的经理人同时提供一个环境，让他们可以好好地发

挥，就这样他们就会将现金源源不绝地送回总部，接下来我们就会面临另一项重

要的任务-如何有效地运用这些资金。

　　　　　 My own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale

concerning my granddaughter, Emily, and her fourth birthday party

last fall. Attending were other children, adoring relatives, and Beemer

the Clown, a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act.

我个人在营运上扮演的角色可由我孙女Emily的一个小故事来做说明，去年秋天

在她四岁的生日宴会上，参加的人除了小朋友与疼爱她的家人之外，还有一位小

丑演员Beemer，席间他还特地为大家表演了一段魔术。

　　　　　 Beginning these, Beemer asked Emily to help him by waving a

"magic wand" over "the box of wonders." Green handkerchiefs went

into the box, Emily waved the wand, and Beemer removed blue ones.

Loose handkerchiefs went in and, upon a magisterial wave by Emily,

emerged knotted. After four such transformations, each more amazing

than its predecessor, Emily was unable to contain herself. Her face

aglow, she exulted: "Gee, I'm really good at this."

一开始Beemer请Emily帮他拿一支神奇的魔棒在一个宝贝箱上挥舞，绿色的

手帕放进箱子里，在Emily挥了棒子一下之后，跑出来蓝色的手帕；接着又放进

一条手帕，Emily又挥了一下，这回跑出一条打结的手帕，经过四回合一次比一

次精彩的表演之后，Emily喜不自胜，脸上发光沾沾自喜的大叫，「我实在是太

厉害了!」

　　　　　 And that sums up my contribution to the performance of

Berkshire's business magicians - the Blumkins, the Friedman family,

Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey and Ralph

Schey. They deserve your applause.

这就是我在Berkshire的所有贡献，感谢旗下企业所有的魔术师- Blumkins家

族、Friedman 家族、Mike Goldberg、the Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、

Stan Lipsey与Ralph Schey等人，请为这些人精彩的演出给予热烈的掌声。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

　　　　　 The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported

earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other

major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against

the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead

aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the

earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we

not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of

presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers

than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP),

which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a

business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the

table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial

statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

　　　　　 Much additional information about these businesses is given on

pages 39-46, where you also will find our segment earnings reported

on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to

read Charlie Munger's letter, which starts on page 56. His letter also

contains the clearest and most insightful discussion of the banking

industry that I have seen.

年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可

以看看查理孟格所写的年报，里头包含我看过对银行产业写的最详尽精辟的分

析。

(000s omitted)

-----------------------------------------

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

------------------- -------------------

1990 1989 1990 1989

-------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ................ $(26,647) $(24,400) $(14,936) $(12,259)

Net Investment Income ....... 327,048 243,599 282,613 213,642

Buffalo News .................. 43,954 46,047 25,981 27,771

Fechheimer .................... 12,450 12,621 6,605 6,789

Kirby ......................... 27,445 26,114 17,613 16,803

Nebraska Furniture Mart ....... 17,248 17,070 8,485 8,441

Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 30,378 33,165 18,458 19,996

See's Candies ................. 39,580 34,235 23,892 20,626

Wesco - other than Insurance .. 12,441 13,008 9,676 9,810

World Book .................... 31,896 25,583 20,420 16,372

Amortization of Goodwill ...... (3,476) (3,387) (3,461) (3,372)

Other Purchase-Price

Accounting Charges ......... (5,951) (5,740) (6,856) (6,668)

Interest Expense* ............. (76,374) (42,389) (49,726) (27,098)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions .............. (5,824) (5,867) (3,801) (3,814)

Other ......................... 58,309 23,755 35,782 12,863

-------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings .............. 482,477 393,414 370,745 299,902

Sales of Securities ............. 33,989 223,810 23,348 147,575

-------- -------- -------- --------

Total Earnings - All Entities $516,466 $617,224 $394,093 $447,477

====== ====== ===== =======

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.

*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用

　　　　　 We refer you also to pages 47-53, where we have rearranged

Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the

way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you more

in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value than consolidated figures

would do. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings

statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major

investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and

retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non- operating assets and

purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged

in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer

Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the

non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the

companies in segment (2), all purchase- price accounting adjustments,

and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent

companies.

目前我们已将Berkshire的财务信息重新分类为四大部门，这是查理跟我认为最

可以帮助大家计算本公司实质价值的最好方式，以下的资产负债表与盈余表就是

依此分类表示(1)保险事业，另将主要投资部位归类(2)制造、出版与零售事业，

扣除非本业资产与购买法的会计调整(3)金融业的子公司-诸如联合储贷与史考

特飞兹财务公司(4)其它项目，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)与购买

法调整，还有Wesco与Berkshire母公司一些其它的资产与负债。

　　　　　 If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four

segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP

statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category

presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in

no way bless it.

如果你将这四个部门的盈余与净值加总，会得到与经会计师依一般公认会计原则

查核一致的数字，然而我还是必须强调这种表达方式并未经过会计师的检视，我

想他宁可选择不要看的好。

"Look-Through" Earnings

透视盈余

　　　　　 The term "earnings" has a precise ring to it. And when an earnings

figure is accompanied by an unqualified auditor's certificate, a naive

reader might think it comparable in certitude to pi, calculated to

dozens of decimal places.

盈余这个名词有一个明确的定义，而当盈余数字再加上会计师无保留意见的背书

后，单纯的投资人可能就会以为它是像圆周率一样经过计算，可以到好几个小数

点般精确。

　　　　　 In reality, however, earnings can be as pliable as putty when a

charlatan heads the company reporting them. Eventually truth will

surface, but in the meantime a lot of money can change hands. Indeed,

some important American fortunes have been created by the

monetization of accounting mirages.

然而事实上，当公司盈余数字是由骗徒所主导时，盈余可能像油灰一样地脆弱，

当然到最后真相一定会大白，但在此同时一大笔财富可能已经换手，确实许多美

国财富传奇就是靠着这种会计数字假象所创造出来的。

　　　　　 Funny business in accounting is not new. For connoisseurs of

chicanery, I have attached as Appendix A on page 22 a previously

unpublished satire on accounting practices written by Ben Graham in

1936. Alas, excesses similar to those he then lampooned have many

times since found their way into the financial statements of major

American corporations and been duly certified by big-name auditors.

Clearly, investors must always keep their guard up and use accounting

numbers as a beginning, not an end, in their attempts to calculate true

"economic earnings" accruing to them.

有趣的企业会计并不是件新鲜事，对于企业诈骗的专家，我特别附上班哲明葛拉

罕在1936年所写未经出版有关会计做帐的讽刺性文章，自此之后，我们可以发

现这种葛拉罕所描写的方法散见于各大美国企业财务报表中，而且全部都经过各

大会计师事务所签证背书，所以对此投资人必须特别提高警戒，要了解在计算一

家公司的实质的经济盈余时，会计数字只不过是个出发点，而绝非是最后的结果。

　　　　　 Berkshire's own reported earnings are misleading in a different,

but important, way: We have huge investments in companies

("investees") whose earnings far exceed their dividends and in which

we record our share of earnings only to the extent of the dividends we

receive. The extreme case is Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. Our 17% share of

the company's earnings amounted to more than $83 million last year.

Yet only about $530,000 ($600,000 of dividends it paid us less some

$70,000 of tax) is counted in Berkshire's GAAP earnings. The residual

$82 million-plus stayed with Cap Cities as retained earnings, which

work for our benefit but go unrecorded on our books.

Berkshire本身的盈余在某些重要的方面也有所误导，首先我们主要的被投资公

司其实际盈余远高于后来发放的股利，而Berkshire帐列的盈余也仅限于这些已

发放的股利收入，最明显的例子就是资本城/ABC公司，若依照我们持股17%的

比例，去年可分得的利润是8,300万美元，但Berkshire依照一般公认会计原

则所认列的投资利益却只有53万美元(亦即60万股利收入扣除7万美元的税

负)，剩下8,200多万的盈余则保留在该公司的帐上，虽然实际上对我们大有益

处，但在我们公司的帐上却一点踪迹都没有。

　　　　　 Our perspective on such "forgotten-but-not-gone" earnings is

simple: The way they are accounted for is of no importance, but their

ownership and subsequent utilization is all-important. We care not

whether the auditors hear a tree fall in the forest; we do care who

owns the tree and what's next done with it.

我们对于这种被遗忘但却存在的盈余的态度很简单，到底认不认列数字一点都不

重要，最重要的是我们可以确定这些盈余可以为我们所有且会被充分加以运用，

我们不在乎听到会计师说森林中有一棵树被砍倒了，我们在乎的是这棵树是不是

属于我们的，以及之后要如何来处理它。

　　　　　 When Coca-Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares,

the company increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to

be the most valuable franchise in the world. (Coke also, of course,

uses retained earnings in many other value-enhancing ways.) Instead

of repurchasing stock, Coca-Cola could pay those funds to us in

dividends, which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares.

That would be a less efficient scenario: Because of taxes we would pay

on dividend income, we would not be able to increase our

proportionate ownership to the degree that Coke can, acting for us. If

this less efficient procedure were followed, however, Berkshire would

report far greater "earnings."

当可口可乐利用保留盈余来买回自家股份，该公司等于间接增加我们的持股比

例，也就是此举让我认定这家公司是全世界最好的企业(当然可口可乐还将资金

运用在很多加强公司利益的地方上)，除了买回股份，可口可乐也可以将这些资

金以股利的方式退还给股东，然后我们同样可以利用这笔钱买进更多可口可乐的

股票，只是后面这种做法比较没有效率，因为如此还要支付额外的所得税，使得

最后所得到的持股比例比前面的方式少一点，而讽刺的是要是利用后面的那种做

法，Berkshire的帐面盈余可能还会更好看。

　　　　　 I believe the best way to think about our earnings is in terms of

"look-through" results, calculated as follows: Take $250 million, which

is roughly our share of the 1990 operating earnings retained by our

investees; subtract $30 million, for the incremental taxes we would

have owed had that $250 million been paid to us in dividends; and add

the remainder, $220 million, to our reported operating earnings of

$371 million. Thus our 1990 "look-through earnings" were about

$590 million.

我个人相信最好的方式是利用透视的方法来衡量Berkshire的盈余，2亿5,000

万美元大概是我们在1990年可以从被投资公司那边未分配到的营业利润，扣除

3,000万的额外股利所得税，再将剩下的2亿2,000万美元加到本来的帐列盈

余3亿7,100万，所得的5亿9,000万大概就是我们经过透视的真正盈余。

　　　　　 As I mentioned last year, we hope to have look-through earnings

grow about 15% annually. In 1990 we substantially exceeded that rate

but in 1991 we will fall far short of it. Our Gillette preferred has been

called and we will convert it into common stock on April 1. This will

reduce reported earnings by about $35 million annually and

look-through earnings by a much smaller, but still significant, amount.

Additionally, our media earnings - both direct and look-through -

appear sure to decline. Whatever the results, we will post you annually

on how we are doing on a look-through basis.

就像我去年曾经提到的，我希望我们的透视盈余每年都能够成长15%，在1990

年我们确实大幅超越这个比率，但1991年结果却差很多，我们在吉列的可转换

特别股投资已经被赎回，我们将在4月1日把它们转为普通股投资，虽然这将

会使得我们每年的帐面盈余减少3,500万，透视盈余也会跟着减少，另外我们

在媒体事业的直接与透视盈余也可能下滑，但不论如何，我们每年还是会向大家

报告透视盈余的计算结果。

Non-Insurance Operations

非保险营运

　　　　　 Take another look at the figures on page 51, which aggregate the

earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations.

After-tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that

would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500.

看看52页的那些数字，亦即我们非保险事业的盈余与资产负债加总，1990年

的平均股东权益报酬率是51%，这个获利能力在1989年的财星五百大可以排

在前20名。

　　　　　 Two factors make this return even more remarkable. First,

leverage did not produce it: Almost all our major facilities are owned,

not leased, and such small debt as these operations have is basically

offset by cash they hold. In fact, if the measurement was return on

assets - a calculation that eliminates the effect of debt upon returns -

our group would rank in Fortune's top ten.

还有两项因素使得这样的成绩显得更为出色，第一它们完全不靠融资杠杆，几乎

所有的主要设备都是自有而不是向外面租的，仅有的负债可以由自有的现金完全

抵销，事实上若讲到资产报酬率，亦即扣除负债对于盈余的影响，我们非保险事

业甚至可以排在前10名。

　　　　　 Equally important, our return was not earned from industries, such

as cigarettes or network television stations, possessing spectacular

economics for all participating in them. Instead it came from a group

of businesses operating in such prosaic fields as furniture retailing,

candy, vacuum cleaners, and even steel warehousing. The explanation

is clear: Our extraordinary returns flow from outstanding operating

managers, not fortuitous industry economics.

同样重要的是我们的获利并不是来自于像香烟或是电视台这些拥有特殊经济型

态的产业，相反地它们是来自于一些再平凡不过的产业，诸如家具零售、糖果、

吸尘器甚至是钢铁仓储等，这样的解释很明白，我们得来不易的报酬主要是靠优

秀杰出的经理人后天的努力而非先天的产业环境优势。

Let's look at the larger operations:

让我们来看看其中比较大的营运

o　　　　　 It was a poor year for retailing - particularly for big-ticket items

- but someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borsheim's. Sales were up

18%. That's both a same-stores and all-stores percentage, since

Borsheim's operates but one establishment.

去年对零售业来说算是相当惨淡的一年，尤其是单价高的东西，不过大家可能是

忘了提醒在波仙珠宝店Ike Friedman这项事实，导致他店里的业绩逆势成长了

18%，这是单店也是全店的数字，自从波仙仅此一家别无分号的老店开幕以来就

是如此。

　　　　　 But, oh, what an establishment! We can't be sure about the fact

(because most fine-jewelry retailers are privately owned) but we

believe that this jewelry store does more volume than any other in the

U.S., except for Tiffany's New York store.

喔!超厉害的一家店，我们实在不太敢相信这是事实，(因为大部分最高级的珠宝

店多是私人拥有)，但我们却相信这家店除了纽约的Tiffany之外，全美其它所

有的珠宝店没有一家比得上它。

　　　　　 Borsheim's could not do nearly that well if our customers came

only from the Omaha metropolitan area, whose population is about

600,000. We have long had a huge percentage of greater Omaha's

jewelry business, so growth in that market is necessarily limited. But

every year business from non-Midwest customers grows dramatically.

Many visit the store in person. A large number of others, however, buy

through the mail in a manner you will find interesting.

波仙的客户群若只有大奥玛哈都会区600万人口的话，生意可能没有办法做的

那么大，长久以来我们在奥玛哈地区的占有率一直就很高，不过这部份的成长潜

力实在是有限，所幸每年来自非中西部地区的生意都大幅成长，很多都是客户自

己慕名而来单独上门，但还有一大部分是透过相当有趣的邮购方式购买我们的产

品。

　　　　　 These customers request a jewelry selection of a certain type and

value - say, emeralds in the $10,000 -$20,000 range - and we then

send them five to ten items meeting their specifications and from

which they can pick. Last year we mailed about 1,500 assortments of

all kinds, carrying values ranging from under $1,000 to hundreds of

thousands of dollars.

这些客户大多指定要一定品质与价位的珠宝，例如1万到2万美元的绿宝石，

之后我们会送上五到十个符合他们要求的样品供他们做挑选，去年我们总共寄出

超过1,500种组合，每种组合的价值从1,000美元到几十万美元不等。

　　　　　 The selections are sent all over the country, some to people no

one at Borsheim's has ever met. (They must always have been well

recommended, however.) While the number of mailings in 1990 was a

record, Ike has been sending merchandise far and wide for decades.

Misanthropes will be crushed to learn how well our "honor-system"

works: We have yet to experience a loss from customer dishonesty.

这些产品被分送到全美各地，有些人是波仙素未谋面的，(当然他们必须要经过

别人郑重的推荐)，虽然这个数量在1990年达到高峰，但事实Ike在几十年以

前就开始这样的创举，厌世者在得知我们所实施的荣誉制度可能会崩溃，截至目

前为止我们还没有因为客户的不诚实而遭受损失。

　　　　　 We attract business nationwide because we have several

advantages that competitors can't match. The most important item in

the equation is our operating costs, which run about 18% of sales

compared to 40% or so at the typical competitor. (Included in the 18%

are occupancy and buying costs, which some public companies include

in "cost of goods sold.") Just as Wal-Mart, with its 15% operating costs,

sells at prices that high-cost competitors can't touch and thereby

constantly increases its market share, so does Borsheim's. What works

with diapers works with diamonds.

我们之所以能够吸引全美各地的生意上门主要是因为我们有几项优势是其它竞

争对手所无法比拟的，其中最重要的一项就是经营的成本，相较于同业的40%

的高比率，波仙的营业成本大概是营业额的18%(这包含持有与买进成本，有些

公开发行的大公司还把他们列在销货成本项下)，就像是Wal-Mart的营业费用

率只有15%，因此可以以其它高成本竞争者无法达到的价位销售，从而持续地

增加其市场占有率，波仙也是如此，同样的方式除了卖尿布以外，换做于卖钻石

一样管用。

　　　　　 Our low prices create huge volume that in turn allows us to carry

an extraordinarily broad inventory of goods, running ten or more

times the size of that at the typical fine-jewelry store. Couple our

breadth of selection and low prices with superb service and you can

understand how Ike and his family have built a national jewelry

phenomenon from an Omaha location.

由于价格低廉所以销售数量也相当大，因此我们可以备有各式各样的产品存货，

比起其它店规模与数量甚至超过十倍之多，除了种类齐全、价格低廉之外，再加

上我们贴心的服务，这也是为什么Ike与他的家庭可以在奥玛哈这个小地方创造

出全美闻名的珠宝传奇。

　　　　　 And family it is. Ike's crew always includes son Alan and

sons-in-law Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale. And when things are busy

- that's often - they are joined by Ike's wife, Roz, and his daughters,

Janis and Susie. In addition, Fran Blumkin, wife of Louie (Chairman of

Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike's cousin), regularly pitches in. Finally,

you'll find Ike's 89-year-old mother, Rebecca, in the store most

afternoons, Wall Street Journal in hand. Given a family commitment

like this, is it any surprise that Borsheim's runs rings around

competitors whose managers are thinking about how soon 5 o'clock

will arrive?

真是虎父无犬子，Ike的团队总少不了他儿子Alan与女婿Marvin和Donald，

而且要是生意忙不过来的话，Ike的老婆Roz跟他的女儿们Janis与Susie还会

跳进来帮忙，另外Fran Blumkin-Louie的老婆(内布拉斯加家具店的老板-Ike

的侄子)，有时也会插花帮忙，最后大家绝对不要忘了还有高龄89岁的老祖母

Rebecca，每天下午都会手拿华尔街日报坐镇店里，能够有一个家族像这样的投

入，也难怪他们可以轻松击败那些由每天只等五点下班的专业经理人所经营的

店。

o　　　　　 While Fran Blumkin was helping the Friedman family set records

at Borsheim's, her sons, Irv and Ron, along with husband Louie, were

setting records at The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Sales at our

one-and-only location were $159 million, up 4% from 1989. Though

again the fact can't be conclusively proved, we believe NFM does close

to double the volume of any other home furnishings store in the

country.

当Fran Blumkin帮助Friedman家族创造波仙珠宝店的记录时，她的先生

Louie再搭配儿子Irv与Ron，同时也在内布拉斯加家具店创造记录，1990年

单店的营业额1.59亿美元，较前一年度增加4%，虽然没有精确的统计数字，

但我们相信NFM的销售量最少是全美其它同业的两倍以上。

　　　　　 The NFM formula for success parallels that of Borsheim's. First,

operating costs are rock-bottom - 15% in 1990 against about 40% for

Levitz, the country's largest furniture retailer, and 25% for Circuit City

Stores, the leading discount retailer of electronics and appliances.

Second, NFM's low costs allow the business to price well below all

competitors. Indeed, major chains, knowing what they will face, steer

clear of Omaha. Third, the huge volume generated by our bargain

prices allows us to carry the broadest selection of merchandise

available anywhere.

NFM成功的方程式与波仙十分的相近，首先经营成本实在是有够低，1990年

相较于全美最大家具零售商Levitz的40%与家用电器折扣量贩店Circuit City

的25%，NFM竟只有15%，第二也由于成本低，所以NFM的产品订价就可以

比竞争同业低许多，事实上许多通路商也很清楚这一点，所以他们唯一的做法就

是尽量远离奥玛哈地区，第三便宜的价格导致销量大好，从而可以让我们备有更

多别处所看不到，种类齐全的产品。

　　　　　 Some idea of NFM's merchandising power can be gleaned from a

recent report of consumer behavior in Des Moines, which showed that

NFM was Number 3 in popularity among 20 furniture retailers serving

that city. That may sound like no big deal until you consider that 19 of

those retailers are located in Des Moines, whereas our store is 130

miles away. This leaves customers driving a distance equal to that

between Washington and Philadelphia in order to shop with us, even

though they have a multitude of alternatives next door. In effect, NFM,

like Borsheim's, has dramatically expanded the territory it serves - not

by the traditional method of opening new stores but rather by creating

an irresistible magnet that employs price and selection to pull in the

crowds.

有关NFM的商品魔力可以从最近Des Moines地区的消费者行为调查报告中看

出端倪，NFM在该地区所有的20家家具零售商当中排名第三，这讯息乍听之

下或许没什么了不得，但你可知道其它19家都位在Des Moines，除了NFM

离该地区足足有130英哩远，这距离代表当地的居民虽然在附近有更多的选

择，却还是情愿大老远开车走相当从华盛顿到费城的距离，只为了买我们的产

品，事实上NFM就像波仙一样，急速地扩张其版图范围，靠的不是传统地展店

模式，而是利用价格与种类散发出强烈的磁场，吸引客户远道而来。

　　　　　 Last year at the Mart there occurred an historic event: I

experienced a counterrevelation. Regular readers of this report know

that I have long scorned the boasts of corporate executives about

synergy, deriding such claims as the last refuge of scoundrels

defending foolish acquisitions. But now I know better: In Berkshire's

first synergistic explosion, NFM put a See's candy cart in the store late

last year and sold more candy than that moved by some of the

full-fledged stores See's operates in California. This success

contradicts all tenets of retailing. With the Blumkins, though, the

impossible is routine.

去年在家具店发生了一件重大的历史事件，使我经历了一次自我反省，经常阅读

我们年报的读者应该都知道长久以来我对于企业主管动不动就强调的企业综效

饬之以鼻，认为这不过是经营阶层对于愚蠢购并案所作的推托之词，不过现在我

学乖了，在Berkshire我们创造出第一个企业综效，NFM在去年底决定在店内

摆设喜斯的糖果车，结果所卖出的糖果甚至比加州的旗舰店还要多，这次的成功

打破了所有零售业的定律，有B太太家族在，所有不可能的事都变成家常便饭。

o　　　　　 At See's, physical volume set a record in 1990 - but only barely

and only because of good sales early in the year. After the invasion of

Kuwait, mall traffic in the West fell. Our poundage volume at Christmas

dropped slightly, though our dollar sales were up because of a 5%

price increase.

提到喜斯糖果，1990年的销售数量又创新高，不过成长相当有限且主要是拜年

初业绩大好所致，在伊拉克入侵科威特之后，西方世界的交通活动大减，使得圣

诞节的销售数量稍微下滑，虽然因为调整价格的关系，使得我们的营收成长了

5%。

　　　　　 That increase, and better control of expenses, improved profit

margins. Against the backdrop of a weak retailing environment, Chuck

Huggins delivered outstanding results, as he has in each of the

nineteen years we have owned See's. Chuck's imprint on the business

- a virtual fanaticism about quality and service - is visible at all of our

225 stores.

销售金额增加加上营业费用控制得当，获利也有所改善，面对零售业大环境不佳

的窘境，就如同过去他接手后的19年，Chuck Huggins还是一如往常递出漂

亮的成绩单，Chuck对于品质与服务的坚持，在我们所有225家分店中都看得

到。

　　　　　 One happening in 1990 illustrates the close bond between See's

and its customers. After 15 years of operation, our store in

Albuquerque was endangered: The landlord would not renew our lease,

wanting us instead to move to an inferior location in the mall and even

so to pay a much higher rent. These changes would have wiped out

the store's profit. After extended negotiations got us nowhere, we set

a date for closing the store.

1990年所发生的一件事最足以说明喜斯糖果与客户之间紧密的关系，经过15

年的营运，我们在Albuquerque的分店经营发生危机，地主不愿与我们继续签

订租约，反而希望我们搬到购物商场地点较差的摊位，并且还要调涨租金，如此

一来将会把我们仅有的利润给吃光，经过协调不成，迫不得已我们贴出的即将停

业的告示。

　　　　　 On her own, the store's manager, Ann Filkins, then took action,

urging customers to protest the closing. Some 263 responded by

sending letters and making phone calls to See's headquarters in San

Francisco, in some cases threatening to boycott the mall. An alert

reporter at the Albuquerque paper picked up the story. Supplied with

this evidence of a consumer uprising, our landlord offered us a

satisfactory deal. (He, too, proved susceptible to a counterrevelation.)

之后靠着店经理Ann Filkins个人的努力，采取行动敦促客户们像房东表达抗

议，总计有263位客户写信或打电话到喜斯位于旧金山的总部，有的甚至扬言

要抵制购物商场，甚至引起当地记者的注意，大幅刊载这项消息，有了众多客户

的支持，房东最后终于妥协，提供一个令我们满意的条件(我想他应该也得到一

个自我反省的机会教育)。

　　　　　 Chuck subsequently wrote personal letters of thanks to every

loyalist and sent each a gift certificate. He repeated his thanks in a

newspaper ad that listed the names of all 263. The sequel: Christmas

sales in Albuquerque were up substantially.

事后Chuck对喜斯所有忠实的支持者一一写给每个人亲笔的感谢函，并在报纸

上刊登所有263位客户名单，后续的发展是我们在Albuquerque分店的业绩

大幅成长。

o　　　　　 Charlie and I were surprised at developments this past year in the

media industry, including newspapers such as our Buffalo News. The

business showed far more vulnerability to the early stages of a

recession than has been the case in the past. The question is whether

this erosion is just part of an aberrational cycle - to be fully made up

in the next upturn - or whether the business has slipped in a way that

permanently reduces intrinsic business values.

查理跟我对于过去几年媒体事业的发展感到相当的意外，包含水牛城日报等报纸

在内，这个产业现在因为经济衰退所受到的伤害，要比过去的经验要来的严重许

多，问题是这种退化只是因为景气循环的暂时失调呢? (意味着下次景气翻扬会再

回复)，或是有可能一去不复返，企业的价值就此永远地流失掉。

　　　　　 Since I didn't predict what has happened, you may question the

value of my prediction about what will happen. Nevertheless, I'll

proffer a judgment: While many media businesses will remain

economic marvels in comparison with American industry generally,

they will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or

lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.

因为我没能预料到已经发生的事，所以你可能会质疑我预测未来的能力，尽管如

此我还是提供个人的判断供大家参考，虽然相较于美国其它产业，媒体事业仍然

维持一个不错的经济荣景，不过还是远不如我个人、产业界或是借款人几年前的

预期。

　　　　　 The reason media businesses have been so outstanding in the

past was not physical growth, but rather the unusual pricing power

that most participants wielded. Now, however, advertising dollars are

growing slowly. In addition, retailers that do little or no media

advertising (though they sometimes use the Postal Service) have

gradually taken market share in certain merchandise categories. Most

important of all, the number of both print and electronic advertising

channels has substantially increased. As a consequence, advertising

dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors

has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic

value of our major media investments and also the value of our

operating unit, Buffalo News - though all remain fine businesses.

媒体事业过去只所以能有如此优异的表现，并不是因为销售数量上的成长，而主

要是靠所有的业者运用非比寻常的价格主导力量，不过时至今日，广告预算成长

已大不如前，此外逐渐取得商品销售市场占有率的一般零售通路商根本就不做媒

体广告(虽然有时他们会做邮购服务)，最重要的是印刷与电子广告媒体通路大幅

增加，因此广告预算被大幅度地分散稀释，广告商的议价能力逐渐丧失殆尽，这

种的现象大大地减低我们所持有几个主要媒体事业投资与水牛城报纸的实际价

值，虽然大体而言，他们都还算是不错的企业。

　　　　　 Notwithstanding the problems, Stan Lipsey's management of the

News continues to be superb. During 1990, our earnings held up

much better than those of most metropolitan papers, falling only 5%.

In the last few months of the year, however, the rate of decrease was

far greater.

不看这些问题，Stan Lipsey的新闻事业经营还是相当地杰出，1990年我们的

盈余比起其它主要都会地区的报纸要好的多，大概只下滑了5%，虽然去年有几

个月份，减少的幅度稍微大了一点。

　　　　　 I can safely make two promises about the News in 1991: (1) Stan

will again rank at the top among newspaper publishers; and (2)

earnings will fall substantially. Despite a slowdown in the demand for

newsprint, the price per ton will average significantly more in 1991

and the paper's labor costs will also be considerably higher. Since

revenues may meanwhile be down, we face a real squeeze.

展望1991年我可以很安心地向大家做出两个保证(1)Stan将会继续在所有的主

要新闻出版者当中名列前茅(2)盈余一定会大幅缩水，因为虽然新闻印刷需求大

幅缩水，但每吨印刷成本与劳工成本还是会大幅增加，再加上营收下降，面临两

头挤压的窘境。

　　　　　 Profits may be off but our pride in the product remains. We

continue to have a larger "news hole" - the portion of the paper

devoted to news - than any comparable paper. In 1990, the proportion

rose to 52.3% against 50.1% in 1989. Alas, the increase resulted from

a decline in advertising pages rather than from a gain in news pages.

Regardless of earnings pressures, we will maintain at least a 50% news

hole. Cutting product quality is not a proper response to adversity.

获利虽然缩水，但我们对于产品依然感到骄傲，比起其它相同规模的报纸，我们

拥有超高的新闻比率-新闻占报纸所有版面的比率，从1989年的50.1%增加为

52.3%，只可惜增加的原因是因为广告量的减少，而不是新闻版面的增加，虽然

受到盈余不小的压力，但我们还是会坚持50%的新闻比率，降低产品的品质不

是身处逆境最好的应对方式。

o　　　　　 The news at Fechheimer, our manufacturer and retailer of

uniforms, is all good with one exception: George Heldman, at 69, has

decided to retire. I tried to talk him out of it but he had one irrefutable

argument: With four other Heldmans - Bob, Fred, Gary and Roger - to

carry on, he was leaving us with an abundance of managerial talent.

接下来是我们制服的制造与销售商费区海默的好消息，除了一个坏消息之外，那

就是69岁的George Heldman决定要退休，我曾经试着说服他，不过他有一

项令人无法拒绝的理由，因为他留下了其它四位Heldmans家族的成员-Bob、

Fred、Gary与Roger做接班。

　　　　　 Fechheimer's operating performance improved considerably in

1990, as many of the problems we encountered in integrating the

large acquisition we made in 1988 were moderated or solved. However,

several unusual items caused the earnings reported in the "Sources"

table to be flat. In the retail operation, we continue to add stores and

now have 42 in 22 states. Overall, prospects appear excellent for

Fechheimer.

费区海默的经营绩效在1990年又大幅增进，因为先前在1988年大型的购并所

产生的问题已逐渐获得解决，然而由于几个特殊的事件使得我们今年的盈余表现

平平，在零售的部份，我们持续地拓展店面，目前在全美22个州拥有42家店，

总言之，我们对于费区海默的前景仍然相当看好。

o　　　　　 At Scott Fetzer, Ralph Schey runs 19 businesses with a mastery

few bring to running one. In addition to overseeing three entities listed

on page 6 - World Book, Kirby, and Scott Fetzer Manufacturing - Ralph

directs a finance operation that earned a record $12.2 million pre-tax

in 1990.

轮到史考特飞兹，Ralph Schey经营19家企业的手法比起一般人经营一个还娴

熟，除了后面所叙述的三家企业-世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与史考特飞兹制造

公司之外，Ralph甚至还掌管一家年税前获利1,220万美元的财务公司。

　　　　　 Were Scott Fetzer an independent company, it would rank close to

the top of the Fortune 500 in terms of return on equity, although it is

not in businesses that one would expect to be economic champs. The

superior results are directly attributable to Ralph.

如果史考特飞兹是一个独立的集团，它在财富五百大股东权益报酬率的排名一定

能名列前茅，虽然它所处的产业很难出现耀眼的明星，但这些难得的成绩全都要

归功于Ralph。

　　　　　 At World Book, earnings improved on a small decrease in unit

volume. The costs of our decentralization move were considerably less

in 1990 than 1989 and the benefits of decentralization are being

realized. World Book remains far and away the leader in United States

encyclopedia sales and we are growing internationally, though from a

small base.

世界百科全书，虽然销售数量略微下滑，但盈余却变佳，1990年因分散决策中

心的做法所须负担的成本较1989年减少，而其所带来的效益却逐渐显现，世界

百科全书在全美百科全书销售中依旧独占鳌头，至于海外市场方面虽然基础规模

较小，但却持续地成长中。

　　　　　 Kirby unit volume grew substantially in 1990 with the help of our

new vacuum cleaner, The Generation 3, which was an unqualified

success. Earnings did not grow as fast as sales because of both

start-up expenditures and "learning-curve" problems we encountered

in manufacturing the new product. International business, whose

dramatic growth I described last year, had a further 20% sales gain in

1990. With the aid of a recent price increase, we expect excellent

earnings at Kirby in 1991.

受惠于新款的真空吸尘器，寇比在1990年的销售数量大增，第三代的推出无疑

是一大胜利，由于先期开发成本与新产品制造所面临的学习曲线问题，使得获利

增加不若营收成长的幅度，海外市场方面相较于去年爆炸性的成长，今年再度有

20%的成长，而由于最近产品价格再度调涨，我们预期寇比在1991年的获利应

该会更好。

　　　　　 Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, Campbell Hausfeld,

its largest unit, had a particularly fine year. This company, the

country's leading producer of small and medium-sized air

compressors, achieved record sales of $109 million, more than 30% of

which came from products introduced during the last five years.

至于史考特飞兹制造公司部份，最大的单位Campbell Hausfeld今年的表现特

别好，它是全美中小型空气压缩机的领导品牌，年度营业额创下1.09亿美元的

新高，其中有30%的营收系来自于最近五年新推出的产品。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　 In looking at the figures for our non-insurance operations, you

will see that net worth increased by only $47 million in 1990 although

earnings were $133 million. This does not mean that our managers are

in any way skimping on investments that strengthen their business

franchises or that promote growth. Indeed, they diligently pursue both

goals.

在看我们非保险业的营运数字时，大家可能会好奇为何我们年度的盈余有1.33

亿美元，但净值却只增加了4,700万美元呢? 这并不代表我们的经理人用任何

方法来掩盖其公司的经济实力或成长潜力，事实上他们无不努力追求这些目标。

　　　　　 But they also never deploy capital without good reason. The result:

In the past five years they have funneled well over 80% of their

earnings to Charlie and me for use in new business and investment

opportunities.

不过他们也从不会毫无理由地浪费资金，过去五年以来他们将所赚得的80%盈

余送回母公司，交给查理跟我运用在新的事业与投资机会之上。

Insurance Operations

保险业营运

　　　　　 Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting

key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:

下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数

Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate

in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by

Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GNP Deflator (%)

----------- ------------------ ------------- --------------

1981 ..... 3.8 106.0 6.5 9.6

1982 ..... 3.7 109.6 8.4 6.5

1983 ..... 5.0 112.0 6.8 3.8

1984 ..... 8.5 118.0 16.9 3.8

1985 ..... 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.0

1986 ..... 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.6

1987 ..... 9.4 104.6 7.8 3.1

1988 ..... 4.4 105.4 5.5 3.3

1989 (Revised) 3.2 109.2 7.7 4.1

1990(Est.) 4.5 109.8 5.0 4.1

Source: A.M. Best Co.

　　　　　 The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses

incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio

below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100

indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the

investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders'

funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 -

111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of

earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，比率在100

以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保

险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100

以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部份所产生的

盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107-111之间。

　　　　　 For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the

industry's incurred losses to grow at an average of 10% annually, even

in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the

last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate,

11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate,

underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to

under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a

time.

基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期

保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10%以

上，损失一定会增加，(事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11%的速度在成

长)，虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来。

　　　　　 Last year premium growth fell far short of the required 10% and

underwriting results therefore worsened. (In our table, however, the

severity of the deterioration in 1990 is masked because the industry's

1989 losses from Hurricane Hugo caused the ratio for that year to be

somewhat above trendline.) The combined ratio will again increase in

1991, probably by about two points.

去年保费收入的成长远低于最基本的10%要求，承保成绩可想而知会继续恶化，

(不过在这张表上，1990年恶化的程度因为1989年发生Hugo飓风钜额损失

而被略微掩盖)，1991年的综合比率将会再度恶化，有可能会增加2个百分点

以上。

　　　　　 Results will improve only when most insurance managements

become so fearful that they run from business, even though it can be

done at much higher prices than now exist. At some point these

managements will indeed get the message: The most important thing

to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging. But so far

that point hasn't gotten across: Insurance managers continue to dig -

sullenly but vigorously.

虽然以现在的市场状况保险业者大可以用比现在更高的价格来作生意，但营运结

果却只可能在所有的保险公司主管因为恐惧而远离市场时才有可能好转，就某种

程度而言，这些经理人应该已经收到了一些讯息，当你发现自己深陷洞中最重要

的一件事就是不要再挖了，不过这个临界点显然还没到，许多保险公司虽然不甘

愿但还是用力地在挖洞。

　　　　　 The picture would change quickly if a major physical or financial

catastrophe were to occur. Absent such a shock, one to two years will

likely pass before underwriting losses become large enough to raise

management fear to a level that would spur major price increases.

When that moment arrives, Berkshire will be ready - both financially

and psychologically - to write huge amounts of business.

还好这种情况可能在发生重大的天然灾害或金融风暴后很快地改变，但若是没有

这类事件发生，可能还要再等一、两年，直到所有的保险公司受不了钜额的承保

损失，才有可能迫使经理人大幅提高保费，而等那个时刻到来时，Berkshire一

定会作好准备，不论是在财务上或是心理上，等着接下大笔大笔的保单。

　　　　　 In the meantime, our insurance volume continues to be small but

satisfactory. In the next section of this report we will give you a

framework for evaluating insurance results. From that discussion, you

will gain an understanding of why I am so enthusiastic about the

performance of our insurance manager, Mike Goldberg, and his cadre

of stars, Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, and Don Wurster.

在此同时，我们的保费收入虽然很少但还是处于可以接受的范围，在下一段报告

中我会告诉大家如何去衡量保险公司的绩效表现，看完之后你就会明了，为何我

对我们的保险事业经理人，包含Mike Goldberg与他的明星团队Rod Eldred、

Dinos Lordanou、Ajit Jalin与Don Wurster的表现会感到如此满意了。

　　　　　 In assessing our insurance results over the next few years, you

should be aware of one type of business we are pursuing that could

cause them to be unusually volatile. If this line of business expands, as

it may, our underwriting experience will deviate from the trendline you

might expect: In most years we will somewhat exceed expectations

and in an occasional year we will fall far below them.

在衡量我们保险事业过去几年的经营绩效时，大家必须特别注意因为我们所追求

的生意形态而造成经营结果的波动，若是这类型的生意扩张，事实上这很有可

能，则我们的承保结果可能会与一般产业趋势有很大的差异，大部分的时候，我

们的成绩会超乎大家的预期，但很有可能在某一年度又大幅落后在产业标准之

下。

　　　　　 The volatility I predict reflects the fact that we have become a

large seller of insurance against truly major catastrophes

("super-cats"), which could for example be hurricanes, windstorms or

earthquakes. The buyers of these policies are reinsurance companies

that themselves are in the business of writing catastrophe coverage for

primary insurers and that wish to "lay off," or rid themselves, of part of

their exposure to catastrophes of special severity. Because the need

for these buyers to collect on such a policy will only arise at times of

extreme stress - perhaps even chaos - in the insurance business, they

seek financially strong sellers. And here we have a major competitive

advantage: In the industry, our strength is unmatched.

我预估的波动主要是反应在我们即将成为真正超大型意外灾害保单(又称霹雳猫)

承保人的事实之上，这些灾害有可能是飓风、风暴或是地震，这类保单的购买者

大多是接受一般保险业者分散风险的再保公司，由于他们自己本身也要分散或是

卸下部份单一重要灾害的风险，而由于这些保险公司主要是希望在发生若干重大

的意外后，在一片混乱之中还能有可以依靠的对象，所以在选择投保对象时，首

重的就是财务实力，而这正是我们最主要的竞争优势，在这个业界，我们坚强的

实力是别人所比不上的。

　　　　　 A typical super-cat contract is complicated. But in a plain- vanilla

instance we might write a one-year, $10 million policy providing that

the buyer, a reinsurer, would be paid that sum only if a catastrophe

caused two results: (1) specific losses for the reinsurer above a

threshold amount; and (2) aggregate losses for the insurance industry

of, say, more than $5 billion. Under virtually all circumstances, loss

levels that satisfy the second condition will also have caused the first

to be met.

典型的霹雳猫合约相当的复杂，不过以一个最简单的例子来说，我们可能签下一

年期，1,000万美元的保单，其中规定再保公司在灾害造成两种状况下才有可能

得到理赔，(1)再保公司的损失超过一定的门槛(2)整个保险业界的总损失超过一

定的门槛，假设是50亿美元，只是通常在第二种条件符合时，第一个条件也会

达到标准。

　　　　　 For this $10 million policy, we might receive a premium of, say, $3

million. Say, also, that we take in annual premiums of $100 million

from super-cat policies of all kinds. In that case we are very likely in

any given year to report either a profit of close to $100 million or a

loss of well over $200 million. Note that we are not spreading risk as

insurers typically do; we are concentrating it. Therefore, our yearly

combined ratio on this business will almost never fall in the industry

range of 100 - 120, but will instead be close to either zero or 300%.

对于这种1,000万的保单，我们收取的保费可能会在300万左右，假设我们一

年收到所有的霹雳猫保费收入为1亿美元，则有可能某些年度我们可以认列将

近1亿美元的利益，但也有可能在单一年度要认列2亿美元的损失，值得注意

的是我们不像其它保险公司是在分散风险，相反地我们是将风险集中，因此在这

一部份，我们的综合比率不像一般业者会介于100-120之间，而是有可能会介

于0-300之间。

　　　　　 Most insurers are financially unable to tolerate such swings. And if

they have the ability to do so, they often lack the desire. They may

back away, for example, because they write gobs of primary property

insurance that would deliver them dismal results at the very time they

would be experiencing major losses on super- cat reinsurance. In

addition, most corporate managements believe that their shareholders

dislike volatility in results.

当然有许多业者无法承受这样大幅的变动，而且就算有能力可以做到，他们的意

愿也不会太高，他们很可能在吃下一大笔保单之后，因为灾害发生一时必须承担

大额的损失而被吓跑，此外大部分的企业管理阶层会认为他们背后的股东应该不

喜欢变动太大。

　　　　　 We can take a different tack: Our business in primary property

insurance is small and we believe that Berkshire shareholders, if

properly informed, can handle unusual volatility in profits so long as

the swings carry with them the prospect of superior long-term results.

(Charlie and I always have preferred a lumpy 15% return to a smooth

12%.)

不过我们采取的方向就不同了，我们在初级产险市场的业务相当少，但我们相信

Berkshire的股东，若事先经过沟通，应该可以接受这种获利波动较大，只要最

后长期的结果能够令人满意就可以的经营结果，(查理跟我总是喜欢变动的15%

更胜于固定的12%)。

　　　　　 We want to emphasize three points: (1) While we expect our

super-cat business to produce satisfactory results over, say, a decade,

we're sure it will produce absolutely terrible results in at least an

occasional year; (2) Our expectations can be based on little more than

subjective judgments - for this kind of insurance, historical loss data

are of very limited value to us as we decide what rates to charge today;

and (3) Though we expect to write significant quantities of super-cat

business, we will do so only at prices we believe to be commensurate

with risk. If competitors become optimistic, our volume will fall. This

insurance has, in fact, tended in recent years to be woefully

underpriced; most sellers have left the field on stretchers.

我们有三点必须要强调(1)我们预期霹雳猫的业务长期来讲，假设以10年为期，

应该可以获得令人满意的结果，当然我们也知道在这其中的某些年度成绩可能会

很惨(2)我们这样的预期并非是基于客观的判断，对于这样的保险业务，历史的

资料对于我们在做订价决策时并没有太大的参考价值(3)虽然我们准备签下大量

的霹雳猫保单，但有一个很重要的前提那就是价格必须要能够与所承担的风险相

当，所以若我们的竞争对手变得乐观积极，那么我们的量就会马上减少，事实上

过去几年市场价格有点低的离谱，这使得大部分的参与者都被用担架抬离场。

　　　　　 At the moment, we believe Berkshire to be the largest U.S. writer

of super-cat business. So when a major quake occurs in an urban area

or a winter storm rages across Europe, light a candle for us.

在此同时，我们相信Berkshire将会成为全美最大的霹雳猫承保公司，所以要是

那天都会地区发生大地震或是发生席卷欧陆地区的风暴时，请点亮蜡烛为我们祈

祷。

Measuring Insurance Performance

衡量保险业的表现

　　　　　 In the previous section I mentioned "float," the funds of others

that insurers, in the conduct of their business, temporarily hold.

Because these funds are available to be invested, the typical

property-casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed

premiums by 7% to 11% and still be able to break even on its business.

Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on

net worth - that is, on the funds provided by shareholders.

在前段文章我曾提到浮存金-也就是保险业者在从事业务时，所暂时持有的资

金，因为这些资金可以用在投资之上，所以产物意外险公司即使在损失与费用超

过保费收入7%到11%，仍能自行吸收达到损益两平，当然这要扣除保险业者本

身的净值，也就是股东自有资金所产生的获利，。

　　　　　 However, many exceptions to this 7% to 11% range exist. For

example, insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage

produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business

are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat,

and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately.

Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no

profit for the insurer.

当然7%到11%的范围还是有许多例外情况，例如保险业者承保谷物冰雹伤害损

失几乎没有浮存金的贡献，保险业者通常是在冰雹即将来临之前才收到保费收

入，而只要其中有任何一位农夫发生损失就要马上支付赔偿金，因此即使谷物冰

雹保险的综合比率为100，保险业者也赚不了半毛钱。

　　　　　 At the other extreme, malpractice insurance covering the potential

liabilities of doctors, lawyers and accountants produces a very high

amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float

materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged

wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further

delayed by lengthy litigation. The industry calls malpractice and

certain other kinds of liability insurance "long- tail" business, in

recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold

large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers (and

to the insurer's lawyers as well).

另外一个极端的例子，执行业务过失保险-一种专门提供给医师、律师与会计师

分散可能责任风险的保险，较之每年收到的保费收入，这部份险种的浮存金就很

高，这种浮存金之所以很重要的原因在于理赔申请案通常会在业务过失发生很长

一段时间之后才会提出，而且真正理赔的时点也会因冗长的法律诉讼程序结束后

才会执行，保险业界统称业务过失保险与其它特定种类的责任保险为"长尾巴业

务"意思是说保险业者在将理赔金支付给申请人跟他的律师(或甚至是保险公司

的律师)之前，可以持有这一大笔的资金相当长的一段时间。

　　　　　 In long-tail situations a combined ratio of 115 (or even more) can

prove profitable, since earnings produced by the float will exceed the

15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch,

though, is that "long-tail" means exactly that: Liability business written

in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a combined

ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300 or worse

when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.

像这种长尾巴业务，通常即使综合比率高达115(或更高)都还可能有获利，因为

在索赔与费用发生之前的那一段时间利用浮存金所赚的利润甚至会超过15%，

但重点是所谓的长尾巴顾名思义，就是在某一年度承接的责任保险保单之时，假

设会有115的综合比率，但结果到最后尾大不掉，经过多年的纠缠，终于和解

的结果，有可能让保险业者承担200、300或是更糟的综合比率。

　　　　　 The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that

too often is ignored: Though certain long-tail lines may prove

profitable at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably

find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead,

prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal

trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance

industry. Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses;

aiming for 110 - 115 is business suicide.

这项业务一定要特别注意一项时常令人忽略的经营原则的陷阱，虽然部份长尾巴

业务在110到115的综合比率之间仍可以获利，但若是保险业者依此比率来订

定保费价格的话很可能会亏大钱，所以保费价格必须要有一个安全的边际空间以

防止当今总是会让保险业有昂贵的意外蹦出来的社会趋势，将综合比率设在100

一定会产生重大的损失，将目标锁定在110-115之间则无异是自杀的行为。

　　　　　 All of that said, what should the measure of an insurer's

profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the

combined ratio - and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good

indicator of where a company ranks in profitability. We believe a better

measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float

developed.

说了那么多，到底该如何衡量一家保险公司的获利能力呢? 分析师与经理人通常

习惯性的会去看综合比率，当然在我们要看一家保险公司是否赚钱时，这项比率

是一个很好的正确指针，但我们认为还有一项数字是更好的衡量标准，那就是承

保损失与浮存金的比率。

　　　　　 This loss/float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance

results, is meaningless over short time periods: Quarterly underwriting

figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be

much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a

rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance

operations. A low cost of funds signifies a good business; a high cost

translates into a poor business.

这种损失/浮存金比率跟其它保险业常用的绩效衡量统计数字一样，必须要有一

段相当长的时间才有意义，单季或甚至是单一年度的数字，会因为估计的成份太

浓而无参考价值，但是只要时间一拉长，这个比率就可以告诉我们保险营运所产

生浮存金的资金成本，若资金成本低就代表这是一家好公司，相反地就是一家烂

公司。

　　　　　 On the next page we show the underwriting loss, if any, of our

insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate

that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year.

From this data we have computed a "cost of funds developed from

insurance."

下一页是我们进入保险业后，每年的承保损失统计(若有的话)，以及每年平均持

有的浮存金数量，从这个表我们可以很轻易地算出保险事业所产生的浮存金其资

金成本是多少。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

---------- ------------- --------------- -----------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 ......... profit $17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 ......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 ......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 ......... $0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 ......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 ......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 ......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 ......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 ......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 ......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 ......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 ......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 ......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 ......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 ......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 ......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 ......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 ......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 ......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 ......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 ......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 ......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 ......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 ......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

　　　　　 The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves, loss

adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus

agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges

applicable to assumed reinsurance. At some insurers other items

should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are

unimportant and have been ignored.

浮存金的数字是将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再

扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，若是别的保险业者可能还有

其它项目需要列入做计算，但因为这些科目在Berkshire并不重要，所以予以省

略。

　　　　　 During 1990 we held about $1.6 billion of float slated eventually

to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we

sustained during the year was $27 million and thus our insurance

operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1.6%. As the table

shows, we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in

those instances our cost of funds was less than zero. In other years,

such as 1984, we paid a very high price for float. In 19 years out of the

24 we have been in insurance, though, we have developed funds at a

cost below that paid by the government.

在1990年我们大概持有16亿美元的浮存金，这些钱会慢慢地流到其它人的手

中，当年度的承保损失约为2,600万美元，因此我们从保险营运所获得的资金，

其成本约为1.6%，而就如同这张表所显示的，有些年度我们有承保获利，所以

我们的资金成本甚至低于零，但是也有些年度，像1984年我们必须为浮存金支

付相当高的成本，但是总计至今24个年度当中有19个年度，我们负担的资金

成本甚至比美国政府发行债券的成本还低。

　　　　　 There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the

fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won't know our true

1967 - 1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been

settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to

shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up

their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to

double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct

investments would be more tax-efficient.

这项计算式有两个重要的要求，首先胖女人漱口都很难听了，更何况还要她唱

歌，除非等到这时间所发生的损失都已确定解决，否则我们不能确定1967年

-1990年的资金成本到底是多少，第二浮存金对于股东的价值有点打折，因为

股东们还必须投入相对的资金来支持保险事业的营运，同时这些资金所赚取的投

资收益又必须面临双重的课税，相较之下直接投资的税负就少多了。

　　　　　 The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders

is in fact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I

would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company

would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their

cost of float. I also think that approximates the correct figure for

Berkshire.

间接投资加诸在股东身上的租税惩罚事实上是相当重的，虽然计算公式铁定没办

法做的很精确，但我估计对于这些保险事业的所有者来说，租税惩罚至少让他们

增加一个百分点以上的资金成本，我想这个数字也适用于Berkshire之上。

　　　　　 Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone

analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or

negative value for shareholders. If this cost (including the tax penalty)

is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds, the value

is negative. If the cost is lower, the value is positive - and if the cost is

significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable

asset.

分析保险事业的资金成本使得任何人都可以据此判断这家公司的营运对于股东

到底是正面的还是负面的，若是这项成本(包含租税惩罚)高于其它替代性的资金

来源，其价值就是负的，若是成本更低，那么对股东便能产生正面的价值，而若

是成本远低于一般水准，那么这个事业就是一项相当有价值的资产。

　　　　　 So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly-lower camp. Even

more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership

interest is now 48% and which customarily operates at an underwriting

profit. GEICO's growth has generated an ever-larger amount of funds

for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than

zero. Essentially, GEICO's policyholders, in aggregate, pay the

company interest on the float rather than the other way around. (But

handsome is as handsome does: GEICO's unusual profitability results

from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification

of risks, a package that in turn allows rock-bottom prices for

policyholders.)

到目前为止，Berkshire算是资金成本相当低的那类，虽然我们拥有48%股权的

GEICO的比率更好，且通常每年都享有承保获利，GEICO藉由不断地成长提供

越来越多的资金以供投资，而且它的资金成本还远低于零成本以下，意思是说

GEICO的保单持有人不但要先付保费给公司而且还要支付利息，(但就像有人又

帅又有才干，GEICO非凡的获利能力导因于公司经营的效率与对风险的严格分

类，如此使得保户也可享受超低价格的保单)。

　　　　　 Many well-known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur

an underwriting loss/float cost that, combined with the tax penalty,

produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies,

like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that

could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float

right off the chart. Unless these companies can materially improve

their underwriting performance - and history indicates that is an

almost impossible task - their shareholders will experience results

similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate

of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.

在另外一方面，许多知名的保险公司，在考量承保损失/浮存金成本，再加上租

税惩罚之后，事实上让股东产生负的报酬，此外这些公司像其它业者一样，相当

容易受到大型灾害的伤害，在扣除再保部份所得到的保护之后，资金成本率还是

有可能升高到无以复加的地步，而除非这些公司能够大幅改善其承保的成绩，历

史的经验显示这是项不可能的任务，这些股东很可能会和吸收较高的存款利息支

出，却只能收到较低的借款利息收入的银行股东一样的下场。

　　　　　 All in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have

expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we

have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these

low-cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes, but

they have been more than compensated for this cost (so far) by the

benefits produced by the float.

总的来说，保险营运给我们的回报算是相当不错的了，我们的保险浮存金以合理

的资金成本率持续增加，而靠着这些低成本的资金赚取更高的投资报酬使我们的

事业蒸蒸日上，确实我们的股东必须负担额外的税负，但大家从这样低的资金成

本所获得的利益却补回更多(至少到目前为止是如此)。

　　　　　 A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was

achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior

to Mike Goldberg's arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for

error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many

years later, the bills keep arriving for these mistakes: In the insurance

business, there is no statute of limitations on stupidity.

尤其有更令人振奋的一点，这些记录还包含本人之前所犯下一些重大的错误，在

Mike Goldberg接手后，应该会有更好的成绩，保险往往会有一大堆让你发生

错误的机会，而通常在这些机会敲门时，我都会响应，以致于经过那么多年之后，

到现在我们还必须为我以前所犯的那些错误付出代价，在保险业愚蠢的程度是没

有上限的。

　　　　　 The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far

more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or

newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is

worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the

problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one - among

all the fine businesses we own - that has the greatest potential.

我们保险事业的实际价值永远比其它事业如糖果或是报纸事业难以估计，但是不

管用任何计算方法，保险事业的价值一定远高于其帐面价值，更重要的是虽然保

险业让我们三不五时会出状况，但这行业却是我们现在所有不错的事业当中，最

有成长潜力的。

Marketable Securities

有价证券投资

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over

$100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to

subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关

系企业所持有)。

12/31/90

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............ $ 517,500 $1,377,375

46,700,000 The Coca-Cola Co. ................... 1,023,920 2,171,550

2,400,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. ... 71,729 117,000

6,850,000 GEICO Corp. ......................... 45,713 1,110,556

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ......... 9,731 342,097

5,000,000 Wells Fargo & Company ............... 289,431 289,375

Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our

investment style: This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five

of our six major holdings. The exception was Wells Fargo, a

superbly-managed, high-return banking operation in which we

increased our ownership to just under 10%, the most we can own

without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one-sixth of

our position was bought in 1989, the rest in 1990.

树濑天生特有的懒散正代表着我们的投资模式，今年我们没有增加也没有处分任

何持股，除了Wells Fargo这家拥有良好的经营团队，并享有相当高的股东权益

报酬率的银行，所以我们将持股比率增加到10%左右，这是我们可以不必向联

准会申报的最高上限，其中六分之一是在1989年买进，剩下的部份则是在1990

年增加。

The banking business is no favorite of ours. When assets are

twenty times equity - a common ratio in this industry - mistakes that

involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of

equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at

many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that

we described last year when discussing the "institutional imperative:"

the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their

peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many

bankers played follow-the-leader with lemming-like zeal; now they

are experiencing a lemming-like fate.

银行业并不是我们的最爱，因为这个行业的特性是资产约为股权的20倍，这代

表只要资产发生一点问题就有可能把股东权益亏光光，而偏偏大银行出问题早已

变成是常态而非特例，许多情况是管理当局的疏失，就像是去年度我们曾提到的

系统规范-也就是经营主管会不自主的模仿其它同业的做法，不管这些行为有多

愚蠢，在从事放款业务时，许多银行业者也都有旅鼠那种追随领导者的行为倾

向，所以现在他们也必须承担像旅鼠一样的命运。

Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial

strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of

a poorly-managed bank at a "cheap" price. Instead, our only interest is

in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.

因为20比1的比率，使得所有的优势与缺点所造成的影响对会被放大，我们对

于用便宜的价格买下经营不善的银行一点兴趣都没有，相反地我们希望能够以合

理的价格买进一些经营良好的银行。

With Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers

in the business, Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen. In many ways the

combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another - Tom Murphy

and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC. First, each pair is stronger than

the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts and

admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people

well, but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed. Third, both

attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when

they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand

and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt.

(Thomas J. Watson Sr. of IBM followed the same rule: "I'm no genius,"

he said. "I'm smart in spots - but I stay around those spots.")

在Wells Fargo，我想我们找到银行界最好的经理人Carl Reichardt与Paul

Hazen，在许多方面这两个人的组合使我联想到另外一对搭档，那就是资本城

/ABC的Tom Murphy与Dan Burke，首先两个人加起来的力量都大于个别单

打独斗，因为每个人都了解、信任并尊敬对方，其次他们对于有才能的人从不吝

啬，但也同时厌恶冗员过多，第三尽管公司获利再好，他们控制成本的努力不曾

稍减，最后两者都坚持自己所熟悉的，让他们的能力而非自尊来决定成败，就像

IBM的Thomas Watson曾说:「我不是天才，我只是有点小聪明，不过我却充

分运用这些小聪明。」

Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic

market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate: Month by month

the foolish loan decisions of once well-regarded banks were put on

public display. As one huge loss after another was unveiled - often on

the heels of managerial assurances that all was well - investors

understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted.

Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our 10% interest

in Wells Fargo for $290 million, less than five times after-tax earnings,

and less than three times pre-tax earnings.

我们是在1990年银行股一片混乱之间买进Wells Fargo的股份的，这种失序的

现象是很合理的，几个月来有些原本经营名声不错的银行，其错误的贷款决定却

一一被媒体揭露，随着一次又一次庞大的损失数字被公布，银行业的诚信与保证

也一次又一次地被践踏，渐渐地投资人越来越不敢相信银行的财务报表数字，趁

着大家出脱银行股之际，我们却逆势以2.9亿美元，五倍不到的本益比(若是以

税前获利计算，则本益比甚至不到三倍)，买进Wells Fargo 10%的股份。

Wells Fargo is big - it has $56 billion in assets - and has been

earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets. Our purchase

of one-tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to

our buying 100% of a $5 billion bank with identical financial

characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have

to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover,

that $5 billion bank, commanding a premium price, would present us

with another problem: We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to

run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly

recruited than any others in the banking business; no one, however,

has been able to hire the dean.

Wells Fargo实在是相当的大，帐面资产高达560亿美元，股东权益报酬率高

达20%，资产报酬率则为1.25%，买下他10%的股权相当于以买下一家50亿

美元资产100%股权，但是真要有这样条件的银行，其价码可能会是2.9亿美元

的一倍以上，此外就算真的可以买得到，我们同样也要面临另外一个问题，那就

是找不到像Carl Reichardt这样的人才来经营，近几年来，从Wells Fargo出

身的经理人一直广受各家银行同业所欢迎，但想要请到这家银行的老宗师可就不

是一件容易的事了。

Of course, ownership of a bank - or about any other business -

is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major

earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn

destroy the banks lending to them. A second risk is systemic - the

possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it

would endanger almost every highly-leveraged institution, no matter

how intelligently run. Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is

that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding

and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion.

Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be

particularly vulnerable.

当然拥有一家银行的股权，或是其它企业也一样，绝非没有风险，像加州的银行

就因为位于地震带而必须承担客户受到大地震影响而还不出借款的风险，第二个

风险是属于系统性的，也就是严重的企业萧条或是财务风暴导致这些高财务杠杆

经营的金融机构，不管经营的再好都有相当的危机，最后市场当时主要的考虑点

是美国西岸的房地产因为供给过多而崩盘的风险，连带使得融资给这些扩张建案

的银行承担钜额的损失，而也因为Wells Fargo就是市场上最大的不动产借款银

行，一般咸认它最容易受到伤害。

None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of

the first two occurring, however, is low and even a meaningful drop in

real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for

well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics: Wells Fargo

currently earns well over $1 billion pre-tax annually after expensing

more than $300 million for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the

bank's loans - not just its real estate loans - were hit by problems in

1991, and these produced losses (including foregone interest)

averaging 30% of principal, the company would roughly break even.

以上所提到的风险都很难加以排除，当然第一点与第二点的可能性相当低，而且

即使是房地产大幅的下跌，对于经营绩效良好的银行也不致造成太大的问题，我

们可以简单地算一下，Wells Fargo现在一年在提列3亿美元的损失准备之后，

税前还可以赚10亿美元以上，今天假若该银行所有的480亿借款中有10%在

1991年发生问题，且估计其中有30%的本金将收不回来，必须全部转为损失(包

含收不回来的利息)，则在这种情况下，这家银行还是可以损益两平。

A year like that - which we consider only a low-level possibility,

not a likelihood - would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire we would

love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced

no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn 20% on

growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real estate disaster

similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells

Fargo stock to fall almost 50% within a few months during 1990. Even

though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the

fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many

more shares at the new, panic prices.

若是真有一年如此，虽然我们认为这种情况发生的可能性相当低，我们应该还可

以忍受，事实上在Berkshire选择购并或是投资一家公司，头一年不赚钱没有关

系，只要以后每年能够有20%的股东权益报酬率，尽管如此，加州大地震使得

投资人害怕新英格兰地区也会有同样的危险，导致Wells Fargo在1990年几个

月间大跌50%以上，虽然在股价下跌前我们已买进一些股份，但股价下跌使我

们可以开心地用更低的价格捡到更多的股份。

Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments

throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward

market fluctuations; instead many illogically become euphoric when

stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such

confusion in their reaction to food prices: Knowing they are forever

going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore

price increases. (It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining

prices.) Similarly, at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for

newsprint - even though it would mean marking down the value of the

large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand - because we

know we are going to be perpetually buying the product.

以长期投资作为终生目标的投资人对于股市波动也应该采取同样的态度，千万不

要因为股市涨就欣喜若狂，股市跌就如丧考妣，奇怪的是他们对于食物的价格就

一点都不会搞错，很清楚知道自己每天一定会买食物，当食物价格下跌时，他们

可高兴的很，(要烦恼的应该是卖食物的人)，同样的在水牛城报纸我们期望印刷

成本能够降低，虽然这代表我们必须将帐列的新闻印刷存货价值向下调整，因为

我们很清楚，我们必须一直买进这些产品。

Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire's

investments. We will be buying businesses - or small parts of

businesses, called stocks - year in, year out as long as I live (and

longer, if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled).

Given these intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and

rising prices hurt us.

同样的原则也适用在Berkshire的投资之上，只要我还健在(若我死后，Berkshire

的董事会愿意透过我所安排的降神会接受我的指示，则期间或许更长久)，我们

会年复一年买下企业或是企业的一部份-也就是股票，也因此企业的价格下跌对

我们会更有利，反之则可能会对我们不利。

The most common cause of low prices is pessimism - some

times pervasive, some times specific to a company or industry. We

want to do business in such an environment, not because we like

pessimism but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism

that is the enemy of the rational buyer.

股价不振最主要的原因是悲观的情绪，有时是全面性的，有时则仅限于部份产业

或是公司，我们很期望能够在这种环境下做生意，不是因为我们天生喜欢悲观，

而是如此可以得到便宜的价格买进更多好的公司，乐观是理性投资人最大的敌

人。

None of this means, however, that a business or stock is an

intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular; a contrarian

approach is just as foolish as a follow-the-crowd strategy. What's

required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand

Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in

the financial world: "Most men would rather die than think. Many do."

当然以上所述并不代表不受欢迎或注意的股票或企业就是好的投资标的，反向操

作有可能与群众心理一样的愚蠢，真正重要的是独立思考而不是投票表决，不幸

的是Bertrand Russell对于人性的观察同样地也适用于财务投资之上，「大多

数的人宁死也不愿意去思考！」。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our other major portfolio change last year was large additions to

our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds, securities that we first bought in

late 1989. At yearend 1990 we had $440 million invested in these

securities, an amount that approximated market value. (As I write this,

however, their market value has risen by more than $150 million.)

我们去年其它主要的投资组合的变动就是增加RJR Nabisco的债券，我们是在

1989年开始买进这种有价证券，到了1990年底我们的投资金额约为4.4亿美

元，与目前的市价相当(不过在撰写年报的同时，他们的市价已增加了1.5亿美

元)。

Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is

the purchase of below-investment-grade bonds. But opportunities

that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile

impact on Berkshire's results are rare. Therefore, we will look at any

category of investment, so long as we understand the business we're

buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly.

(Woody Allen, in another context, pointed out the advantage of

open-mindedness: "I can't understand why more people aren't

bi-sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday

night.")

就像我们很少买进银行股，同样地我们也很少买进投资等级以下的债券，不过能

够引起我们兴趣的投资机会，同时规模大到足以对Berkshire有相当影响力的投

资机会实在是不多，因此我们愿意尝试各种不同的投资工具，只要我们对于即将

买进的投资标的有相当的了解，同时价格与价值有相当大的差距(伍迪艾伦也另

一句台词用来形容开明的好处︰「我实在不了解为什么有那么多人排斥双性恋，

人们在星期六夜晚至少可以有多一倍的机会能够约会？」)。

In the past we have bought a few below-investment-grade

bonds with success, though these were all old-fashioned "fallen

angels" - bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were

downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times. In the 1984 annual

report we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel, the

Washington Public Power Supply System.

在过去我们也曾成功地投资了好几次投资等级以下的债券，虽然他们多是传统上

所谓的失翼的天使，意思是指原先发行时属于投资等级但后来因为公司出现问题

而被降等，在1984年的年报中我们也曾经提到过买进华盛顿公用电力系统债券

的原因。

A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment

scene in the 1980s - "junk bonds" that were far below investmentgrade

when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of

manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable

outcome occurred: Junk bonds lived up to their name. In 1990 - even

before the recession dealt its blows - the financial sky became dark

with the bodies of failing corporations.

不过到了1980年代大量假冒的失翼的天使充斥着整个投资界，也就是所谓的垃

圾债券，这些债券在发行时企业本身的信用评等就不佳，十几年下来垃圾债券越

来越垃圾，最后真的变成名符其实的垃圾，到了1990年代在经济衰退引发债权

危机之前，整个投资界的天空已布满着这些假冒失翼天使的尸体。

The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't

happen: Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to

focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the

steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed

with intensified care. We'll acknowledge that such an attention-getter

would produce a very alert driver. But another certain consequence

would be a deadly - and unnecessary - accident if the car hit even the

tiniest pothole or sliver of ice. The roads of business are riddled with

potholes; a plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.

迷信这些债券的门徒一再强调不可能发生崩盘的危机，钜额的债务会迫使公司经

理人更专注于经营，就像是一位驾驶开着一辆轮胎上插着一只匕首的破车，大家

可以确定这位驾驶一定会小心翼翼地开车，当然我们绝对相信这位驾驶一定会相

当小心谨慎，但是另外却还有一个变量必须克服，那就是只要车子碰到一个小坑

洞或是一小片雪就可能造成致命的车祸，而偏偏在商业的道路上，遍布着各种坑

坑洞洞，一个要求必须避开所有坑洞的计画实在是一个相当危险的计画。

In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham

forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to

distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the

motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still

think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed

this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s

began.

在葛拉罕智能型投资人的最后一章中，很强烈地驳斥这种匕首理论，如果要将稳

健的投资浓缩成三字箴言，那就是安全边际，在读到这篇文章的42年后，我仍

深深相信这三个字，没能注意到这个简单原则的投资人在1990年代开始就会慢

慢尝到损失的痛苦。

At the height of the debt mania, capital structures were

concocted that guaranteed failure: In some cases, so much debt was

issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce

the funds to service it. One particularly egregious "kill- 'em-at-birth"

case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television

station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that the interest on it

exceeded the station's gross revenues. Even if you assume that all

labor, programs and services were donated rather than purchased, this

capital structure required revenues to explode - or else the station

was doomed to go broke. (Many of the bonds that financed the

purchase were sold to now-failed savings and loan associations; as a

taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly.)

在债务恐慌最高点的时候，资本结构注定导致失败的发生，有些公司的融资杠杆

高到即使是再好的企业也无法负担，有一个特别惨、一出生就夭折的案例，就是

一个坦帕湾地方电视台的购并案，这个案子一年的利息负担甚至还超过他一整年

的营收，也就是说即使所有的人工、节目与服务都不须成本，且营收也能有爆炸

性的成长，这家电视台还是会步上倒闭的命运，(许多债券都是由现在大多倒闭

的储贷机构买进，所以身为纳税义务人的你，等于间接替这些愚蠢的行为买单)。

All of this seems impossible now. When these misdeeds were

done, however, dagger-selling investment bankers pointed to the

"scholarly" research of academics, which reported that over the years

the higher interest rates received from low-grade bonds had more

than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the

friendly salesmen, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce

greater net returns than would a portfolio of high-grade bonds.

(Beware of past-performance "proofs" in finance: If history books

were the key to riches, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)

现在看起来这种情况当然不太可能再发生，当这些错误的行为发生时，专门贩卖

匕首的投资银行家纷纷把责任推给学术单位，表示研究显示低等级债券所收到的

利息收入应该可以弥补投资人所承担可能收不回本金的风险，因此推断说好心的

业务员所介绍给客户的高收益债券将给客户带来比高等级债券更好的收益，(特

别要小心财务学上过去的统计资料实证，若历史资料是致富之钥，那么富比士四

百大富豪不都应该是图书馆员吗?)

There was a flaw in the salesmen's logic - one that a first- year

student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being

made that the universe of newly-minted junk bonds was identical to

the universe of low-grade fallen angels and that, therefore, the default

experience of the latter group was meaningful in predicting the default

experience of the new issues. (That was an error similar to checking

the historical death rate from Kool-Aid before drinking the version

served at Jonestown.)

不过这些业务员的逻辑有一个漏洞，这是统计系的新生都知道的，那就是假设所

有新发行的垃圾债券都与以前的失翼天使一样，也就是说前者还不出本金的机率

与后者是一样的，(这种错误就像是在喝Jonestown的毒药之前，以过去的死亡

率为参考)。

The universes were of course dissimilar in several vital respects.

For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned

to regain investment-grade status and worked toward that goal. The

junk-bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving

much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a

cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix.

Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the

typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more finely

developed than were those of the junk-bond-issuing financiopath.

这个世界在许多方面当然有很大的不同，对于开拓者来说，失翼天使的经理人无

不渴望重新到投资等级的名单之上，，但是垃圾债券的经营者就全然不是那么一

回事了，不思解决其为债务所苦的困境，反而偏好运用英雄式的行径，寻找暂时

解脱之道，此外失翼天使忠诚的敏感特质通常比那些垃圾债券经营者要来的好的

多。

Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the Street's

enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to

the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by

those who didn't care to those who didn't think - and there was no

shortage of either.

华尔街对于这样的差异根本就不在乎，通常华尔街关心的不是它到底有多少优缺

点，而是它可以产生多少收入，成千上万的垃圾债券就是由这帮不在乎的人卖给

那些不懂得思考之人。

Junk bonds remain a mine field, even at prices that today are

often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have

never bought a new issue of a junk bond. (The only time to buy these

is on a day with no "y" in it.) We are, however, willing to look at the

field, now that it is in disarray.

即使现在垃圾债券的市场价格只有发行价格的一点点，它还是个地雷区，就像是

去年我们曾经说过的，我们从来不买新发行的垃圾债券，(唯一会买进的时点是

没有y之时)，不过趁现在市场一遍混乱，我们倒是愿意花点时间看看。

In the case of RJR Nabisco, we feel the Company's credit is

considerably better than was generally perceived for a while and that

the yield we receive, as well as the potential for capital gain, more than

compensates for the risk we incur (though that is far from nil). RJR has

made asset sales at favorable prices, has added major amounts of

equity, and in general is being run well.

在RJR Nabisco这个案子我们认为这家公司的债信要比外界想象中好一点，同

时我们感觉潜在的利益，应该可以弥补我们要承担的风险(虽然绝非无风险)，RJR

资产处份的价格还算不错，股东权益增加了许多，现在经营也渐上轨道了。

However, as we survey the field, most low-grade bonds still look

unattractive. The handiwork of the Wall Street of the 1980s is even

worse than we had thought: Many important businesses have been

mortally wounded. We will, though, keep looking for opportunities as

the junk market continues to unravel.

然而在我们看了市场以后发现，大部分低等级的债券还是不具吸引力，华尔街

1980年代的技术比我们想象中差多了，许多重要生意都大受影响，不过我们还

是会继续在垃圾债券市场中寻找好的投资机会。

Convertible Preferred Stocks

可转换特别股

　　　　　 We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in

earlier reports: $700 million of Salomon Inc, $600 million of The

Gillette Company, $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. and $300 million

of Champion International Corp. Our Gillette holdings will be

converted into 12 million shares of common stock on April 1.

Weighing interest rates, credit quality and prices of the related

common stocks, we can assess our holdings in Salomon and

Champion at yearend 1990 as worth about what we paid, Gillette as

worth somewhat more, and USAir as worth substantially less.

我们持续持有先前向各位报告过的可转换特别股，包括所罗门7亿美金、吉列6

亿美金、美国航空3.58亿美金与冠军企业3亿美金。我们吉列的特别股将会在

4月1日转换为1,200万股的普通股，在衡量利率、债信与普通股的价格之后，

我们可以确信在所罗门与冠军企业的投资现值应该与我们当初的成本差不多，吉

列的价值比成本高，至于美国航空的价值则远低于当初的投资成本。

　　　　 In making the USAir purchase, your Chairman displayed exquisite

timing: I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it

ran into severe problems. (No one pushed me; in tennis parlance, I

committed an "unforced error.") The company's troubles were brought

on both by industry conditions and by the post-merger difficulties it

encountered in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have

expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by

operational turmoil.

在投资美国航空时，本人在下我真是抓对了时点，我几乎是在航空业爆发严重的

问题之前，跳进去这个产业，(没有人强迫我，如同在网球场上，我把它形容做

是非受迫性失误)，美国航空问题的发生，导因于产业本身的状况与对Piedmont

购并后所产生的后遗症，这点我应该要早该预料到，因为几乎所有的航空业购并

案最后的结果都是一团混乱。

　　　　　 In short order, Ed Colodny and Seth Schofield resolved the second

problem: The airline now gets excellent marks for service.

Industry-wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our

purchase, the economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an

alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain

carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers

illustrates an important truth: In a business selling a commodity-type

product, it's impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest

competitor.

在这不久之后，Ed Colodny与Seth Schofield解决了第二个难题，美国航空现

在的服务受到好评，不过整个产业所面临的问题却越来越严重，自从我们开始投

资之后，航空业的状况便很急遽地恶化，尤其再加上某些业者自杀性的杀价竞

争，这样的结果导致所有的航空业者都面临一项残酷的事实，在销售制式化商品

的产业之中，你很难比最笨的竞争对手聪明到哪里去。

　　　　　 However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few

years, our USAir investment should work out all right. Ed and Seth

have decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major

changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than

at the time I made it.

不过除非在未来几年内，航空业全面地崩溃，否则我们在美国航空的投资应该能

够确保安全无虞，Ed与Seth很果决地在营运上做了一些重大的改变来解决目前

营运所面临的问题，虽然如此，我们的投资现在的情况比起当初还是差了一点。

　　　　　 Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities,

yet I should warn you that, if the past is any guide, you may from time

to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last

year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value

of all our preferreds as equal to that of the common stock into which

they are convertible. By their logic, that is, our Salomon preferred,

convertible into common at $38, would be worth 60% of face value if

Salomon common were selling at $22.80. But there is a small problem

with this line of reasoning: Using it, one must conclude that all of the

value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and

that the value of a non-convertible preferred of Salomon would be

zero, no matter what its coupon or terms for redemption.

我们的可转换特别股算是相当单纯的投资工具，不过我还是必须警告各位，若是

过去的经验有任何参考价值，大家可能还是会读到一些不正确或是误导的讯息，

举例来说像去年，有几家报章杂志错误地将它们的价值与可以转换的普通股价格

混为一谈，我们的所罗门特别股转换价格为38美元，根据它们的逻辑，由于所

罗门普通股的现价为22.8美元，所以其可转换特别股的价值只有面额的60%，

但这样的推论却有一个盲点，因为这样的说法表示所有的可转换特别股，其价值

只在其所拥有的转换权利，至于所罗门不可转换的债券价值则为零，不管它所拥

有的赎回条件为何。

　　　　　 The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our

convertible preferreds is derived from their fixed-income

characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than

the value they would possess as non-convertible preferreds and may

be worth more because of their conversion options.

大家必须特别记住的一点是我们可转换特别股大部分的价值其实是来自于固定

收益的特性，这意思是说这些有价证券的价值不可能低于一般不具转换权的特别

股，相反地会因为它们拥有可转换的选择权而具有更高的价值。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　 I deeply regret having to end this section of the report with a note

about my friend, Colman Mockler, Jr., CEO of Gillette, who died in

January. No description better fitted Colman than "gentleman" - a

word signifying integrity, courage and modesty. Couple these qualities

with the humor and exceptional business ability that Colman

possessed and you can understand why I thought it an undiluted

pleasure to work with him and why I, and all others who knew him, will

miss Colman so much.

很遗憾我必须在报告末段以我的好朋友Colman Mockler-吉列的CEO在今年

一月过世做为结尾，除了「绅士」这个代表品格、勇气与谦和的字，没有其它字

更能贴切形容Colman这个人，除了这些特质之外，再加上他所拥有的幽默与

超凡的经营能力，所以大家应该可以想象与他共事是多么令人感到愉快的一件

事，这也是为何包含我在内的许多人，会对他感到特别怀念的缘故。

　　　　　 A few days before Colman died, Gillette was richly praised in a

Forbes cover story. Its theme was simple: The company's success in

shaving products has come not from marketing savvy (though it

exhibits that talent repeatedly) but has instead resulted from its

devotion to quality. This mind-set has caused it to consistently focus

its energies on coming up with something better, even though its

existing products already ranked as the class of the field. In so

depicting Gillette, Forbes in fact painted a portrait of Colman.

在Colman死之前几天，吉列受到富比士以封面故事大加赞扬，标题很简单，

这家公司在刮胡刀产业的成功，不单单只靠行销手段(虽然他们一再展现这方面

的能力)，同时更源自于他们对于品质的追求，这种心理建设使得他们持续将精

力摆在推出更新更好的产品之上，虽然现有的产品已是市场上最经典的，富比士

对于吉列的形容，就好象是在描述Colman本人一样。

Help! Help!

救命!救命!

　　　　　 Regular readers know that I shamelessly utilize the annual letter in

an attempt to acquire businesses for Berkshire. And, as we constantly

preach at the Buffalo News, advertising does work: Several businesses

have knocked on our door because someone has read in these pages

of our interest in making acquisitions. (Any good ad salesman will tell

you that trying to sell something without advertising is like winking at

a girl in the dark.)

熟悉的读者都知道我经常利用年报不顾廉耻地替Berkshire寻找合适的投资标

的，此外我们也常常在水牛城报纸刊登广告征求投资标的，而如此的宣传做法确

实也收到效果，有好几家企业收到我们相关的讯息后，上门前来(任何好的业务

销售人员都会告诉你不靠广告卖东西就好象是在黑夜里对于女孩扎眼一样没有

用)。

　　　　　 In Appendix B (on pages 26-27) I've reproduced the essence of a

letter I wrote a few years back to the owner/manager of a desirable

business. If you have no personal connection with a business that

might be of interest to us but have a friend who does, perhaps you can

pass this report along to him.

附录B是我回信给一位可能的卖方的摘要，若是你知道那家企业可能会是我们有

兴趣的标的，同时你有认识的朋友在那家企业，欢迎你直接将这份资料送给他参

考。

　　　　　 Here's the sort of business we are looking for:

　　　　 (1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

　　　　 (2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are

of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),

　　　　 (3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing

little or no debt,

　　　　 (4) Management in place (we can't supply it),

　　　　 (5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't

understand it),

　　　　 (6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of

the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price

is unknown).

以下就是我们想要找的企业条件

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

　　　　　 We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise

complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within

five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for

cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in

intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过

五分钟) ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样

多，否则不考虑发行股份。

　　　　　 Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-

Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's ownermanagers

wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for

themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the

same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who

continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think

we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We

invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom

we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望

能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往

常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意

的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。

　　　　　 Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that

don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you

advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping

to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses

our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales:

"When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me."

另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机

股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有

一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，对于这类的事业，有首乡村歌曲其中的一句

歌词最能描述我们的感觉，「若电话不响，你就知道那是我」。

　　　　　 Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as

described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of

large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold

in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, and Champion. We are not

interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we

might make in the general stock market.

除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股

份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空与冠军企业这几个Case一样

的公司，不过对于一般直接从股票市场上买进股份的建议我们，则一点兴趣都没

有。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

　　　　　 Ken Chace has decided not to stand for reelection as a director at

our upcoming annual meeting. We have no mandatory retirement age

for directors at Berkshire (and won't!), but Ken, at 75 and living in

Maine, simply decided to cut back his activities.

Ken Chace决定从今年股东会起不再担任本公司的董事，在Berkshire我们没

有强制董事退休的年龄限制(以后绝对也不会有)，但是住在缅因州75岁的Ken

还是决定减少自己在Berkshire的活动量。

　　　　　 Ken was my immediate choice to run the textile operation after

Buffett Partnership, Ltd. assumed control of Berkshire early in 1965.

Although I made an economic mistake in sticking with the textile

business, I made no mistake in choosing Ken: He ran the operation

well, he was always 100% straight with me about its problems, and he

generated the funds that allowed us to diversify into insurance.

Ken是我在1965年透过巴菲特合伙入主Berkshire时，选择经营纺织事业的

第一人选，虽然我在坚持纺织事业继续经营上做了错误的决策，但选择Ken却

是正确的决定，他把公司经营的非常好，对于所面临的问题也是百分之百地坦

诚，更重要的是他产生出足够让我们进军保险业的资金。

　　　　　 My wife, Susan, will be nominated to succeed Ken. She is now the

second largest shareholder of Berkshire and if she outlives me will

inherit all of my stock and effectively control the company. She knows,

and agrees, with my thoughts on successor management and also

shares my view that neither Berkshire nor its subsidiary businesses

and important investments should be sold simply because some very

high bid is received for one or all.

我的内人Susan将会被提名接替Ken担任董事，她个人现在是Berkshire第二

大股东，而且要是她活的比我久的话，还会继承我个人所持有的股份，进而取得

公司的控制权，她明了也完全同意我个人对于可能接替人选的想法，同时也认同

不管是Berkshire本身或是旗下事业与主要的投资，都不会单纯地因为有人出高

价要买，便轻易地对外出售。

　　　　　 I feel strongly that the fate of our businesses and their managers

should not depend on my health - which, it should be added, is

excellent - and I have planned accordingly. Neither my estate plan nor

that of my wife is designed to preserve the family fortune; instead,

both are aimed at preserving the character of Berkshire and returning

the fortune to society.

我强烈地感觉Berkshire企业与经理人的命运不应该依赖在我个人的健康之

上，当然若是因此可以加分会更好，为此我已做好的万全的计画，不管是我个人

或是我内人的遗嘱都不打算将这些财产留给家族，相反地重点会放在如何保持

Berkshire的特质，并将所有的财富回归给社会。

　　　　　 Were I to die tomorrow, you could be sure of three things: (1)

None of my stock would have to be sold; (2) Both a controlling

shareholder and a manager with philosophies similar to mine would

follow me; and (3) Berkshire's earnings would increase by $1 million

annually, since Charlie would immediately sell our corporate jet, The

Indefensible (ignoring my wish that it be buried with me).

所以万一要是明天我突然死了，大家可以确定三件事(1)我在Berkshire的股份，

一股都不会卖(2)继承我的所有权人与经理人一定会遵循我的投资哲学

(3)Berkshire的盈余会因为出售我个人的专用飞机-无可辩解号，每年可增加

100万美元(不要管我希望让她陪葬的遗愿)。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　 About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1990

shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made

through the program were $5.8 million, and 2,600 charities were

recipients.

大约有97.3%的有效股权参与1990年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约580万美

元捐出的款项分配给2,600家慈善机构。

　　　　　 We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our

shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages

54-55. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your

shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1991 will be ineligible for the 1991 program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在

未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是

受托人的名下，必须在1991年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1991

年的捐赠计画。

　　　　　 In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that

Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make

contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million

annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The

United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our

businesses.

Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计画对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每

年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在150万美元左右。

这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐

出的相当。

　　　　　 However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the

parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad

national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest

to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your

employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or

other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe

they should use their own money, not yours.

然而不管是旗下事业或是母公司的经理人在利用Berkshire的资金对外捐赠给

全国性组织或特别利益团体时，都是以站在股东利益立场所应该做的，相对地若

是你的员工也包含CEO在内，想要与其校友会或其它人建立个人关系的，我们

认为他们最好是用自己的钱，而不是从你的口袋里掏钱。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　 The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater

in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 29, 1991.

Attendance last year grew to a record 1,300, about a 100-fold

increase from ten years ago.

今年的股东会预计在1991年4月29日，星期一早上9点30分举行在

Orpheum中心召开，去年股东会参加人数突破1,300人，大概是十年前的一

百倍。

　　　　　 We recommend getting your hotel reservations early at one of

these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but

nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red

Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3)

the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim's

and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the

Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting, and return

after it ends.

我们建议大家最好先向以下旅馆预订房间(1)Radisson-Redick旅馆-就位在

Orpheum中心对街拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆(2)较大一点的Red Lion旅馆

-离Orpheum中心约五分钟路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奥玛哈西区，离波仙珠

宝店约100公尺，开车到市中心约需20分钟，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返

股东会会场。

　　　　　 Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can

make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of

the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting

anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent,

owner-related questions.

查理跟我一直都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可

由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的

股东像Berkshire的股东一样由高智能水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。

　　　　　 An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain

the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday

parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number

of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also

contains information about them.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说

明供大家参考。

　　　　　 As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture

Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you to downtown

hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time

to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving

early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from

10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on

Sundays. While there, stop at the See's Candy cart and see for yourself

the dawn of synergism at Berkshire.

一如往常，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭

店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天

到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星

期日则从中午开到下午5点30分，到那里时记得到喜斯糖果摊逛逛，看看

Berkshire企业综效的初步成果。

　　　　　 Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for

shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 28.

At our Sunday opening last year you made Ike very happy: After

totaling the day's volume, he suggested to me that we start holding

annual meetings quarterly. Join us at Borsheim's even if you just come

to watch; it's a show you shouldn't miss.

波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别破例，4月28日星期天从中

午开到下午6点，去年由于大家的卖力表现让Ike相当的开心，在看过那天的业

绩数字之后，他建议我们最好能够每一季都召开股东会，今年记得到波仙去看

看，就算不买也没有关系，那是一场你不能错过的秀。

　　　　　 Last year the first question at the annual meeting was asked by

11-year-old Nicholas Kenner, a third-generation shareholder from

New York City. Nicholas plays rough: "How come the stock is down?"

he fired at me. My answer was not memorable.

去年股东会第一个问题是由来自纽约11岁的Nicholas Kenner所提出，他们

一家三代都是Berkshire的股东，一开场Nicholas就来硬的，：「为什么股价

会下跌?」面对如此强大的火力，我的回答却不甚了了。

　　　　　 We hope that other business engagements won't keep Nicholas

away from this year's meeting. If he attends, he will be offered the

chance to again ask the first question; Charlie and I want to tackle him

while we're fresh. This year, however, it's Charlie's turn to answer.

我希望今年Nicholas最好有其它的事要忙，不要来参加今年的股东会，若他真

的出席了，他可能有机会再提出第一个问题，查理跟我都希望尽量不要碰到他，

还好今年轮到查理先回答。

March 1, 1991

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1991年3月1日

　 APPENDIX A

U. S. STEEL ANNOUNCES SWEEPING MODERNIZATION SCHEME*

* An unpublished satire by Ben Graham, written in 1936 and given by the

author to Warren Buffett in 1954.

附录A

美国钢铁公司宣布全面更新计画

本文是葛拉罕于1936年所写未对外公开的讽刺性文章，由巴菲特于1954年提供

　　　　　　　　　　 Myron C. Taylor, Chairman of U. S. Steel Corporation, today

announced the long awaited plan for completely modernizing the

world's largest industrial enterprise. Contrary to expectations, no

changes will be made in the company's manufacturing or selling

policies. Instead, the bookkeeping system is to be entirely revamped.

By adopting and further improving a number of modern accounting

and financial devices the corporation's earning power will be

amazingly transformed. Even under the subnormal conditions of 1935,

it is estimated that the new bookkeeping methods would have yielded

a reported profit of close to $50 per share on the common stock. The

scheme of improvement is the result of a comprehensive survey made

by Messrs. Price, Bacon, Guthrie & Colpitts; it includes the following

six points:

Myron C. Taylor-美国钢铁公司的董事长，今天宣布令人期待已久，有关全世

界最大的制造公司的全面更新计画，与预期相反的，公司的制造或是销售政策全

部没有变动，反而是会计帐务系统做了大幅度的调整，在采取一系列最新最好的

现代会计与财务措施之后，公司的获利能力因而大幅增进，即使是在景气不佳的

1935年，在采用新的会计制度下，估计每股盈余还是可以达到50美元的水准，

这项改造计画是经由Messrs等人经过广泛的研究调查后制定的，其中主要包含

六大点：

　　　　　 1. Writing down of Plant Account to Minus $1,000,000,000.

　　　　 2. Par value of common stock to be reduced to 1￠.

　　　　 3. Payment of all wages and salaries in option warrants.

　　　　 4. Inventories to be carried at $1.

　　　　 5. Preferred Stock to be replaced by non-interest bearing bonds

redeemable at 50% discount.

　　　　 6. A $1,000,000,000 Contingency Reserve to be established.

(1)将厂房价值减少到负的10亿美元

(2)普通股每股面额减到一美分

(3)以认股权的方式支付所有的薪水与奖金

(4)存货的帐面价值减为1美元

(5)原有特别股改成不必马上支付利息50%折价发行的公司债

(6)建立10亿美元的或有准备

　　　　　 The official statement of this extraordinary Modernization Plan

follows in full:

以下就是这项全面更新计画的官方完整声明

　　　　　 The Board of Directors of U. S. Steel Corporation is pleased to

announce that after intensive study of the problems arising from

changed conditions in the industry, it has approved a comprehensive

plan for remodeling the Corporation's accounting methods. A survey

by a Special Committee, aided and abetted by Messrs. Price, Bacon,

Guthrie & Colpitts, revealed that our company has lagged somewhat

behind other American business enterprises in utilizing certain

advanced bookkeeping methods, by means of which the earning power

may be phenomenally enhanced without requiring any cash outlay or

any changes in operating or sales conditions. It has been decided not

only to adopt these newer methods, but to develop them to a still

higher stage of perfection. The changes adopted by the Board may be

summarized under six heads, as follows:

美国钢铁公司的董事会很高兴向大家宣布，在经过对产业界所面临的问题广泛地

研究之后，我们已经核准了一项重新塑造公司会计制度的方案，一项由特别委员

会主导并经Messrs等人协助之下完成的调查显示，我们公司在运用最先进的会

计制度方面远远落后于其它美国企业，透过这样的做法，公司不必负担额外的支

出、营业与销售政策也不必改变，就可以不费吹灰之力地大大改善获利能力，所

以大家一致决定不但要立即跟进采用，而且还要将这项技术发展到淋漓尽致的境

界，董事会所采用的做法，主要可以归纳为以下六点：

1. Fixed Assets to be written down to Minus $1,000,000,000.

固定资产减为负的10亿美元

　　　　　 Many representative companies have relieved their income

accounts of all charges for depreciation by writing down their plant

account to $1. The Special Committee points out that if their plants

are worth only $1, the fixed assets of U. S. Steel Corporation are worth

a good deal less than that sum. It is now a well-recognized fact that

many plants are in reality a liability rather than an asset, entailing not

only depreciation charges, but taxes, maintenance, and other

expenditures. Accordingly, the Board has decided to extend the

write-down policy initiated in the 1935 report, and to mark down the

Fixed Assets from $1,338,522,858.96 to a round Minus

$1,000,000,000.

许多代表公司都已将其帐列厂房价值减为象征性的1美元，好让其损益表免于

折旧费用沉重的负担，特别委员会指出如果它们的厂房只值1美元，那么美国

钢铁的的固定资产比起它们来说还要少很多，事实上近来大家都承认一项事实，

许多厂房对公司来说实际上是一种负债而不是资产，除了要摊提折旧之外，还要

负担税金、维修及其它开支，因此董事会决定要从1935年开始将资产打销，从

原先帐列1,338,522,858.96美元减少为负的1,000,000,000美元。

　　　　　 The advantages of this move should be evident. As the plant wears

out, the liability becomes correspondingly reduced. Hence, instead of

the present depreciation charge of some $47,000,000 yearly there will

be an annual appreciation credit of 5%, or $50,000,000. This will

increase earnings by no less than $97,000,000 per annum.

这样做法的效益相当明显，随着工厂逐渐折减，所代表的负债也相对地减少，因

此以往每年4,700万的折旧费用不但可以免除，以后每年还可以有5,000万美

元的折旧利益，一来一往等于让公司的获利至少增加9,700万美元。

2. Reduction of Par Value of Common Stock to 1￠, and

将普通股面额减少到1美分。

3. Payment of Salaries and Wages in Option Warrants.

所有的薪资与奖金一律以认股权的方式发放。

　　　　　 Many corporations have been able to reduce their overhead

expenses substantially by paying a large part of their executive

salaries in the form of options to buy stock, which carry no charge

against earnings. The full possibilities of this modern device have

apparently not been adequately realized. The Board of Directors has

adopted the following advanced form of this idea:

许多企业早已将本来应该支付给经营主管薪水奖金的大笔支出改以不必认列费

用的股票认股权方式取代，这种现代化的创新做法很明显地还没有被充分运用，

所以董事会决定采取一项更先进的做法。

　　　　　 The entire personnel of the Corporation are to receive their

compensation in the form of rights to buy common stock at $50 per

share, at the rate of one purchase right for each $50 of salary and/or

wages in their present amounts. The par value of the common stock is

to be reduced to 1￠.

企业所有的员工将发给认购价为50美元的认股权作为薪资的替代，而普通股面

额则减少到1美分。

　　　　　 The almost incredible advantages of this new plan are evident

from the following:

这项计画很明显的有下列好处：

　　　　　 A. The payroll of the Corporation will be entirely eliminated, a

saving of $250,000,000 per annum, based on 1935 operations.

A公司将不再有任何的薪资支出，参考1935年的情况，每年估计将因此省下

2.5亿美元。

　　　　　 B. At the same time, the effective compensation of all our

employees will be increased severalfold. Because of the large earnings

per share to be shown on our common stock under the new methods,

it is certain that the shares will command a price in the market far

above the option level of $50 per share, making the readily realizable

value of these option warrants greatly in excess of the present cash

wages that they will replace.

B同时，所有员工的报酬将因此增加好几倍，因为在新的会计原则之下公司帐上

显示的每股盈余将因此大增，从而使得公司的股价远高于认股权所设定的50美

元认购价，于是所有的员工都将因为认股权的行使而受惠，所得到的报酬将远比

他们原来领的现金收入要高的多。

　　　　　 C. The Corporation will realize an additional large annual profit

through the exercise of these warrants. Since the par value of the

common stock will be fixed at 1￠, there will be a gain of $49.99 on

each share subscribed for. In the interest of conservative accounting,

however, this profit will not be included in the income account, but will

be shown separately as a credit to Capital Surplus.

C透过这些认股权的行使，公司因此还可以实现额外特别的年度利益，而由于我

们将普通股面额设定为1美分，因此每认购一股便能产生49.99美元的利益，

虽然就会计学保守的立场，这些利益可能无法显现在损益表之上，但却可以在资

产负债表上以资本溢价的方式单独列示。

　　　　　 D. The Corporation's cash position will be enormously

strengthened. In place of the present annual cash outgo of

$250,000,000 for wages (1935 basis), there will be annual cash inflow

of $250,000,000 through exercise of the subscription warrants for

5,000,000 shares of common stock. The Company's large earnings

and strong cash position will permit the payment of a liberal dividend

which, in turn, will result in the exercise of these option warrants

immediately after issuance which, in turn, will further improve the cash

position which, in turn, will permit a higher dividend rate -- and so on,

indefinitely.

D企业的现金部位也会因此大大地增强，每年不但不再有2.5亿美元的薪资流

出，透过行使500万股认股权的做法，每年还可以创造2.5亿美元的现金流入，

公司惊人的获利能力加上坚强的现金部位将使得我们可以随心所欲地配发股

利，然后我们又可以透过行使认股权的方式补强现金实力，之后又可以有更高的

配股能力，如此一直循环下去。

4. Inventories to be carried at $1.

4.帐列存货价值调为1美元

　　　　　 Serious losses have been taken during the depression due to the

necessity of adjusting inventory value to market. Various enterprises

-- notably in the metal and cotton-textile fields -- have successfully

dealt with this problem by carrying all or part of their inventories at

extremely low unit prices. The U. S. Steel Corporation has decided to

adopt a still more progressive policy, and to carry its entire inventory

at $1. This will be effected by an appropriate write-down at the end of

each year, the amount of said write-down to be charged to the

Contingency Reserve hereinafter referred to.

在经济衰退时因为必须将存货价值调整至市价，公司可能会因此蒙受钜额的损

失，因此许多公司，尤其是钢铁与纺织公司纷纷将其帐列存货价值压到相当低的

程度，而成功地解决这方面的问题，有鉴于此美国钢铁公司决定采用一种更积极

的做法，打算将存货价值一举压低到1美元的最低限度，在每年底都会进行这

样的动作，将存货予以调整，差异的数字则全部摆到前面所提到的或有准备科目

项下。

　　　　　 The benefits to be derived from this new method are very great.

Not only will it obviate all possibility of inventory depreciation, but it

will substantially enhance the annual earnings of the Corporation. The

inventory on hand at the beginning of the year, valued at $1, will be

sold during the year at an excellent profit. It is estimated that our

income will be increased by means of this method to the extent of at

least $150,000,000 per annum which, by a coincidence, will about

equal the amount of the write-down to be made each year against

Contingency Reserve.

这种新做法的好处相当的大，不但可以消除存货耗损的可能性，同时也可大大地

增进公司每年的获利能力，每年初存货因为帐列价值只有1美元，所以将因出

售而获得大笔的利益，经估计透过这种新会计方法的运用将可使我们每年至少增

加1.5亿美元的收益，而碰巧的是这个数字与我们每年冲销的或许准备金额相

当。

　　　　　 A minority report of the Special Committee recommends that

Accounts Receivable and Cash also be written down to $1, in the

interest of consistency and to gain additional advantages similar to

those just discussed. This proposal has been rejected for the time

being because our auditors still require that any recoveries of

receivables and cash so charged off be credited to surplus instead of

to the year's income. It is expected, however, that this auditing rule --

which is rather reminiscent of the horse-and-buggy days -- will soon

be changed in line with modern tendencies. Should this occur, the

minority report will be given further and favorable consideration.

特别委员会的一项报告建议为了维持一致性，应收帐款与约当现金最好也能够将

帐面数字调整为1美元，同时也一样可以有先前所提的好处，但这样子的提案

现在被驳回，因为我们的签证会计师认为，任何应收帐款或约当现金若冲回，最

好还是先贷记原有科目，而不是直接作为损益表上的收入，但是我们也预期这种

老掉牙的会计原则应该很快会更新，好与现代趋势做接轨，而等新原则一通过之

后，我们一定会马上将这份报告的建议列为优先执行的方案。

5. Replacement of Preferred Stock by Non-Interest-Bearing Bonds

Redeemable at 50% Discount.

5.将现有特别股改成不必马上支付利息50%折价发行的公司债。

　　　　　 During the recent depression many companies have been able to

offset their operating losses by including in income profits arising

from repurchases of their own bonds at a substantial discount from

par. Unfortunately the credit of U. S. Steel Corporation has always

stood so high that this lucrative source of revenue has not hitherto

been available to it. The Modernization Scheme will remedy this

condition.

过去许多公司在面临景气不佳的时候，大都利用买回自己原先发行大幅折价的债

券来弥补其营业上的损失，不幸的是由于美国钢铁公司的债信一向都还算不错，

所以没有类似这样的油水可以趁机捞一笔，但现代更新计画解决了这样的难题。

　　　　　 It is proposed that each share of preferred stock be exchanged for

$300 face value of non-interest-bearing sinking-fund notes,

redeemable by lot at 50% of face value in 10 equal annual installments.

This will require the issuance of $1,080,000,000 of new notes, of

which $108,000,000 will be retired each year at a cost to the

Corporation of only $54,000,000, thus creating an annual profit of the

same amount.

报告建议原先发行的每一股特别股全部换成面额300美元不必支付利息的债

券，并且可分为十期以面额的50%赎回，总计将要发行面额10.8亿美元的债券，

每年有1.08亿美元到期，并由公司以5,400万美元的价格赎回，同时公司每年

将可因此增加5,400万美元的获利。

　　　　　 Like the wage-and/or-salary plan described under 3. above, this

arrangement will benefit both the Corporation and its preferred

stockholders. The latter are assured payment for their present shares

at 150% of par value over an average period of five years. Since

short-term securities yield practically no return at present, the

non-interest-bearing feature is of no real importance. The Corporation

will convert its present annual charge of $25,000,000 for preferred

dividends into an annual bond-retirement profit of $54,000,000 -- an

aggregate yearly gain of $79,000,000.

就像是第3条所述的薪资奖金计画，这样的安排将可以让公司与其特别股股东

一体受惠，后者可以确定在五年内收回现有特别股面额的150%，因为短期的有

价证券实在是没有多少报酬率，所以不必付息的特点算是无关紧要，如此一来公

司每年将可以减少2,500万的特别股股息，再加上每年多出5,400万美元的获

利，加总之后将可获得每年7,900万的利益。

6. Establishment of a Contingency Reserve of $1,000,000,000.

　　　　 The Directors are confident that the improvements hereinbefore

described will assure the Corporation of a satisfactory earning power

under all conditions in the future. Under modern accounting methods,

however, it is unnecessary to incur the slightest risk of loss through

adverse business developments of any sort, since all these may be

provided for in advance by means of a Contingency Reserve.

6.建立10亿美元的或有负债准备

董事们有信心经过上述的安排，公司未来不管在任何情况下，都可以确保拥有令

人满意的获利能力，然而在现今的会计原则下，公司最好不要承担任何可能的潜

在损失的风险，因为最好能够事先先建立一个或有损失负债准备以兹因应。

　　　　　 The Special Committee has recommended that the Corporation

create such a Contingency Reserve in the fairly substantial amount of

$1,000,000,000. As previously set forth, the annual write-down of

inventory to $1 will be absorbed by this reserve. To prevent eventual

exhaustion of the Contingency Reserve, it has been further decided

that it be replenished each year by transfer of an appropriate sum

from Capital Surplus. Since the latter is expected to increase each year

by not less than $250,000,000 through the exercise of the Stock

Option Warrants (see 3. above), it will readily make good any drains on

the Contingency Reserve.

特别委员会因此建议公司可以建立一个10亿美元的或有负债准备，就像是先前

所述的，存货价值调整为1美元的差异将由这个准备来吸收，同时为了怕将来

或有准备消耗殆尽，每年还将固定由资本公积提拨补充，因为后者透过股票选择

权的运用每年将至少可以增加2.5亿美元(见前面第3点)，所以随时准备好可供

或有准备补充之用。

　　　　　 In setting up this arrangement, the Board of Directors must

confess regretfully that they have been unable to improve upon the

devices already employed by important corporations in transferring

large sums between Capital, Capital Surplus, Contingency Reserves

and other Balance Sheet Accounts. In fact, it must be admitted that our

entries will be somewhat too simple, and will lack that element of

extreme mystification that characterizes the most advanced procedure

in this field. The Board of Directors, however, have insisted upon

clarity and simplicity in framing their Modernization Plan, even at the

sacrifice of possible advantage to the Corporation's earning power.

透过这样的安排，董事会必须坦承他们很遗憾还不能够向其它美国大企业一样，

充分地运用各种方法，让股本、资本公积、或有负债与资产负债表其它科目互通

有无，事实上我们必须承认，目前我们公司所作的分录还过于简单，根本没有达

到一般业界那样能够利用最先进的手法，让整个会计程序神秘复杂化，然而对此

董事会还是强调在规划革新方案时，还是必须坚持清楚明了的原则，虽然这样做

会对公司的获利能力有所影响。

　　　　　 In order to show the combined effect of the new proposals upon

the Corporation's earning power, we submit herewith a condensed

Income Account for 1935 on two bases, viz:

为了显示新方案对于公司获利能力的影响到底有多大? 我们特别列出1935年

分别在两种不同基础下的损益状况：

　　 B. Pro-Forma

Giving Effect to

Changes Proposed

Herewith

　 A. As Reported

Gross Receipts from all Sources (Including Inter-Company) $765,000,000 $765,000,000

Salaries and Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251,000,000 --

Other Operating Expenses and Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461,000,000 311,000,000

Depreciation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47,000,000 (50,000,000)

Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000,000 5,000,000

Discount on Bonds Retired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -- (54,000,000)

Preferred Dividends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25,000,000 --

Balance for Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (24,000,000) 553,000,000

Average Shares Outstanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,703,252 11,203,252

Earned Per Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($2.76) $49.80

　　　　　 In accordance with a somewhat antiquated custom there is

appended herewith a condensed pro-forma Balance Sheet of the U. S.

Steel Corporation as of December 31, 1935, after giving effect to

proposed changes in asset and liability accounts.

为了配合有点老旧的会计原则，附件是美国钢铁1935年12月31日拟制性的

合并资产负债表，在经过调整后的资产负债科目状况。

ASSETS

Fixed Assets, net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($1,000,000,000)

Cash Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142,000,000

Receivables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56,000,000

Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Miscellaneous Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,000,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($774,999,999)

LIABILITIES

Common Stock Par 1￠ (Par Value $87,032.52) Stated Value* ($3,500,000,000)

Subsidiaries' Bonds and Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113,000,000

New Sinking Fund Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,080,000,000

Current Liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69,000,000

Contingency Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000,000,000

Other Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74,000,000

Initial Surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389,000,001

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ($774,999,999)

*Given a Stated Value differing from Par Value, in accordance with the laws of the

State of Virginia, where the company will be re-incorporated.

有别于原先的固定面额，现在的股本改为不固定面额，根据维吉尼亚州的法令，公司必须重新设

立。

　　　　　 It is perhaps unnecessary to point out to our stockholders that

modern accounting methods give rise to balance sheets differing

somewhat in appearance from those of a less advanced period. In view

of the very large earning power that will result from these changes in

the Corporation's Balance Sheet, it is not expected that undue

attention will be paid to the details of assets and liabilities.

实在是不必要跟各位股东报告，更新过后的资产负债表与原先的报表将会有很大

的不同，我想为了让公司的获利大增因此必须就资产负债科目做很大的调整，大

家应该不会对此有太多的意见。

　　　　　 In conclusion, the Board desires to point out that the combined

procedure, whereby plant will be carried at a minus figure, our wage

bill will be eliminated, and inventory will stand on our books at

virtually nothing, will give U. S. Steel Corporation an enormous

competitive advantage in the industry. We shall be able to sell our

products at exceedingly low prices and still show a handsome margin

of profit. It is the considered view of the Board of Directors that under

the Modernization Scheme we shall be able to undersell all

competitors to such a point that the anti-trust laws will constitute the

only barrier to 100% domination of the industry.

总而言之，董事会这一连串措施，包含将厂房价值调为负数、薪水删掉、存货降

到几乎为零，将可使美国钢铁在产业的竞争力大为增加，我们将可以因此以非常

低的价格销售我们所生产的产品，同时还可以保有很好的获利，董事会也认为在

这项更新计画之下，我们将可以彻底打败竞争对手，直到我们达到反托拉斯法

100%市场占有率的最高上限。

　　　　　 In making this statement, the Board is not unmindful of the

possibility that some of our competitors may seek to offset our new

advantages by adopting similar accounting improvements. We are

confident, however, that U. S. Steel will be able to retain the loyalty of

its customers, old and new, through the unique prestige that will

accrue to it as the originator and pioneer in these new fields of service

to the user of steel. Should necessity arise, moreover, we believe we

shall be able to maintain our deserved superiority by introducing still

more advanced bookkeeping methods, which are even now under

development in our Experimental Accounting Laboratory.

当然在准备这份报告时，董事会不是不知道同业也有可能仿效我们这类的做法，

使得我们这样做的效益大打折扣，但是我们有信心美国钢铁身为提供钢铁用户这

类新式服务的先驱领航者，一定能够维持住客户的忠诚度，不论是老客户或是新

客户，当然若是有任何意外，美国钢铁仍将透过我们新设立的会计研究实验室，

致力于研发出更新的会计做帐原则，以继续保持我们的优势地位。

APPENDIX B

附录B

Some Thoughts on Selling Your Business*

对于阁下有意出售公司的一些想法

*This is an edited version of a letter I sent some years ago to a man who had

indicated that he might want to sell his family business. I present it here because it is

a message I would like to convey to other prospective sellers. -- W.E.B.

这是几年前我写给一位有意出售其家族事业给我们的人士，在经过修正后，我特地把这封信摆在

这里，因为这正是我想传达给其它有意出售事业者的讯息-华伦巴菲特

Dear _____________:

　　　　 Here are a few thoughts pursuant to our conversation of the other

day.

您好

以下是在前几天我们的谈话后，我个人的一些想法。

　　　　　 Most business owners spend the better part of their lifetimes

building their businesses. By experience built upon endless repetition,

they sharpen their skills in merchandising, purchasing, personnel

selection, etc. It's a learning process, and mistakes made in one year

often contribute to competence and success in succeeding years.

大部分的企业老板无不终其一生努力地建立自己的企业王国，经过不断地努力焠

炼，他们在行销、采购与人事管理上的经验都能持续地精进，这是一个学习的过

程，先前一时的挫败通常会成就后来的成功。

　　　　　 In contrast, owner-managers sell their business only once --

frequently in an emotionally-charged atmosphere with a multitude of

pressures coming from different directions. Often, much of the

pressure comes from brokers whose compensation is contingent upon

consummation of a sale, regardless of its consequences for both buyer

and seller. The fact that the decision is so important, both financially

and personally, to the owner can make the process more, rather than

less, prone to error. And, mistakes made in the once-in-a-lifetime

sale of a business are not reversible.

相对地，自己当老板的经理人在面对来自各方的压力，偶尔会在一时冲动的情况

下，考虑出售自己拥有的事业，通常是因为中间人为了赚取成交的佣金不顾买卖

双方的利益而怂恿老板赶快做决定，事实上做这样的决策牵涉重大，不管是在财

务或是个人方面皆是如此，仓促地决定可能使得老板做出错误而不是正确的决

策，而且一旦发生可就是一辈子无法挽回的错误。

　　　　 Price is very important, but often is not the most critical aspect of

the sale. You and your family have an extraordinary business -- one of

a kind in your field -- and any buyer is going to recognize that. It's

also a business that is going to get more valuable as the years go by.

So if you decide not to sell now, you are very likely to realize more

money later on. With that knowledge you can deal from strength and

take the time required to select the buyer you want.

价格当然很重要，但是通常它并不是整个交易最关键的因素，你跟你的家族拥有

业界最棒的企业，所有的潜在买家当然都知道这一点，而随着时间的演进，你的

事业也会变得更有价值，所以若你现在决定不卖了，这代表以后你可能可以赚更

多的钱，而有了这样的认知，你大可以从容以对，慢慢地寻找你希望的买主。

　　　　　 If you should decide to sell, I think Berkshire Hathaway offers

some advantages that most other buyers do not. Practically all of these

buyers will fall into one of two categories:

但是要是你真的决定要卖，我相信Berkshire绝对可以提供比别人更好的条件，

基本上可能的买主可以分为两大类︰

　　　　　 (1) A company located elsewhere but operating in your business or

in a business somewhat akin to yours. Such a buyer -- no matter what

promises are made -- will usually have managers who feel they know

how to run your business operations and, sooner or later, will want to

apply some hands-on "help." If the acquiring company is much larger,

it often will have squads of managers, recruited over the years in part

by promises that they will get to run future acquisitions. They will have

their own way of doing things and, even though your business record

undoubtedly will be far better than theirs, human nature will at some

point cause them to believe that their methods of operating are

superior. You and your family probably have friends who have sold

their businesses to larger companies, and I suspect that their

experiences will confirm the tendency of parent companies to take

over the running of their subsidiaries, particularly when the parent

knows the industry, or thinks it does.

(1)第一种是你的同业或是与你的所处的产业相近的业者，这种买家不管他给你

怎么样的承诺，通常会让你感觉到好象他比你懂得如何来经营你的事业，而早晚

有一天他会想要插手来帮忙你的营运，而若是买方再大一点，通常还会应征一大

堆经理人进来，借口表示以后还会有更多的购并案，他们一定会有自己的一套做

事方法，虽然你过去的经营记录明显地比他们好太多，但人性的某一面还是使他

们觉得他们做事的方法才是对的，你跟你家人的朋友大概也有人曾经将公司卖给

大企业的，我想他们应该也有这方面的经验，可以证实大公司有倾向将子公司的

业务接过去管理，尤其是他们对这行也很内行或自认很内行时。

　　　　　 (2) A financial maneuverer, invariably operating with large

amounts of borrowed money, who plans to resell either to the public

or to another corporation as soon as the time is favorable. Frequently,

this buyer's major contribution will be to change accounting methods

so that earnings can be presented in the most favorable light just prior

to his bailing out. I'm enclosing a recent article that describes this sort

of transaction, which is becoming much more frequent because of a

rising stock market and the great supply of funds available for such

transactions.

(2)第二类的公司是财务公司，大量运用所借来的资金，只要时机得当，总是准

备随时将公司再卖给投资大众或是别的大企业，通常这类买主对公司最大的贡献

就是改变公司的会计政策，使得公司盈余比以前看起来好看一点，如此一来使他

得以用更好的价格脱手而出，附件是最近一篇有关这类交易的文章报导，由于最

近股市热络所以这类的活动也相当频繁，同时这类的资金也相当充沛。

　　　　　 If the sole motive of the present owners is to cash their chips and

put the business behind them -- and plenty of sellers fall in this

category -- either type of buyer that I've just described is satisfactory.

But if the sellers' business represents the creative work of a lifetime

and forms an integral part of their personality and sense of being,

buyers of either type have serious flaws.

如果公司现在的拥有人唯一的目标只是随时准备将企业待价而沽，弃企业整体的

利益于不顾，很多的卖主确实属于这类型，那么先前所描述的买方应该都可以为

卖方所接受，但是要是卖方所要出售的公司是他一辈子的心血结晶，甚至已经成

为其人格与生命的一部份，那么这两类的买方可能都不能符合你的标准。　

　　　　 Berkshire is another kind of buyer -- a rather unusual one. We buy

to keep, but we don't have, and don't expect to have, operating people

in our parent organization. All of the businesses we own are run

autonomously to an extraordinary degree. In most cases, the

managers of important businesses we have owned for many years have

not been to Omaha or even met each other. When we buy a business,

the sellers go on running it just as they did before the sale; we adapt

to their methods rather than vice versa.

至于Berkshire则属于另外一类型的买主，而且绝对是与众不同的，我们买进是

为了拥有，但我们不要，也不希望公司的营运主管由母公司指派，我们旗下所有

的事业都能够相当独立自主地营运，大部分的情况下，我们所拥有的重要事业管

理人从来就没有来过奥玛哈，甚至于双方连面都没碰过，当我们买下一间公司之

后，卖方依旧还是照原来的样子经营公司，是我们要去适应他们，不是他们要来

适应我们。

　　　　　 We have no one -- family, recently recruited MBAs, etc. -- to

whom we have promised a chance to run businesses we have bought

from owner-managers. And we won't have.

我们没有任何家族成员或是新进聘用的企管硕士，准备要来经营我们买下的任何

企业，我想以后也不会有这种情况。　

　　　　 You know of some of our past purchases. I'm enclosing a list of

everyone from whom we have ever bought a business, and I invite you

to check with them as to our performance versus our promises. You

should be particularly interested in checking with the few whose

businesses did not do well in order to ascertain how we behaved under

difficult conditions.

如果你知道我们过去的购并案，我会附上过去我们购买企业的名单，我建议你可

以打个电话check看看，我们是不是说到做到，特别是你可以问问少数几家经

营不甚理想的公司，看看在艰难的状况下，我们又会采取怎样的做法。　

　　　　 Any buyer will tell you that he needs you personally -- and if he

has any brains, he most certainly does need you. But a great many

buyers, for the reasons mentioned above, don't match their

subsequent actions to their earlier words. We will behave exactly as

promised, both because we have so promised, and because we need to

in order to achieve the best business results.

任何买主都会告诉你，私底下他很需要你的协助，当然若他真的有大脑，他就会

知道他真的是需要你，但大多数的买主，基于先前所提的几个理由，大都不会遵

守先前所作的承诺，但我们不一样，绝对是说到做到，因为一方面我们已做出承

诺，另一方面我们也是为了有更有的经营成果。

　　　　　 This need explains why we would want the operating members of

your family to retain a 20% interest in the business. We need 80% to

consolidate earnings for tax purposes, which is a step important to us.

It is equally important to us that the family members who run the

business remain as owners. Very simply, we would not want to buy

unless we felt key members of present management would stay on as

our partners. Contracts cannot guarantee your continued interest; we

would simply rely on your word.

这样的需求可以说明为何我们希望原有的经营团队最好能够保留20%的股份，

基于租税规划我们需要80%以上的股权，这点很重要，但同时我们也希望继续

留下来管理的家族成员也能够自己当老板，所以很简单，除非我们确定原有的主

要经理人还会继续留下来成为我们的合伙人，否则我们不会考虑买下公司，合约

并不能保证你会继续投入，我们相信的是你承诺的每一个字。

　　　　　 The areas I get involved in are capital allocation and selection and

compensation of the top man. Other personnel decisions, operating

strategies, etc. are his bailiwick. Some Berkshire managers talk over

some of their decisions with me; some don't. It depends upon their

personalities and, to an extent, upon their own personal relationship

with me.

我们会介入的领域是资金的规划与配置，以及高阶人员的任命与报酬，其余的人

事、营运策略等那就是你自己的事，有些Berkshire旗下事业的经理人会把他们

所作的一些商业决定向我报告，有些则不会，这主要是视他们本身的个性，以及

与我个人的私人关系而定。

　　　　　 If you should decide to do business with Berkshire, we would pay

in cash. Your business would not be used as collateral for any loan by

Berkshire. There would be no brokers involved.

如果你决定要跟Berkshire一起做生意，我们会以现金的方式给予报酬，你的企

业资产也不会被Berkshire拿来当作借款的抵押品，也不会有掮客牵涉其中。

　　　　　 Furthermore, there would be no chance that a deal would be

announced and that the buyer would then back off or start suggesting

adjustments (with apologies, of course, and with an explanation that

banks, lawyers, boards of directors, etc. were to be blamed). And

finally, you would know exactly with whom you are dealing. You would

not have one executive negotiate the deal only to have someone else

in charge a few years later, or have the president regretfully tell you

that his board of directors required this change or that (or possibly

required sale of your business to finance some new interest of the

parent's).

另外在交易成交后，我们也不会临时宣布退出不玩，或是提出要做调整的要求，

(当然要是银行、律师、董事会等方面的出状况，我们也会做出道歉与合理的解

释)，你不会碰到几年前与你谈判的主管突然走人，之后新上任的主管一概不认

帐，或是公司总裁很遗憾地跟你说，他背后的董事会要求你这样或要求你那样，

(或甚至想要再把你的公司卖掉以支应母公司新的资金需求)。

　　　　　 It's only fair to tell you that you would be no richer after the sale

than now. The ownership of your business already makes you wealthy

and soundly invested. A sale would change the form of your wealth,

but it wouldn't change its amount. If you sell, you will have exchanged

a 100%-owned valuable asset that you understand for another valuable

asset -- cash -- that will probably be invested in small pieces (stocks)

of other businesses that you understand less well. There is often a

sound reason to sell but, if the transaction is a fair one, the reason is

not so that the seller can become wealthier.

另外也必须要提醒你在交易完成后，你并不会比原来还富有，因为拥有原来的事

业已经让你用最有利的投资方式赚了很多钱，整个交易只会让你的财富形式有所

改变，但基本上金额数量并不会改变，若你要卖，你可以确定将能够把原有100%

持有且熟悉的资产，换得另外一种资产-现金，或再加上一小部份你比较不熟悉

的企业股份，要做出出售的决定总有许多理由，但若整个交易是公平合理的话，

这个理由绝对不是卖方因此可以变得更富有。

　　　　　 I will not pester you; if you have any possible interest in selling, I

would appreciate your call. I would be extraordinarily proud to have

Berkshire, along with the key members of your family, own _______; I

believe we would do very well financially; and I believe you would have

just as much fun running the business over the next 20 years as you

have had during the past 20.

我不会刻意纠缠你，但若你有任何的意愿想要出售的话，我会很乐意接到你的电

话，我很荣幸能够让Berkshire与你的家族成员一起拥有这份事业；我相信公司

在财务上一定会变得更好，而我也相信在未来的20年内，你也会像过去20年

来一样，愉快地继续经营这份事业。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1991 was $2.1 billion, or

39.6%. Over the last 27 years (that is, since present management

took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $6,437,

or at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually.

1991年本公司的净值成长了21亿美元，较去年增加了39.6%，而总计过去27

年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值从19元成长到现在的

6,437美元，年复合成长率约为23.7%。

The size of our equity capital - which now totals $7.4

billion - makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate

of gain or, for that matter, come close to doing so. As Berkshire

grows, the universe of opportunities that can significantly

influence the company's performance constantly shrinks. When we

were working with capital of $20 million, an idea or business

producing $1 million of profit added five percentage points to

our return for the year. Now we need a $370 million idea (i.e.,

one contributing over $550 million of pre-tax profit) to achieve

the same result. And there are many more ways to make $1 million

than to make $370 million.

现在我们股东权益的资金规模已高达74亿美元，所以可以确定的是，我们可能

再也无法像过去那样继续维持高成长，而随着Berkshire不断地成长，世上所存

可以大幅影响本公司表现的机会也就越来越少。当我们操作的资金只有2,000

万美元的时候，一项获利100万美元的案子就可以使得我们的年报酬率增加

5%，但时至今日，我们却要有3.7亿美元的获利(要是以税前计算的话，更要5.5

亿美元)，才能达到相同的效果，而要一口气赚3.7亿美元比起一次赚100万美

元的难度可是高的多了。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have set a

goal of attaining a 15% average annual increase in Berkshire's

intrinsic value. If our growth in book value is to keep up with a

15% pace, we must earn $22 billion during the next decade. Wish

us luck - we'll need it.

查理孟格-Berkshire的副主席与我一起设定，以15%做为每年公司实质价值成

长的目标，也就是说如果在未来十年内，公司要能达到这个目标，则帐面净值至

少要增加22亿美元，请大家祝我们好运吧! 我们真的很需要祝福。

Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a

phenomenon not apt to be repeated: a dramatic rise in the priceearnings

ratios of Coca-Cola and Gillette. These two stocks

accounted for nearly $1.6 billion of our $2.1 billion growth in

net worth last year. When we loaded up on Coke three years ago,

Berkshire's net worth was $3.4 billion; now our Coke stock alone

is worth more than that.

我们在1991年所经历帐面数字的超额成长是一种不太可能再发生的现象，受惠

于可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀本益比的大幅飙升，光是这两家公司就合计贡献了我们

去年21亿美元净值成长中的16亿美元，三年前当我们大笔敲进可口可乐股票

的时候，Berkshire的净值大约是34亿美元，但是现在光是我们持有可口可乐

的股票市值就超过这个数字。

Coca-Cola and Gillette are two of the best companies in the

world and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates in the

years ahead. Over time, also, the value of our holdings in these

stocks should grow in rough proportion. Last year, however, the

valuations of these two companies rose far faster than their

earnings. In effect, we got a double-dip benefit, delivered

partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so by the

market's reappraisal of these stocks. We believe this reappraisal

was warranted. But it can't recur annually: We'll have to settle

for a single dip in the future.

可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀可说是当今世上最好的两家公司，我们预期在未来几年他

们的获利还会以惊人的速度成长，相对地我们持股的价值也会以等比例的程度增

加，然而另一方面去年这两家公司的股价上涨的幅度却远高于其本身获利增长的

幅度，所以说去年我们是两面得利，一方面是靠公司绝佳的获利能力，一方面是

市场对于公司股票的重新评价，当然我们认为这样的调整是经得起考验的，但这

种情况不太可能每年都发生，展望未来我们可能只能靠前面那点而获益。

A Second Job

第二件工作

In 1989 when I - a happy consumer of five cans of Cherry

Coke daily - announced our purchase of $1 billion worth of Coca

Cola stock, I described the move as a rather extreme example of

putting our money where my mouth was. On August 18 of last year,

when I was elected Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc, it was a

different story: I put my mouth where our money was.

1989年当我以每天五瓶樱桃可乐的爱用者身分，宣布买进价值10亿美元的可

口可乐股票时，我曾形容这项举动其实只是将钱花在嘴巴上的最佳例证，在去年

8月18日当我被推举为所罗门公司的临时主席时，则完全是另外一件事，这次

我把嘴巴摆在我们的钱上。

You've all read of the events that led to my appointment. My

decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but

important message: Berkshire's operating managers are so

outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time I was

spending at the company and yet remain confident that its

economic progress would not skip a beat. The Blumkins, the

Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan

Lipsey, Ralph Schey and Frank Rooney (CEO of H.H. Brown, our

latest acquisition, which I will describe later) are all masters

of their operations and need no help from me. My job is merely to

treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate.

Neither function is impeded by my work at Salomon.

我想大家应该都已经从报上看过有关我个人任命为所罗门董事会临时主席的报

导，我之所以愿意接受这个职位具有一个深刻且重要的意义，那就是Berkshire

旗下事业的经理人是如此的优秀，让我可能很放心的时间摆在别的心思之上，而

完全不必担心公司的营运会走样，Blumkins家族、Friedman 家族、Mike

Goldberg、the Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey 、Ralph Schey

与Frank Rooney(我们最新购并的HH Brown鞋业的CEO，后面还会有详细的

介绍)等人，都是所属产业的龙头，因此根本就不需要我个人的协助，我的工作

只是要思考如何更公平合理地对待他们，同时有效地运用他们所产生出来的资

金，而这两方面都不会因为我在所罗门的工作而受到影响。

The role that Charlie and I play in the success of our

operating units can be illustrated by a story about George Mira,

the one-time quarterback of the University of Miami, and his

coach, Andy Gustafson. Playing Florida and near its goal line,

Mira dropped back to pass. He spotted an open receiver but found

his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a Florida

linebacker. The right-handed Mira thereupon switched the ball to

his other hand and threw the only left-handed pass of his life -

for a touchdown. As the crowd erupted, Gustafson calmly turned to

a reporter and declared: "Now that's what I call coaching."

查理跟我在这些成功的企业所扮演的角色，可以由迈阿密大学著名的四分卫

-George Mira与他的教练-Andy Gustafson的故事来作说明，有一回在与佛

罗里达大学对抗时，在终点线前，Mira突然煞车后退并准备传球，他看到有一

个队友有空档，不过他的右手边却有一位难以摆脱的防守球员在侧，右撇子的

Mira于是将球换到左手，并丢出生平第一次的左手传球，而后达阵成功，当所

有的球迷疯狂地簇拥而上，教练Gustafson镇定地转向一位记者说到：「这都

是因为我平常训练有素的缘故！」。

Given the managerial stars we have at our operating units,

Berkshire's performance is not affected if Charlie or I slip away

from time to time. You should note, however, the "interim" in my

Salomon title. Berkshire is my first love and one that will never

fade: At the Harvard Business School last year, a student asked

me when I planned to retire and I replied, "About five to ten

years after I die."

以我们现有的梦幻明星级的经营团队阵容来说，Berkshire的表现绝不会因为查

理或是我偶尔跷班而有所影响，大家必须知道，我在所罗门的名衔只是暂时的，

Berkshire才是我的最爱，而且是至死不渝的爱，去年在哈佛商学院，有学生问

我何时会退休，我的回答是：「大概要等到我死后五到十年吧！」。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's

reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill

and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not

charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but

are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets

you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been

reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past

reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more

useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally

accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchaseprice

adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The

total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical

to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

A large amount of additional information about these

businesses is given on pages 33-47, where you also will find

our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. However, we will

not in this letter discuss each of our non-insurance operations,

as we have in the past. Our businesses have grown in number - and

will continue to grow - so it now makes sense to rotate coverage,

discussing one or two in detail each year.

年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，依照一般公认会计原则所编写的格式，另外从

今年开始我们将不再像过去那样详细叙述非保险业的营运，因为我们旗下事业组

织日益庞大，且以后还会继续成长，所以实在是没有必要每年都重复讨论相同的

事情。

(000s omitted)

-----------------------------------------

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

---------------------- ----------------------

1991 1990 1991 1990

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............ $(119,593) $ (26,647) $ (77,229) $ (14,936)

Net Investment Income ... 331,846 327,047 285,173 282,613

H. H. Brown (acquired 7/1/91) 13,616 --- 8,611 ---

Buffalo News .............. 37,113 43,954 21,841 25,981

Fechheimer ................ 12,947 12,450 6,843 6,605

Kirby ..................... 35,726 27,445 22,555 17,613

Nebraska Furniture Mart ... 14,384 17,248 6,993 8,485

Scott Fetzer

Manufacturing Group .... 26,123 30,378 15,901 18,458

See's Candies ............. 42,390 39,580 25,575 23,892

Wesco - other than Insurance 12,230 12,441 8,777 9,676

World Book ................ 22,483 31,896 15,487 20,420

Amortization of Goodwill .. (4,113) (3,476) (4,098) (3,461)

Other Purchase-Price

Accounting Charges ..... (6,021) (5,951) (7,019) (6,856)

Interest Expense* ......... (89,250) (76,374) (57,165) (49,726)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions .......... (6,772) (5,824) (4,388) (3,801)

Other ..................... 77,399 58,310 47,896 35,782

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Operating Earnings 400,508 482,477 315,753 370,745

Sales of Securities 192,478 33,989 124,155 23,348

Total Earnings - All Entities $ 592,986 $ 516,466 $ 439,908 $ 394,093

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and

Mutual Savings & Loan.

*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用

"Look-Through" Earnings

透视盈余

We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which

consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous

section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major

investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our

profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by

Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been

distributed to us.

之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到的帐列盈

余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公

司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所

得税。

I've told you that over time look-through earnings must

increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is

to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management took over in

1965, our look-through earnings have grown at almost the identical

23% rate of gain recorded for book value.

我曾经告诉各位，长期而言，如果我们的实质价值也期望以这个幅度来成长的

话，透视盈余每年也必须增加15%，而的确过自从现有经营阶层于1965年接

手后，公司的透视盈余几乎与帐面价值一样，以23%的年复合成长率增加。

Last year, however, our look-through earnings did not grow at

all but rather declined by 14%. To an extent, the decline was

precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's report

and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look-through

earnings.

然而去年我们的透视盈余不但没有增加，反而减少了14%，这样的下滑主要导

源于去年年报就曾经向各位提过的两项因素，那时我就曾经警告各位那对我们的

透视盈余将会有负面的影响。

First, I told you that our media earnings - both direct and

look-through - were "sure to decline" and they in fact did. The

second force came into play on April 1, when the call of our

Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into common. The

after-tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been about $45

million, an amount somewhat higher than the combination in 1991 of

three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months of

look-through earnings on the common.

首先我告诉各位旗下媒体事业的盈余，不管是帐面直接或是间接透视一定会减

少，而事实证明确是如此，第二个因素发生在4月1号我们吉列特别股被要求

转为普通股，1990年来自特别股的税后盈余是4,500万美元，大概比1991

年一季的股利总和加上三季的普通股透视盈余还多一点。

Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt lookthrough

earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result from

our interest in Wells Fargo (dividends we received from the company

were offset by negative retained earnings). Last year I said that

such a result at Wells was "a low-level possibility - not a

likelihood." Second, we recorded significantly lower - though still

excellent - insurance profits.

另外有二项我没有意料到的结果，也影响到我们1991年的透视盈余，首先我们

在Well-Fargo的利益大概仅维持损益两平(所收到的股利收入被其累积亏损所

抵消)，去年我说这样的可能性很低的说法，其可信度存疑，第二我们的保险业

盈余虽然算是不错，但还是比往年低。

The following table shows you how we calculate look-through

earnings, although I warn you that the figures are necessarily very

rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been

included in the operating earnings itemized on page 6, mostly

under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数

字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益

项下)

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)

----------------------- --------------------- ------------------

1991 1990 1991 1990

------ ------ -------- --------

Capital Cities/ABC Inc. ........ 18.1% 17.9% $ 61 $ 85

The Coca-Cola Company .......... 7.0% 7.0% 69 58

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 3.4%(1) 3.2%(1) 15 10

The Gillette Company ........... 11.0% --- 23(2) ---

GEICO Corp. .................... 48.2% 46.1% 69 76

The Washington Post Company .... 14.6% 14.6% 10 18

Wells Fargo & Company .......... 9.6% 9.7% (17) 19(3)

-------- --------

Berkshire's share of

undistributed earnings of major investees $230 $266

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings (30) (35)

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 316 371

-------- --------

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $516 $602

====== ======

1. Net of minority interest at Wesco

已扣除Wesco的少数股权

(2) For the nine months after Berkshire converted its

preferred on April 1

仅含Berkshire于4月1日申请转换为普通股后的九个月

(3) Calculated on average ownership for the year

以年平均持有股权比例计算

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing on

their own look-through earnings. To calculate these, they should

determine the underlying earnings attributable to the shares they

hold in their portfolio and total these. The goal of each investor

should be to create a portfolio (in effect, a "company") that will

deliver him or her the highest possible look-through earnings a

decade or so from now.

我们也相信投资人可以透过研究自己的透视盈余而受益，在算这个东西时，他们

就会了解到其个别投资组合所应分配到的真正盈余的合计数，所有投资人的目

标，应该是要建立一项投资组合可以让其透视盈余在从现在开始的十年内极大

化。

An approach of this kind will force the investor to think

about long-term business prospects rather than short-term stock

market prospects, a perspective likely to improve results. It's

true, of course, that, in the long run, the scoreboard for

investment decisions is market price. But prices will be determined

by future earnings. In investing, just as in baseball, to put runs

on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field, not the

scoreboard.

这样的方式将会迫使投资人思考企业真正的长期远景而不是短期的股价表现，从

而藉此改善其投资绩效，当然无可否认就长期而言，投资决策的绩效还是要建立

在股价表现之上，但价格将取决于未来的获利能力，投资就像是打棒球一样，想

要得分大家必须将注意力集中到场上，而不是紧盯着计分板。

A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math

媒体产业的变化与其评价的算式

In last year's report, I stated my opinion that the decline in

the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as

cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that case: The

economic strength of once-mighty media enterprises continues to

erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and

entertainment choices proliferate. In the business world,

unfortunately, the rear-view mirror is always clearer than the

windshield: A few years back no one linked to the media business -

neither lenders, owners nor financial analysts - saw the economic

deterioration that was in store for the industry. (But give me a

few years and I'll probably convince myself that I did.)

在去年的报告中，我曾经表示媒体事业获利能力衰退主要是反应景气的循环因

素，但在1991年发生的情况则不是那么一回事，由于零售业形态的转变加上广

告与娱乐事业的多元化，以往曾经一度风光的媒体事业，其竞争力已受到严重的

侵蚀，然而不幸的是在商业世界中，从后照镜所看到的景象永远比挡风玻璃的还

清楚，几年前几乎没有人，包含银行、股东与证券分析师在内，会不看好媒体事

业的发展，(若是再多给我几年，我可能就能正确判断出这个产业正在走下坡)。

The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine

properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises

in their economic behavior. Let's take a quick look at the

characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise, keeping

in mind, however, that many operations fall in some middle ground

and can best be described as weak franchises or strong businesses.

事实是报纸、电视与杂志等媒体的行为，越来越超越身为特许行业所应该做的

事，让我们很快地看一下特许事业与一般事业在特性上的不同，不过请记住，很

多公司事实上是介于这两者之间，所以也可以将之形容为弱势的特许事业或是强

势的一般企业。

An economic franchise arises from a product or service that:

(1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have

no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation.

The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a

company's ability to regularly price its product or service

aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital.

Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers

may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot inflict

mortal damage.

藉由特定的产品或服务，一家公司可以成为特许的行业(1)它确有需要或需求(2)

被顾客认定为找不到其它类似的替代品(3)不受价格上的管制，一家公司到底有

没有具有以上三个特点可能从他是否能积极地为本身所提供的产品与服务订定

价格的能力，从而赚取更高的资本报酬率，更重要的特许事业比较能够容忍不当

的管理，无能的经理人虽然会降低特许事业的获利能力，但是并不会造成致命

的伤害。

In contrast, "a business" earns exceptional profits only if it

is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is

tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With

superior management, a company may maintain its status as a lowcost

operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly

faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike

a franchise, can be killed by poor management.

相对的，一般事业想要获致高报酬就只有靠着节省成本或是当其所提供的产品或

服务供需不均之时，但是这种供给不足的情况通常维持不了多久，倒是透过优良

的管理，一家公司却可以长期维持低成本的营运，但即使是如此，还是会面临竞

争对手持续不断的攻击，而不像特许事业，一般事业有可能因为管理不善而倒闭。

Until recently, media properties possessed the three

characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price

aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers

looking for information and entertainment (their primary interest

being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to

find them. Unfortunately, demand can't expand in response to this

new supply: 500 million American eyeballs and a 24-hour day are all

that's available. The result is that competition has intensified,

markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some -

though far from all - of its franchise strength.

直到最近，媒体产业还拥有特许事业这三项特质，因此还能够订定侵略性的价格

并容忍宽松的管理，不过现在的消费大众不断地寻找不同的信息与娱乐来源，也

越来越能够接受各种不同的选择，另一方面很不幸的是消费者的需求并不会随着

供给的增加而变大，五亿只美国眼睛，一天24小时，就这么多，不可能再增加

了。所以结果可想而知竞争会变得更激烈，市场被区隔开，媒体产业因而丧失了

部份原有的特许能力。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The industry's weakened franchise has an impact on its value

that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings. For an

understanding of this phenomenon, let's look at some much oversimplified,

but relevant, math.

媒体产业转为弱势，除了让短期盈余获利受到冲击之外，对其本身的价值将有更

深远的影响，为了让大家了解这种现象，让我们来看看稍微简化但却颇为相关的

数学算式。

A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper,

television or magazine property would forever increase its earnings

at 6% or so annually and would do so without the employment of

additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges would

roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements

would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings (before amortization

of intangibles) were also freely-distributable earnings, which

meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin

to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6% a year. Say, next,

that a discount rate of 10% was used to determine the present value

of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that it was

appropriate to pay a whopping $25 million for a property with

current after-tax earnings of $1 million. (This after-tax multiplier

of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about 16.)

几年以来一般人都认为新闻、电视或是杂志产业的获利能力，可以永无止尽地以

每年6%左右的比率成长，而且可以完全不必依靠额外的资金，也因此每年的折

旧费用应该会与资本支出相当，而由于所需的营运资金也相当小，所以帐列盈余

(在扣除无形资产摊销前)几乎等于可以自由分配运用的盈余，也就是说拥有一家

媒体事业，每年几乎可以有6%稳定增加的纯现金流入，同时若我们以10%的折

现率来计算现值的话，等于是一次2,500万的投资，每年可以贡献100万美元

的税后净利贡献(亦即约为25倍的税后本益比，若换成税前盈余本益比则约为

16左右)。

Now change the assumption and posit that the $1 million

represents "normal earning power" and that earnings will bob around

this figure cyclically. A "bob-around" pattern is indeed the lot of

most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their owners are

willing to commit more capital (usually in the form of retained

earnings). Under our revised assumption, $1 million of earnings,

discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million valuation.

Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property's

valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2 times

pre-tax earnings).

现在假设条件改变，这家公司只拥有普通的获利能力，所以每年100万的获利

只能上上下下起伏，这种打摆子的形式就是大部分公司的状况，而公司的获利想

要有所成长，老板就必须要投入更多的资金才办得到(通常都是透过保留盈余的

方式)，经过我们将假设重新做修正，同样以10%加以折现，大概可以达到1,000

万美元的价值，结果可以看出，一项看起来不大重要的假设变动却使这家企业的

价值大幅减少至10倍税后盈余本益比(或6.5倍税前盈余本益比)。

Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the

operation of media properties or of steel mills. What in the past

caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media far higher

than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property

were expected to constantly grow (without the business requiring

much additional capital), whereas steel earnings clearly fell in

the bob-around category. Now, however, expectations for media have

moved toward the bob-around model. And, as our simplified example

illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations

are revised.

现金就是现金，不管今天它是靠经营媒体事业或是钢铁工厂得来的都一样，而过

去同样是一元的获利，大家之所以看重媒体事业的原因是预期他会继续成长(股

东不需要再投入额外的资金)，而钢铁业很明显会落入打摆子的那类族群，不过

现在大家对于媒体事业的看法也逐渐改为后者，而如我们刚刚所举简单的例子，

评价的结果可能因为这样的修正而有很大的改变。

We have a significant investment in media - both through our

direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The

Washington Post Company and Capital Cities/ABC - and the intrinsic

value of this investment has declined materially because of the

secular transformation that the industry is experiencing. (Cyclical

factors have also hurt our current look-through earnings, but these

factors do not reduce intrinsic value.) However, as our Business

Principles on page 2-3 note, one of the rules by which we run

Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses - or investee holdings

that we have classified as permanent - simply because we see ways

to use the money more advantageously elsewhere. (We did sell

certain other media holdings sometime back, but these were

relatively small.)

我们在媒体事业有相当大的投资，不管是百分之百拥有的水牛城日报或是在华盛

顿邮报与资本城/ABC的股票投资，而这些媒体事业的价值因为前面所提到的产

业所面临的形态转变而大幅滑落，(景气循环因素也使得我们现在的透视盈余大

受影响，虽然还不致于让实质价值减少)，然而就像是我们经营Berkshire的企

业原则所揭示的，我们不会只是因为还有其它更有利的资金用途，就随便将已被

列为永恒的事业或主要投资出售，(当然之前我们也确实卖了一些媒体股，不过

规模相对较小)。

The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been

moderated because the Buffalo News, under Stan Lipsey's leadership,

has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap

Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well-managed. In

particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during the late

1980's period in which purchasers of media properties regularly

paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Cap Cities and

Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold.

As a result, the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not

been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly-owned

media companies, our two investees are about the only ones

essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies, through a

combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and

shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to five or more

times their current net income.

还好我们的实质价值受到损害的情况尚称轻微，因为水牛城日报在Stan Lipsey

的领导之下，表现远比其它报纸同业要来的优秀，另一方面资本城与华盛顿邮报

的经营也都很上轨道，特别是在1980年代许多媒体公司以高价大举并购同业

时，我们的投资事业都只是做壁上观，而资本城与华盛顿邮报两家公司的负债也

都很少，甚至于手上的现金就足以清偿所有的债务，因此公司资产的缩水并没有

因为杠杆而扩大，所以现在在所有主要的媒体事业当中，大概就只有我们投资的

这两家公司可以免于债务所苦，而早期那些透过大量购并的同业，除了盈余大幅

缩水之外，还同时背负着至少相当于年度获利能力五倍以上的负债。

The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities

and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these

investments than we would be with holdings in any other media

companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to have far

better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average

American business. But gone are the days of bullet-proof franchises

and cornucopian economics.

总而言之，资本城及华盛顿邮报超强的资产负债表与管理阶层，持有它们的股份

使得我们比持有别家公司的股份感到更放心，而且就现阶段而言，媒体事业还是

比其它一般美国企业要来的有竞争力，只是不再像过去拥有金刚不坏之身与诱人

的暴利而已。

Twenty Years in a Candy Store

二十年的糖果店

We've just passed a milestone: Twenty years ago, on January 3,

1972, Blue Chip Stamps (then an affiliate of Berkshire and later

merged into it) bought control of See's Candy Shops, a West Coast

manufacturer and retailer of boxed-chocolates. The nominal price

that the sellers were asking - calculated on the 100% ownership we

ultimately attained - was $40 million. But the company had $10

million of excess cash, and therefore the true offering price was

$30 million. Charlie and I, not yet fully appreciative of the value

of an economic franchise, looked at the company's mere $7 million

of tangible net worth and said $25 million was as high as we would

go (and we meant it). Fortunately, the sellers accepted our offer.

我们刚刚跨过历史性的一页，二十年前也就是1972年1月3日，蓝筹邮票公

司(原为Berkshire的分支机构，后来并入Berkshire)，买下喜斯糖果-西岸的一

家盒装巧克力制造与销售厂商，当时卖方所提的报价，以最后取得的100%股权

换算约为4,000万美元，但当时光是公司帐上就有1,000万美元的现金，所以

认真算起来真正出的资金只有3,000万美金，不过当时查理跟我还不是那么了

解一家特许事业所拥有的真正价值，所以在看过帐面净值只有700万美元的报

表之后，竟向对方表示2,500万是我们可以出的最高上限(当时我们确实是这样

子认为)，很幸运的是卖方接受了我们的报价。

The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined

from $102.5 million in 1972 to $1.2 million in 1991. But See's

candy sales in the same period increased from $29 million to $196

million. Moreover, profits at See's grew even faster than sales,

from $4.2 million pre-tax in 1972 to $42.4 million last year.

之后蓝筹邮票公司的邮票买卖收入从1972年的1亿美元下滑到1991年的

1,200万美元，但在同一期间喜斯糖果的营收，却从2,900万成长到1.96亿

美元，更甚者，其获利成长的幅度还远高于营收成长的幅度，税前获利从1972

年的420万，变成去年的4,240万美元。

For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it must

be compared with the incremental capital investment required to

produce it. On this score, See's has been astounding: The company

now operates comfortably with only $25 million of net worth, which

means that our beginning base of $7 million has had to be

supplemented by only $18 million of reinvested earnings. Meanwhile,

See's remaining pre-tax profits of $410 million were distributed to

Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these companies to

deploy (after payment of taxes) in whatever way made most sense.

对于每多赚一块钱的效益评量，大家必须将其所需额外投入的资金考量进去，就

这点儿言，喜斯的表现实在是相当惊人，这家公司现在的净值只有2,500万美

元，意思是说除了原来投资时的700万美元，后来只保留了1,800万的盈余未

分配，除了之外喜斯将这20年来剩下所赚的4亿1,000万美元，在扣除所得

税之后，全部发还给蓝筹邮票与Berkshire，将资金分配到更有利的地方之上。

In our See's purchase, Charlie and I had one important

insight: We saw that the business had untapped pricing power.

Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction was not

derailed by our dumb insistence on a $25 million price. Second, we

found Chuck Huggins, then See's executive vice-president, whom we

instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal experiences

with Chuck have been outstanding. One example: When the purchase

was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation

arrangement - conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a

written contract - that remains unchanged to this day.

在买下喜斯时，有一点是我们已预见的，那就是它尚未被发掘的订价能力，另外

我们有两方面算是很幸运，第一整个交易还好没有因为我们愚昧地坚持2,500

万美元的上限而告吹，第二我们选中Chuck Huggins-当时喜斯糖果的副总经

理，立即走马上任，不管是在公事或是私人方面，我们与Chuck共处的经验都

相当难得，有一个例子可以说明，当购并案完成后，我们在短短五分钟内就与

Chuck协议好他担任总经理的薪资报酬，而且连书面契约都没有签，就一直延

续到今天。

In 1991, See's sales volume, measured in dollars, matched that

of 1990. In pounds, however, volume was down 4%. All of that

slippage took place in the last two months of the year, a period

that normally produces more than 80% of annual profits. Despite the

weakness in sales, profits last year grew 7%, and our pre-tax

profit margin was a record 21.6%.

1991年喜斯糖果的销售金额与前一年度相当，但是若是以销售数量来算，则减

少了4%，所有减少的部份大多来自于占年度获利80%的最后两个月，不过尽管

业绩不太好，获利还是成长了7%，税前盈益率更创下21.6%的新高记录。

Almost 80% of See's sales come from California and our

business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the state

with particular force late in the year. Another negative, however,

was the mid-year initiation in California of a sales tax of 7%-8?

(depending on the county involved) on "snack food" that was deemed

applicable to our candy.

喜斯糖果80%的收入都来自于加州，而我们的生意很明显地受到景气衰退的影

响，尤其在年度的后半段更是显著，另外一个负面因素是加州在年度中开始对零

食课征7%-8%的营业税(依每个市镇有所不同)，当然巧克力糖果也不能幸免。

Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings will

enjoy California's classifications of "snack" and "non-snack"

foods:

若是精研认识论差异的股东应该会觉得加州对于零食与非零食的分类感到相当

有兴趣。

Taxable "Snack" Foods Non-Taxable "Non-Snack" Foods

--------------------- -----------------------------

Ritz Crackers Soda Crackers

Popped Popcorn Unpopped Popcorn

Granola Bars Granola Cereal

Slice of Pie (Wrapped) Whole Pie

Milky Way Candy Bar Milky Way Ice Cream Bar

What - you are sure to ask - is the tax status of a melted

Milky Way ice cream bar? In that androgynous form, does it more

resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the

sun? It's no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California's

State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food bill but

must now administer it, has said: "I came to this job as a

specialist in tax law. Now I find my constituents should have

elected Julia Child."

你一定会问，那融化的牛奶冰淇淋棒要不要课税呢? 在这种仿真两可的状态下，

它到底是比较像冰淇淋棒还是在大太阳底下的糖果棒呢? 也难怪Brad

Sherman-加州公平交易委员会的主席，虽然反对这项法案但还是必须负责监督

执行，他提到我以税务专家的身分到这个委员会任职，但我觉得大家要选的对

象，应该是小孩子才对。

Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our

association with Chuck and See's. The obvious ones are that we've

earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process.

Equally important, ownership of See's has taught us much about the

evaluation of franchises. We've made significant money in certain

common stocks because of the lessons we learned at See's.

查理跟我有太多理由要感谢Chuck跟喜斯糖果，最明显的原因是他们帮我们赚

了那么多钱，而且其间的过程是如此令人愉快，还有一点同样重要的是拥有喜斯

糖果让我们对于强势的特许事业有更深一层的认识，我们靠着在喜斯身上所学的

东西，在别的股票投资上，又赚了更多的钱。

H. H. Brown

布朗鞋业

We made a sizable acquisition in 1991 - the H. H. Brown

Company - and behind this business is an interesting history. In

1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the

company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, for

$10,000 and began a 62-year career of running it. (He also found

time for other pursuits: At age 90 he was still joining new golf

clubs.) By Mr. Heffernan's retirement in early 1990 H. H. Brown had

three plants in the United States and one in Canada; employed close

to 2,000 people; and earned about $25 million annually before

taxes.

我们在1991年做了一件大型的购并案，那就是买下布朗鞋业，这背后有一段有

趣的故事，1927年时有一位29岁的年轻商人-Ray Heffernan以10,000美

元买下这家公司，并把它搬到麻赛诸赛州，从此展开长达62年的事业(当然同时

他还有其它追求的目标，高龄90岁的他现在还在加入新的高尔夫球俱乐部)，等

1990年Heffernan先生宣布退休时，布朗鞋业在美国已有三座工厂，还有另外

一座在加拿大，每年的税前获利约有2,500万美元。

Along the way, Frances Heffernan, one of Ray's daughters,

married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. Heffernan

before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas he might

have about working for his father-in-law. That was one of Mr.

Heffernan's few mistakes: Frank went on to become CEO of Melville

Shoe (now Melville Corp.). During his 23 years as boss, from 1964

through 1986, Melville's earnings averaged more than 20% on equity

and its stock (adjusted for splits) rose from $16 to $960. And a

few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen ill,

asked him to run Brown.

这期间Heffernan的一个女儿Frances嫁给了Frank Rooney，当时Heffernan

严正地告诉他的女婿最好断了想要参与经营布朗鞋业的念头，但这却是

Heffernan先生所犯下的少数错误之一，Frank后来跑到另外一家鞋业Melville

担任CEO，在他从1964年到1986年担任主管的期间，Mellville每年的股东

权益报酬高达20%，而股价更从16元涨到960元(经过还原后)，而在Frank

退休多年后，Heffernan先生因为生病，才叫Frank回来经营布朗鞋业。

After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided to

sell the company - and here we got lucky. I had known Frank for a

few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a

possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to

a major investment banker, which failed also to think of us. But

last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis, a

long-time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder, who is

always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing about

the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company

should be right up Berkshire's alley, and Frank promptly gave me a

call. I thought right away that we would make a deal and before

long it was done.

之后在1990年Heffernan先生过世，他的家人决定要把公司卖掉，所以我们

的机会就来了，那时我们认识Frank也有好几年了，但没有好到让他认为

Berkshire是布朗鞋业合适的买主，反而他把卖公司的事交给一家投资银行来负

责，可想而知投资银行绝对不会想到我们，但是就在去年春天，Frank跟John

Loomis一起到佛罗里达打高尔夫球，John是我多年的好友，同时也是Berkshire

的股东，他总是随时注意有没有适合我们投资的对象，在听到布朗鞋业即将出售

的消息之后，John告诉Frank说这家公司应该要投到Berkshire的麾下，而

Frank也从善如流马上打了通电话给我，我当下觉得我们应该可以谈得成，果然

在不久之后，整个交易便确定了。

Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank's

willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers, he has

no financial need to work but does so because he loves the game and

likes to excel. Managers of this stripe cannot be "hired" in the

normal sense of the word. What we must do is provide a concert hall

in which business artists of this class will wish to perform.

我之所以会对这项交易这么感兴趣的原因在于Frank愿意继续留下来担任

CEO，就像我们其它所有经理人一样，他不需要因为经济因素而继续工作，但他

确实热爱这项任务且做的很好，这类型的经理人可不是三言两语就可以"请"得到

的，我们能做的就是尽量提供一个够水准的演奏厅，让这些商业界的天才艺术家

可以在这里好好发挥。

Brown (which, by the way, has no connection to Brown Shoe of

St. Louis) is the leading North American manufacturer of work shoes

and boots, and it has a history of earning unusually fine margins

on sales and assets. Shoes are a tough business - of the billion

pairs purchased in the United States each year, about 85% are

imported - and most manufacturers in the industry do poorly. The

wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes

inventories to be heavy; substantial capital is also tied up in

receivables. In this kind of environment, only outstanding managers

like Frank and the group developed by Mr. Heffernan can prosper.

布朗(跟圣路易的布朗鞋子完全没有关系)是北美地区工作鞋与工作靴的领导品

牌，同时拥有非凡的销售毛利与资产报酬，事实上鞋子产业竞争相当地激烈，在

全美一年10亿双的采购量中，大约有85%是从国外进口，而产业中大部分的制

造工厂表现都乏善可陈，由于款式与型号繁多导致库存压力相当重，同时资金也

绑在大笔的应收帐款，在这样的环境底下，只有像Frank这样优秀的经理人再

加上Heffernan先生所建立这样的事业才有可能生存。

A distinguishing characteristic of H. H. Brown is one of the

most unusual compensation systems I've encountered - but one that

warms my heart: A number of key managers are paid an annual salary

of $7,800, to which is added a designated percentage of the profits

of the company after these are reduced by a charge for capital

employed. These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes of

owners. In contrast, most managers talk the talk but don't walk the

walk, choosing instead to employ compensation systems that are long

on carrots but short on sticks (and that almost invariably treat

equity capital as if it were cost-free). The arrangement at Brown,

in any case, has served both the company and its managers

exceptionally well, which should be no surprise: Managers eager to

bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to

bet on.

布朗鞋业有一个相当与众不同的特点，那就是它的薪资奖赏制度与我之前看到的

完全不同，不过却深得我心，公司主要的经理人每年的底薪只有7,800美元，

之后再依据公司每年的获利，乘以一个事先订定的百分比，并扣除运用资金的成

本，因此我们可以说这些经理人完全是与股东站在同一条船上，相对于一般说归

说、做归做的经理人，选择运用红萝卜长，杆子短的薪资报酬制度(总是把股东

所提供的资金当作是不用成本的)，事实证明布朗鞋业这样的安排，不论在任何

情况下，对于公司与经理人都绝对有利，胆敢依恃个人能力来做赌注的经理人，

绝对有相当的能力来下赌。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

It's discouraging to note that though we have on four

occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were

represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of

these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other

three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some

point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of

prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by

thinking of us - and therefore repeat here what we're looking for:

很令人失望的是虽然我们有四个主要的投资个案的卖方是透过著名的投资银行

所介绍，但却只有一家是真正由投资银行主动联系我们的，其它三个案子都是在

投资银行寻求其名单上的买主不成后，由我本人或是朋友促成最后的交易，我们

很希望中间人在赚取其佣金收入的同时，还能够想到我们的存在，以下就是我们

想要找的企业条件

(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax

earnings),

(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections

are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround"

situations),

(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing

little or no debt,

(4) Management in place (we can't supply it),

(5) Simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we

won't understand it),

(6) An offering price (we don't want to waste our time or

that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily,

about a transaction when price is unknown).

(1)钜额交易(每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元)

(2)持续稳定获利(我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并且甚少举债)

(4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

(5)简单的企业(若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂)

(6)合理的价格(在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间)

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise

complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily

within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. (With Brown,

we didn't even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for cash, but

will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic

business value as we give.

我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过

五分钟)，像是布朗鞋业这样的案子根本就不要五分钟，我们倾向采现金交易，

除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern

through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fechheimer's and

Borsheim's. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish

to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves,

but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same

time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue

to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we

offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives and

we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people

with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太- Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望

能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往

常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意

的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions

that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if

you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will

call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a

country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds,

or auction-like sales: "When the phone don't ring, you'll know it's

me."

另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机

股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有

一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，对于这类的事业，有首乡村歌曲其中的一句

歌词最能描述我们的感觉，「若电话不响，你就知道那是我」。

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as

described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase

of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those

we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion, and

American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving

suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock

market.

除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股

份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空、冠军企业与美国运通这几个

Case一样的公司，不过对于一般直接从股票市场上买进股份的建议我们，则一

点兴趣都没有。

Insurance Operations

保险业营运

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table

presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance

industry:

下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数

Yearly Change Combined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate

in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by

Written (%) Dividends Losses (%) GDP Deflator (%)

------------- --------------- ------------- ----------------

1981 ..... 3.8 106.0 6.5 10.0

1982 ..... 3.7 109.6 8.4 6.2

1983 ..... 5.0 112.0 6.8 4.0

1984 ..... 8.5 118.0 16.9 4.5

1985 ..... 22.1 116.3 16.1 3.7

1986 ..... 22.2 108.0 13.5 2.7

1987 ..... 9.4 104.6 7.8 3.1

1988 ..... 4.4 105.4 5.5 3.9

1989 ..... 3.2 109.2 7.7 4.4

1990 (Revised) 4.4 109.6 4.8 4.1

1991 (Est.) 3.1 109.1 2.9 3.7

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses

incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A

ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above

100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year.

When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding

policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a

combined ratio in the 107 - 111 range typically produces an

overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds

provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，比率在100

以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保

险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100

以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部份所产生的

盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107-111之间。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the

industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually, even

in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over

the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a

still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially

lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount.

基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期

保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10%以

上，损失一定会增加，(事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11%的速度在成

长)，若是保费收入还是大幅落后于10%的门槛，承保损失一定会继续增加。

However, the industry's tendency to under-reserve when

business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time - and that

could well describe the situation last year. Though premiums did

not come close to growing 10%, the combined ratio failed to

deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved.

Loss-reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason

to be skeptical of that outcome, and it may turn out that 1991's

ratio should have been worse than was reported. In the long run,

of course, trouble awaits managements that paper over operating

problems with accounting maneuvers. Eventually, managements of

this kind achieve the same result as the seriously-ill patient

who tells his doctor: "I can't afford the operation, but would

you accept a small payment to touch up the x-rays?"

然而产业普遍存在损失准备提列不足的现象，使得企业前景不佳的情况可以获得

暂时的掩饰，这正是去年度所发生的事，虽然保费收入成长不到10%，但综合

比率非但没有像我所预测地那样恶化反而还有点改善，损失准备的统计资料显示

这样的现象实在是相当令人怀疑，这种结果也可能导致1991年的比率将更进一

步恶化，当然就长期而言，这些利用会计手法掩盖营运问题的经理人还是要面对

真正的麻烦，到最后这类的经理人会变得跟许多病入膏肓的病人对医生说的一

样：「我实在是承受不起另一次手术，不过你是否可以考虑把我的X光片给补

一补」。

Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make

combined ratios, our own or the industry's, largely irrelevant

to our performance. What counts with us is the "cost of funds

developed from insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of

float."

于是Berkshire旗下的保险事业将与公司本身或产业经营绩效越来越不相关的

综合比率做了一番修正，对我们来说真正重要的是我们从保险业所得到的资金的

成本，套句行话就是浮存金的成本。

Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the

total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and

unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid

acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed

reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our

underwriting loss.

浮存金-我们靠保险业所取得大量的资金，系指将所有的损失准备、损失费用调

整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费

用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。

The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the

business in 1967.

下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

(承保损失) (平均浮存金) (平均资金成本) (长期公债殖利率)

------------ ---------- --------------- -----------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 ........ profit $17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 ........ profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 ........ profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 ........ $0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 ........ profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 ........ profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 ........ profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 ........ 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 ........ 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 ........ profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 ........ profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 ........ profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 ........ profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 ........ profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 ........ profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 ........ 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 ........ 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 ........ 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 ........ 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 ........ 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 ........ 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 ........ 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 ........ 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 ........ 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 ........ 119.6 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

As you can see, our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the

U. S. Government's cost on newly-issued long-term bonds. We have in

fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been

in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over

that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold,

which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost

of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue to grow;

the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost.

各位可以看到我们1991年的资金成本甚至比美国政府新发行的长期公债利率

还低，事实上在过去25年的保险事业经营中，我们有20年是远胜于政府公债

发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，同时所持有的浮存金数量也以惊人

的幅度成长，当然这只有在资金成本低的情况下，才称得上是好现象，展望未来，

浮存金的数量还会继续成长，对我们而言，最大的挑战是这些资金是否能有合理

的成本取得。

Berkshire continues to be a very large writer - perhaps the

largest in the world - of "super-cat" insurance, which is coverage

that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against

major catastrophic losses. Profits in this business are enormously

volatile. As I mentioned last year, $100 million in super-cat

premiums, which is roughly our annual expectation, could deliver us

anything from a $100 million profit (in a year with no big

catastrophe) to a $200 million loss (in a year in which a couple of

major hurricanes and/or earthquakes come along).

Berkshire一直都是霹雳猫保单相当大的发行公司，或许规模已是全世界最大

的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来分散他们本身在重大意外事故所需承担

的风险，这类保险的获利情况变化相当的大，就像是去年我曾经提过的，一亿美

元的保费收入，这大约是我们预期一年所能接到的业务量，可能可以让我们有一

亿美元的获利(只要当年度没有重大灾害发生)，也可能让我们产生二亿美元的损

失(只要当年度发生连续几个飓风或地震)。

We price this business expecting to pay out, over the long

term, about 90% of the premiums we receive. In any given year,

however, we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or

enormously unprofitable. That is true in part because GAAP

accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophefree

years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other

years. In effect, a one-year accounting cycle is ill-suited to the

nature of this business - and that is a reality you should be aware

of when you assess our annual results.

当我们在订价时，长期而言我们预期只要支付出90%收到的保费收入，当然在

任何一个特定年度，我们可能大赚或是大亏，一部份的原因在于一般公认会计原

则并不允许我们在没有重大灾害发生的年度提拨损失准备，以弥补其它年度一定

会发生的损失，事实上以一年为期的会计期间并不适合这类的保险业务，所以换

句话说当你在评断我们公司的年度绩效时，一定要特别注意到这一点。

Last year there appears to have been, by our definition, one

super-cat, but it will trigger payments from only about 25% of our

policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting

profit from our catastrophe business to have been about $11

million. (You may be surprised to learn the identity of the biggest

catastrophe in 1991: It was neither the Oakland fire nor Hurricane

Bob, but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused the

industry an insured loss now estimated at about $4-$5 billion. At

the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass that

from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record-holder.)

去年照我们的定义可能会有一件霹雳猫保单要付上我们年度保费收入的25%，

因此我们预计1991年这类业务的承保获利大约是1,100万美元(或许你很好奇

想要知道1991年所发生的最大灾害是什么? 它既不是奥克兰大火也不是Bob

飓风，而是九月在日本发生的台风造成的损失估计在40-50亿美元上下，若以

上限估计，这个数字将超过Hugo飓风先前所创下的最高损失记录)。

Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance

protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as for natural

catastrophes. In the 1980's much of this reinsurance was supplied

by "innocents" - that is, by insurers that did not understand the

risks of the business - but they have now been financially burned

beyond recognition. (Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often

when I was personally running the insurance operation.) Insurers,

though, like investors, eventually repeat their mistakes. At some

point - probably after a few catastrophe-scarce years - innocents

will reappear and prices for super-cat policies will plunge to

silly levels.

保险业者总会需要大量的再保险来规避航海与航空以及天然灾害等意外事故，在

1980年代许多再保险保单都是由外行人来承接，这些人根本就不知道这类保险

的风险有多高，所以现在他们已经被烫的不省人事，(就连Berkshire在本人经

营这项业务时也是如此)，保险业者如同投资人一样，还是会一再重复所发生的

错误，只要有一、两年意外灾害较少，就会有无知的业者跳出来以极低的价格杀

价竞争抢单。

As long as apparently-adequate rates prevail, however, we will

be a major participant in super-cat coverages. In marketing this

product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because of

our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know that when

"the big one" comes, many reinsurers who found it easy to write

policies will find it difficult to write checks. (Some reinsurers

can say what Jackie Mason does: "I'm fixed for life - as long as I

don't buy anything.") Berkshire's ability to fulfill all its

commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is

unquestioned.

然而只要市场上费率看起来合理，我们就会继续留在这一行里，而在推销这类保

单时，我们所拥有的最大竞争优势就是我们的财务实力，有远见的客户都知道许

多再保业者可以很轻松地接下保单，但是当重大的意外灾害接连发生时，要他们

支付赔偿金可能就有点困难，(有些再保业者就像Jackie Mason所说的一样，我

可以一辈子不花钱，只要我不买任何东西)，相对地Berkshire在任何极端的状

况下，都能够履行他所做出的承诺。

Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest

opportunities. Mike Goldberg has accomplished wonders with this

operation since he took charge and it has become a very valuable

asset, albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision.

总的来说，保险业提供Berkshire相当大的机会，Mike Goldberg在他接手这

项业务之后，就一直缔造出优异的成绩，也使得保险子公司成为我们非常宝贵的

资产，虽然我们无法以精确的数字来衡量。

Marketable Common Stocks

有价证券股票投资

On the next page we list our common stock holdings having a

value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments

belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关

系企业所持有)。

12/31/91

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............ $ 517,500 $1,300,500

46,700,000 The Coca-Cola Company. .............. 1,023,920 3,747,675

2,495,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. .... 77,245 343,090

6,850,000 GEICO Corp. ......................... 45,713 1,363,150

24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................ 600,000 1,347,000

31,247,000 Guinness PLC ........................ 264,782 296,755

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ......... 9,731 336,050

5,000,000 Wells Fargo & Company 289,431 290,000

As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to

investing. Guinness is a new position. But we held the other seven

stocks a year ago (making allowance for the conversion of our

Gillette position from preferred to common) and in six of those we

hold an unchanged number of shares. The exception is Federal Home

Loan Mortgage ("Freddie Mac"), in which our shareholdings increased

slightly. Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock

market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from

the active to the patient. (With tongue only partly in check, I

suggest that recent events indicate that the much-maligned "idle

rich" have received a bad rap: They have maintained or increased

their wealth while many of the "energetic rich" - aggressive real

estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, etc. - have

seen their fortunes disappear.)

一如往常，以上这张表显示我们李伯大梦式的投资方式，健力士Guinness是我

们最新的投资部位，至于其它七项主要的投资都持有一年以上(如果把吉列从特

别股转换成普通股也包含在内的话)，其中六项投资甚至连持股数都没有变动，

唯一的例外是联邦家庭贷款抵押(Freddie Mac)，我们投资的股数略微增加，我

们以不变应万变的做法主要是反应我们把股票市场当作是财富重分配的中心，而

钱通常由积极的份子流到有耐性的投资人手中，(我嘴巴可能闭的不够紧，我认

为最近几件事情显示许多躺着赚的有钱人招到许多攻击，因为他们好象没做什么

事就使得本身的财富暴涨，而在此同时过去那些积极活跃的有钱人，如房地产大

亨、企业购并家与石油钻探大亨等，却眼睁睁地看着自己的财产一点一滴地缩

水)。

Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire's first significant

investment in a company domiciled outside the United States.

Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion as

Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner most of

their profits from international operations. Indeed, in the sense

of where they earn their profits - continent-by-continent - Coca-

Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. (But you'll never

get their drinks confused - and your Chairman remains unmovably in

the Cherry Coke camp.)

我们在健力士Guinness的持股代表Berkshire第一次对海外公司进行大规模的

投资，不过Guinness所赚的钱与可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀等美国公司却极为类

似，主要都是仰赖国际部门的营运，确实以国际性的眼光来看，Guinness与可

口可乐的获利来源有相当的共通性，(但是大家绝对不能将自己最爱的饮料搞混

掉，像我个人的最爱依旧是樱桃可口可乐)。

We continually search for large businesses with

understandable, enduring and mouth-watering economics that are run

by able and shareholder-oriented managements. This focus doesn't

guarantee results: We both have to buy at a sensible price and get

business performance from our companies that validates our

assessment. But this investment approach - searching for the

superstars - offers us our only chance for real success. Charlie

and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large sums we

work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and selling

portions of far-from-great businesses. Nor do we think many others

can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from flower to

flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name "investors" to

institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who

repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.

我们还是持续地在寻找大型的企业，那种令人容易了解、具有持续性且让人垂涎

三尺的事业，并且由有能力才干并以股东利益为优先的经营阶层，虽然这些要求

的重点并不一定保证结果就一定令人满意，当然我们一定要以合理的价格投资并

且确保我们的被投资公司绩效表现与我们当初所评估的一致，这样的投资方法-

寻找产业的超级明星，是我们唯一能够成功的机会，查理跟我的天资实在是有

限，以我们目前操作的资金规模，实在是无法靠着买卖一些平凡普通的企业来赚

取足够的利益，当然我们也不认为其它人就有办法以这种小蜜蜂飞到西、飞到东

的方法成功，事实上我们认为将这些短线进出如此频繁的法人机构称为投资人，

就好象是把一个每天寻找一夜情的花花公子称作为浪漫情人一样。

If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say, to

private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess the longterm

economic characteristics of each business; second, assess the

quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third, try to

buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price. I

certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in

town. Why, then, should Berkshire take a different tack when

dealing with the larger universe of public companies? And since

finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult,

why should we discard proven products? (I was tempted to say "the

real thing.") Our motto is: "If at first you do succeed, quit

trying."

今天假设我的投资天地仅限于比如说奥玛哈地区的私人企业，那么首先我们仔细

地评估每家企业长期的竞争力，第二我会再评估经营者的特质，之后再以合理的

价格买进一小部份的股权，既然我不可能雨露均沾地去买镇上所有公司的股权，

那么为什么Berkshire在面对全美一大堆上市大公司时，就要采取不同的态度，

也因为要找到好的事业并加上好的经理人是如此的困难，那么为什么我们要拋弃

那些已经被证明过的投资对象呢? (通常我喜欢把它们称做是狠角色)，我们的座

右铭是如果你第一次就成功了，那就不要费力再去试别的了。

John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor

matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business

associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: "As

time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method

in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which

one thinks one knows something about and in the management of

which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits

one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which

one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. . . .

One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are

seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in

which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence."

著名经济学家凯恩斯，他的投资绩效跟他的理论思想一样杰出，在1934年8

月15日他曾经写了一封信给生意伙伴Scott上面写到，随着时光的流逝，我越

来越相信正确的投资方式是将大部分的资金投入在自己认为了解且相信的事业

之上，而不是将资金分散到自己不懂且没有特别信心的一大堆公司，每个人的知

识与经验一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很难同时有两三家以上的公司可以让

我感到完全的放心。

Mistake Du Jour

实时供应的错误

In the 1989 annual report I wrote about "Mistakes of the First

25 Years" and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences in the

first few years of this second "semester" indicate that my backlog

of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to

my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in

these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further

bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and football

teams; why not for businesses and investors?)

在1989年的年报中，我曾经写过Berkshire头25所犯的错误，而且承诺在

2015年还会再有更新的报告，但是第二阶段的头几年让我觉得若是坚持原来的

计画的话，可能让这些记录多到难以管理，因此我决定每隔一段时间会在这里丢

出一点东西，所谓自首无罪，抓到双倍，希望我公开的忏悔能够免于大家继续对

我的轰炸(不管是医院的死后验尸或是足球队常常用到的事后检讨，我想应该也

能够适用在企业与投资人之上)。

Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission,

rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie and me

some embarrassment, since you don't see these errors; but their

invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa, I am

not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an

esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple), or

even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never develop the

competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer to

business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem

clearly attractive - but in which we nevertheless end up sucking

our thumbs rather than buying.

通常我们很多重大的错误不是发生在我们已经做的部份，而是在于我们没有去做

的那部份，虽然因为各位看不到这些失误，所以查理跟我可以少一点难堪，但看

不到不代表我们就不必付出代价，而这些我公开承认的错误，并不是指我错过了

某些革命性的新发明(就像是全录像印技术)、高科技(像是苹果计算机)或是更优秀

的通路零售商(像是威名百货)，我们永远不可能拥有在早期发掘这些优秀公司的

能力，反而我指的是那些查理跟我可以很容易就了解且很明显对我们有吸引力的

公司，无奈在当时我们只是不断地咬着指甲犹豫不决，就是不能下定决心把他们

买下来。

Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I

wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic: In early 1988,

we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent

split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which

would have been a $350-$400 million investment. We had owned the

stock some years earlier and understood the company's business.

Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae's

CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited

and had established the company as a financial powerhouse - with

the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and confirmed

that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a large

position.

每位作者都知道，要让读者了解其意思最好的方式就是举个例子，不过希望我现

在举的例子不会过于极端，回顾1988年当时我们决定以3.5亿到4亿美元之

间，买进3,000万股(经过事后的分割调整)的联邦国家贷款协会，简称Fannie

Mae，我们之前曾经拥有过这家公司的股份，也对其所处的产业相当了解，另外

很显然的，也很清楚David Maxwell也就是Fannie Mae的总裁，有能力处理

他所接下的一堆问题，同时进一步将公司建立成为一个金融巨擘，一切可说是前

景看好，为此我还特地到华盛顿拜访David，确认他对于我们持有该公司一大部

分的股权不会感到任何的不愉快。

After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began to

climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that,

thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly

during our purchase program). In an even sillier move, I

surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the

7 million shares we owned.

只不过当我们开始买进不到700万股时，该公司股价就开始上涨，失望之余，

我立刻停止买进(事后回想还好我没有在买进可口可乐时犯下相同的错误)，更有

甚者，我觉得区区700万股对我们来说实在是没有太大的意义，所以之后又把

持有的700万股全部卖掉。

I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my

amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn't one.

What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the

approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of your

Chairman's mistake: about $1.4 billion.

我期盼对于我这样不具职业水准的投资行为可以给各位一个稍微合理一点的解

释，不过我实在是编不出来，不过我倒是可以跟各位报告因为本人的这项错误，

大概使得Berkshire在1991年少赚了14亿美元。

Fixed-Income Securities

固定收益证券

We made several significant changes in our fixed-income

portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred

was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common

stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was

subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we purchased

fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire State

Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added to a

small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late

1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:

1991年我们在固定收益证券这方面的投资有很大的变动，如同先前曾提到的我

们的吉列可转换特别股被强制赎回，使得我们必须将之转换为普通股，另外我们

也出清了RJR Nabisco的债券，因为它在被转换后赎回，在另一方面我们也买

进美国运通与第一帝国-一家水牛城的银行控股公司的固定收益证券，此外还在

1990年底买进了一些ACF工业的债券，以下是截至年底我们持有的主要部位：

(000s omitted)

-----------------------------------

Cost of Preferreds and

Issuer Amortized Value of Bonds Market

------ ------------------- ------------

ACF Industries ................ $ 93,918(2) $118,683

American Express .............. 300,000 263,265(1)(2)

Champion International ........ 300,000(2) 300,000(1)

First Empire State 40,000 50,000(1)(2)

RJR Nabisco 222,148(2) 285,683

Salomon 700,000(2) 714,000(1)

USAir 358,000(2) 232,700(1)

Washington Public Power Systems 158,553(2) 203,071

(1)Fair value as determined by Charlie and me

(1)公平价值是由查理跟我来判断

(2) Carrying value in our financial statements

(2)是指财务报表上的帐面价值

Our $40 million of First Empire State preferred carries a 9%

coupon, is non-callable until 1996 and is convertible at $78.91 per

share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for

Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers, CEO of

First Empire, and like being his partner on any scale.

我们在第一帝国9%收益率的特别股投资了4,000万美元，在1996年前公司无

法赎回，每股转换价格订为78.91美元，通常我会认为这样的规模对于

Berkshire来说实在是太小了，但由于我们对于该公司总裁Bob Wilmers实在

是过于崇敬，所以不管金额大小，还是希望有机会能与他一起合伙共事。

Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed-income

security. Rather it is a "Perc," which carries a fixed dividend of

8.85% on our $300 million cost. Absent one exception mentioned

later, our preferred must be converted three years after issuance,

into a maximum of 12,244,898 shares. If necessary, a downward

adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order to limit

to $414 million the total value of the common we receive. Though

there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock that we

will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms of the

preferred, however, include a provision allowing us to extend the

conversion date by one year if the common stock is below $24.50 on

the third anniversary of our purchase.

至于美国运通的投资则不是一般的固定收益证券，它算是一种Perc-每年可以为

我们3亿美元的投资贡献8.85%的股利收入，除了接下来会提到的一个特点，

那就是我们的特别股在发行后的三年可以转换成最多12,244,898股的普通

股，若有必要我们可转换的股份可能会向下调整，以确定我们所收到的股份总值

不能够超过4.14亿美元，虽然对于可能取得的普通股价值有其上限，但相对地

却没有下限，不过这样的特别条款还包含若是三年期限到时公司股价低于24.5

美元时，可以有权请求延长转换期限一年。

Overall, our fixed-income investments have treated us well,

both over the long term and recently. We have realized large

capital gains from these holdings, including about $152 million in

1991. Additionally, our after-tax yields have considerably exceeded

those earned by most fixed-income portfolios.

总的来说，不管最近或是是长期而言，我们在固定收益证券上的投资表现还算不

错，靠着这样的投资我们赚取大量的资本利得，在1991年这个数字大约在1.52

亿美元左右，此外我们的税后投资报酬率也远高于一般的固定收益证券。

Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater than

the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the

Salomon situation. As I write this letter, I am also writing a

letter for inclusion in Salomon's annual report and I refer you to

that report for an update on the company. (Write to: Corporate

Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY

10048) Despite the company's travails, Charlie and I believe our

Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during 1991.

Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon's common

produced this result.

不过在这期间也发生一些小意外，当然没有像所罗门事件那样让我本人都跳进

去，当我在撰写这封信时，我也同时写了一封信要放在所罗门的年度报告之内，

我顺便提出来算是对于该公司近况的一份报告，(写给纽约第七世贸大楼所罗门

公司)，虽然公司遭逢不幸，但查理跟我都相信，目前低利率的环境加上所罗门

普通股的股价回升，使我们在所罗门的特别股价值已略见增加。

Last year I told you that our USAir investment "should work

out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few

years." Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period for the

industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered

bankruptcy. (Stretch the period to 14 months and you can add

Continental and TWA.)

去年我曾告诉各位除非航空业的经营环境在未来几年内加速恶化，否则我们在美

国航空的投资应该可以有不错的结果，不过很不幸的随着中美、泛美与美西航空

相继倒闭，1991年正是航空业加速恶化的一年，(若是把时间延长为14个月，

则还要包括大陆航空与TWA两家航空公司)。

The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table

reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for

virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from

negligible. The risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have

been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating. These

carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry's

costs because the bankrupts don't incur the capital costs faced by

their solvent brethren and because they can fund their losses - and

thereby stave off shutdown - by selling off assets. This burn-thefurniture-

to-provide-firewood approach to fare-setting by bankrupt

carriers contributes to the toppling of previously-marginal

carriers, creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed to

bring the industry to its knees.

表上我们对于在美国航空投资的评价之所以如此的低，反应出整个产业目前所面

临到的获利前景不佳的风险，这个风险又因为法院鼓励已经宣布破产的航空公司

继续营运而更加提高，这些同业得以用比一般成本还低的价格，因为它们完全可

以不必在乎其它还咽咽一息的同业所需负担的资金成本，因为为了避免营运停

摆，它们可以靠着变卖资产来弥补所发生的损失，这种拆家具拿来当材火烧的做

法，有可能进一步危及其它营运还算正常的同业，然后引发骨牌效应，使得整个

产业一败涂地。

Seth Schofield, who became CEO of USAir in 1991, is making

major adjustments in the airline's operations in order to improve

its chances of being one of the few industry survivors. There is no

tougher job in corporate America than running an airline: Despite

the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected into it,

the industry, in aggregate, has posted a net loss since its birth

after Kitty Hawk. Airline managers need brains, guts, and

experience - and Seth possesses all three of these attributes.

Seth Schofield在1991年成为美国航空公司的总裁，正对整个公司的营运做出

相当重大的调整，期能增加其成为航空业仅存的几位幸存者之一，在美国没有比

经营一家航空公司还要困难的行业，虽然大笔的资金已经投入到这个产业，但是

从小鹰号诞生开始，航空业历史累积加总所产生的损失却是相当惊人，航空公司

的经理人需要的不只是智能、勇气还要再加上经验，而毫无疑问的，Seth 同时

具有以上三项的特质。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's

1991 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions

made through the program were $6.8 million, and 2,630 charities

were recipients.

大约有97.7%的有效股权参与1991年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约680万美

元捐出的款项分配给2,630家慈善机构。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our

shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages

48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your

shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1992 will be ineligible for the 1992

program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在

未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是

受托人的名下，必须在1992年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1992

年的捐赠计画。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that

Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make

contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million

annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The

United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our

businesses.

Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计画对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每

年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在150万美元左右。

这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐

出的相当。

However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the

parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad

national programs or charitable activities of special personal

interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders.

If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma

maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal

attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.

然而不管是旗下事业或是母公司的经理人在利用Berkshire的资金对外捐赠给

全国性组织或特别利益团体时，都是以站在股东利益立场所应该做的，相对地若

是你的员工也包含CEO在内，想要与其校友会或其它人建立个人关系的，我们

认为他们最好是用自己的钱，而不是从你的口袋里掏钱。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The faithful will notice that, for the first time in some

years, Charlie's annual letter to Wesco shareholders is not

reprinted in this report. Since his letter is relatively barebones

this year, Charlie said he saw no point in including it in these

pages; my own recommendation, however, is that you get a copy of

the Wesco report. Simply write: Corporate Secretary, Wesco

Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA

91101.

死忠的巴菲特迷可能会发现，许多年来头一次大家在年报中找不到查理孟格写给

Wesco股东的信，主要是因为他认为今年的报告相当阳春，所以没有必要附在

我们的年报中，不过我个人还是建议，想办法写信给Wesco公司的秘书，就可

以拿到Wesco的年报。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Malcolm G. Chace, Jr., now 88, has decided not to stand for

election as a director this year. But the association of the Chace

family with Berkshire will not end: Malcolm III (Kim), Malcolm's

son, will be nominated to replace him.

现年88岁的Malcolm Chace二世，决定从今年起不再担任本公司的董事，但

Berkshire与Chace家族的关系却不会断，他儿子也就是Malcolm三世会接替

其位置继续担任本公司董事。

In 1931, Malcolm went to work for Berkshire Fine Spinning

Associates, which merged with Hathaway Manufacturing Co. in 1955 to

form our present company. Two years later, Malcolm became Berkshire

Hathaway's Chairman, a position he held as well in early 1965 when

he made it possible for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. to buy a key

block of Berkshire stock owned by some of his relatives. This

purchase gave our partnership effective control of the company.

Malcolm's immediate family meanwhile kept its Berkshire stock and

for the last 27 years has had the second-largest holding in the

company, trailing only the Buffett family. Malcolm has been a joy

to work with and we are delighted that the long-running

relationship between the Chace family and Berkshire is continuing

to a new generation.

1931年Malcolm进入Berkshire针织工厂工作，后来该公司在1955年与

Hathaway工业合并，成为现在的Berkshire Hathaway，之后两年他接任本公

司董事长的职位，直到1965年由他一手促成巴菲特合伙事业买下他与亲人大部

分的股权，而使得我们成功入主该公司，之后Malcolm家族在往后的27年内

继续持有本公司的股份成为仅次于巴菲特家族，本公司第二大股东，Malcolm

一直是个很容易相处的伙伴，我们很高兴Chase家族与巴菲特家族的感情能够

延续到下一代。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum

Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 27, 1992.

Attendance last year grew to a record 1,550, but that still leaves

plenty of room at the Orpheum.

今年的股东会预计在1992年4月27日，星期一早上9点30分在位于奥玛哈

市中心的Orpheum中心召开，去年股东会参加人数又创新高突破1,550人，

不过会场还是剩下很多座位。

We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one

of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms)

but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much

larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the

Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards

from Borsheim's and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will

have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the

meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议大家最好先向以下旅馆预订房间(1)Radisson-Redick旅馆-就位在

Orpheum中心对街拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆(2)较大一点的Red Lion旅馆

-离Orpheum中心约五分钟路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奥玛哈西区，离波仙珠

宝店约100公尺，开车到市中心约需20分钟，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返

股东会会场。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can

make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the

quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual

meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of

intelligent, owner-related questions.

查理跟我一直都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可

由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的

股东像Berkshire的股东一样由高智能水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With

the admission card, we will enclose information about parking

facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a

little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to

walk a few blocks.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说

明供大家参考。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture

Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to

downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow

plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores.

Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of

the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and

from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See's

Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Americans ate 26 million

pounds of See's products last year.

一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭

店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天

到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星

期日则从中午开到下午5点30分，到那里时记得到喜斯糖果摊逛逛，了解一下

为何美国人一年能够吞下2,600万磅的喜斯糖果。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will be open

for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday,

April 26. Borsheim's will also have a special party the previous

evening at which shareholders are welcome. (You must, however,

write Mrs. Gladys Kaiser at our office for an invitation.) On

display that evening will be a 150-year retrospective of the most

exceptional timepieces made by Patek Philippe, including watches

once owned by Queen Victoria, Pope Pius IX, Rudyard Kipling, Madame

Curie and Albert Einstein. The centerpiece of the exhibition will

be a $5 million watch whose design and manufacture required nine

years of labor by Patek Philippe craftsmen. Along with the rest of

the collection, this watch will be on display at the store on

Sunday - unless Charlie has by then impulsively bought it.

波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别为股东与来宾开放，4月26

日星期天从中午开到下午6点，同时前一天晚上还将为所有股东举行一个特别

的Party，(但必须事先向我们办公室的Gladys Kaiser女士登记取得邀请函)，

当晚将会展示Patek Philippe过去150年来的作品回顾，包含英国维多利亚女

皇、教宗Pius四世与爱因斯坦等历史名人所拥有的手表，另外会场中的重头戏

是一只由Patek Philippe工匠设计打造，耗时一年价值500万美元的手表，如

无意外也会随着其它物品一起展出，除非查理忍不住诱惑先买下了它。

Nicholas Kenner nailed me - again - at last year's meeting,

pointing out that I had said in the 1990 annual report that he was

11 in May 1990, when actually he was 9. So, asked Nicholas rather

caustically: "If you can't get that straight, how do I know the

numbers in the back [the financials] are correct?" I'm still

searching for a snappy response. Nicholas will be at this year's

meeting - he spurned my offer of a trip to Disney World on that

day - so join us to watch a continuation of this lop-sided battle

of wits.

去年股东会Nicholas Kenner又杠上我了，他表示：「我在去年1990年报中

表示他在1990年5月11号满十岁，但事实上他那时才刚满9岁」，他接着又

用很嘲讽的语气说：「如果你连这个都搞不清楚，我如何还能相信你报告中的其

他数字是正确的」到现在我还在想如何做出一个有力的回答，今年Nicholas还

会出席，他拒绝了我邀请他当天到迪士尼乐园玩的建议，所以请大家继续好好观

赏这一面倒的机智问答。

Warren E. Buffett

February 28, 1992 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1992年2月28日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our per-share book value increased 20.3% during 1992. Over

the last 28 years (that is, since present management took over)

book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of 23.6%

compounded annually.

1992年本公司的净值成长了20.3%，总计过去28年以来，也就是自从现有经

营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的7,745美元，年复合成

长率约为23.6%。

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.52

billion. More than 98% of this gain came from earnings and

appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming

from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a

result of our calling our convertible debentures for redemption

on January 4, 1993, and of some holders electing to receive

common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative.

Most holders of the debentures who converted into common waited

until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and

therefore received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to

the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding: $25 million were

converted into shares before yearend; $46 million were converted

in January; and $405 million were redeemed for cash. The

conversions were made at $11,719 per share, so altogether we

issued 6,106 shares.

回顾过去一年，Berkshire的净值增加了15.2亿美元，其中98%系来自于盈余

与投资组合的增值，剩下的2%则是因为发行新股的缘故，这些股份是因为我们

赎回在1993年1月4日所发行的可转换特别股，其中有部份持有人不要现金

而选择领取本公司的普通股，大部分的持有人选择在1月进行转换，另外有一

小部份则在去年12月就径行转换，总计当初我们发行总值4.76亿美元的债券

中，4,600万在一月转换，另外4.05亿美元则以现金赎回，转换价订为11,719

美元一股，换算下来一共发行了6,106股。

Berkshire now has 1,152,547 shares outstanding. That

compares, you will be interested to know, to 1,137,778 shares

outstanding on October 1, 1964, the beginning of the fiscal year

during which Buffett Partnership, Ltd. acquired control of the

company.

Berkshire目前流通在外股数为1,152,547股，相较于1964年10月1日当

初，巴菲特合伙取得Berkshire控制权时的1,137,778股来说，增加的股数实

属有限。

We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire,

doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal

value, however, has not been easy to obtain, since we have always

valued our shares highly. So be it: We wish to increase

Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth

of its owners.

对于发行新股我们有相当严格的规定，那就是除非我们确信所收到的价值与我们

付出的一致时，我们才会考虑这样做，当然同等的价值不是那么容易达到，因为

我们一向自视甚高，不过那又如何，除非确定公司股东的财富也会增加，否则我

们不会随便扩大规模。

Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand-in-hand as an

amusing but value-destroying experience in our past illustrates.

On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank

whose management was hell-bent on expansion. (Aren't they all?)

When our bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock

swap on a basis that valued the acquiree's net worth and earning

power at over twice that of the acquirer's. Our management -

visibly in heat - quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquiree

then insisted on one other condition: "You must promise me," he

said in effect, "that once our merger is done and I have become a

major shareholder, you'll never again make a deal this dumb."

大家要知道这两个目的不一定就会自然吻合，事实上在我们过去所举过的例子

中，有些就是看起来有趣但却是让价值受到减损的经验，在那次经验中，我们在

一家银行有相当大的投资，而银行经理人对于扩张却有极度偏好，(他们不都是

如此吗?)，当我们投资的银行在追求另外一家较小的银行时，对方开出的价码是

以其净值与获利能力作为基础后的两倍，当时我们的经理人因为正在热头上，所

以很快就答应了，这时对方又得寸进尺开出另外一项条件，他说：「你必须答应

我，在整个购并案完成后，我可以变成公司最大的股东，同时以后你也不能在做

类似这次交易那样愚蠢的购并案」。

You will remember that our goal is to increase our per-share

intrinsic value - for which our book value is a conservative, but

useful, proxy - at a 15% annual rate. This objective, however,

cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is

particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply

to the common stocks owned by our insurance companies, whose

portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire's net worth.

Since 1979, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) have

required that these securities be valued at their market prices

(less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation)

rather than at the lower of cost or market. Run-of-the-mill

fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results

to gyrate, especially in comparison to those of the typical

industrial company.

大家一定要记得，我们的终极目标是希望能让公司每年以15%稳定的速度来增

加每股的实质价值，当然公司的帐面价值虽然保守了点，但却是相当有用的替代

性指针，不过这样的目标很难以平稳地态势达成，这在Berkshire尤其困难，因

为会计原则规定，我们旗下保险事业所持有，占Berkshire相当大部分的股票投

资必须以市价列示。自从1979年以来，一般公认会计原则就要求它们以市价方

式而非原先的成本与市价孰低法列在公司帐上(当然要扣除未实现资本利得估计

应支付的税负)，股票价格如同水车滚轮般上上下下，也使得我们每年结算的成

绩变化很大，尤其是在与一般公司产业比较时更为明显。

To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been - and

to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term

results - we show on the facing page our annual change in pershare

net worth and compare it with the annual results (including

dividends) of the S&P 500.

为了解释我们净值变化的程度以及股票市场波动对于公司帐面盈余短期的影

响，从今年起我们决定在年报的首页放置每年公司净值变化以及与S&P 500指

数(含现金股利)之间的比较。

You should keep at least three points in mind as you

evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses

we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in

stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both

our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years.

Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then

represented a significant portion of our net worth, were a major

drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the

case if the money invested in that business had instead been

invested in the S&P 500. In more recent years, as we assembled

our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally

exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses

have been high - usually well in excess of the returns achieved

by the S&P.

大家在评估这份资料时至少必须要注意三个重点，第一、我们旗下许多事业每年

年度的获利并不受股市波动的影响，而这些企业对于我们绝对或相对的影响每年

也都不一样，就早期而言，由于我们在纺织事业的报酬占我们净值相当大的部

份，所以要是在这方面投资不当，我们的绩效可能会远远落后于将钱摆在S&P

500指数相关类股之上，不过到了最近，当我们逐渐利用投资组成一支由优秀

经理人经营的优秀企业团队时，这些企业所带来的报酬通常远高于投资S&P 500

指数。

A second important factor to consider - and one that

significantly hurts our relative performance - is that both the

income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a

substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are

pre-tax. To comprehend the damage, imagine that Berkshire had

owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28-year period

covered. In that case, the tax bite would have caused our

corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in

the table for the S&P. Under present tax laws, a gain for the

S&P of 18% delivers a corporate holder of that index a return

well short of 13%. And this problem would be intensified if

corporate tax rates were to rise. This is a structural

disadvantage we simply have to live with; there is no antidote

for it.

第二项应该要特别注意的因素-也是影响我们相对表现的因素，那就是我们投资

证券所产生的收益与资本利得必须要负担相当重的税负，而在此同时S&P 500

指数却是以免税基础计算的，为了让大家了解这期间的差异性，假设Berkshire

在过去28年间就只投资S&P 500指数，则最后所得到的投资报酬将远低于S&P

500指数本身的表现，依照目前的税率，若是S&P 500上涨18%，则在课税后

投资人真正得到的报酬只有13%不到，而这个问题若是考量目前税率即将调高

的情况，将会变得更严重，这是一个我们必须要忍受的结构性问题，基本上没有

办法可解。

The third point incorporates two predictions: Charlie

Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I are

virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an

investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the

past decade, and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by

Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our

historical advantage relative to the index.

第三点包含两个预测，查理孟格-Berkshire的副主席兼主要合伙人，跟我都相

当清楚，那就是未来十年内S&P 500指数的表现将无法像过去十年那样的好，

而我们同样也相信以Berkshire目前资本规模越来越大的趋势，将会大大影响过

去我们大幅超越指数的表现。

Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain:

We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to

make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue

to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should

be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children and also

from grown-ups who behave in the market like children. However,

it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their

underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some

time, and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that

the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be

significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second

conclusion - that an increased capital base will act as an anchor

on our relative performance - seems incontestable. The only open

question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some

tolerable, though slowed, pace.

做出第一项预测有违我们的本性，一直以来我们认为股市预言家唯一的价值就是

让算命先生看起来像那么一回事，即便是现在，查理跟我还是相信短期股市的预

测是毒药，应该要把他们摆在最安全的地方，远离儿童以及那些在股市中的行为

像小孩般幼稚的投资人，虽然有时股市的表现会有相当大的起伏，然而很明显的

股市的表现不可能永远都能超越其背后所代表的企业，这也是为何我们胆敢预测

未来十年投资人在股市所获得的报酬将很难再像过去十年那样的优异的原因。我

们第二点结论，规模越来越大的资金将会拖累我们的绩效，对于这点倒是不容置

疑，唯一的问题在于我们拖着这样的重担的同时，如何还能以缓慢但是可以忍受

的速度前进。

We will continue to experience considerable volatility in

our annual results. That's assured by the general volatility of

the stock market, by the concentration of our equity holdings in

just a few companies, and by certain business decisions we have

made, most especially our move to commit large resources to

super-catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility

but welcome it: A tolerance for short-term swings improves our

long-term prospects. In baseball lingo, our performance

yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.

往后我们将会继续经历年度绩效的上下变动，面对多变的股市，这点绝对可以确

定，尤其是我们将资金集中在几家主要的被投资公司之上，同时也因为我们将大

部分的资源摆在超级意外险之上的商业决策，我们不但接受这种变动，而且相当

能够接受，只要忍受短期变动的同时可以为我们带来长期的效果，套句棒球常用

的术语，我们的表现主要是看长打率而不是打击率。

The Salomon Interlude

所罗门插曲

Last June, I stepped down as Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc

after ten months in the job. You can tell from Berkshire's 1991-

92 results that the company didn't miss me while I was gone. But

the reverse isn't true: I missed Berkshire and am delighted to

be back full-time. There is no job in the world that is more fun

than running Berkshire and I count myself lucky to be where I am.

去年六月，在接手十个月后，我正式辞去所罗门董事会临时主席的职务，大家可

以从1991年到1992年Berkshire的经营绩效看出，公司并没有因为我暂时不

在而发生任何差错，不过反过来说就不一定了，我很怀念Berkshire且很愿意再

度回到公司担任全职工作，对我而言，世界上没有任何其它工作比起经营

Berkshire更有乐趣，很庆幸我自己能够身处现在这个位置。

The Salomon post, though far from fun, was interesting and

worthwhile: In Fortune's annual survey of America's Most Admired

Corporations, conducted last September, Salomon ranked second

among 311 companies in the degree to which it improved its

reputation. Additionally, Salomon Brothers, the securities

subsidiary of Salomon Inc, reported record pre-tax earnings last

year - 34% above the previous high.

这次所罗门的任务虽然不是很愉快，但却相当有趣且值得，在去年九月财富杂志

票选全美最受崇敬企业的年度调查中，所罗门在全部的311家公司中名列第二

进步奖，此外所罗门兄弟-所罗门集团其下的证券子公司，其税前盈余更是创下

之前历史新高34%之多。

Many people helped in the resolution of Salomon's problems

and the righting of the firm, but a few clearly deserve special

mention. It is no exaggeration to say that without the combined

efforts of Salomon executives Deryck Maughan, Bob Denham, Don

Howard, and John Macfarlane, the firm very probably would not

have survived. In their work, these men were tireless,

effective, supportive and selfless, and I will forever be

grateful to them.

所罗门能够得到解救需要感谢许多人，其中有几位尤其要特别提到的，若是没有

Deryck Maughhan、Bob Denham、Don Howard与John Macfarlane等人

的通力合作，这家证券商很可能无法幸免，这些人努力不懈、有效率、无私奉献

的精神，让我永远感佩他们。

Salomon's lead lawyer in its Government matters, Ron Olson

of Munger, Tolles & Olson, was also key to our success in getting

through this trouble. The firm's problems were not only severe,

but complex. At least five authorities - the SEC, the Federal

Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Attorney

for the Southern District of New York, and the Antitrust Division

of the Department of Justice - had important concerns about

Salomon. If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and

prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal,

business and human skills. Ron had them all.

所罗门在政府事务方面的首席律师-Munger, Tolles&Olson联合律师事务所的

Ron Olson也是这次问题能够顺利解决的核心人物，所罗门所面临的问题不但

严重而且相当复杂，至少有五个主管机关-证管会、纽约联邦准备银行、美国财

政部、纽约南区地方法院与司法部的反托拉斯部门都牵涉其中，若是我们想要以

明快有组织性地解决这件事，我们绝对必须要有一位具有商务法律专业与沟通技

巧的律师来帮忙，Ron正是具备有这样条件的最佳人选。

Acquisitions

购并案

Of all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating

for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with

excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like,

trust and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make but we

look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the same

attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse: It

pays to be active, interested and open-minded, but it does not

pay to be in a hurry.

在Berkshire所有的活动中，最令查理跟我感到雀跃的是当我们找到同时具有超

强产业竞争力并且还拥有我们信任与崇敬的经营者的那种企业，想要买到这类公

司可不是件容易的事，但我们会一直努力寻找，而在寻找的过程当中，我们采取

的就像是与一般人寻找终身伴侣一样相同的态度，当然积极、乐观与开放的态度

是应该的，但绝对没有必要躁进。

In the past, I've observed that many acquisition-hungry

managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of

the story about the frog-kissing princess. Remembering her

success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads,

expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing

results only deepen their desire to round up new toads.

("Fanaticism," said Santyana, "consists of redoubling your effort

when you've forgotten your aim.") Ultimately, even the most

optimistic manager must face reality. Standing knee-deep in

unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous "restructuring"

charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program,

the CEO receives the education but the stockholders pay the

tuition.

过去我看过许多对于购并活动相当饥渴的经理人，很显然地可能是小时候青蛙王

子的故事看太多了，脑中只记得那美丽的结局，他们很慷慨地花大笔的银子取得

亲吻蟾蜍的机会，期望会有神奇的事情发生，而失望的结果往往只会让他们更积

极地寻找下一次机会，(Santyana说：所谓的狂乐就是当你忘了目标何在时，还

加倍投入你的心力)，到最后即使是最乐观的经理人还是要被迫面对现实，深陷

在一堆没有反应的蟾蜍当中，然后他会再大声地宣布将进行另一波的重整改造方

案，在这种企业版的全新出击方案，CEO学到相当宝贵的教训，只不过学费却

必须由股东们来出。

In my early days as a manager I, too, dated a few toads.

They were cheap dates - I've never been much of a sport - but my

results matched those of acquirers who courted higher-priced

toads. I kissed and they croaked.

早年在我担任经理人时，也曾碰到几只蟾蜍，还好他们算是相当便宜的了，虽然

我并没有那么积极，但所得到的结果与那些花高价追求蟾蜍的凯子经理人差不

多，在亲了之后，它们还是依然聒聒叫。

After several failures of this type, I finally remembered

some useful advice I once got from a golf pro (who, like all pros

who have had anything to do with my game, wishes to remain

anonymous). Said the pro: "Practice doesn't make perfect;

practice makes permanent." And thereafter I revised my strategy

and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices rather than fair

businesses at good prices.

在失败过几次之后，我终于想起我曾经从某位职业高尔夫选手的建议(像所有职

业选手一样，只要和我打过球的，通常都不太愿意我提起他们的名字)，他说：

「不断的练习虽然无法达到完美的境界，但练习却能够使你的成绩永续维持」，

也因此我决定改变我的投资策略，试着以合理的价格买进好公司而不是以便宜的

价格买进普通的公司。

Last year, in December, we made an acquisition that is a

prototype of what we now look for. The purchase was 82% of

Central States Indemnity, an insurer that makes monthly payments

for credit-card holders who are unable themselves to pay because

they have become disabled or unemployed. Currently the company's

annual premiums are about $90 million and profits about $10

million. Central States is based in Omaha and managed by Bill

Kizer, a friend of mine for over 35 years. The Kizer family -

which includes sons Bill, Dick and John - retains 18% ownership

of the business and will continue to run things just as it has in

the past. We could not be associated with better people.

去年十二月，我们做了一个我们现在所认为最典型的购并案，那就是买下中央州

险公司82%的股权，这是一家专门受理信用卡持有人因为突然失业或是失能而

付不出信用卡帐单风险的保险公司，现在这家保险公司一年的保费收入大概是

9,000万美元，获利1,000万美元，总部就设于奥玛哈，并且由与我结交35

年以上的老朋友Bill Kizer所管理，Kizer家族包含他几个儿子持有剩下18%的

股权，而且还会如同以前那般地经营这项事业，我们实在是不太可能再找到更合

适的人选。

Coincidentally, this latest acquisition has much in common

with our first, made 26 years ago. At that time, we purchased

another Omaha insurer, National Indemnity Company (along with a

small sister company) from Jack Ringwalt, another long-time

friend. Jack had built the business from scratch and, as was the

case with Bill Kizer, thought of me when he wished to sell.

(Jack's comment at the time: "If I don't sell the company, my

executor will, and I'd rather pick the home for it.") National

Indemnity was an outstanding business when we bought it and

continued to be under Jack's management. Hollywood has had good

luck with sequels; I believe we, too, will.

碰巧的是这件最新的购并案与我在26年前第一次所做的案子有许多雷同之处，

在当时，我们从另一位老朋友Jack Ringwalt手中，买下奥玛哈另一家保险公司

-国家产险公司，这家公司是由Jack一手草创，同时也跟Bill一样，当他打算把

公司卖掉时，第一个人就想到我，(Jack当时说到：若是我自己不卖这家公司，

我的遗嘱执行人也会卖，所以我宁可自己为它找个归宿)，国家产险在我们当初

买下时，就是一家相当优秀的好公司，而在Jack的领导下依旧维持这样的情况，

好莱坞在发行电影续集时，通常都会有不错的成绩，我想我也是。

Berkshire's acquisition criteria are described on page 23.

Beyond purchases made by the parent company, however, our

subsidiaries sometimes make small "add-on" acquisitions that

extend their product lines or distribution capabilities. In this

manner, we enlarge the domain of managers we already know to be

outstanding - and that's a low-risk and high-return proposition.

We made five acquisitions of this type in 1992, and one was not

so small: At yearend, H. H. Brown purchased Lowell Shoe Company,

a business with $90 million in sales that makes Nursemates, a

leading line of shoes for nurses, and other kinds of shoes as

well. Our operating managers will continue to look for add-on

opportunities, and we would expect these to contribute modestly

to Berkshire's value in the future.

Berkshire的购并标准详另页，除了母公司本身时常对外进行购并，我们旗下的

子公司偶尔也会自行新添生力军，以延伸其产品线或是通路能力，就这点儿言，

我们很愿意扩大旗下经理人的视野，因为我们相当清楚他们优异的能力，这绝对

是低风险高报酬的一件事，在1992年我们总共有5件这样类似的案例，另外

还有一件比较大的案子，在年底时，布朗鞋业买下Lowell鞋业-一家年营业额

9,000万美金，专门制造护士专用鞋的公司，当然我们旗下事业的经理人还是继

续寻找扩充的机会，而我们也预期他们未来将能够为Berkshire创造出更多的价

值。

Then again, a trend has emerged that may make further

acquisitions difficult. The parent company made one purchase in

1991, buying H. H. Brown, which is run by Frank Rooney, who has

eight children. In 1992 our only deal was with Bill Kizer,

father of nine. It won't be easy to keep this string going in

1993.

不过市场上目前的趋势再度地不利于购并活动的进行，母公司在1991年所买下

的布朗鞋业，经营者Frank有八个小孩，我们在1992年唯一的案子的经理人，

Bill有九个小孩，不过我想这种趋势很难在1993年继续维持下去。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's

reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of

Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments

are not charged against the specific businesses to which they

apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This

procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they

would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've

explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to

us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing

GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a

business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in

the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our

audited financial statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

(000s omitted)

-----------------------------------------------

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

---------------------- ----------------------

1992 1991 1992 1991

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............ $(108,961) $(119,593) $ (71,141) $ (77,229)

Net Investment Income.... 355,067 331,846 305,763 285,173

H. H. Brown (acquired 7/1/91) 27,883 13,616 17,340 8,611

Buffalo News .............. 47,863 37,113 28,163 21,841

Fechheimer ................ 13,698 12,947 7,267 6,843

Kirby ..................... 35,653 35,726 22,795 22,555

Nebraska Furniture Mart ... 17,110 14,384 8,072 6,993

Scott Fetzer

Manufacturing Group .... 31,954 26,123 19,883 15,901

See's Candies ............. 42,357 42,390 25,501 25,575

Wesco - other than Insurance 15,153 12,230 9,195 8,777

World Book ................ 29,044 22,483 19,503 15,487

Amortization of Goodwill .. (4,702) (4,113) (4,687) (4,098)

Other Purchase-Price

Accounting Charges ..... (7,385) (6,021) (8,383) (7,019)

Interest Expense* ......... (98,643) (89,250) (62,899) (57,165)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions .......... (7,634) (6,772) (4,913) (4,388)

Other ..................... 72,223 77,399 36,267 47,896

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Operating Earnings .......... 460,680 400,508 347,726 315,753

Sales of Securities ......... 89,937 192,478 59,559 124,155

---------- ---------- ---------- ----------

Total Earnings - All Entities $ 550,617 $ 592,986 $ 407,285 $ 439,908

======== ======== ========= ======

*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual

Savings & Loan. Includes $22.5 million in 1992 and $5.7 million in

1991 of premiums paid on the early redemption of debt.

*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用，另外加计1992年与1991年分别赎回可转换债券

所额外支付的2,250万与570万溢价。

A large amount of additional information about these

businesses is given on pages 37-47, where you will also find our

segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. Our goal is to give you

all of the financial information that Charlie and I consider

significant in making our own evaluation of Berkshire.

在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们

的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必要的资

讯。

"Look-Through" Earnings

透视盈余

We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which

consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous

section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major

investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our

profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by

Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been

distributed to us. Though no single figure can be perfect, we

believe that the look-through number more accurately portrays the

earnings of Berkshire than does the GAAP number.

之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到的帐列盈

余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公

司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所

得税。虽然没有任何一项数字是完美的，但我们相信这项透视盈余会比按一般公

认会计原则下的数字更能够反应Berkshire实际的获利状况。

I've told you that over time look-through earnings must

increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is

to grow at that rate. Our look-through earnings in 1992 were $604

million, and they will need to grow to more than $1.8 billion by

the year 2000 if we are to meet that 15% goal. For us to get

there, our operating subsidiaries and investees must deliver

excellent performances, and we must exercise some skill in capital

allocation as well.

我曾经告诉各位，长期而言，如果我们的实质价值也期望以这个幅度来成长的

话，透视盈余每年也必须增加15%，1992年我们的透视盈余约为6.04亿美元，

而到公元2000年为止，若要以15%的目标，透视盈余必须成长到18亿美元，

要完成这样的目标，代表我们旗下的营运事业及主要的被投资公司必须要有更杰

出的表现，同时我们本身资金规划分配也要更有效益才成。

We cannot promise to achieve the $1.8 billion target. Indeed,

we may not even come close to it. But it does guide our decisionmaking:

When we allocate capital today, we are thinking about what

will maximize look-through earnings in 2000.

我们不敢保证届时一定可以达到18亿美元的目标，甚至很有可能根本就达不

到，不过这目标还是对我们的决策有帮助，每当我们现在在分配资金时，我们都

会想到要如何将2000年的透视盈余极大化。

We do not, however, see this long-term focus as eliminating

the need for us to achieve decent short-term results as well.

After all, we were thinking long-range thoughts five or ten years

ago, and the moves we made then should now be paying off. If

plantings made confidently are repeatedly followed by disappointing

harvests, something is wrong with the farmer. (Or perhaps with the

farm: Investors should understand that for certain companies, and

even for some industries, there simply is no good long-term

strategy.) Just as you should be suspicious of managers who pump

up short-term earnings by accounting maneuvers, asset sales and the

like, so also should you be suspicious of those managers who fail

to deliver for extended periods and blame it on their long-term

focus. (Even Alice, after listening to the Queen lecture her about

"jam tomorrow," finally insisted, "It must come sometimes to jam

today.")

不过我们对于长期目标的专注并不代表我们就不注重短期结果，总的来说我们早

在5到10年前就预先规划设想，而当时所作的举动现在才开始慢慢地回收，如

果每次有信心的播种最后的收割结果都一再让人失望的话，农夫就应该要好好地

检讨原因了，(不然就是农地有问题，投资人必须了解对于某些公司或甚至是某

些产业，根本就没有所谓的长期性策略)，就像是你可能会特别留心那些利用会

计手法或出售资产撑高短期盈余的经理人，你也应该要特别注意那些一再延长达

成目标期程，并把长期目标一直挂在嘴上的人，(即使是爱莉丝一再听到母后明

天再挤牛奶的说教，她最后还是忍不注坚持，总有一些应该要今天挤吧！)

The following table shows you how we calculate look-through

earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very

rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been

included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly

under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数

字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益

项下)

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)

----------------------- ----------------------- ------------------

1992 1991 1992 1991

-------- -------- -------- --------

Capital Cities/ABC Inc. ....... 18.2% 18.1% $ 70 $ 61

The Coca-Cola Company ......... 7.1% 7.0% 82 69

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 8.2%(1) 3.4%(1) 29(2) 15

GEICO Corp. ................... 48.1% 48.2% 34(3) 69(3)

General Dynamics Corp. ........ 14.1% -- 11(2) --

The Gillette Company .......... 10.9% 11.0% 38 23(2)

Guinness PLC .................. 2.0% 1.6% 7 --

The Washington Post Company ... 14.6% 14.6% 11 10

Wells Fargo & Company ......... 11.5% 9.6% 16(2) (17)(2)

-------- -------- -------- --------

Berkshire's share of

undistributed earnings of major investees $298 $230

Hypothetical tax on these

undistributed investee earnings (42) (30)

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 348 316

-------- --------

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $604 $516

(1) Net of minority interest at Wesco

已扣除Wesco的少数股权

(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year

以年平均持有股权比例计算

(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both recurring and significant

扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table

presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance

industry:

下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数

Yearly Change Combined Ratio

in Premiums After Policyholder

Written (%) Dividends

------------- --------------

1981 ........................... 3.8 106.0

1982 ........................... 3.7 109.6

1983 ........................... 5.0 112.0

1984 ........................... 8.5 118.0

1985 ........................... 22.1 116.3

1986 ........................... 22.2 108.0

1987 ........................... 9.4 104.6

1988 ........................... 4.5 105.4

1989 ........................... 3.2 109.2

1990 ........................... 4.5 109.6

1991 (Revised) ................. 2.4 108.8

1992 (Est.) .................... 2.7 114.8

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses

incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A

ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above

100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year.

When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding

policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a

combined ratio in the 106 - 110 range typically produces an

overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds

provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，比率在100

以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保

险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100

以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部份所产生的

盈余)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在106-110之间。

About four points in the industry's 1992 combined ratio can

be attributed to Hurricane Andrew, which caused the largest

insured loss in history. Andrew destroyed a few small insurers.

Beyond that, it awakened some larger companies to the fact that

their reinsurance protection against catastrophes was far from

adequate. (It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's

been swimming naked.) One major insurer escaped insolvency

solely because it had a wealthy parent that could promptly supply

a massive transfusion of capital.

1992年的综合比率由于史上最大的单一损失理赔事件-Andrew 飓风发生而多

增加了4个百分点，Andrew让几家小型保险公司因此倒闭，另外他也让许多大

型保险公司发觉自己并未寻求到足够的再保险保护，(只有当浪退了，大家才知

道是谁没穿衣服还在游泳的)，还有一家大型的保险公司要不是因为背后有个有

钱的母公司及时供应资金的话，可能早就已经关门大吉了。

Bad as it was, however, Andrew could easily have been far

more damaging if it had hit Florida 20 or 30 miles north of where

it actually did and had hit Louisiana further east than was the

case. All in all, many companies will rethink their reinsurance

programs in light of the Andrew experience.

坏归坏，还好Andrew没有往北20-30英哩侵袭到佛罗里达，或是往东侵袭到

路易西安那州，否则损失可能难以估计，总而言之，很多公司因为Andrew事

件可能会重新考虑现有的再保险安排是否适当。

As you know we are a large writer - perhaps the largest in

the world - of "super-cat" coverages, which are the policies that

other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major

catastrophic losses. Consequently, we too took our lumps from

Andrew, suffering losses from it of about $125 million, an amount

roughly equal to our 1992 super-cat premium income. Our other

super-cat losses, though, were negligible. This line of business

therefore produced an overall loss of only $2 million for the

year. (In addition, our investee, GEICO, suffered a net loss

from Andrew, after reinsurance recoveries and tax savings, of

about $50 million, of which our share is roughly $25 million.

This loss did not affect our operating earnings, but did reduce

our look-through earnings.)

大家知道Berkshire一直都是霹雳猫保单相当大的发行公司，或许规模已是全世

界最大的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来分散他们本身在重大意外事故所

需承担的风险，也因此我们必须承受一大块Andrew所造成的损失，金额约为

1.25亿美元，这数字相当于我们一整年的保费收入，不过还好其它霹雳猫保单

实际发生的损失都相当轻微，所以结算下来全年的总损失只有200万美元，(另

外我们的被投资公司GEICO也因Andrew飓风产生了一些损失，在扣除再保分

摊与税负抵减之后，金额约为5,000万美元，依我们的持股比例大概要分摊

2,500万美元，虽然这项损失不会反应在我们的帐上，但确实已对我们的透视盈

余造成影响)。

In last year's report I told you that I hoped that our

super-cat business would over time achieve a 10% profit margin.

But I also warned you that in any given year the line was likely

to be "either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable."

Instead, both 1991 and 1992 have come in close to a break-even

level. Nonetheless, I see these results as aberrations and stick

with my prediction of huge annual swings in profitability from

this business.

在去年的年报中，我曾告诉各位我们希望能从霹雳猫保险这类业务获得10%的

利润空间，但我还是要提醒各位在某些特定的年度中，有可能一下子大赚或是一

下子大亏，然而1991年与1992年倒是维持在损益两平的边缘，不过我还是认

为这样的结果有点异常，同时我还是坚持在这行获利可能大好大坏的预测。

Let me remind you of some characteristics of our super-cat

policies. Generally, they are activated only when two things

happen. First, the direct insurer or reinsurer we protect must

suffer losses of a given amount - that's the policyholder's

"retention" - from a catastrophe; and second, industry-wide

insured losses from the catastrophe must exceed some minimum

level, which usually is $3 billion or more. In most cases, the

policies we issue cover only a specific geographical area, such

as a portion of the U.S., the entire U.S., or everywhere other

than the U.S. Also, many policies are not activated by the first

super-cat that meets the policy terms, but instead cover only a

"second-event" or even a third- or fourth-event. Finally, some

policies are triggered only by a catastrophe of a specific type,

such as an earthquake. Our exposures are large: We have one

policy that calls for us to pay $100 million to the policyholder

if a specified catastrophe occurs. (Now you know why I suffer

eyestrain: from watching The Weather Channel.)

我还是苦口婆心再提醒各位霹雳猫保单的特点，通常只有在两种情况发生时，理

赔才会生效，首先受我们保护的保险或再保公司的损失必须超过一定金额-也就

是保户的自留保额部份；第二整个保险业界的损失也必须超过一定的上限，比如

说30亿美元以上或甚至更多。在大部分的状况之下，我们发行的保单只包含特

定地区，像是美国一部份州、或是全美国或是除了美国的以外地区，另外有许多

保单也不是在第一次大型灾害发生后就须理赔，有的只保第二次或第三次甚至是

第四次大灾害，最后一点有些保单只保特定种类的灾害，比如说是地震，我们暴

露的风险相当的大，我们有一张保单若是发生保单上指定的特定灾害发生的话，

就必须给予保户1亿美元的理赔，(现在你应该知道我常常盯着气象频道盯到眼

睛酸的原因了吧)。

Currently, Berkshire is second in the U.S. property-casualty

industry in net worth (the leader being State Farm, which neither

buys nor sells reinsurance). Therefore, we have the capacity to

assume risk on a scale that interests virtually no other company.

We have the appetite as well: As Berkshire's net worth and

earnings grow, our willingness to write business increases also.

But let me add that means good business. The saying, "a fool

and his money are soon invited everywhere," applies in spades in

reinsurance, and we actually reject more than 98% of the business

we are offered. Our ability to choose between good and bad

proposals reflects a management strength that matches our

financial strength: Ajit Jain, who runs our reinsurance

operation, is simply the best in this business. In combination,

these strengths guarantee that we will stay a major factor in the

super-cat business so long as prices are appropriate.

现在Berkshire是全美国净值第二大的产业意外险公司(排名第一的是州农保

险，不过他们并不从事再保业务)，因此我们绝对有能力也有兴趣去承担别的保

险公司无法承担的风险，随着Berkshire的净值与获利能力继续成长，我们接受

保单的意愿也跟着增加，但是我必须强调只有好的生意我们才愿意接，有人说：

笨的有钱人特别好骗，我想这句话也适用在再保险之上，事实上我们平均我们拒

绝98%以上上门的保单请求，我们挑选客户的能力跟我们本身的财务实力相当，

Ajit Jain负责经营我们的再保业务，堪称业界的翘楚，两者结合使得我们的竞争

力确保我们可以在霹雳猫保险业界继续成为主要的参与者，只要保费价格合理的

话。

What constitutes an appropriate price, of course, is

difficult to determine. Catastrophe insurers can't simply

extrapolate past experience. If there is truly "global warming,"

for example, the odds would shift, since tiny changes in

atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather

patterns. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a

mushrooming of population and insured values in U.S. coastal

areas that are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes, the number

one creator of super-cats. A hurricane that caused x dollars of

damage 20 years ago could easily cost 10x now.

当然何谓合理的价格实在是很难去界定，灾害保险业者实在是很难依据过去的经

验来预估未来，例如若是全球温室效应确实存在的话，意外变量一定会增多，只

要大气状况有任何些微的转变就有可能造成气象形态的巨幅波动，更有甚者，最

近几年美国海岸地区人口爆炸性成长，使得这些地区的被保标的特别容易受到飓

风的侵袭，而飓风正是超级意外最常发生的第一名，现在一次飓风所发生的损失

可能是二十年前的十倍以上。

Occasionally, also, the unthinkable happens. Who would have

guessed, for example, that a major earthquake could occur in

Charleston, S.C.? (It struck in 1886, registered an estimated 6.6

on the Richter scale, and caused 60 deaths.) And who could have

imagined that our country's most serious quake would occur at New

Madrid, Missouri, which suffered an estimated 8.7 shocker in

1812. By comparison, the 1989 San Francisco quake was a 7.1 -

and remember that each one-point Richter increase represents a

ten-fold increase in strength. Someday, a U.S. earthquake

occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for

insurers.

而且有时还会有意想不到的事情发生，比如说谁会想到Charleston地区竟然会

发生大地震(它在1886年发生，芮氏规模6.6，造成60个人死亡)，又有谁知

道美国史上最严重的地震是1812年发生在密苏里州估计规模8.7的那次地震，

比较起来1989年发生在旧金山的大地震，规模只有7.1，大家要知道每增加

0.1级代表其释放的力量就要增加10倍，哪一天要是加州发生大地震的话，将

会对所有保险业者造成难以估计的损失。

When viewing our quarterly figures, you should understand

that our accounting for super-cat premiums differs from our

accounting for other insurance premiums. Rather than recording

our super-cat premiums on a pro-rata basis over the life of a

given policy, we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs

or until the policy expires. We take this conservative approach

because the likelihood of super-cats causing us losses is

particularly great toward the end of the year. It is then that

weather tends to kick up: Of the ten largest insured losses in

U.S. history, nine occurred in the last half of the year. In

addition, policies that are not triggered by a first event are

unlikely, by their very terms, to cause us losses until late in

the year.

当各位在检视我们每季的数字时，大家一定要知道我们霹雳猫保险的会计原则与

一般保险有些许的不同，没有将霹雳猫的保费收入按保单发行期间平均分摊认

列，我们必须等到整个保单期间结束或是损失发生后才全部一次认列，我们之所

以采取这样保守的做法，原因在于霹雳猫保单在年度截止之前特别容易发生意

情，尤其是天气状况更是如此，在历史上前十大意外灾害中，有九件是发生在下

半年，此外由于许多保单在第一次重大灾害发生时，并不理赔，所以若真的发生

损失的话，通常会是在下半年。

The bottom-line effect of our accounting procedure for

super-cats is this: Large losses may be reported in any quarter

of the year, but significant profits will only be reported in the

fourth quarter.

对于霹雳猫保险我们的会计原则底限就是，钜额的损失可能会发生在任何一季，

但钜额的获利只有在每年的第四季才有可能出现。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

As I've told you in each of the last few years, what counts

in our insurance business is "the cost of funds developed from

insurance," or in the vernacular, "the cost of float." Float -

which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss

reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium

reserves minus agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs and

deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. The cost of

float is measured by our underwriting loss.

就像是前几年向各位提过的，真正重要的是我们从保险业所取得的资金，其资金

成本到底是多少，套句专业术语，就是浮存金成本，浮存金-系指我们靠保险业

所取得大量的资金，系指将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加

总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本

则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。

The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the

business in 1967.

下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

------------ ------------- ------------- -------------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 ......... profit $17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 ......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 ......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 ......... $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 ......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 ......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 ......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 ......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 ......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 ......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 ......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 ......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 ......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 ......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 ......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 ......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 ......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 ......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 ......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 ......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 ......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 ......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 ......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 ......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 ......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992 ......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

Last year, our insurance operation again generated funds at a

cost below that incurred by the U.S. Government on its newly-issued

long-term bonds. This means that in 21 years out of the 26 years

we have been in the insurance business we have beaten the

Government's rate, and often we have done so by a wide margin.

(If, on average, we didn't beat the Government's rate, there would

be no economic reason for us to be in the business.)

去年我们保险营运所产生的资金成本还是一样低于美国政府当年所新发行的公

债利率，意思是说在过去26年的保险事业经营中，我们有21年是远胜于政府

公债发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，(那天要是我们平均的资金成

本高于政府公债的利率的话，我们实在就没有理由继续留在保险业了)。

In 1992, as in previous years, National Indemnity's commercial

auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster, and our

homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred, made excellent

contributions to our low cost of float. Indeed, both of these

operations recorded an underwriting profit last year, thereby

generating float at a less-than-zero cost. The bulk of our float,

meanwhile, comes from large transactions developed by Ajit. His

efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during

1993.

1992年，如同以往年度，由Don Wurster领导的国家产物意外险公司所经营

的汽车与一般责任保险以及Rod Eldred领导的Homestate营运，对于我们取

得低廉的资金有相当的贡献，事实上，在去年这两家公司都有承保获利，也就是

说所产生的保险浮存金的资金成本都是低于零，当然我们也有一大笔的浮存金是

来自于Ajit所开发出来的大型案件，展望1993年这方面所贡献的保费收入还

会增加。

Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which

we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come.

The industry is huge; in certain sectors we can compete world-wide;

and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage. We

will look for ways to expand our participation in the business,

either indirectly as we have done through GEICO or directly as we

did by acquiring Central States Indemnity.

查理跟我还是相当喜爱保险业，这也是我们预期未来十年盈余的主要来源，这个

产业规模够大，在某些类别我们可以与全世界业者竞争，同时Berkshire在这方

面也拥有特殊的竞争力，我们会继续寻找在这行增加参与的机会，不管是间接透

过GEICO、或是以取得中央州立保险公司的股权那样直接参与。

Common Stock Investments

股票投资

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over

$100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to

subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关

系企业所持有)。

12/31/92

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

3,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. $ 517,500 $1,523,500

93,400,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............... 1,023,920 3,911,125

16,196,700 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

("Freddie Mac") ................... 414,257 783,515

34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45,713 2,226,250

4,350,000 General Dynamics Corp. ............... 312,438 450,769

24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600,000 1,365,000

38,335,000 Guinness PLC ......................... 333,019 299,581

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company .......... 9,731 396,954

6,358,418 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 380,983 485,624

Leaving aside splits, the number of shares we held in these

companies changed during 1992 in only four cases: We added

moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo, we more

than doubled our position in Freddie Mac, and we established a new

holding in General Dynamics. We like to buy.

除了股票分割，我们1992年在这些主要投资的持股只有四项变动，我们小幅增

加Guinness与Wells Fargo的持股，另外将Freddie Mac的持股增加一倍，

至于通用动力则是全新增加的投资。

Selling, however, is a different story. There, our pace of

activity resembles that forced upon a traveler who found himself

stuck in tiny Podunk's only hotel. With no T.V. in his room, he

faced an evening of boredom. But his spirits soared when he spied

a book on the night table entitled "Things to do in Podunk."

Opening it, he found just a single sentence: "You're doing it."

我们很喜欢买股票，不过卖股票又是另外一回事，就这点我们的步伐就像是一个

旅行家发现自己身处于只有一个小旅馆的小镇上，房间里没有电视，面对慢慢无

聊的长夜，突然间他很兴奋地发现桌上有一本书名为「在本小镇可以做的事」，

只是当他翻开书后，里面却只有短短的一句话：「那就是你现在在做的这件事」。

We were lucky in our General Dynamics purchase. I had paid

little attention to the company until last summer, when it

announced it would repurchase about 30% of its shares by way of a

Dutch tender. Seeing an arbitrage opportunity, I began buying the

stock for Berkshire, expecting to tender our holdings for a small

profit. We've made the same sort of commitment perhaps a halfdozen

times in the last few years, reaping decent rates of return

for the short periods our money has been tied up.

我们很高兴能买到通用动力，之前我并未特别留意这家公司，直到去年夏天该公

司宣布买回流通在外30%的股权，看到这样难得的套利机会，我开始替

Berkshire买进这家公司的股票，预期透过公司买回股份可以小赚一笔，在过去

几年中，我们曾经做了好几次类似这样的交易，让短期投入的资金获得相当丰厚

的报酬。

But then I began studying the company and the accomplishments

of Bill Anders in the brief time he'd been CEO. And what I saw

made my eyes pop: Bill had a clearly articulated and rational

strategy; he had been focused and imbued with a sense of urgency in

carrying it out; and the results were truly remarkable.

之后我开始研究这家公司，以及Bill Anders在担任该公司CEO短短期间所做

的事，没想到让我眼睛一亮，Bill有一套精心设计的策略，他相当专注于把这项

策略付诸实行，而最后所得到的成果也相当不错。

In short order, I dumped my arbitrage thoughts and decided

that Berkshire should become a long-term investor with Bill. We

were helped in gaining a large position by the fact that a tender

greatly swells the volume of trading in a stock. In a one-month

period, we were able to purchase 14% of the General Dynamics shares

that remained outstanding after the tender was completed.

过不了多久，我就把短期套利的念头拋开，决定Berkshire应该成为Bill的长期

投资者，而受惠于买回股份的消息，成交量扩大，我们得以买进大量的部位，在

短短一个月期间，我们一口气买进通用动力14%的股份，这是在扣除该公司本

身买回的股份之后的比例。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what

it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report:

"We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we

would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want

the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with

favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent

people; and (d) available at a very attractive price." We have

seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both

market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive

price" for "a very attractive price."

我们在股权投资的策略跟15年前1977年度报告的那套一样，并没有多大的变

化，在选择股票投资所采用的评估方式与买下一整家企业的情况没什么两样，我

们希望投资的对象(1)是我们所了解的(2)具有长期的远景(3)由才德兼具的人所

经营(4)非常吸引人的合理价格。但考量目前市场的情况与公司的资金规模，我

们现在决定将"非常吸引人的价格"改成"吸引人的价格"。

But how, you will ask, does one decide what's "attractive"?

In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose

between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition:

"value" and "growth." Indeed, many investment professionals see

any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual crossdressing.

或许你又会问，那么到底应该如何决定价格够不够吸引人呢? 在回答这个问题

时，大部分的分析师通常都会选择两种看起来对立的方法，"价值法"与"成长法"，

事实上有许多投资专家会将这两种方法交替运用，就像是轮流换穿衣物一样。

We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be

confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the

two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component

in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose

importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact

can be negative as well as positive.

我们觉得这种观念似是而非(为此我个人必须承认，好几年前我也是采用这种方

法)，基本上我们认为这两种方法本为一体，在计算一家公司的价值时，成长当

然是一件很重要的因素，这个变量将会使得所计算出来的价值从很小到极大，所

造成的影响有可能是正面的，也有可能是负面的。

In addition, we think the very term "value investing" is

redundant. What is "investing" if it is not the act of seeking

value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously

paying more for a stock than its calculated value - in the hope

that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price - should be

labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor - in our

view - financially fattening).

此外，我们也认为所谓的「价值投资」根本就是废话，若是所投入的资金不是为

了换取追求相对应的价值的话，那还算是投资吗? 明明知道所付出的成本已经高

出其所应有的价值，而只是寄望在短期之内可以用更高的价格卖出根本就是投机

的行为，(当然这种行为一点都不会违法，也不违反道德，只是就我们的观点来

说，只是在玩吹气球游戏而已)。

Whether appropriate or not, the term "value investing" is

widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having

attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low priceearnings

ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such

characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from

determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something

for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the

principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly,

opposite characteristics - a high ratio of price to book value, a

high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield - are in no way

inconsistent with a "value" purchase.

不管适不适当，「价值投资」这个名词常常被人引用，一般而言，它代表投资人

以较低的股价/净值比或是本益比或是高的股利收益率买进投资标的，很不幸的

是，就算是具备以上所有的特点，投资人还是很难确保所买到的投资标的确有此

价值，从而确信他的投资是依照取得企业价值的原意在进行；相对地，以较高的

股价/净值比或是本益比或是低的股利收益率买进投资标的，也不一定就代表不

是一项有「价值」的投资。

Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about

value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value,

sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is

far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured

money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or

worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better

if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more

the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.

同样的企业成长本身而言，也很难保证就一定代表价值，当然成长通常会对价值

有正面的影响，有时是相当重要的一项前提，但这种影响却不是绝对，例如投资

人以往将大笔的资金投入到国内的航空业来支持获利无望(或是悲惨)的成长，对

于这些投资人来说，应该会希望莱特兄弟当初没有驾着小鹰号成功起飞，航空产

业越发达，这些投资人就越悲惨。

Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can

invest at incremental returns that are enticing - in other words,

only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a

dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return

business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.

成长只有当企业将资金投入到可以增加更多报酬的活动上，投资人才有可能受

惠，换句话说，只有当每投入的一块钱可以在未来创造超过一块钱的价值时，成

长才有意义，至于那些需要资金但却只能创造出低报酬的公司，成长对于投资人

来说反而是有害的。

In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago,

John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we

condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is

determined by the cash inflows and outflows - discounted at an

appropriate interest rate - that can be expected to occur during

the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same

for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and

difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a

coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the

case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the

future "coupons." Furthermore, the quality of management affects

the bond coupon only rarely - chiefly when management is so inept

or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast,

the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity

"coupons."

在John Burr Williams 50年前所写的投资价值理论当中，老早便已提出计算价

值的公式，。我把它浓缩列示如下：今天任何股票、债券或是企业的价值，都将

取决于其未来年度剩余年限的现金流入与流出，以一个适当的利率加以折现后所

得的期望值，特别注意这个公式对于股票与债券皆一体适用，不过这里有一点很

重要但却很难克服差异的差异，那就是债券有债票与到期日可以清楚的定义未来

的现金流入，但是就股票而言，投资者必须自己去分析未来可能得到的票息，更

重要的是管理阶层的品质对于债券的影响相当有限，顶多因为公司无能或是诚信

明显不足而延迟债息的发放，但是对于股票投资者来说，管理阶层的能力将大大

影响未来票息发放的能力。

The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash

calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should

purchase - irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn't,

displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a

high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book

value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown

equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable:

When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment,

they should be bought.

根据这种现金流量折现的公式计算，投资人应该选择的是价钱最低的那一种投

资，不论他的盈余变化大不大、营收有没有成长，与现在的盈余以及帐面价值差

多少，虽然大部分的状况下，投资股票所算出来的价值会比债券要来多划算，但

是这却不是绝对，要是当债券所算出来的价值高于股票，则投资人应该买的就是

债券。

Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own

is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of

incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst

business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite - that

is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low

rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very

hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little

capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if

it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant

stock repurchases.

今天先不管价格多少，最值得拥有的企业是那种在一段长的期间可以将大笔的资

金运用在相当高报酬的投资上，最不值得拥有的企业是那种跟前面那个例子完全

相反的，在一段长的期间将大笔的资金运用在相当低报酬的投资之上，不幸的

是，第一类的企业可遇不可求，大部分拥有高报酬的企业都不需要太多的资金，

这类企业的股东通常会因为公司发放大量的股利或是买回自家公司的股份而大

大地受惠。

Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate

equities are not difficult, an analyst - even one who is

experienced and intelligent - can easily go wrong in estimating

future "coupons." At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this

problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we

believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple

and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to

constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash

flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What

counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but

rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An

investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she

avoids big mistakes.

虽然评估股权投资的数学计算式并不难，但是即使是一个经验老到、聪明过人的

分析师，在估计未来年度票息时也很容易发生错误，在Berkshire我们试图以两

种方法来解决这个问题，首先我们试着坚守在我们自认为了解的产业之上，这表

示他们本身通常相当简单且稳定，如果企业很复杂而产业环境也一直在变，我们

实在是没有足够的聪明才智去预测其未来的现金流量，碰巧的是，这个缺点一点

也不会让我们感到困扰，就投资而言，人们应该注意的，不是他到底知道多少，

而是应该注意自己到底有多少是不知道的，投资人不需要花太多时间去做对的

事，只要他能够尽量避免去犯重大的错误。

Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety

in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock

to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in

buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly

emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment

success.

第二点一样很重要，那就是我们在买股票时，必须要坚持安全边际，若是我们所

计算出来的价值只比其价格高一点，我们不会考虑买进，我们相信恩师葛拉罕十

分强调的安全边际原则，是投资成功最关键的因素。

Fixed-Income Securities

固定收益证券

Below we list our largest holdings of fixed-income securities:

下表是我们固定收益证券主要持有的部位：

(000s omitted)

------------------------------------

Cost of Preferreds and

Issuer Amortized Value of Bonds Market

------ ------------------------ ----------

ACF Industries Debentures ...... $133,065(1) $163,327

American Express "Percs" ....... 300,000 309,000(1)(2)

Champion International Conv. Pfd. 300,000(1) 309,000(2)

First Empire State Conv. Pfd. .. 40,000 68,000(1)(2)

Salomon Conv. Pfd. ............. 700,000(1) 756,000(2)

USAir Conv. Pfd. ............... 358,000(1) 268,500(2)

Washington Public Power Systems Bonds 58,768(1) 81,002

(1) Carrying value in our financial statements

(1)是指财务报表上的帐面价值

(2) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me

(2)公平价值是由查理跟我来判断

During 1992 we added to our holdings of ACF debentures, had

some of our WPPSS bonds called, and sold our RJR Nabisco position.

1992年我们增加了ACF债券的部位，另外华盛顿公用电力系统债券有部份被

赎回，另外RJR Nabisco的部位则已出清。

Over the years, we've done well with fixed-income investments,

having realized from them both large capital gains (including $80

million in 1992) and exceptional current income. Chrysler

Financial, Texaco, Time-Warner, WPPSS and RJR Nabisco were

particularly good investments for us. Meanwhile, our fixed-income

losses have been negligible: We've had thrills but so far no

spills.

过去几年来，我们在固定收益证券的表现还不错，靠着他们不但实现了相当大量

的资本利得(包含1992年的8,000万)与利息收益，克莱斯勒、Texaco、时代

华纳、WPPSS与RJR Nabisco都是相当好的投资，另一方面发生损失的部份也

相当少，虽然过程一度紧张但幸好最后并没有搞砸。

Despite the success we experienced with our Gillette

preferred, which converted to common stock in 1991, and despite our

reasonable results with other negotiated purchases of preferreds,

our overall performance with such purchases has been inferior to

that we have achieved with purchases made in the secondary market.

This is actually the result we expected. It corresponds with our

belief that an intelligent investor in common stocks will do better

in the secondary market than he will do buying new issues.

虽然我们在吉列特别股的投资还算是成功(在1991年转换为普通股)，但整体而

言，这类协议谈判所取得的特别股投资的绩效还是略逊于从次级市场所取得的投

资，不过这种结果我们早已预期到，这与我们相信一个智能型的投资人在次级流

通市场的表现会比初级发行市场来的好的道理是相同的。

The reason has to do with the way prices are set in each

instance. The secondary market, which is periodically ruled by

mass folly, is constantly setting a "clearing" price. No matter

how foolish that price may be, it's what counts for the holder of a

stock or bond who needs or wishes to sell, of whom there are always

going to be a few at any moment. In many instances, shares worth x

in business value have sold in the market for 1/2x or less.

原因与当初设定价格的方式有关，次级市场时常受惠于群众愚蠢的心理所影响，

总是会有一个重新设定的全新价格，不管价格是多么的离谱，那都是代表该股票

或债券的持有人想要出脱的价格，不论何时总会有一小部份的股东会有这种念

头，在很多的情况下，一家具有X价值的股票往往以不到一半半数，也就是1/2X

的价格求售。

The new-issue market, on the other hand, is ruled by

controlling stockholders and corporations, who can usually select

the timing of offerings or, if the market looks unfavorable, can

avoid an offering altogether. Understandably, these sellers are

not going to offer any bargains, either by way of a public offering

or in a negotiated transaction: It's rare you'll find x for

1/2x here. Indeed, in the case of common-stock offerings, selling

shareholders are often motivated to unload only when they feel the

market is overpaying. (These sellers, of course, would state that

proposition somewhat differently, averring instead that they simply

resist selling when the market is underpaying for their goods.)

至于初级发行市场则受到发行公司与大股东所掌控，通常会选择对他们最有利的

时点发行，当市场状况不理想的时候，甚至会避开发行，可以理解的是，卖方不

太可能让你有任何便宜可占，不管是透过公开发行或私下协议的方式都一样，你

不可能以一半的价格买到你想要的东西，尤其是在发行普通股时，原有股东惟有

在他们认为市场价格明显过高时，才有可能大幅出脱其持股，(这些卖方当然会

换另外一种说词，强调如果市场过于低估其股份时，他们是不可能贱价出售的)。

To date, our negotiated purchases, as a group, have fulfilled

but not exceeded the expectation we set forth in our 1989 Annual

Report: "Our preferred stock investments should produce returns

modestly above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios." In

truth, we would have done better if we could have put the money

that went into our negotiated transactions into open-market

purchases of the type we like. But both our size and the general

strength of the markets made that difficult to do.

到目前为止，我们透过协议所作的投资，算是勉强达到我们在1989年年报所作

的预期，这些特别股投资应该可以产生比一般固定收益债券还好一点的报酬，不

可讳言若是我们当初不是透过协议而是直接在公开市场上买进类似的投资的

话，我们的表现可能会更好，只是考量到我们的规模太大与市场的状况，这样的

做法在执行上有其困难度。

There was one other memorable line in the 1989 Annual Report:

"We have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment

banking business, the airline industry, or the paper industry." At

the time some of you may have doubted this confession of ignorance.

Now, however, even my mother acknowledges its truth.

1989年报还有一段相当令人怀念的话，"我们没有能力去预测投资银行业、航

空业或是造纸业的前景"，在当时或许有很多人怀疑我们这样公开的承认有点无

知，不过到如今，连我的母亲都不得不承认这项事实。

In the case of our commitment to USAir, industry economics had

soured before the ink dried on our check. As I've previously

mentioned, it was I who happily jumped into the pool; no one pushed

me. Yes, I knew the industry would be ruggedly competitive, but I

did not expect its leaders to engage in prolonged kamikaze

behavior. In the last two years, airline companies have acted as

if they are members of a competitive tontine, which they wish to

bring to its conclusion as rapidly as possible.

就像我们在美国航空的投资，在我们签发支票的墨水还没干之前，产业情况就已

经开始恶化，如同先前所提到的，没有人强迫我，是我自己心干情愿跳下水的，

没错，我的确预期到这个产业竞争会变得相当激烈，但我没想到这个产业的领导

者竟会从事长期自杀性的行为，过去两年以来，航空业者的行为就好象觉得自己

是公务人员抢着办退休好领退休金一样，为求尽快达到目的而不择手段。

Amidst this turmoil, Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has done a

truly extraordinary job in repositioning the airline. He was

particularly courageous in accepting a strike last fall that, had

it been lengthy, might well have bankrupted the company.

Capitulating to the striking union, however, would have been

equally disastrous: The company was burdened with wage costs and

work rules that were considerably more onerous than those

encumbering its major competitors, and it was clear that over time

any high-cost producer faced extinction. Happily for everyone, the

strike was settled in a few days.

在一遍混乱之中，美国航空的总裁-Seth Schofield在重新调整该公司体质之

上，花了不少的工夫，尤其是去年秋天他勇于承担一次罢工事件，若是处置不当，

再拖延下去很可能让公司面临倒闭的命运，而若是屈服于工会抗争的压力，则其

下场一样悲惨，该公司所面对沉重的薪资成本与工会要求比起其它竞争同业来

说，又更繁杂许多，而事实很明显任何成本过高的业者到最后终将面临淘汰的命

运，还好罢工事件在发生几天后圆满地落幕。

A competitively-beset business such as USAir requires far more

managerial skill than does a business with fine economics.

Unfortunately, though, the near-term reward for skill in the

airline business is simply survival, not prosperity.

对那些为竞争所苦的行业，如美国航空来说，比起一般产业更需要好的管理技

巧，不过很不幸的是，这种技巧所带来的好处，只不过是让公司得以继续存活下

去，并不能让公司如何地飞黄腾达。

In early 1993, USAir took a major step toward assuring

survival - and eventual prosperity - by accepting British Airways'

offer to make a substantial, but minority, investment in the

company. In connection with this transaction, Charlie and I were

asked to join the USAir board. We agreed, though this makes five

outside board memberships for me, which is more than I believe

advisable for an active CEO. Even so, if an investee's management

and directors believe it particularly important that Charlie and I

join its board, we are glad to do so. We expect the managers of

our investees to work hard to increase the value of the businesses

they run, and there are times when large owners should do their bit

as well.

在1993年初，美国航空为确保存活以及长远发展，做了一项重大的决定-接受

英国航空所提出的钜额的投资，透过这次的交易，查理跟我本人被邀请担任该公

司的董事，我们同意接受，虽然此举将使得我要同时担任五家公司的外部董事，

远超过我个人认为对公司能做的贡献，不过即便如此，只要我们的被投资公司以

及其董事认为查理跟我加入其董事会，会对其公司有所帮助，我们还是会欣然接

受，在我们期望旗下事业经理人拼死拼活为我们打拼以增加公司价值之时，身为

公司大股东的我们有时也应该多尽一点自己的本分。

Two New Accounting Rules and a Plea for One More

两个会计新原则，还有一个亟待增加的原则

A new accounting rule having to do with deferred taxes becomes

effective in 1993. It undoes a dichotomy in our books that I have

described in previous annual reports and that relates to the

accrued taxes carried against the unrealized appreciation in our

investment portfolio. At yearend 1992, that appreciation amounted

to $7.6 billion. Against $6.4 billion of that, we carried taxes at

the current 34% rate. Against the remainder of $1.2 billion, we

carried an accrual of 28%, the tax rate in effect when that portion

of the appreciation occurred. The new accounting rule says we must

henceforth accrue all deferred tax at the current rate, which to us

seems sensible.

一项与递延所得税有关的新颁会计原则在1993年开始生效，它取消了先前曾经

在年报中提过会计帐上的二分法，而这又与我们帐上未实现投资利益所需提列的

应付所得税有关，以1992年年底计，我们这部份未实现高达76亿美元，其中

64亿我们以34%的税率估列应付所得税，剩下的12亿美元则以发生时点的28%

估列，至于新的会计原则则要求我们以现行税率一体估计所得税，而我们也认为

这样的做法较合理。

The new marching orders mean that in the first quarter of 1993

we will apply a 34% rate to all of our unrealized appreciation,

thereby increasing the tax liability and reducing net worth by $70

million. The new rule also will cause us to make other minor

changes in our calculation of deferred taxes.

新颁的命令代表我们从1993年的第一季开始我们股票未实现利益就必须以

34%的税率来估算，因而增加我们所得税的负债，并使净值减少7,000万美元，

新规定也使我们在计算递延所得税时，在几个地方做了点修正。

Future changes in tax rates will be reflected immediately in

the liability for deferred taxes and, correspondingly, in net

worth. The impact could well be substantial. Nevertheless, what

is important in the end is the tax rate at the time we sell

securities, when unrealized appreciation becomes realized.

往后若税率有做任何变动时，我们的递延所得税负债以及净值也必须马上跟着做

调整，这个影响数可能会很大，不过不论如何，真正重要的是我们在最后出售证

券而实现增值利益时，所适用的税率到底是多少。

Another major accounting change, whose implementation is

required by January 1, 1993, mandates that businesses recognize

their present-value liability for post-retirement health benefits.

Though GAAP has previously required recognition of pensions to be

paid in the future, it has illogically ignored the costs that

companies will then have to bear for health benefits. The new rule

will force many companies to record a huge balance-sheet liability

(and a consequent reduction in net worth) and also henceforth to

recognize substantially higher costs when they are calculating

annual profits.

另一项会计原则的重大变动在1993年1月1日开始实行，要求所有企业必须

认列公司员工应计的退休金负债，虽然先前一般公认会计原则也曾要求企业必须

先认列未来必须支付的退休金，但却不合理地忽略企业未来必须承受的健康保险

负担，新规定将会使得许多公司在资产负债表上认列一大笔负债(同时也会使得

净值大幅减少)，另一方面往后年度在结算成果时，也会因为须认列这方面的成

本而使得获利缩水。

In making acquisitions, Charlie and I have tended to avoid

companies with significant post-retirement liabilities. As a

result, Berkshire's present liability and future costs for postretirement

health benefits - though we now have 22,000 employees -

are inconsequential. I need to admit, though, that we had a near

miss: In 1982 I made a huge mistake in committing to buy a company

burdened by extraordinary post-retirement health obligations.

Luckily, though, the transaction fell through for reasons beyond

our control. Reporting on this episode in the 1982 annual report,

I said: "If we were to introduce graphics to this report,

illustrating favorable business developments of the past year, two

blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate

centerfold." Even so, I wasn't expecting things to get as bad as

they did. Another buyer appeared, the business soon went bankrupt

and was shut down, and thousands of workers found those bountiful

health-care promises to be largely worthless.

另一方面查理跟我在进行购并时，也会尽量避开那些潜藏高额退休金负债的公

司，也因此虽然Berkshire目前拥有超过22,000名的员工，但在退休金这方面

的问题并不严重，不过我还是必须承认，在1982年时我曾经差点犯下大错买下

一家背有沉重退休金负债的公司，所幸后来交易因为某项我们无法控制的因素而

告吹，而在1982年年报中报告这段插曲时，我曾说：「如果在年报中我们要报

告过去年度有何令人觉得可喜的进展，那么两大页空白的跨页插图，可能最足以

代表当年度告吹的交易」不过即便如此，我也没有预期到后来情况会如此恶化，

当时另外一家买主出现买下这家公司，结果过了没多久公司便走上倒闭关门的命

运，公司数千名的员工也发现大笔的退休金健保承诺全部化为乌有。

In recent decades, no CEO would have dreamed of going to his

board with the proposition that his company become an insurer of

uncapped post-retirement health benefits that other corporations

chose to install. A CEO didn't need to be a medical expert to know

that lengthening life expectancies and soaring health costs would

guarantee an insurer a financial battering from such a business.

Nevertheless, many a manager blithely committed his own company to

a self-insurance plan embodying precisely the same promises - and

thereby doomed his shareholders to suffer the inevitable

consequences. In health-care, open-ended promises have created

open-ended liabilities that in a few cases loom so large as to

threaten the global competitiveness of major American industries.

最近几十年来，没有一家公司的总裁会想到，有一天他必须向董事会提出这种没

有上限的退休健保计画，他不须要具有专业的医学知识也知道越来越高的预期寿

命以及健保支出将会把一家公司给拖垮，但是即便如此，很多经理人还是闭着眼

睛让公司透过内部自保的方式，投入这种永无止尽的大坑洞，最后导致公司股东

承担后果血本无归，就健保而言，没有上限的承诺所代表的就是没有上限的负

债，这种严重的后果，甚至危急了一些美国大企业的全球竞争力。

I believe part of the reason for this reckless behavior was

that accounting rules did not, for so long, require the booking of

post-retirement health costs as they were incurred. Instead, the

rules allowed cash-basis accounting, which vastly understated the

liabilities that were building up. In effect, the attitude of both

managements and their accountants toward these liabilities was

"out-of-sight, out-of-mind." Ironically, some of these same

managers would be quick to criticize Congress for employing "cashbasis"

thinking in respect to Social Security promises or other

programs creating future liabilities of size.

而我相信之所以会有这种不顾后果的行为，一部份原因是由于会计原则并没有要

求公司将这种潜藏的退休金负债呈现在会计帐上，相反地，会计原则允许业者采

取现金基础制，此举大大地低估了负债，而公司的经营阶层与签证会计师所采取

的态度就是眼不见为净，而讽刺的是，这些经理人还常常批评国会对于社会保险

采用现金基础的思惟，根本就不顾未来年度所可能产生的庞大负债。

Managers thinking about accounting issues should never forget

one of Abraham Lincoln's favorite riddles: "How many legs does a

dog have if you call his tail a leg?" The answer: "Four, because

calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg." It behooves managers

to remember that Abe's right even if an auditor is willing to

certify that the tail is a leg.

经理人在思索会计原则时，一定要谨记林肯总统本身最常讲的一句俚语：「如果

一只狗连尾巴也算在内的话，总共有几条腿﹖ 答案还是四条腿，因为不论你是

不是把尾巴当作是一条腿，尾巴永远还是尾巴！」，这句话提醒经理人就算会计

师愿意帮你证明尾巴也算是一条腿，你也不会因此多了一条腿。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The most egregious case of let's-not-face-up-to-reality

behavior by executives and accountants has occurred in the world of

stock options. In Berkshire's 1985 annual report, I laid out my

opinions about the use and misuse of options. But even when

options are structured properly, they are accounted for in ways

that make no sense. The lack of logic is not accidental: For

decades, much of the business world has waged war against

accounting rulemakers, trying to keep the costs of stock options

from being reflected in the profits of the corporations that issue

them.

提到公司主管与会计师鸵鸟心态，最极端的例子就是发行认股权这档子事，在

Berkshire 1985年的年报中，我曾经对于认股权的滥用表示过个人的看法，但

是即便是认股权规划得当，在许多方面这种做法还是显得相当没有道理，然而缺

乏逻辑绝对不是第一次，几十年来，企业界就不断地向会计原则制定者进行攻

击，意图将发行认股权的相关成本排除在企业的损益表之外。

Typically, executives have argued that options are hard to

value and that therefore their costs should be ignored. At other

times managers have said that assigning a cost to options would

injure small start-up businesses. Sometimes they have even

solemnly declared that "out-of-the-money" options (those with an

exercise price equal to or above the current market price) have no

value when they are issued.

通常企业主管会辩称很难衡量选择权的价值，也因此其成本应该可以被忽略，有

时经理人也会说若认列这方面的成本，将不利于新成立公司的发展，有时他们甚

至义正词严地指出处于价外(亦即行使的价格等于或是高于现在的股价)的选择

权在发行时并没有价值。

Oddly, the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in

with a variation on that theme, opining that options should not be

viewed as a cost because they "aren't dollars out of a company's

coffers." I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting

possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving

their reported profits. For example, they could eliminate the cost

of insurance by paying for it with options. So if you're a CEO and

subscribe to this "no cash-no cost" theory of accounting, I'll make

you an offer you can't refuse: Give us a call at Berkshire and we

will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of longterm

options on your company's stock.

很奇怪的是机构投资人协会这时也插进来表示不同的意见，他们认为选择权不应

当被视作为一种成本，因为从头到尾公司根本就不需要从口袋里掏出一毛钱，我

认为这样的理由等于是给了所有美国企业大幅改善帐面获利的难得良机，例如他

们可以以选择权的方式来支付公司的保险费，所以如果由你来担任CEO，同时

充分地运用这种不付现金就没又支出的会计理论，我绝对可以提出一个你无法拒

绝的条件，打个电话到Berkshire给我们，我们很愿意以取得贵公司长期认股权

的代价，接受你们的保单。

Shareholders should understand that companies incur costs when

they deliver something of value to another party and not just when

cash changes hands. Moreover, it is both silly and cynical to say

that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply

because it can't be quantified with pinpoint precision. Right now,

accounting abounds with imprecision. After all, no manager or

auditor knows how long a 747 is going to last, which means he also

does not know what the yearly depreciation charge for the plane

should be. No one knows with any certainty what a bank's annual

loan loss charge ought to be. And the estimates of losses that

property-casualty companies make are notoriously inaccurate.

公司股东们必须了解当公司将某些有价值的东西交给别人，实际上就已经发生成

本了，而不是等到现金付出去时才算，还有一点，如果有人说因为所付出的实在

是难以准确衡量，因此就可以不须认列成本，这实在是既愚蠢又让人啼笑皆非的

说法。会计这档子事本来就充满的不确定性，有哪一个经理人或是会计师可以正

确的预估一架波音747客机的寿命到底有多久，那么难道他就不能估列这架飞

机一年所需分担的折旧费用有多少吗? 何况像是产险业的损失估计更是有名的

不准。

Does this mean that these important items of cost should be

ignored simply because they can't be quantified with absolute

accuracy? Of course not. Rather, these costs should be estimated

by honest and experienced people and then recorded. When you get

right down to it, what other item of major but hard-to-preciselycalculate

cost - other, that is, than stock options - does the

accounting profession say should be ignored in the calculation of

earnings?

所以难道这类重大的成本项目，就可以因为一句难以估计而加以省略吗? 当然不

行，相反地这些成本应该由诚实有经验的人加以估算并认列在帐上，而说到这

里，没有其它任何成本，会像员工认股权成本金额既高影响更重大的了，难道会

计师在计算年度损益时真的可以将这个项目刻意省略不计吗?

Moreover, options are just not that difficult to value.

Admittedly, the difficulty is increased by the fact that the

options given to executives are restricted in various ways. These

restrictions affect value. They do not, however, eliminate it. In

fact, since I'm in the mood for offers, I'll make one to any

executive who is granted a restricted option, even though it may be

out of the money: On the day of issue, Berkshire will pay him or

her a substantial sum for the right to any future gain he or she

realizes on the option. So if you find a CEO who says his newlyissued

options have little or no value, tell him to try us out. In

truth, we have far more confidence in our ability to determine an

appropriate price to pay for an option than we have in our ability

to determine the proper depreciation rate for our corporate jet.

更何况，选择权也不是那么地难以估计，虽然授与经理人的选择权，因为加了许

多限制条款，而使得计算的难度增加，所代表的价值也略微减少，但却从不表示

他们就完全没有价值，事实上，如果我们旗下的经理人愿意，我也可以提供给他

们有限制的认股权作为报酬奖励，而在发行的那天，虽然行使的价格远高于现在

的市价，但Berkshire还是必须因此付出一大笔金额，好让他们能在未来年度行

使这项认股权，所以如果若你遇到任何一位总裁跟你说他发行的认股权一点价值

都没有的话，告诉他来找我们试一试，事实上比起决定企业专机每年的折旧费

用，对于认股权的评价我们觉得有信心多了。

It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be

summarized quite simply: If options aren't a form of compensation,

what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And,

if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in

the world should they go?

总而言之，个人对于认股权的看法可以归纳为以下简单几点。如果认股权不算是

对经理人的一种报酬的话，那么它又算是什么? 而如果一家公司可以不必把报酬

列为是一种费用的话，那么它又算是什么? 又如果一家公司可以不必把费用列入

盈余计算的话，那么它到底又跑到哪里去了呢?

The accounting profession and the SEC should be shamed by the

fact that they have long let themselves be muscled by business

executives on the option-accounting issue. Additionally, the

lobbying that executives engage in may have an unfortunate byproduct:

In my opinion, the business elite risks losing its

credibility on issues of significance to society - about which it

may have much of value to say - when it advocates the incredible on

issues of significance to itself.

会计学者以及证管会应该对于选择权会计长期受到企业牵制而感到羞愧，此外企

业长期不遗余力的游说也会产生相当不良的副作用，个人认为，企业人士竟会为

了一己之私利而干冒为社会尽一份心力、失去重大议题公信力的风险。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

We have two pieces of regrettable news this year. First,

Gladys Kaiser, my friend and assistant for twenty-five years, will

give up the latter post after the 1993 annual meeting, though she

will certainly remain my friend forever. Gladys and I have been a

team, and though I knew her retirement was coming, it is still a

jolt.

今年我们有两件遗憾的消息，首先Gladys Kaiser我个人的朋友同时也是我25

年的助理决定在1993年股东会后，辞去后面那项职务，虽然她永远都是我的好

朋友，长久以来Gladys与我已培养出相当好的团队默契，虽然我老早就知道她

准备退休的计画，但一时之间我还是不太能够接受这项事实。

Secondly, in September, Verne McKenzie relinquished his role

as Chief Financial Officer after a 30-year association with me that

began when he was the outside auditor of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.

Verne is staying on as a consultant, and though that job

description is often a euphemism, in this case it has real meaning.

I expect Verne to continue to fill an important role at Berkshire

but to do so at his own pace. Marc Hamburg, Verne's understudy for

five years, has succeeded him as Chief Financial Officer.

第二去年九月Verne McKenzie辞去在本公司长达30年的财务长职位，早期

Verne曾担任巴菲特合伙企业的签证会计师，不过他将以顾问的名义继续留在

Berkshire，虽然在大部分的情形下，这种顾问名义只是形式性的，但Verne却

是真的会在Berkshire扮演重要的角色，只是会稍做调整以符合他本身的步调，

而跟在Verne已有五年之久的Marc Hamburg，将会接替Verne担任Berkshire

财务长的位置。

I recall that one woman, upon being asked to describe the

perfect spouse, specified an archeologist: "The older I get," she

said, "the more he'll be interested in me." She would have liked

my tastes: I treasure those extraordinary Berkshire managers who

are working well past normal retirement age and who concomitantly

are achieving results much superior to those of their younger

competitors. While I understand and empathize with the decision of

Verne and Gladys to retire when the calendar says it's time, theirs

is not a step I wish to encourage. It's hard to teach a new dog

old tricks.

我一直记得有个女人曾经被问到什么样的男人是最理想的终身伴侣，她回答说：

「考古学家！因为我越老，他就越对我有兴趣。」我想她也应该会喜欢我的品味，

对于Berkshire这群老早就超过他们退休年龄的资深经理人，我特别珍惜，因为

相较之下他们远比那些年轻许多的同侪表现要出色的多，不过我还是相当尊重

Verne与Gladys决定退休的想法，时间到了就必须休息，当然我也绝对不鼓励

其它人这样做，因为实在很难教新狗老把戏。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I am a moderate in my views about retirement compared to Rose

Blumkin, better known as Mrs. B. At 99, she continues to work

seven days a week. And about her, I have some particularly good

news.

对于退休年龄的看法比起B太太我可算是温和的多，现年99岁的她还是一样每

周工作七天，提到她我有一项好消息要报告。

You will remember that after her family sold 80% of Nebraska

Furniture Mart (NFM) to Berkshire in 1983, Mrs. B continued to be

Chairman and run the carpet operation. In 1989, however, she left

because of a managerial disagreement and opened up her own

operation next door in a large building that she had owned for

several years. In her new business, she ran the carpet section but

leased out other home-furnishings departments.

大家应该记得当B太太家族在1983年买NFM 80%的股权卖给Berkshire时，

B太太还是继续留下来担任负责人并经营地毯生意，然而在1989年，她因为管

理意见与其它家族成员不合而决定在隔壁自己再开一家店，在那里她亲自经营地

毯生意，至于家具的部份则租给其它家具百货业者经营。

At the end of last year, Mrs. B decided to sell her building

and land to NFM. She'll continue, however, to run her carpet

business at its current location (no sense slowing down just when

you're hitting full stride). NFM will set up shop alongside her,

in that same building, thereby making a major addition to its

furniture business.

不过去年底，B太太决定把这家店连同土地全部卖回给NFM，但她还是会继续

在原来的地方经营她的地毯生意(在这样的情况下，她还是一点都没有停下来的

意思)，NFM将会在她店的旁边增设家具部门以扩大营运。

I am delighted that Mrs. B has again linked up with us. Her

business story has no parallel and I have always been a fan of

hers, whether she was a partner or a competitor. But believe me,

partner is better.

我很高兴B太太可以再度与我们合伙做生意，她成功的故事实在是前所未有，而

我本人也是她忠实的支持者，不管她是我们的伙伴或是竞争对手，当然最好是能

成为伙伴。

This time around, Mrs. B graciously offered to sign a noncompete

agreement - and I, having been incautious on this point

when she was 89, snapped at the deal. Mrs. B belongs in the

Guinness Book of World Records on many counts. Signing a noncompete

at 99 merely adds one more.

有鉴于上次她89岁时，我在签约时疏忽掉，这一次经过B太太的首肯，同意签

下竞业禁止的条款了，B太太有好几项记录可以名列金氏世界记录之中，在99

岁签下竞业禁止条款，只不过是再增添一项罢了。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Ralph Schey, CEO of Scott Fetzer and a manager who I hope is

with us at 99 also, hit a grand slam last year when that company

earned a record $110 million pre-tax. What's even more impressive

is that Scott Fetzer achieved such earnings while employing only

$116 million of equity capital. This extraordinary result is not

the product of leverage: The company uses only minor amounts of

borrowed money (except for the debt it employs - appropriately - in

its finance subsidiary).

Ralph Schey-史考特飞兹的总裁，也是另一位我希望他能够一直工作到99岁

的经理人，在去年击出了满贯全垒打，总计去年创造出1.1亿美元的税前获利，

更令人印象深刻的是史考特飞兹总计也不过用了1.16亿美元的资本，就缔造出

这样惊人的盈余数字，而且这样的结果并没有靠任何的财务杠杆，整个公司只有

少量的借款(扣除旗下的财务金融子公司所运用的借款不算)。

Scott Fetzer now operates with a significantly smaller

investment in both inventory and fixed assets than it had when we

bought it in 1986. This means the company has been able to

distribute more than 100% of its earnings to Berkshire during our

seven years of ownership while concurrently increasing its earnings

stream - which was excellent to begin with - by a lot. Ralph just

keeps on outdoing himself, and Berkshire shareholders owe him a

great deal.

史考特飞兹现在在存货与固定资产上的投资比起当初我们在1986年买下该公

司时还要少，这代表着公司不但可以将我们拥有该公司七年的期间，所赚到的盈

余全部分配给我们，同时还能继续保持获利能力大幅度的成长，Ralph不断地超

越自我，而Berkshire欠他的也越来越多。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Those readers with particularly sharp eyes will note that our

corporate expense fell from $5.6 million in 1991 to $4.2 million in

1992. Perhaps you will think that I have sold our corporate jet,

The Indefensible. Forget it! I find the thought of retiring the

plane even more revolting than the thought of retiring the

Chairman. (In this matter I've demonstrated uncharacteristic

flexibility: For years I argued passionately against corporate

jets. But finally my dogma was run over by my karma.)

眼尖的读者应该会发现，1992年420万美元的营业费用，比起1991年的560

万还要少的多，或是各位会以为是我把企业专机-无可辩解号给卖掉了，别做梦！

除非我退休，否则别想打这架飞机的主意，(对于这点我个人展现了前所未有的

弹性，早年对于企业专机我曾大力反对，不过到最后我的理念还是屈服在个人的

因果报应之下)。

Our reduction in corporate overhead actually came about

because those expenses were especially high in 1991, when we

incurred a one-time environmental charge relating to alleged pre-

1970 actions of our textile operation. Now that things are back to

normal, our after-tax overhead costs are under 1% of our reported

operating earnings and less than 1/2 of 1% of our look-through

earnings. We have no legal, personnel, public relations, investor

relations, or strategic planning departments. In turn this means

we don't need support personnel such as guards, drivers,

messengers, etc. Finally, except for Verne, we employ no

consultants. Professor Parkinson would like our operation - though

Charlie, I must say, still finds it outrageously fat.

其实公司营业费用的减少主要是因为1991年的费用特别高的缘故，当时因为一

次性地提列早期1970年代纺织事业与环境相关的费用所致，而现在一切回复正

常，所以我们税后的费用占帐列税后盈余的比率不到1%，占年度透视盈余的比

率更低于0.5%，在Berkshire我们没有法律、人事、公关或是营运企划部门，

这同时也代表我们不需要警卫、司机或是跑腿的人，最后除了Vernre以外，我

们也没有任何的顾问，Parkinson教授一定会喜欢我们的营运模式，虽然我必须

说查理还是觉得我们的组织过于庞杂。

At some companies, corporate expense runs 10% or more of

operating earnings. The tithing that operations thus makes to

headquarters not only hurts earnings, but more importantly slashes

capital values. If the business that spends 10% on headquarters'

costs achieves earnings at its operating levels identical to those

achieved by the business that incurs costs of only 1%, shareholders

of the first enterprise suffer a 9% loss in the value of their

holdings simply because of corporate overhead. Charlie and I have

observed no correlation between high corporate costs and good

corporate performance. In fact, we see the simpler, low-cost

operation as more likely to operate effectively than its

bureaucratic brethren. We're admirers of the Wal-Mart, Nucor,

Dover, GEICO, Golden West Financial and Price Co. models.

在某些公司，营业费用可能占营业利益10%以上，这种十分法不但对于盈余有

相当的影响，同时对企业价值也有很大的伤害，比起一家总部费用占其盈余的

1%的公司来说，投资人可能因为企业总部额外的费用，立即就要遭受9%以上的

损失，查理跟我这么多年观察下来的结果，企业总部的高成本与公司的绩效改善

之间可以说是完全没有关系，事实上我们认为组织越简单、成本越低的公司运作

起来会比那些拥有庞大官僚组织的公司更有效率的多，就这点而言，我们相当佩

服Wal-Mart、Nucor、Dover、GEICO与Golden West等公司。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Late last year Berkshire's stock price crossed $10,000.

Several shareholders have mentioned to me that the high price

causes them problems: They like to give shares away each year and

find themselves impeded by the tax rule that draws a distinction

between annual gifts of $10,000 or under to a single individual and

those above $10,000. That is, those gifts no greater than $10,000

are completely tax-free; those above $10,000 require the donor to

use up a portion of his or her lifetime exemption from gift and

estate taxes, or, if that exemption has been exhausted, to pay gift

taxes.

去年底Berkshire的股价正式超越10,000美元大关，有许多股东反应高股价让

他们产生相当的困扰，因为他们每年必须分出部份股份，却发现Berkshire的股

份价值超过10,000美元年度赠与税上限的门槛，因为超过上限代表捐赠人必须

使得个人终身捐赠的上限额度，而且若是再超过的话，就必须要缴赠与税。

I can suggest three ways to address this problem. The first

would be useful to a married shareholder, who can give up to

$20,000 annually to a single recipient, as long as the donor files

a gift tax return containing his or her spouse's written consent to

gifts made during the year.

对于这个问题，我个人提出三种解决的方案，第一对于已婚的股东，可以与配偶

共同利用20,000美元的额度，只要在申报年度赠与税时，附上配偶的同意书即

可。

Secondly, a shareholder, married or not, can make a bargain

sale. Imagine, for example, that Berkshire is selling for $12,000

and that one wishes to make only a $10,000 gift. In that case,

sell the stock to the giftee for $2,000. (Caution: You will be

taxed on the amount, if any, by which the sales price to your

giftee exceeds your tax basis.)

第二不论结婚与否，股东可以考虑以较低的价格进行转让，例如假设Berkshire

的股价为12,000美元，则股东可以考虑用2,000元的价格进行移转，则其间

10,000美元的差价则视同赠与，(但是大家还是必须注意，若是价差超过你本身

累积的免税额度时，还是要被课赠与税)。

Finally, you can establish a partnership with people to whom

you are making gifts, fund it with Berkshire shares, and simply

give percentage interests in the partnership away each year. These

interests can be for any value that you select. If the value is

$10,000 or less, the gift will be tax-free.

最后，你可考虑与你要赠与的对象成立合伙关系，以Berkshire的股份参与合

伙，然后每年再将部份权益慢慢移转给合伙人，金额的大小可以由你自行决定，

只要每年不超过10,000美元的上限，即可免课赠与税。

We issue the customary warning: Consult with your own tax

advisor before taking action on any of the more esoteric methods of

gift-making.

不过照惯例我们还是要提出警告，在从事比这些例子更极端的交易之前，最好还

是跟你的税务顾问咨询一下比较妥当。

We hold to the view about stock splits that we set forth in

the 1983 Annual Report. Overall, we believe our owner-related

policies - including the no-split policy - have helped us assemble

a body of shareholders that is the best associated with any widely

held American corporation. Our shareholders think and behave like

rational long-term owners and view the business much as Charlie and

I do. Consequently, our stock consistently trades in a price range

that is sensibly related to intrinsic value.

在1983年的年报中，我们曾经提到对于股票分割我们持保留的态度，毕竟我们

相信我们以股东利益为优先的政策，也包含不分割股份在内，使得我们得以组成

一群全美国企业中，最优秀的股东阵容，我们的股东不论是在想法或是做法上，

都是长期稳健的投资人，同时与查理跟我一样看重公司，也因此Berkshire的股

价也才能一直与公司本身的实质价值保持一致。

Additionally, we believe that our shares turn over far less

actively than do the shares of any other widely-held company. The

frictional costs of trading - which act as a major "tax" on the

owners of many companies - are virtually non-existent at Berkshire.

(The market-making skills of Jim Maguire, our New York Stock

Exchange specialist, definitely help to keep these costs low.)

Obviously a split would not change this situation dramatically.

Nonetheless, there is no way that our shareholder group would be

upgraded by the new shareholders enticed by a split. Instead we

believe that modest degradation would occur.

此外，我相信Berkshire股份的周转率比起其它公开发行的公司来说，要低的许

多，股权交易所产生的摩擦成本，或是我们称之为持有股权主要的税负，在

Berkshire身上几乎是看不到，(在纽约证券交易所负责我们股份交易的营业员

-Jim Maguire藉由其搓合市场的能力使得我们的交易成本进一步下降)，而很显

然地，股份分割对于交易成本的降低贡献着实有限，而且股份分割也不可以使我

们的股东阵容水准进一步提高，相反的我们认为因为股份分割而被引吸上门的新

股东可能会使得我们的股东水准变得更低。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

As I mentioned earlier, on December 16th we called our zerocoupon,

convertible debentures for payment on January 4, 1993.

These obligations bore interest at 5 1/2%, a low cost for funds

when they were issued in 1989, but an unattractive rate for us at

the time of call.

先前曾经提到过，在12月16日我们宣布将于1993年1月4号将先前所发行

的零息可转换债券赎回，这些债务在1989年发行的时候，所背负的资金成本大

约在5.5%左右，在当时算是相当低的利率，但时至今日这样的利率水准并不吸

引人，所以我们决定将他们给赎回。

The debentures could have been redeemed at the option of the

holder in September 1994, and 5 1/2% money available for no longer

than that is not now of interest to us. Furthermore, Berkshire

shareholders are disadvantaged by having a conversion option

outstanding. At the time we issued the debentures, this

disadvantage was offset by the attractive interest rate they

carried; by late 1992, it was not.

这些债券其持有人可选择在1994年9月以5.5%的利率要求公司赎回，此外

Berkshire有可转换的权利流通在外，对其他股东而言，实在不是件有利的事，

当然当初债券发行时，其利率水准相对对我们有利。

In general, we continue to have an aversion to debt,

particularly the short-term kind. But we are willing to incur

modest amounts of debt when it is both properly structured and of

significant benefit to shareholders.

总的来说，我们还是尽量避免举债，尤其是短期的借款，不过若是规划得当且对

于股东有利的话，我们也不排斥承担少量的债务。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's

1992 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions

made through the program were $7.6 million, and 2,810 charities

were recipients. I'm considering increasing these contributions in

the future at a rate greater than the increase in Berkshire's book

value, and I would be glad to hear from you as to your thinking

about this idea.

大约有97%的有效股权参与1992年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约760万美

元捐出的款项分配给2,810家慈善机构，目前我正考虑是否该提高提拨捐赠的

比率使得其超越Berkshire本身净值增加的幅度，同时我也很愿意听到各位对于

这件事情的看法。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our

shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages

48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your

shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1993 will be ineligible for the 1993

program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在

未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是

受托人的名下，必须在1993年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1993

年的捐赠计画。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that

Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make

contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $2.0 million

annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The

United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our

businesses.

Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计画对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每

年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在150万美元左右。

这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐

出的相当。

However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the

parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad

national programs or charitable activities of special personal

interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders.

If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma

maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal

attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.

然而不管是旗下事业或是母公司的经理人在利用Berkshire的资金对外捐赠给

全国性组织或特别利益团体时，都是以站在股东利益立场所应该做的，相对地若

是你的员工也包含CEO在内，想要与其校友会或其它人建立个人关系的，我们

认为他们最好是用自己的钱，而不是从你的口袋里掏钱。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum

Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 26, 1993.

A record 1,700 people turned up for the meeting last year, but that

number still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.

今年的股东会预计在1993年4月26日，星期一早上9点30分在位于奥玛哈

市中心的Orpheum中心召开，去年股东会参加人数又创新高突破1,700人，

不过会场还是剩下很多座位。

We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one

of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms)

but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much

larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the

Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards

from Borsheim's, which is a twenty minute drive from downtown. We

will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45

for the meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议大家最好先向以下旅馆预订房间(1)Radisson-Redick旅馆-就位在

Orpheum中心对街拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆(2)较大一点的Red Lion旅馆

-离Orpheum中心约五分钟路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奥玛哈西区，离波仙珠

宝店约100公尺，开车到市中心约需20分钟，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返

股东会会场。

Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can

make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the

quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual

meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of

intelligent, owner-related questions.

查理跟我一向都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可

由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的

股东像Berkshire的股东一样由高智能水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With

the admission card, we will enclose information about parking

facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a

little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk

a few blocks.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

由于开会当天会场不好停车，如果你开车过来，记得早一点到，否则附近的车位

很快就会停满，你可能就必须要停远一点，再走路过来。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture

Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to

downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow

plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores.

Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of

the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and

from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See's

Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Charlie and I are a good

bit wider than we were back in 1972 when we bought See's.

一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭

店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天

到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星

期日则从中午开到下午5点30分，到那里时记得到喜斯糖果摊逛逛，你就知道

为何我跟查理在1972年买下喜斯之后，腰围会有如此大的变化了。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for

shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April

25. Charlie and I will be in attendance, sporting our jeweler's

loupes, and ready to give advice about gems to anyone foolish

enough to listen. Also available will be plenty of Cherry Cokes,

See's candies, and other lesser goodies. I hope you will join us.

波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别为股东与来宾开放，4月25

日星期天从中午开到下午6点，当天查理跟我都会带着放大镜出席，预备提供

任何人都知道的，如何鉴定宝石的基本常识，现场还备有樱桃可乐、喜斯糖果及

其它纪念品，我希望大家都能够来参加。

Warren E. Buffett

March 1, 1993 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1993年3月1日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our per-share book value increased 14.3% during 1993. Over

the last 29 years (that is, since present management took over)

book value has grown from $19 to $8,854, or at a rate of 23.3%

compounded annually.

1993年本公司的净值成长了14.3%，总计过去29年以来，也就是自从现有经

营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的8,854美元，年复合成

长率约为23.3%。

During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.5

billion, a figure affected by two negative and two positive nonoperating

items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them

here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free

to fast-forward through this discussion:

回顾过去一年，Berkshire的净值增加了15亿美元，主要受到两项负面以及两

项正面非营业的因素所影响，为了做完整的表达，我将它们条列如下，若是大家

对于会计有点感冒，大可直接跳过本段不看。

1. The first negative was produced by a change in

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)

having to do with the taxes we accrue against

unrealized appreciation in the securities we

carry at market value. The old rule said that

the tax rate used should be the one in effect

when the appreciation took place. Therefore,

at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34%

on the $6.4 billion of gains generated after

1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains

generated before that. The new rule stipulates

that the current tax rate should be applied to

all gains. The rate in the first quarter of

1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%.

Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains

reduced net worth by $70 million.

1. 第一个负面因素是由于一般公认会计原则变动所造成，主要与

帐上依照市价计算的未实现增值利益所估列的所得税有关，原来规

定税率必须按照涨价所发生时点来计算，因此在1992年底，我们

的未实现利益也64亿美元系按照34%计算，其余12亿则按28%

计算；而新的规定则改成全部依照现行税率计算，故1993年第一

季所适用的税率则为34%，包含1987年以前的未实现利得在内全

部适用，此举将使得我们的净值因此减少7,000万美元。

2. The second negative, related to the first, came

about because the corporate tax rate was raised

in the third quarter of 1993 to 35%. This

change required us to make an additional charge

of 1% against all of our unrealized gains, and

that charge penalized net worth by $75 million.

Oddly, GAAP required both this charge and the

one described above to be deducted from the

earnings we report, even though the unrealized

appreciation that gave rise to the charges was

never included in earnings, but rather was

credited directly to net worth.

2.第二个负面因素与第一个也有关，因为从1993年开始企业税率提

高为35%，此举又使得我们必须为帐上未实现利得多提1%的税负，

导致我们的净值又减少7,500万美元，奇怪的是一般公认会计原则要

求这两项变动皆须列入损益表，却不顾当初这些未实现利得根本就从

未列入盈余之内，而是直接当作是净值的增加。

3. Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value

at which we carry the securities that we own.

In recent years, both the common stocks and

certain common-equivalent securities held by

our insurance companies have been valued at

market, whereas equities held by our non

insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company

were carried at their aggregate cost or market,

whichever was lower. Now GAAP says that all

common stocks should be carried at market, a

rule we began following in the fourth quarter

of 1993. This change produced a gain in

Berkshire's reported net worth of about $172

million.

3.1993年另外一个会计原则的变动影响的则是我们帐上持有的这些

有价证券的价值，近几年来，我们保险公司所持有的不管是普通股或

是约当普通股，都是按市价计算，至于母公司或是其它非保险业子公

司所持有的的股票则以成本与市价孰低法计算，现在一般公认会计原

则则改成全部都按市价计算，这个规定将从1993年的第四季开始实

施，此举将使得Berkshire的净值增加1.72亿美元。

4. Finally, we issued some stock last year. In a

transaction described in last year's Annual

Report, we issued 3,944 shares in early

January, 1993 upon the conversion of $46

million convertible debentures that we had

called for redemption. Additionally, we issued

25,203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe, a

purchase discussed later in this report. The

overall result was that our shares outstanding

increased by 29,147 and our net worth by about

$478 million. Per-share book value also grew,

because the shares issued in these transactions

carried a price above their book value.

4.最后去年我们又发行的一些股份，在一项去年曾提过的购并交易

中，我们在1993年一月将4,600万美元的可转换债券赎回，而发行

了3,944股，此外在买下Dexter鞋业时，(后面报告还会详加叙述)

我们又发行了25,203股，总计一共新发行了29,147股，增加4.78

亿美元的净值，每股帐面净值也因发行价格高于原先帐面每股净值而

提升。

Of course, it's per-share intrinsic value, not book value,

that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the

capital, including retained earnings, that has been put into a

business. Intrinsic value is a present-value estimate of the

cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining

life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated.

Berkshire, however, is an exception: Our book value, though

significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful

device for tracking that key figure. In 1993, each measure grew

by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but

unexciting.

当然真正重要的是每股实质价值而非帐面净值，帐面净值是一个会计名词，用来

衡量一家公司所投入的资本，也包含未分配的盈余在内，实质价值则是对于一家

企业终其一生所能产生现金流量的估计折现值，对大部分的公司来说，这两个数

字大多不相关，不过Berkshire算是一个例外，我们的帐面净值，虽然远低于实

质价值，但却是追踪实质价值相当好的一项指针，在1993年两项数值大约皆以

14%左右的比率增加，这种成绩虽让人满意却不令人惊喜。

These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain

- 39% - in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course,

market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same

destination. But in the short run the two often diverge in a

major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years

ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed

market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings

gains. In the 1991 Annual Report, I said that the stocks of

these companies could not continuously overperform their

businesses.

这些利得比起Berkshire本身股价39%的涨幅来说还是略微逊色，当然就长期

而言，Berkshire的市价与实质价值将会到达相同的水平，但短期而言，两者的

变化可能会有很大的差异，这种现象稍后我们会再详细讨论，两年前我们两项主

要的投资可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀的股价表现远超过本身的盈余成长，在1991年

的年报中，我便说过这些公司的股票市价不可能永远持续超越其本业。

From 1991 to 1993, Coke and Gillette increased their annual

operating earnings per share by 38% and 37% respectively, but

their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%. In other words,

the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt

partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names.

Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings

performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will

also prosper, though not in a lock-step manner.

从1991年到1993年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股获利的增加幅度分别为38%

与37%，但是同期间股票市价的涨幅却只有11%与6%，换句话说，这些公司的

表现超越股票市场，主要的原因还在于华尔街对于品牌有很深的疑虑，但是不管

怎样，真正重要的还是这些公司本身的获利情况，如果他们经营顺利，Berkshire

也就跟着水涨船高，虽然不是依照一步步稳定的方式前进。

Let me add a lesson from history: Coke went public in 1919

at $40 per share. By the end of 1920 the market, coldly

reevaluating Coke's future prospects, had battered the stock down

by more than 50%, to $19.50. At yearend 1993, that single share,

with dividends reinvested, was worth more than $2.1 million. As

Ben Graham said: "In the short-run, the market is a voting

machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only

money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the longrun,

the market is a weighing machine."

接着让我为各位上一次历史课，1919年可口可乐股票以每股40美元公开上

市，到了1920年由于市场对于可口可乐的前景看法相当冷淡，而将股价下修一

半至19.5美元，然而时至今日，1993年底，若是将收到的股利再重复投资下

去，则当初股票的价值将变成210万美元，就像葛拉罕所说：「短期而言，市

场是投票机器，投资人不须靠智能或情绪控制，只要有钱都可以登记参加投票，

但就长期而言，股票市场却是一个体重机。」

So how should Berkshire's over-performance in the market

last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher

percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the

case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world

of 6% or 7% long-term interest rates, Berkshire's market price

was not inappropriate if - and you should understand that this is

a huge if - Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I can

attain our long-standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per-share

intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15%. We have not

retreated from this goal. But we again emphasize, as we have for

many years, that the growth in our capital base makes 15% an

ever-more difficult target to hit.

所以我们应该如何看待Berkshire去年的股价超越本质的表现呢? 很明显的在

1993年底Berkshire的股价占实质价值比重较年初为高，另外一方面，在长期

利率只有6%到7%的投资环境下，同时若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能让

Berkshire的实质价值每年达到15%的成长的话，你就知道Berkshire去年这样

的股价表现实在是有点反常，虽然对于这样的目标我们从不妥协，但我们必须再

一次强调，随着资本规模的日益扩大，想要达到这个目标的困难度也与日俱增。

What we have going for us is a growing collection of goodsized

operating businesses that possess economic characteristics

ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance

ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about

this group.

不过另一方面，伴随我们的是由一些相当规模且拥有竞争优势的企业，并且由杰

出的经理人所经营，对于这样的梦幻组合大家大可以放心。

The capital-allocation work that Charlie and I do at the

parent company, using the funds that our managers deliver to us,

has a less certain outcome: It is not easy to find new

businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite

that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are

happy to report an important success in 1993.

倒是查理跟我在母公司利用子公司所贡献资金所作的资金分配工作，所面临的不

确定性就比较高，要找到像我们现在拥有一样好的企业并不容易，但是虽然难度

高，查理跟我却绝对不会放弃追寻，而很高兴在1993年我们能有相当成功的斩

获。

Dexter Shoe

Detxter 鞋业

What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H.

H. Brown, a superbly-run manufacturer of work shoes, boots and

other footwear. Brown has been a real winner: Though we had

high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been

considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Issler and the

talented managers who work with them. Because of our confidence

in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe, at the end of

1992. Lowell was a long-established manufacturer of women's and

nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing. Again,

results have surpassed our expectations. So we promptly jumped

at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine,

which manufactures popular-priced men's and women's shoes.

Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing: It is one of the

best-managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business

lifetimes.

去年我们所做的乃是基于1991年买进HH布朗鞋业-一家管理良善的鞋子、靴

子制造公司的续曲，布朗鞋业成为一家真正成功的赢家，虽然一开始我们就对他

就有相当高的标准，但是在Frank与其它经理人的努力之下，这家公司的表现

甚至还超过我们的预期，基于我们对Frank团队的信心，接着在1992年年底

我们又买下Lowell鞋业，Lowell是一家女鞋与护士鞋的老牌制造公司，不过他

的管理还需要改进，再一次他的表现又超乎我们的预期，所以我们立刻又再接再

厉在去年又趁机买下缅因州的Dexter鞋业，一家专门制造高级男女鞋的品牌，

这次我可以向大家保证Dexter并不需要改造，Dexter是查理跟我在职业生涯

中，所见过最好的公司之一。

Harold Alfond, who started working in a shoe factory at 25

cents an hour when he was 20, founded Dexter in 1956 with $10,000

of capital. He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder, his nephew.

The two of them have since built a business that now produces over

7.5 million pairs of shoes annually, most of them made in Maine

and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the

domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to

compete with imports from low-wage countries. But someone forgot

to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H. H.

Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the

U.S. plants of both companies highly competitive against all

comers.

话说Harold Alfond从20岁以时薪25美分开始到制鞋工厂做工，并在1956

年靠着一万美元的资本创立Dexter，1958年他的侄子Peter加入，从此两人

建立起年产750万双鞋子的企业，大部分的鞋子都在缅因州生产，其余的则在

波多黎各，就像大家都知道的，国内的制鞋业，一般被认为无法与国外进口低价

产品竞争，但是大家似乎忘记提醒布朗鞋业与Dexter经营团队有这么一回事，

是他们让两家公司位于美国的工厂拥有高度的竞争力以对抗外来的入侵者。

Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets, located

primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major

manufacturer of golf shoes, producing about 15% of U.S. output.

Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacture of traditional

shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels: Last

year both Nordstrom and J.C. Penney bestowed special awards upon

Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992.

Dexter还包含77家的零售门市，主要集中在西北地区，该公司同时也是高尔

夫球鞋的主要制造商，全美的市场占有率约为15%，不过他的主要业务还是传

统通路商的传统鞋类，这也是它最擅长的领域，去年Dexter还获得Nordstrom

与JC Penny所颁发的年度最佳供货商奖项。

Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of

merger, November 7th. In 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe

operations to have more than $550 million in sales, and we would

not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these

businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago we had no thought

of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that

industry, and I sing "There's No Business Like Shoe Business" as

I drive to work. So much for strategic plans.

Berkshire只能从1993年11月7号购并日后开始计入Dexter的业绩，在1994

年我们预计Berkshire光是在鞋类方面的销售额就达到5.5亿美元，而总计税前

获利极有可能超过8,500万，记得在五年前我们根本就没想到会跨进鞋类这一

行，现在光是在这个产业所雇用的员工就超过7,200人，现在我每天上班，都

会边开车边唱，没有一个行业会像卖鞋这一行，策略计画还有很多发挥的空间。

At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates

what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think

it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it

embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We

prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of

businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics

of managers with whom we wish to associate - and then to hope we

get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.

在Berkshire，对于将来会进入那个产业，我们并没有特定的看法，事实上，我

们常在想对于一家大型企业的股东来说，与其追求具有远景的新创事业有时反而

有害，所以我们比较偏爱专注于那些我们想要拥有的经济型态以及我们喜爱一起

共事的经理人，剩下的就只看我们有没有足够的运气，找到同时拥有这两项特点

的组合了，在Dexter我们确实找到了。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And now we pause for a short commercial: Though they owned

a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter (who were not

interested in cash) made a sound decision in exchanging their

Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect,

was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a

smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses. They

incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can

be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be

converted to cash in amounts, and at times, of their own

choosing. Should members of their families desire to, they can

pursue varying financial paths without running into the

complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a

private business.

接下来让我们休息一下，进段小广告，虽然他们拥有商业界的宝石，但我们也相

信Harold与Peter(他们对于现金都不感兴趣)做了一个正确的决定，将Dexter

的股份转为Berkshire的股份，他们所做的，实际上等于将一家规模小的好公司

的全部权益转成一家大规模好公司的一部份权益，这样的转换并不会产生租税负

担，同时还可享有依个人意愿随时进行赠与或变现的好处，如果他们的家族成员

有意愿，他们可以依照自己的想法追求不同的目标，而不必像过去那样所有的资

产全部绑在一家私人的企业。

For tax and other reasons, private companies also often find

it difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire,

in contrast, can diversify with ease. So in shifting their

ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a

reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have

non-controlling shares in Berkshire, rather than controlling

shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and

that we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to

retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the

merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I

have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to

Berkshire shares - and since the company will issue me neither

restricted shares nor stock options - my gain-loss equation will

always match that of all other owners.

基于租税规划以及其它理由，私人企业通常很难透过延伸本业以外的投资达到分

散风险的目的，相对的，在Berkshire我们可以很轻易地就多角化，因此藉由经

营权移转至Berkshire，Dexter的股东可以很轻易地就解决转投资的问题，更

重要的是，虽然Harold与Peter现在持有的是Berkshire无控制权的股份，而

不是原先Dexter具控制权的股份，但他们很清楚自己将被视为真正的合伙人，

同时我们也会以经营者的心态参与，所以一旦他们决定将自己的投资转为

Berkshire的股份，那么从合并那天开始，他们就可以确定本身的投资成果将会

与我个人的投资成果相当，而因为我个人绝大部份的身家都摆在Berkshire，也

因为我个人从不会自公司身上取得特殊的股份或员工认股权，所以我个人的成败

得失也将与其它所有公司股权持有人一致。

Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can

keep our promises: There will be no changes of control or

culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of

paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will

get to run their business - an activity they dearly love -

exactly as they did before the merger. At Berkshire, we do not

tell .400 hitters how to swing.

此外，Harold与Peter也相当了解，在Berkshire我们言出必行，在可见的未

来几十年内，Berkshire的控制权与文化将不会有所改变，最后同时也是最重要

的一点，Harold与Peter可以确定将能够继续经营原来的企业，这是他们最喜

爱的工作，这点不会因为合并案完成而有任何的改变，在Berkshire，我们不会

鸡婆地去提醒打击率高达四成的强打者应该要如何挥棒。

What made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense

for a few other owners of large private businesses. So, if you

have a business that might fit, let me hear from you. Our

acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix on page 22.

我想这些的道理同样也适合其它大型私人企业的所有者，所以如果你有公司的情

况符合我们的标准的，请务必让我知道，在年报的后段有我们拟购并企业的标

准。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's

reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of

Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments

are not charged against the specific businesses to which they

apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This

procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they

would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've

explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to

us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing

GAAP, which requires purchase-price adjustments to be made on a

business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in

the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our

audited financial statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

(000s omitted)

------------------------------------------

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

-------------------- ------------------

1993 1992 1993 1992

---------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............... $ 30,876 $(108,961) $ 20,156 $(71,141)

Net Investment Income ...... 375,946 355,067 321,321 305,763

H. H. Brown, Lowell,

and Dexter ............... 44,025* 27,883 28,829 17,340

Buffalo News ................. 50,962 47,863 29,696 28,163

Commercial & Consumer Finance 22,695 19,836 14,161 12,664

Fechheimer ................... 13,442 13,698 6,931 7,267

Kirby ........................ 39,147 35,653 25,056 22,795

Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 21,540 17,110 10,398 8,072

Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 38,196 31,954 23,809 19,883

See's Candies ................ 41,150 42,357 24,367 25,501

World Book ................... 19,915 29,044 13,537 19,503

Purchase-Price Accounting &

Goodwill Charges ......... (17,033) (12,087) (13,996) (13,070)

Interest Expense** ........... (56,545) (98,643) (35,614) (62,899)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions ............ (9,448) (7,634) (5,994) (4,913)

Other ........................ 28,428 67,540 15,094 32,798

---------- ---------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings ............. 643,296 460,680 477,751 347,726

Sales of Securities ............ 546,422 89,937 356,702 59,559

Tax Accruals Caused by

New Accounting Rules ........ --- --- (146,332) ---

---------- ---------- -------- --------

Total Earnings - All Entities .. $1,189,718 $ 550,617 $688,121 $407,285

* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,

November 7, 1993.

*Dexter的盈余仅含购并日1993年11月7日以后的盈余

**Excludes interest expense of Commercial and Consumer Finance

businesses. In 1992 includes $22.5 million of premiums paid on

the early redemption of debt.

**不含商业与消费金融公司的利息费用，另外1992年部份还包含2,250万提前赎回债券的溢

价。

A large amount of information about these businesses is given

on pages 38-49, where you will also find our segment earnings

reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 52-59, we have

rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-

GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and

I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the

financial information that we would wish you to give us if our

positions were reversed.

在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们

的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必要的资

讯。

"Look-Through" Earnings

透视盈余

We've previously discussed look-through earnings, which we

believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does

our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings

consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous

section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major

investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our

profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by

Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been

distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here

exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major

restructuring charges.

之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到的帐列盈

余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公

司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所

得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企业调整的

主要支出。

Over time, our look-through earnings need to increase at about

15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that rate. Last

year, I explained that we had to increase these earnings to about

$1.8 billion in the year 2000, were we to meet the 15% goal.

Because we issued additional shares in 1993, the amount needed has

risen to about $1.85 billion.

长期而言，如果我们的实质价值想要以每年15%的幅度来成长的话，那么透视

盈余每年也必须增加以这个幅度来成长，去年我曾经提到，到公元2000年为

止，Berkshire若要以15%的目标，透视盈余必须成长到18亿美元，而由于1993

年我们又发行了一些新股，所以现在的门槛提高到18.5亿美元。

That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold us

to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice of

shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the target,

centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit. We will

instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting later.

这是一个高难度的目标，不过也希望大家能够继续支持我们，在过去我们常常批

评有些管理阶层总是先把箭射出去后再划上准心，不管这箭射得有多歪，因此关

于这点我们宁愿先标出准心，然后再瞄准目标射箭。

If we are to hit the bull's-eye, we will need markets that

allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible terms.

Right now, markets are difficult, but they can - and will - change

in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime, we'll

try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply

because we are long on cash. There's no use running if you're on

the wrong road.

如果我们想要命中靶心，那么我们绝对需要有能以合理价格买到好的公司与股份

的市场，不过对我们来说，现在市场上的情况并不理想，当然这种情况随时都有

可能会改变，在此同时，我们也会尽量避免手上闲钱太多而去做那些浪费工夫的

蠢事，若方向不对，再怎么努力冲刺也是白费力气。

The following table shows how we calculate look-through

earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very

rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been

included in the operating earnings itemized on page 8, mostly

under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数

字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益

项下)。

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)

------------------------ --------------------- --------------------

1993 1992 1993 1992

------ ------ ------ ------

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ..... 13.0% 18.2% $ 83(2) $ 70

The Coca-Cola Company ........ 7.2% 7.1% 94 82

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.8%(1) 8.2%(1) 41(2) 29(2)

GEICO Corp. .................. 48.4% 48.1% 76(3) 34(3)

General Dynamics Corp. ....... 13.9% 14.1% 25 11(2)

The Gillette Company ......... 10.9% 10.9% 44 38

Guinness PLC ................. 1.9% 2.0% 8 7

The Washington Post Company .. 14.8% 14.6% 15 11

Wells Fargo & Company ........ 12.2% 11.5% 53(2) 16(2)

Berkshire's share of undistributed

earnings of major investees $439 $298

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed

investee earnings(4) (61) (42)

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 478 348

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $856 $604

(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest

at Wesco

不包含Wesco的少数股权

(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year

以年平均持有股权比例计算

(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both

recurring and significant

扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，

(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays

on the dividends it receives

适用的税率为14%，这是Berkshire收到现金股利时的平均税率。

We have told you that we expect the undistributed,

hypothetically-taxed earnings of our investees to produce at least

equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date, we have

far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986 we bought

three million shares of Capital Cities/ABC for $172.50 per share

and late last year sold one-third of that holding for $630 per

share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized a $297

million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight years

we held these shares, the retained earnings of Cap Cities

attributable to them - hypothetically taxed at a lower 14% in

accordance with our look-through method - were only $152 million.

In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our lookthrough

presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless realized

a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to

these shares.

我曾告诉过各位，我们预估这些已依估计税率调整过的未分配盈余至少可以为

Berkshire创造出同等的实质价值，而到目前为止，其真正的结果甚至超乎我们

的预期，举例来说，我们在1986年以每股172.5美元的价格买进300万股资

本城/ABC公司的股份，去年我们以每股630美元的价格处分了其中的三分之

一，在支付35%的资本利得税后，我们实现2.97亿美元的税后盈余，相对地，

在我们持有这些股份的八年期间，经由这些股份资本城公司分配给我们的透视盈

余在扣除估计14%的所得税之后，只有1.52亿美元，换句话说，透过出售这些

股份，所获取的利益，即便在扣除较高的所得税负之后，还是比原先透过持股所

分配到的盈余还要高出许多。

We expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the future

and therefore believe our look-through earnings to be a

conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings.

而我们也预期这样的情况在未来还会持续发生，因此我们相信Berkshire所计算

的透视盈余，算是相当保守的表达方式。

Taxes

税负

As our Cap Cities sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial

payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay 1993

federal income taxes of $390 million, about $200 million of that

attributable to operating earnings and $190 million to realized

capital gains. Furthermore, our share of the 1993 federal and

foreign income taxes paid by our investees is well over $400

million, a figure you don't see on our financial statements but

that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's

1993 federal income tax payments will be about 1/2 of 1% of the total

paid last year by all American corporations.

就像是刚刚提到的资本城股份出售案，Berkshire可以说是联邦政府的缴税大

户，总计在1993年，我们总共缴了3.9亿美元的所得税，其中2亿属于本业

获利，另外1.9亿则源自于资本利得，此外我们的被投资公司另外向联邦政府与

国外政府又缴交了超过4亿美元的所得税，这是你在本公司的财务报表上看不

到，但却又确实存在的，直接再加上间接合计，Berkshire占去年所有美国企业

缴给联邦政府所得税总额的1.5%。

Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely no

complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based

economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does

the efforts of others whose output is of equal or greater benefit

to society. Taxation should, and does, partially redress this

inequity. But we still remain extraordinarily well-treated.

对于这个比例，查理跟我本人一点怨言也没有，我们知道我们是在一个市场导向

的经济社会，我们努力所收到的报酬，其比例甚至比一些对这个社会有更多贡献

的人还要多，透过租税政策，多多少少可以降低这种不合理性，不过即便是如此，

我们还是认为自己受到特别优厚的待遇。

Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay a

much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or "S"

corporation, two structures often used for business activities.

For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire to do.

However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated -

though far from eliminated - by our strategy of investing for the

long term. Charlie and I would follow a buy-and-hold policy even

if we ran a tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest way

to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities. A

third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact that taxes

are due only when gains are realized.

虽然Berkshire若是以合伙或S型企业的形式来经营，(在美国许多商业活动确

实是以这两种形态在运作)，Berkshire跟其所有的股东，总的来说可以大大减少

所需负担的税负，但基于许多理由，那样的做法并不适合Berkshire的运作，所

幸我们以企业形态运作的模式所受到的租税惩罚，因为我们采取长期投资的策略

而稍稍减轻，虽然就算是证交所得免税，查理跟我还是会坚持遵照买进并持有的

策略，这是我们认为最好的投资方式，同时也最符合我们的个人特质，当然第三

个好处就是因为这样做可以使我们只有在实现资本利得时才需要缴税。

Through my favorite comic strip, Li'l Abner, I got a chance

during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes, though I

missed the lesson at the time. Making his readers feel superior,

Li'l Abner bungled happily, but moronically, through life in

Dogpatch. At one point he became infatuated with a New York

temptress, Appassionatta Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her

because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested

solely in millionaires. Dejected, Abner took his problem to Old

Man Mose, the font of all knowledge in Dogpatch. Said the sage:

Double your money 20 times and Appassionatta will be yours (1, 2,

4, 8 . . . . 1,048,576).

经由我个人最喜爱的漫画短片，Li'l Abner，我有机会可以体会到延迟支付所得

税的好处，虽然当时我没有好好地利用那次机会，为了让他的读者觉得自己很优

越，Li'l Abner一直快乐地维持单身，直到他为纽约一位女演员Appassionatta

深深地着迷，但由于她只对百万富翁有兴趣，因此一贫如洗的Abner可以说是

一点希望都没有，在遭到拒绝之后，Abner跑去智能老人Mose那里请他指点

迷津，结果这位圣贤对Abner说，很简单你只要能够将身上仅有的一块钱，复

制20次，Appassionatta自然就会投入到你的怀抱(1,2,4,8,….,1,048,576)。

My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a roadhouse,

dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that

spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Mose's

advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next

double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham.

我记得这段漫画的最后一段是Abner跑到一家旅馆，将他仅有的一块钱投入吃

角子老虎中，结果竟然中了七星，一时之间奖金掉满地，没想到他老兄一丝不苟

遵照Mose老人的旨意，只捡起了其中的两块钱之后，就出发去寻找下一次复制

的机会，看到这里我便舍弃了Abner，并开始研读葛拉汉的理论。

Mose clearly was overrated as a guru: Besides failing to

anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to instructions, he also

forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say, to the 35%

federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double

annually, he would after 20 years only have accumulated $22,370.

Indeed, had he kept on both getting his annual doubles and paying a

35% tax on each, he would have needed 7 1/2 years more to reach the

$1 million required to win Appassionatta.

Mose很显然地不配当他人的精神导师，除了低估Abner对于他的指示过于盲

从的程度，他也忘了考虑到可能的税负，假设今天Abner也像Berkshire一样

必须负担高达35%的联邦所得税的话，而且他每年只能成功地复制一次的话，

就算连续20年都如他所愿，他也只能累积到22,370元，当然若是他能持之以

恒地保持这样的记录的话，他则还须多等上七年半，才能累积到所需的100万

以赢得Appassionatta的芳心。

But what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single

investment and held it until it doubled the same 27 1/2 times? In

that case, he would have realized about $200 million pre-tax or,

after paying a $70 million tax in the final year, about $130

million after-tax. For that, Appassionatta would have crawled to

Dogpatch. Of course, with 27 1/2 years having passed, how

Appassionatta would have looked to a fellow sitting on $130 million

is another question.

然而要是Abner只将资金放在单一不变的投资之上，同时连续27年半都能保

持每年倍数成长的记录的话，这样到最后，他在税前可以累积高达二亿美元的获

利，或是在扣除7,000万美元的所得税之后，得到税后1亿3,000万美元的利

益，届时可能会换做是Appassionatta爬着来求他了，当然等到27年后，一

个坐拥1亿多美元的富翁会怎么看待年华老去的Appassionatta，则又是另外

一回事了。

What this little tale tells us is that tax-paying investors

will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that

compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of

investments compounding at the same rate. But I suspect many

Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago.

这宗小故事告诉我们必须负担税负的投资人从每年固定以一个比率成长的单一

投资上，可以获得比每年更换投资对象所得的多的多，即便是两者成长的幅度一

样也是如此，不过我怀疑许多Berkshire的股东老早就已经知道这个道理了。

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

At this point in the report we've customarily provided you

with a table showing the annual "combined ratio" of the insurance

industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares total

insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) to revenue from

premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100, a level

indicating an underwriting loss. That is, the industry has taken

in less money each year from its policyholders than it has had to

pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during

the year.

接下来到这里我们通常会准备一张表来说明保险业过去十多年来的综合比率，综

合比率代表保险的总成本(理赔损失加上费用)占保费收入的比例，多年以来，比

率在100以下代表有承保的损失，也就是说，保险业者当年度从客户那里收到

的保费，不足以支应必须支付给保户的理赔款以及营运所需的费用开支。

Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact: Insurers get

to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying

it out. This happens because most policies require that premiums

be prepaid and, more importantly, because it often takes time to

resolve loss claims. Indeed, in the case of certain lines of

insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice,

many years may elapse between the loss event and payment.

当然若是两者能够相等，将会是一个很令人高兴的结局，因为保险业者在真正支

付给客户理赔金之前，通常有一段时间可以将这笔钱好好地运用，因为大部分的

保单都是先向客户收取保费，更重要的是，通常得花上一段时间才会将损失理赔

款给付出去，尤其是像产品责任险或是专门职业执行业务不当等保险，通常要花

上好几年的时间，才能将理赔损失定案。

To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds

prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for incurred-butnot-

yet-paid claims is called "the float." In the past, the

industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and

still break even from its insurance writings because of the

earnings derived from investing this float.

再讲白一点，这些保户预付的保险费加上那些已经发生但还未理赔的资金统称为

保险浮存金，在过去，利用这些浮存金创造投资收益，使得整个保险业即使面临

高达107到111的综合比率，却依然可以维持损益两平。

As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float has

substantially declined. Therefore, the data that we have provided

in the past are no longer useful for year-to-year comparisons of

industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined

ratio now as in the 1980's today has a far less attractive business

than it did then.

不过随着利率下滑，保险浮存金的价值大幅滑落，因此过去我们提供的比率已经

无法用来衡量保险业者每年的获利状况比较，今天一家拥有相同综合比率的保险

公司比起1980年代来说，已无法同日而语。

Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting

results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from float

can one evaluate the true economics of the business that a

property-casualty insurer writes. Of course, the actual investment

results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and

stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be

carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial

performance. But that should be a separate analysis from the one

we are discussing here. The value of float funds - in effect,

their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to

the investment operation - should be determined simply by the riskfree,

long-term rate of interest.

我们认为只有将保险业的承保结果与保险浮存金可以获得的无风险盈余做分

析，才有办法正确地评估一家产物意外险公司真正的价值，当然一家保险公司利

用其浮存金与股东资金所能创造的投资收益也相当重要，这点也是投资人在该公

司的经营表现时，必须特别注意的，只不过那需要分开另外分析，而不是我们现

在要讨论的主题。事实上，保险浮存金的价值，关键在于其从保险营运移转至投

资营运的转拨价格，这点可以简单的以长期无风险的资金利率作为标准。

On the next page we show the numbers that count in an

evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business. We calculate our

float - which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our

premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves

and unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agent's

balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable

to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our

underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an

underwriting profit, which includes 1993, our cost of float has

been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by

adding underwriting profit to float income.

下一页我们将会列出如何计算出Berkshire保险事业价值，首先先计算浮存金总

额-相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的，将所有的损

失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成

本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而

定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负

的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利

益。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

------------ ----------- -------------- -------------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

1993 profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%

As you can see, in our insurance operation last year we had

the use of $2.6 billion at no cost; in fact we were paid $31

million, our underwriting profit, to hold these funds. This sounds

good - is good - but is far from as good as it sounds.

大家应该看得出，去年我们保险事业的营运结果，等于是让我们可以免费利用

26亿美元的浮存金，而事实上，应该还要再加上3,100万美元的承保利益，这

看起来相当不错，不过实际上并没有想象中的那么好。

We temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of

"super-cat" policies (which other insurance and reinsurance

companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega

catastrophes) and because last year we had no losses of consequence

from this activity. As that suggests, the truly catastrophic

Midwestern floods of 1993 did not trigger super-cat losses, the

reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from

private insurers.

我们试着大家冷静一下，因为我们接下的生意其中有一大部分属于霹雳猫保单

(这是其它保险公司或再保公司专门买来分担他们在发生重大意外灾害时，所可

能造成的损失)，同时去年这类的业务并没有出现重大的损失，意思是说，就连

发生在1993年真正严重的中西部水灾也没有触及霹雳猫损失理赔的门槛，原因

在于很少有私人保险公司会去购买水灾险。

It would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this singleyear

result that the super-cat business is a wonderful one, or even

a satisfactory one. A simple example will illustrate the fallacy:

Suppose there is an event that occurs 25 times in every century.

If you annually give 5-for-1 odds against its occurrence that year,

you will have many more winning years than losers. Indeed, you may

go a straight six, seven or more years without loss. You also will

eventually go broke.

这样很容易会产生错觉，并做出单一年度霹雳猫的成绩是相当不错且令人满意的

一年，一个简单的例子足以说明一切，假设每个世纪平均都会发生25次重大的

意外事件，而你每年都以以一赔五的比率赌它今年不会发生，则你赌对的年份可

能远比赌错的年份多出许多，甚至你有可能连续赌对六年、七年，甚至是更多年，

但我必须说，不管怎样，到最后你一定会以破产作为结局。

At Berkshire, we naturally believe we are obtaining adequate

premiums and giving more like 3 1/2-for-1 odds. But there is no way

for us - or anyone else - to calculate the true odds on super-cat

coverages. In fact, it will take decades for us to find out

whether our underwriting judgment has been sound.

在Berkshire，我们直觉地相信我们已经收到合理的保费，以类似以一赔三又二

分之一的赌率接受赌注，当然没有人可以真正正确地算出霹雳猫保险真正的赔

率，事实上，可能要等到几十年后，我们才能知道当初的判断是否正确。

What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely to be a

lulu. There may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses

from the super-cat business equal to three or four times what we

earned from it in 1993. When Hurricane Andrew blew in 1992, we

paid out about $125 million. Because we've since expanded our

super-cat business, a similar storm today could cost us $600

million.

不过我们确实知道，当损失真正降临时，铁定是件轰动的事，以后可能会发生三

倍或四倍于我们在1993年所赚到的盈余那样大的意外事件，1992年Andrew

飓风发生的那次，我们总共赔了1.25亿美元，时至今日由于我们已大幅扩大在

霹雳猫保险的业务量，所以同样规模的飓风可能会造成我们六亿美元左右的理赔

损失。

So far, we have been lucky in 1994. As I write this letter,

we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake

will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead of a 6.8,

it would have been a different story.

1994年到目前为止，我们还算是幸运，在我写这封信时，我们因为洛杉矶大地

震所造成的损失还算在正常范围之内，不过要是当时地震发生的规模不是6.8

而是7.5的话，那么最后的结果就完全不是那么一回事了。

Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super-cat policies.

In Ajit Jain, we have by far the best manager in this business.

Additionally, companies writing these policies need enormous

capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that

of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge

resources aren't that important: An insurer can diversify the

risks it writes and, if necessary, can lay off risks to reduce

concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in the supercat

business. So these competitors are forced into offering far

smaller limits than those we can provide. Were they bolder, they

would run the risk that a mega-catastrophe - or a confluence of

smaller catastrophes - would wipe them out.

Berkshire本身很适合从事霹雳猫保险的业务，我们有业界最优秀的经理人Ajit

Jain，此外从事这行需要相当雄厚的资金实力，在这点我们公司的净值大概是其

他主要竞争对手的10到20倍，对大部分的保险业务而言，背后所拥有的资源

还不是那么地重要，一家保险公司可以很轻易地就把它所承担的风险分散出去，

若有必要，也可以降低险种集中度以减低风险，但是对霹雳猫保险这种特殊的保

险就没有办法这样子做，所以其它的竞争同业只能被迫降低理赔的上限来因应，

而要是他们胆敢承担更高的风险，则一个超大型的意外灾害或是连续发生几个较

小型的灾害，就有可能让他们粉身碎骨。

One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that

each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys

very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire. Better than

anyone else, these giants understand that the test of a reinsurer

is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying

circumstances, not its readiness to accept premiums when things

look rosy.

有一件事情可以显示我们超强的竞争力与卓越的声誉，那就是全世界前四大再保

公司全部都向Berkshire投保钜额的霹雳猫保险，这些大公司比谁都清楚，对于

再保公司来说，真正要考验的是他们在困难的状况下，愿意且能够支付理赔金的

能力与意愿，而绝对不是在太平时期勇于接受保费收入的意愿。

One caution: There has recently been a substantial increase

in reinsurance capacity. Close to $5 billion of equity capital has

been raised by reinsurers, almost all of them newly-formed

entities. Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write

business so that they can justify the projections they utilized in

attracting capital. This new competition won't affect our 1994

operations; we're filled up there, primarily with business written

in 1993. But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration. If

this trend continues, we will resign ourselves to much-reduced

volume, keeping ourselves available, though, for the large,

sophisticated buyer who requires a super-cat insurer with large

capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.

值得注意的是，近年来愿意接受再保业务的供给量大幅增加，再保业者总共募集

了近50亿美元的资金来进军这类业务，且大部分都是新成立的公司，很自然的

这些新进的业者急欲承接业务以证明当初他们吸收资金时所作的预估，这些新加

入的竞争并不会影响我们1994年的营运，因为我们早已经接满了生意，主要是

在1993年签下的，不过我们已经看到保费价格有恶化的趋势，如果这种情况持

续下去，我们将会大幅降低承接的业务量，但随时准备好接下大型且复杂的保险

业者所欲寻找确定能够理赔损失的保证。

In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate

operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers' compensation business,

headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit-card operation, managed by the

Kizer family; and National Indemnity's traditional auto and general

liability business, led by Don Wurster, all achieved excellent

results. In combination, these four units produced a significant

underwriting profit and substantial float.

在我们其它保险业务方面，我们由Rod领导的住宅保险、Brad带领的员工退休

保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以及由Don所领导的国家产险

所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来说，这四类业务都表现的相当

不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保险浮存金。

All in all, we have a first-class insurance business. Though

its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an

intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount -

larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business.

总而言之，我们拥有第一流的保险事业，虽然他们的经营成果变化相当的大，但

是其实质价值却远超过其帐面的价值，而事实上，在Berkshire其它事业的身上

也有类似的情况。

Common Stock Investments

股票投资

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over

$250 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to

subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过二亿五千万美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于

Berkshire关系企业所持有)。

12/31/93

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

2,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. $ 345,000 $1,239,000

93,400,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............... 1,023,920 4,167,975

13,654,600 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

("Freddie Mac") ................... 307,505 681,023

34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45,713 1,759,594

4,350,000 General Dynamics Corp. ............... 94,938 401,287

24,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600,000 1,431,000

38,335,000 Guinness PLC ......................... 333,019 270,822

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company. ......... 9,731 440,148

6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 423,680 878,614

Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last,

you may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we

continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an

interest in a business that is both understandable and durably

wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to

replace.

看到今年所列的投资与去年竟如此的相似，你可能会认为本公司的管理阶层实在

是昏庸到无可救药的地步，不过我们还是坚持相信离开原本就熟悉且表现优异稳

定的公司，实在是非常不智之举，这类的公司实在是还难找到更好的替代。

Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble

understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they

operate: A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb longterm

economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of

price. "Why," the CEO would ask, "should I part with my crown

jewel?" Yet that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal

investment portfolio, will offhandedly - and even impetuously -

move from business to business when presented with no more than

superficial arguments by his broker for doing so. The worst of

these is perhaps, "You can't go broke taking a profit." Can you

imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star

subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes

sense in stocks: An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece

of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner

would exhibit if he owned all of that business.

有趣的是企业经理人在认定何者才是自己本业时，从来就不会搞不清楚情况，母

公司是不会单纯因为价格因素就将自己旗下最优秀的子公司给卖掉，公司总裁一

定会问，为什么要把我皇冠上的珠宝给变卖掉，不过当场景转换到其个人的投资

组合时，他却又会毫不犹豫地，甚至是情急地从这家公司换到另一家公司，靠的

不过是股票经纪人肤浅的几句话语，其中最烂的一句当属，你不会因为获利而破

产，你能想象要是一家公司的总裁用类似的方式建议董事会将最有潜力的子公司

给卖掉时，就我个人的观点，适用于企业经营的原则也同样适用于股票投资，投

资人在持有一家公司的股票所展现的韧性应当与一家公司的老板持有公司全部

的股权一样。

Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been

achieved by investing $40 in The Coca-Cola Co. in 1919. In 1938,

more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke, and long after

the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did

an excellent story on the company. In the second paragraph the

writer reported: "Several times every year a weighty and serious

investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's

record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking

too late. The specters of saturation and competition rise before

him."

先前我曾经提到若是在1919年以40美元投资可口可乐会获得怎样的成果，

1938年在可乐问世达50年且早已成为代表美国的产品之后，财富杂志对该公

司做了一次详尽的专访，在文章的第二段作者写到：每年都会有许多重量型的投

资人看好可口可乐，并对于其过去的辉煌记录表示敬意，但也都做下自己太晚发

现的结论，认为该公司已达巅峰，前方的道路充满了竞争与挑战。

Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But

it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca-Cola Co. sold 207 million

cases of soft drinks (if its gallonage then is converted into the

192-ounce cases used for measurement today) and in 1993 it sold

about 10.7 billion cases, a 50-fold increase in physical volume

from a company that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major

industry. Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor: Though

the $40 invested in 1919 in one share had (with dividends

reinvested) turned into $3,277 by the end of 1938, a fresh $40 then

invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to $25,000 by yearend

1993.

没错，1938年确实充满了竞争，而1993年也是，不过值得注意的是1938年

可口可乐一年总共卖出二亿箱的饮料(若是将当时加仑装改成现在192盎斯的箱

子)，但是到了1993年该公司一年卖出饮料高达107亿箱，对这家当时已经成

为市场领导者的公司，在后来将近50的期间总共又成长了50倍，对于1938

年加入的投资者来说，Party根本还没有结束，虽然在1919年投资40美元在

可口可乐股票的投资人(含将所收到的股利再投资)，到了1938年可获得3,277

美元，但是若是在1938年重新以40美元投资可口可乐股票，时至1993年底，

还是照样可以成长到25,000美元。

I can't resist one more quote from that 1938 Fortune story:

"It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to Coca-

Cola and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can

point to a ten-year record anything like Coca-Cola's." In the 55

years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened

somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description still fits.

我忍不住想要在引用1938年财富杂志的报导，「实在是很难在找到像可口可乐

这样规模而且又能持续十年保持不变的产品内容」，如今又过了55个年头，可

口可乐的产品线虽然变得更广泛，但令人印象深刻的是这种形容词还依旧适用。

Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime

it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That

judgment became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital

mushroomed and the universe of investments that could significantly

affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a

strategy that required our being smart - and not too smart at that

- only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good

idea a year. (Charlie says it's my turn.)

查理跟我老早以前便明了要一个人的投资生涯中，做出上百个小一点投资决策是

件很辛苦的一件事，这种想法随着Berkshire资金规模日益扩大而益形明显，而

放眼投资世界中，可以大幅影响本公司投资成效的机会已越来越少，因此我们决

定采取一种只要求自己在少数的时候够聪明就好，而不是每回都要非常的聪明，

所以我们现在只要求每年出现一次好的投资主意就可以了，(查理提醒我今年该

轮到我)。

The strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard

diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the

strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional

investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio

concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should,

both the intensity with which an investor thinks about a business

and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics

before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk,

using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or injury."

我们采取的这种策略排除了依照普通分散风险的教条，许多学者便会言之凿凿说

我们这种策略比起一般传统的投资风险要高的许多，这点我们不敢苟同，我们相

信集中持股的做法同样可以大幅降低风险，只要投资人在买进股份之前，能够加

强本身对于企业的认知以及对于竞争能力熟悉的程度，在这里我们将风险定义，

与一般字典里的一样，系指损失或受伤的可能性。

Academics, however, like to define investment "risk"

differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock

or portfolio of stocks - that is, their volatility as compared to

that of a large universe of stocks. Employing data bases and

statistical skills, these academics compute with precision the

"beta" of a stock - its relative volatility in the past - and then

build arcane investment and capital-allocation theories around this

calculation. In their hunger for a single statistic to measure

risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle: It is better

to be approximately right than precisely wrong.

然而在学术界，却喜欢将投资的风险给予不同的定义，坚持把它当作是股票价格

相对波动的程度，也就是个别投资相较于全体投资波动的幅度，运用数据库与统

计方法，这些学者能够计算出一只股票"精确"的Beta值，代表其过去相对波动

的幅度，然后根据这项公式建立一套晦涩难解的投资与资金分配理论，为了渴望

找出可以衡量风险的单一统计值，但他们却忘了一项基本的原则，宁愿大概对，

也不要完全错。

For owners of a business - and that's the way we think of

shareholders - the academics' definition of risk is far off the

mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under

beta-based theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared

to the market - as had Washington Post when we bought it in 1973 -

becomes "riskier" at the lower price than it was at the higher

price. Would that description have then made any sense to someone

who was offered the entire company at a vastly-reduced price?

对于企业的所有权人来说，这是我们认为公司股东应该有的想法，学术界对于风

险的定义实在是有点离谱，甚至于有点荒谬，举例来说，根据Beta理论，若是

有一种股票的价格相对于大盘下跌的幅度更高，就像是我们在1973年买进华盛

顿邮报股份时一样，那么其风险远比原来高股价时还要更高，那么要是哪天有人

愿意以极低的价格把整家公司卖给你时，你是否也会认为这样的风险太高，而予

以拒绝呢?

In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham

explained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he

introduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day

to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The

more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities

available to the investor. That's true because a wildly

fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will

periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to

see how the availability of such prices can be thought of as

increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to

either ignore the market or exploit its folly.

事实上，真正的投资人喜欢波动都还来不及，班哲明．葛拉汉在智能型投资人一

书的第八章便有所解释，他引用了市场先生理论，市场先生每天都会出现在你面

前，只要你愿意都可以从他那里买进或卖出你的投资，只要他老兄越沮丧，投资

人拥有的机会也就越多，这是由于只要市场波动的幅度越大，一些超低的价格就

更有机会会出现在一些好公司身上，很难想象这种低价的优惠会被投资人视为对

其有害，对于投资人来说，你完全可以无视于他的存在或是好好地利用这种愚蠢

的行为。

In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a

company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much

borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to

know the company's name. What he treasures is the price history of

its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forgo knowing the price

history and instead will seek whatever information will further our

understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock,

consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a

year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our 100% position in

See's or H. H. Brown to validate our well-being. Why, then, should

we need a quote on our 7% interest in Coke?

在评估风险时，Beta理论学者根本就不屑于了解这家公司到底是在做什么，他

的竞争对手在干嘛，或是他们到底借了多少钱来营运，他们甚至不愿意知道公司

的名字叫什么，他们在乎的只是这家公司的历史股价，相对地，我们很愿意不管

这家公司过去股价的历史，反而希望尽量能够得到有助于我们了解这家公司的资

讯，另外在我们买进股份之后，我们一点也不在意这家公司的股份在未来的一、

两年内是否有交易，就像是我们根本就不需要持有100%股权的喜斯糖果或是布

朗鞋业的股票报价来证明我们的权益是否存在，同样地我们也不需要持有7%的

可口可乐每日的股票行情。

In our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is

whether his aggregate after-tax receipts from an investment

(including those he receives on sale) will, over his prospective

holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he

had to begin with, plus a modest rate of interest on that initial

stake. Though this risk cannot be calculated with engineering

precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy

that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation

are:

我们认为投资人应该真正评估的风险是他们从一项投资在其预计持有的期间内

所收到的税后收入加总(也包含出售股份所得)，是否能够让他保有原来投资时拥

有的购买力，再加上合理的利率，虽然这样的风险无法做到像工程般的精确，但

它至少可以做到足以做出有效判断的的程度，在做评估时主要的因素有下列几

点︰

1) The certainty with which the long-term economic

characteristics of the business can be evaluated;

1)这家公司长期竞争能力可以衡量的程度

2) The certainty with which management can be evaluated,

both as to its ability to realize the full potential of

the business and to wisely employ its cash flows;

2)这家公司管理阶层发挥公司潜能以及有效运用现金可以衡量的程度

3) The certainty with which management can be counted on

to channel the rewards from the business to the

shareholders rather than to itself;

3)这家公司管理阶层将企业获得的利益确实回报给股东而非中饱私囊可

以衡量的程度

4) The purchase price of the business;

4)买进这家企业的价格

5) The levels of taxation and inflation that will be

experienced and that will determine the degree by which

an investor's purchasing-power return is reduced from his

gross return.

5)投资人的净购买力所得，须考虑税负与通货膨胀等因素必须从投资收

益总额中扣除的部份

These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably

fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a data base of any kind.

But the difficulty of precisely quantifying these matters does not

negate their importance nor is it insuperable. Just as Justice

Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but

nevertheless asserted, "I know it when I see it," so also can

investors - in an inexact but useful way - "see" the risks inherent

in certain investments without reference to complex equations or

price histories.

这些因素对于许多分析师来说，可能是丈二金刚摸不着头脑，因为他们根本无法

从现有的数据库中找到这些信息，但是取得这些精确数字的难度高并不代表他们

就不重要或是无法克服，就像是司法正义一样，Stewart法官发现他根本无法找

到何谓猥亵的标准，不过他还是坚称，只要我一看到就知道是不是，同样地对于

投资人来说，不需靠精确的公式或是股价历史，而只要运用不太精确但却有用的

方式，就可以看到潜藏在某些投资里的风险。

Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and

Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than,

say, any computer company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about

44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in

value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which

Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in

which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power.

就长期而言，可口可乐与吉列所面临的产业风险，要比任何计算机公司或是通路商

或小得多，可口可乐占全世界饮料销售量的44%，吉列则拥有60%的刮胡刀市

场占有率(以销售额计)，除了称霸口香糖的箭牌公司之外，我看不出还有那家公

司可以像他们一样长期以来享有傲视全球的竞争力。

Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their

worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their

brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of

their distribution systems give them an enormous competitive

advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic

castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily

without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks

of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a

warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."

更重要的，可口可乐与吉列近年来也确实一点一滴地在增加他们全球市场的占有

率，品牌的力量、产品的特质与配销通路的优势，使得他们拥有超强的竞争力，

就像是树立起高耸的护城河来保卫其经济城堡，相对的，一般公司却要每天耗尽

心思去打没有意义的游击战，就像是彼得．林区所说的，对于那些只会销售量贩

式产品的公司来说，大家应该在其股票上加印这句警语-「竞争可能有害于人类

的利益」。

The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to

even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks

is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who

possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude

from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and

Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured?

Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company

- its stock - is somehow divorced from the long-term risk inherent

in its business operations? We believe neither conclusion makes

sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no

sense.

可口可乐与吉列的竞争力在一般产业观察家眼中实在是显而易见的，然而其股票

的Beta值却与一般平庸、完全没有竞争优势的公司相似，难道只因为这样我们

就该认为在衡量公司所面临的产业风险时，完全不须考虑他们所享有的竞争优势

吗? 或者就可以说持有一家公司部份所有权-也就是股票的风险，与公司长期所

面临的营运风险一点关系都没有，我们认为这些说法，包含衡量投资风险的Beta

公式在内，一点道理都没有。

The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for

differentiating the risk inherent in, say, a single-product toy

company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy

company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite

possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they

have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the

factors that create long-term competitive strength or weakness.

Obviously, every investor will make mistakes. But by confining

himself to a relatively few, easy-to-understand cases, a reasonably

intelligent, informed and diligent person can judge investment

risks with a useful degree of accuracy.

Beta学者所架构的理论根本就没有能力去分辨，销售宠物玩具或呼拉圈的玩具

公司与销售大富翁或芭比娃娃的玩具公司，所隐藏的风险有何不同? 但对一般普

通的投资人来说，只要他略懂得消费者行为以及形成企业长期竞争优势或弱势的

原因的话，就可以很明确的看出两者的差别，当然每个投资人都会犯错，但只要

将自己集中在相对少数，容易了解的投资个案上，一个理性、知性与耐性兼具的

投资人一定能够将投资风险限定在可接受的范围之内。

In many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine

whether we are dealing with a "pet rock" or a "Barbie." We

couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend

years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes our own

intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding,

and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the

roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast-moving

technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of

its long-term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what

would transpire in the television-manufacturing or computer

industries? Of course not. (Nor did most of the investors and

corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries.)

Why, then, should Charlie and I now think we can predict the

future of other rapidly-evolving businesses? We'll stick instead

with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack

when one is sitting in plain sight?

当然有许多产业，连查理或是我可能都无法判断到底我们在玩的是宠物玩具或芭

比娃娃，甚至在花了许多年时间努力的研究这些产业之后，我们还是无法解决这

个问题，有时是因为我们本身智识上的缺陷，阻碍了我们对事情的了解，有时则

是因为产业特性的关系，例如对于一家随时都比须面临快速变迁技术的公司来

说，我们根本就无法对其长期的竞争力做出任何的评断，人类在三十年前，是否

就能预知现在电视制造或计算机产业的演进，当然不能，就算是大部分钻研于这方

面领域的投资人与企业经理人也没有办法，那么为什么查理跟我要觉得应该要有

去预测其它产业快速变迁前景的能力呢? 我们宁愿挑些简单一点的，一个人坐的

舒舒服服就好了，为什么还要费事去挨稻草里的针呢?

Of course, some investment strategies - for instance, our

efforts in arbitrage over the years - require wide diversification.

If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk

should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutuallyindependent

commitments. Thus, you may consciously purchase a

risky investment - one that indeed has a significant possibility of

causing loss or injury - if you believe that your gain, weighted

for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss, comparably

weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar, but

unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this

strategy. Should you choose to pursue this course, you should

adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which

will want to see lots of action because it is favored by

probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single, huge bet.

当然，有些投资策略，例如我们从事多年的套利活动，就必须将风险分散，若是

单一交易的风险过高，就比须将资源分散到几个各自独立的个案之上，如此一

来，虽然每个个案都有可能导致损失或伤害，但只要你确信每个独立的个案经过

机率的加权平均能够让你获致满意的报酬就行了，许多创业投资者用的就是这种

方法，若是你也打算这样做的话，记得采取与赌场老板搞轮盘游戏同样的心态，

那就是鼓励大家持续不断的下注，因为长期而言，机率对庄家有利，但千万要拒

绝单一一次的大赌注。

Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when

an investor who does not understand the economics of specific

businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a longterm

owner of American industry. That investor should both own a

large number of equities and space out his purchases. By

periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the knownothing

investor can actually out-perform most investment

professionals. Paradoxically, when "dumb" money acknowledges its

limitations, it ceases to be dumb.

另外一种需要分散风险的特殊情况是，当投资人并没有对任何单一产业有特别的

熟悉，不过他却对美国整体产业前景有信心，则这类的投资人应该分散持有许多

公司的股份，同时将投入的时点拉长，例如，透过定期投资指数基金，一个什么

都不懂的投资人通常都能打败大部分的专业经理人，很奇怪的是，当愚昧的金钱

了解到自己的极限之后，它就不再愚昧了。

On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able

to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensiblypriced

companies that possess important long-term competitive

advantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you.

It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I

cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money

into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding

that money to his top choices - the businesses he understands best

and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit

potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a

good thing can be wonderful."

另一方面，若是你是稍具常识的投资人，能够了解产业经济的话，应该就能够找

出五到十家股价合理并享有长期竞争优势的公司，此时一般分散风险的理论对你

来说就一点意义也没有，要是那样做反而会伤害到你的投资成果并增加你的风

险，我实在不了解那些投资人为什么要把钱摆在他排名第20的股票上，而不是

把钱集中在排名最前面，最熟悉了解同时风险最小，获利可能最大的投资之上，

或许这就是先知梅西卫斯特所说的，「好事物越多，就越完美」。

Corporate Governance

企业治理

At our annual meetings, someone usually asks "What happens to

this place if you get hit by a truck?" I'm glad they are still

asking the question in this form. It won't be too long before the

query becomes: "What happens to this place if you don't get hit by

a truck?"

在年度的股东会上，有人常常会问︰「要是那天你不幸被车撞到，该怎么办?」

我只能说很庆幸他们还是在问这样的问题，而不是「要是那天你不被车撞到，我

们该怎么办?」。

Such questions, in any event, raise a reason for me to discuss

corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year. In

general, I believe that directors have stiffened their spines

recently and that shareholders are now being treated somewhat more

like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators on

corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction among

three fundamentally different manager/owner situations that exist

in publicly-held companies. Though the legal responsibility of

directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect change

differs in each of the cases. Attention usually falls on the first

case, because it prevails on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire

falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into

the third, we will discuss all three variations.

这样的问题让我有机会谈谈近年来相当热门的话题-公司治理，首先我相信最近

许多公司的董事们已开始试着把他们的腰杆打直，而现在的投资人比起以前来

说，也慢慢地被公司当作真正的拥有人来对待，但是评论专家并没有仔细地去区

别目前公开上市公司三种截然不同的经营权与所有权形态，虽然在法律上，董事

们应该承担的责任是责无旁贷的，但他们能发挥影响力进行改变的程度却有很大

的不同，大家通常都把注意力摆在第一类的案例之上，因为这是目前一般企业的

常态，但由于Berkshire本身是属于第二类，甚至有一天会变成第三类，所以在

这里我们有必要讨论一下三者的不同。

The first, and by far most common, board situation is one in

which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case,

I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee

owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all

proper ways. Unfortunately, "long-term" gives directors a lot of

wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think

independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders

while still claiming to be acting in their long-term interest. But

assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a

management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have the

responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent

owner would do if he were present. And if able but greedy managers

over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders'

pockets, directors must slap their hands.

首先是第一类，也是目前最普遍的一类，在公司的股权结构中，并没有一个具掌

控能力的大股东，在这种情况下，我相信董事会的行为应该要像是公司有一个因

事未出席的大股东一样，在各种情况下，都要能够确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利

益不会受到损害，然而很不幸的是，所谓的长期利益，反而给了董事会很大的弹

性操作空间，而假设董事会运作尚称顺畅，不过经营阶层却很平庸甚至差劲时，

那么董事会就必须负起责任将经营阶层换掉，就好象一般公司老板会做的决定一

样，另外要是经营阶层能力尚可，只不过过于贪心，不时地想要从股东的口袋里

捞钱，那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予警告。

In this plain-vanilla case, a director who sees something he

doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his

views. If he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make

the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director

can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel

free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors

seldom do that, of course. The temperament of many directors would

in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort. But I

see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are

serious. Naturally, the complaining director can expect a vigorous

rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors, a prospect that should

discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non-rational

causes.

在这种一般常见的情况下，当个别董事发觉有不合理的现象时，应该试着说服其

他董事有关他的看法，若能够成功，那么董事会就有能力做出适当的决定，但是

假设要是这位落寞的董事孤掌难鸣，无法获得其它董事的支持，那么他就应该要

让没能出席的股东知道他的看法，当然很少有董事真的这样做，很多的董事事实

上并没有足够的胆识敢做这样大胆的动作，但我却认为这样的举动并没有什么不

妥，当然假设问题真的很严重的话，自然而然发出不平之鸣的董事一定会遭到其

他不认同看法的董事严正的驳斥，认为反对的董事不要在枝微末节或是非理性的

原因上捣乱。

For the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought

to be relatively few in number - say, ten or less - and ought to

come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should

establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also

periodically meet, without his being present, to evaluate his

performance against those standards.

对于前述讨论的董事会形态，我认为董事的人数不必太多，最好是十个以内，同

时大部分成员应该从外部遴选，而外部董事应该要能够建立对CEO表现的评核

制度，并定期聚会，在CEO不在场的情况下，依据这些原则评断其表现。

The requisites for board membership should be business savvy,

interest in the job, and owner-orientation. Too often, directors

are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to

the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in

selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments

are so hard to undo: The pleasant but vacuous director need never

worry about job security.

至于董事会成员遴选的条件，并须具备商业经验、对这项角色有兴趣同时以股东

利益为导向，只是目前大部分被遴选出来的董事，大多是因为他们的社会地位或

只是为了增加董事会成员的多样化，这样的做法是错误的，更有甚至，这种错误

还有后遗症，因为董事被任命之后就很难再加以撤消，好说话且没有意见的董事

是不怕找不到位置的。

The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the

controlling owner is also the manager. At some companies, this

arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock

endowed with disproportionate voting power. In these situations,

it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners

and management and that the directors cannot effect chang，e except

through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner/manager is mediocre or

worse - or is over-reaching - there is little a director can do

about it except object. If the directors having no connections to

the owner/manager make a unified argument, it may well have some

effect. More likely it will not.

第二种就像是发生在Berkshire的，具控制权的大股东本身也是经营阶层，在某

些公司，经过特殊的安排，将公司的股权按投票权重的不同分成两类，也会产生

这种情况，在这种情况下，很明显的董事会并非所有权人与经营阶层之间的中

介，且除非经由劝说，否则董事会很难发挥改变的影响力，也因此要是老板经营

者本身的能力平庸或很差劲或不顾他人，则董事除了表示反对以外，别无他法，

而要是与老板经营者没有关系的董事碰巧做出相同的结论，有时或许还有用，但

大部分的状况下是无济于事的。

If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently

serious, the outside directors should resign. Their resignation

will signal their doubts about management, and it will emphasize

that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's

shortcomings.

而要是公司无法做出改变，且情况演变的很严重时，外部董事就应该要辞职，外

部董事的辞职等于是对现有的经营阶层投下反对票，同时凸显外部董事没有能力

纠正老板经营者缺失的现象。

The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling

owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of

which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors

in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with

either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go

directly to the owner (who may also be on the board) and report

their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside

director, since he need make his case only to a single, presumably

interested owner, who can forthwith effect change if the argument

is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that

single course of action. If he remains unsatisfied about a

critical matter, he has no choice but to resign.

第三种情况是公司拥有具控制权的大股东，但却不参与公司经营，这种特殊个案

在现实社会中有Hershey食品与道琼公司等例子，公司能够充分运用外部董事

的能力，若是董事们对于经营阶层的能力或品格感到不满意，他们可以直接向大

股东反应(当然大股东可能也是董事成员)，这种环境相当适合外部董事的发挥，

因为他只需要将情况向单一且关心公司前景的所有权人报告，同时只要论点理由

充分就可以马上发挥改变的效果，但即便如此，有意见的董事也只能有这样的选

择管道，若是他对于特定事情的处理结果不满意，他还是只能辞职而别无其它选

择。

Logically, the third case should be the most effective in

insuring first-class management. In the second case the owner is

not going to fire himself, and in the first case, directors often

find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild overreaching.

Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of

the board - an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if

management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious - their hands

are effectively tied. In practice, directors trapped in situations

of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around

they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds

unfettered.

理论上，第三种情况最能够确保一流的经营阶层存在，因为第二种情况，老板不

可能把自己给Fire掉，而第一种情况，董事们通常很难与表现平庸又难以驾驭

的经理人打交道，而除非那些有意见的董事能够获得董事会多数的支持，这是一

件很困难的协调沟通任务，尤其是经营阶层的表现虽然可恨但却罪不至死的时

候，基本上他们的手脚是被绑的死死的，实务上，面临这种现象的董事通常会说

服自己留在董事会，至少还能有所图，但在此同时，经营阶层却还是同样可以为

所欲为。

In the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor

burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also

insure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful

qualities to the board. These directors, in turn, will know that

the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than

being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling

owner is intelligent and self-confident, he will make decisions in

respect to management that are meritocratic and pro-shareholder.

Moreover - and this is critically important - he can readily

correct any mistake he makes.

在第三种情况下，老板本身不必衡量自己的表现也不必费心去取得多数人的支

持，同时他也可以确保所遴选出来的外部董事将可对董事会的素质有所提升，而

这些被选中的董事，也可以确定所提出的建议会真正被听进去，而不是被消极抵

制的经营阶层当作是耳边风，而若是大股东本身够聪明且有自信，那么他就能够

找到以股东利益为优先的菁英经理人，还有一点更重要的是，他能够随时准备改

正本身所犯的错误。

At Berkshire we operate in the second mode now and will for as

long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent.

For better or worse, you are likely to have me as an owner/manager

for some time.

在Berkshire，我们现在是以第二种情况在做营运，而且在我有生之年都会是如

此，至于我个人的健康状况，我必须要强调，实在是好极了，不管是好或坏，大

家都必须继续接受我担任大股东兼经营者。

After my death, all of my stock will go to my wife, Susie,

should she survive me, or to a foundation if she dies before I do.

In neither case will taxes and bequests require the sale of

consequential amounts of stock.

直到我死后，我拥有的所有股份将会归我内人Susie拥有，要是她比我长寿的

话，不过要是她比我早死，所有的股份将会捐给一个基金会，且不论如何都不会

因为遗产或赠与税而必须被迫出售相当的股份。

When my stock is transferred to either my wife or the

foundation, Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going

forward with a vitally interested, but non-management, owner and

with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation

for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and

in 1993 our son, Howard, joined the board. These family members

will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will

represent the controlling interest should anything happen to me.

Most of our other directors are also significant owners of

Berkshire stock, and each has a strong owner-orientation. All in

all, we're prepared for "the truck."

而当我的股份移转到我内人或是基金会之后，Berkshire将会进入第三种公司治

理情况，变成一个关心公司但却不参与经营的大股东搭配完全为股东设想的经理

人，为了预先做准备，Susie在几年前已经被选为公司的董事，而1993年我的

儿子豪尔也紧接着加入董事会，这些家族成员以后将不会担任公司的经理人，但

要是万一我不在时，他们将继承控制公司的权力，当然公司其它的董事本身也都

是主要的股东，且皆有很强的股东利益导向，总而言之，对于那辆卡车可能到来，

我们已经作好了准备。

Shareholder-Designated Contributions

股东指定捐赠计画

About 97% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's

1993 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions

made through the program were $9.4 million and 3,110 charities were

recipients.

大约有97%的有效股权参与1993年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约940万美

元捐出的款项分配给3,110家慈善机构。

Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy

- as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions that are

clearly related to the company's business activities - differs

significantly from that of other publicly-held corporations.

There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to the wishes

of the CEO (who often will be responding to social pressures),

employees (through matching gifts), or directors (through matching

gifts or requests they make of the CEO).

Berkshire在自由乐捐方面的做法，(不同于具有特定商业目的的捐赠)，与其它

公开上市公司的做法有很大的不同，因为大部分的公司所作的捐赠大多是依照

CEO的意愿(他们通常背负许多社会压力)，员工(透过相对赠与)或董事(透过相对

赠与或是对于CEO的要求)。

At Berkshire, we believe that the company's money is the

owners' money, just as it would be in a closely-held corporation,

partnership, or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds are to be

given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities, it is

the charities favored by our owners that should receive them.

We've yet to find a CEO who believes he should personally fund the

charities favored by his shareholders. Why, then, should they foot

the bill for his picks?

不过在Berkshire我们相信公司所有的钱都是属于股东的，就像是在私人家族合

伙企业一样，因此只要这些捐赠资金与公司本身商业活动无关的话，那么就应该

要由股东们所想要赠与的慈善机构收到这些款项，就像是我们还没看到过有

CEO愿意拿自己的钱，依照股东们的意愿进行乐捐，那么又有什么理由，让股

东为公司的CEO买单呢?

Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last fall,

for two months, we borrowed one person from National Indemnity to

help us implement the instructions that came from our 7,500

registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate

program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far greater

administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead is

less than half the size of our charitable contributions. (Charlie,

however, insists that I tell you that $1.4 million of our $4.9 million

overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, The Indefensible.)

而我必须说明的是我们这项计画执行起来并不困难，去年秋天，我们从国家产险

公司借调一个人为期两个月，帮我们处理来自7,500位股东的捐款指示，而我

也相信其它公司花在处理相同捐赠规模所发生的成本铁定比我们高出许多，事实

上，我们公司每年所有的行政费用甚至不到我们每年捐赠金额的一半，(查理坚

持我必须向大家报告，总计490万美元的营业费用当中，有140万是发生在公

司的企业专机-无可辩解号之上)。

Below is a list showing the largest categories to which our

shareholders have steered their contributions.

(a) 347 churches and synagogues received 569 gifts

(b) 283 colleges and universities received 670 gifts

religious) received 525 gifts

(d) 288 institutions dedicated to art, culture or the

humanities received 447 gifts

(e) 180 religious social-service organizations (split

about equally between Christian and Jewish) received

411 gifts

(f) 445 secular social-service organizations (about 40%

youth-related) received 759 gifts

(g) 153 hospitals received 261 gifts

(h) 186 health-related organizations (American Heart

Association, American Cancer Society, etc.) received

320 gifts

下表显示股东指定捐赠的前十大慈善机构

(a)347个教堂与犹太教堂收到569笔善款

(b)283所大专院校收到670笔善款

(d)288所艺术、文化或人类学研究机构收到447笔善款

(e)180所宗教性社福机构(犹太教与基督教各半)收到411笔善款

(f)445所民间社福机构(其中四成与青少年相关)收到759笔善款

(g)153所医疗机构收到261笔善款

(h)186所与医疗相关的机构(如美国心脏学会，美国癌症协会等) 收到320笔善款

Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to

me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose to give

money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure

from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the

contributions programs of publicly-held companies almost never

allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these

institutions are what many shareholders would like to support.

Third, the gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting

philosophies: 130 gifts were directed to organizations that

believe in making abortions readily available for women and 30

gifts were directed to organizations (other than churches) that

discourage or are opposed to abortion.

在这之中，有三点我认为特别有趣，首先，某种程度可以显示出当人们系依个人

意志而非迫于募款人的压力或募款机构感性的诉求时，所可能做出的选择，第

二，一般大公司的捐赠计画从未将教堂或犹太教堂列入考虑，但这却是股东心目

中最佳的选择之一，第三，股东们所做出的决定有时有明显的冲突，有130笔

捐款给支持堕胎的机构团体，而另外有30笔的捐款指定要给反堕胎的机构团体

(扣除宗教机构不算)。

Last year I told you that I was thinking of raising the amount

that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designatedcontributions

program and asked for your comments. We received a

few well-written letters opposing the entire idea, on the grounds

that it was our job to run the business and not our job to force

shareholders into making charitable gifts. Most of the

shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency of the

plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several

shareholders who have given stock to their children or

grandchildren told me that they consider the program a particularly

good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about the

subject of giving. These people, in other words, perceive the

program to be an educational, as well as philanthropic, tool. The

bottom line is that we did raise the amount in 1993, from $8 per

share to $10.

去年我曾经告诉大家我考虑提高Berkshire股东指定捐赠计画的额度，并询问大

家的意见，不过我们却收到一些股东来信反对整个计画，他们认为我们的责任是

将公司经营好而不是去强迫股东做一些慈善捐赠，当然大部分的股东还是支持这

项计画，认为这种做法可以享受租税优惠，并敦促我们提高捐赠的额度，有好几

位把部份股份移转给子女或孙子女的股东告诉我，他们认为这是让下一代了解施

比受有福最好的教育方法，因此最后我们还是决定将下限从每股8美元提高到

每股10元。

In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that

Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions,

including merchandise, averaging about $2.5 million annually.

These contributions support local charities, such as The United

Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.

Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计画对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每

年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在250万美元左右。

这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐

出的相当。

We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our

shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages

50-51. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your

shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1994 will be ineligible for the 1994

program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在

未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是

受托人的名下，必须在1994年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1994

年的捐赠计画。

A Few Personal Items

几件私人事务

Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin - had her 100th birthday on December 3,

1993. (The candles cost more than the cake.) That was a day on

which the store was scheduled to be open in the evening. Mrs. B,

who works seven days a week, for however many hours the store

operates, found the proper decision quite obvious: She simply

postponed her party until an evening when the store was closed.

B太太在12月3日渡过她100岁的生日，(光是蜡烛钱就比蛋糕还贵)，本来当

天家具店预计营业到晚上，对于每周工作七天的B太太来说，二话不说，等到晚

上店关门之后，才开始她的生日宴会。

Mrs. B's story is well-known but worth telling again. She

came to the United States 77 years ago, unable to speak English and

devoid of formal schooling. In 1937, she founded the Nebraska

Furniture Mart with $500. Last year the store had sales of $200

million, a larger amount by far than that recorded by any other

home furnishings store in the United States. Our part in all of

this began ten years ago when Mrs. B sold control of the business

to Berkshire Hathaway, a deal we completed without obtaining

audited financial statements, checking real estate records, or

getting any warranties. In short, her word was good enough for us.

虽然B太太的传奇故事已广为人知，但我还是不厌其烦地再说一次，77年前她

逃到美国来，不会说英文也没有受过正式的教育，1937年她以500美元创立

内布拉斯加家具店，截至去年该店的年营业额达到2亿美元，远远超过全美其

他单一家具店的业绩，我们与她的关系肇始于十年前，B太太将大部分的股权卖

给Berkshire，当然双方既没有看会计师的财务报表、也没有对房地产权状或是

提供任何保证，简而言之，B太太的一诺值千金。

Naturally, I was delighted to attend Mrs. B's birthday party.

After all, she's promised to attend my 100th.

当然我很高兴能受邀参加她100岁的生日宴会，另外她还答应以后要来参加我

100岁的生日宴会。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Katharine Graham retired last year as the chairman of The

Washington Post Company, having relinquished the CEO title three

years ago. In 1973, we purchased our stock in her company for

about $10 million. Our holding now garners $7 million a year in

dividends and is worth over $400 million. At the time of our

purchase, we knew that the economic prospects of the company were

good. But equally important, Charlie and I concluded that Kay

would prove to be an outstanding manager and would treat all

shareholders honorably. That latter consideration was particularly

important because The Washington Post Company has two classes of

stock, a structure that we've seen some managers abuse.

华盛顿邮报的发行人-凯萨琳葛兰姆女士在去年决定正式退休，1973年我们斥

资1,000万美元买进她公司的股份，时至今日我们每年从该公司取得700万美

元的股利，而持有股票的市值已超过4亿美元，当初在决定买进该公司的股份

时，我们便看好该公司的前景，但另外一点同样重要的是，查理跟我都认为凯萨

琳将会证明自己是位杰出的经理人，同时能够诚实地对待所有的股东，后面那一

点尤其重要，因为该公司股份分成两种，而这种架构常常遭到许多经理人滥用。

All of our judgments about this investment have been validated

by events. Kay's skills as a manager were underscored this past

year when she was elected by Fortune's Board of Editors to the

Business Hall of Fame. On behalf of our shareholders, Charlie and

I had long ago put her in Berkshire's Hall of Fame.

而我们做这项投资的正确判断可由许多事件获得证明，凯萨琳杰出的表现使得她

获得财富杂志编辑群选为商业名人堂，而对于身为股东的我们来说，查理跟我早

就把她列入Berkshire的名人堂之中。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Another of last year's retirees was Don Keough of Coca-Cola,

although, as he puts it, his retirement lasted "about 14 hours."

Don is one of the most extraordinary human beings I've ever known -

a man of enormous business talent, but, even more important, a man

who brings out the absolute best in everyone lucky enough to

associate with him. Coca-Cola wants its product to be present at

the happy times of a person's life. Don Keough, as an individual,

invariably increases the happiness of those around him. It's

impossible to think about Don without feeling good.

另外一位在去年退休的人是可口可乐的Don Keough，虽然如同他本人所说的

他的退休只维持了14个小时，Don是我认识最优秀的人类之一，他不但拥有绝

佳的商业天分，同时更重要的是使得每个幸运能够与他共事的人发挥其潜能，可

口可乐希望其产品能够伴随每个人一生最快乐的时光，而Don这个人却带给周

围的人无限的欢乐，每当想起Don时，没有不让人会心一笑的。

I will edge up to how I met Don by slipping in a plug for my

neighborhood in Omaha: Though Charlie has lived in California for

45 years, his home as a boy was about 200 feet away from the house

where I now live; my wife, Susie, grew up 1 1/2 blocks away; and we

have about 125 Berkshire shareholders in the zip code. As for Don,

in 1958 he bought the house directly across the street from mine.

He was then a coffee salesman with a big family and a small income.

在介绍我如何结识Don时，顺便介绍一下我在奥玛哈的街坊邻居，虽然查理住

在加州长达45年，但他儿时的老家距离我现在住的地方不到100公尺，而我

的内人苏珊从小就住在对街，Berkshire有125个股东住在同一个邮政编码，

而Don在1958买的房子就在我家的正对面，当年他还是一个收入微薄，却必

须养一大家子的咖啡销售员。

The impressions I formed in those days about Don were a factor

in my decision to have Berkshire make a record $1 billion

investment in Coca-Cola in 1988-89. Roberto Goizueta had become

CEO of Coke in 1981, with Don alongside as his partner. The two of

them took hold of a company that had stagnated during the previous

decade and moved it from $4.4 billion of market value to $58

billion in less than 13 years. What a difference a pair of

managers like this makes, even when their product has been around

for 100 years.

当年我对Don的印象是我在1988到1989年间，决定替Berkshire买下10

亿美元可口可乐股票的因素之一，Roberto Goizueta在1981年当上可口可乐

总裁时，Don是他的副手，两人联手接掌这家业务已停滞成长10多年的公司，

短短13年期间将这家原本44亿市值的公司变成为580亿美元，虽然所贩卖的

产品已经问世100年，这两个人却还能让这家公司产生如此大的变化。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Frank Rooney did double duty last year. In addition to

leading H. H. Brown to record profits - 35% above the 1992 high -

he also was key to our merger with Dexter.

Frank Rooney从去年开始做了双份的工作，除了领导的HH布朗鞋业在去年创

下获利历史新高，较去年同期增加35%之外，他也是购并Dexter鞋业的主要灵

魂人物。

Frank has known Harold Alfond and Peter Lunder for decades,

and shortly after our purchase of H. H. Brown, told me what a

wonderful operation they managed. He encouraged us to get together

and in due course we made a deal. Frank told Harold and Peter that

Berkshire would provide an ideal corporate "home" for Dexter, and

that assurance undoubtedly contributed to their decision to join

with us.

Frank认识Harold与Peter有好几十年了，在买下布朗鞋业不久之后，他向我

提到这家由他们管理良善的公司，他积极地把我们凑在一起，过了不久之后，我

们便达成协议，Frank告诉Harold与Peter说，Berkshire将会是Dexter企

业最理想的归宿，而这种安全感无疑的是他们最后决定加入我们最关键的因素。

I've told you in the past of Frank's extraordinary record in

building Melville Corp. during his 23 year tenure as CEO. Now, at

72, he's setting an even faster pace at Berkshire. Frank has a

low-key, relaxed style, but don't let that fool you. When he

swings, the ball disappears far over the fence.

过去我曾向各位提过Frank在Melville企业23年总裁期间的杰出表现，如今

高龄72岁的他在Berkshire的速度甚至比以前还快，虽然Frank有个低调又闲

散的Style，但千万不要被他的外表所骗，当他大棒一挥时，球儿可是会一飞冲

天、消失在围墙之外呢！

The Annual Meeting

年度股东会

This year the Annual Meeting will be held at the Orpheum

Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 25, 1994.

A record 2,200 people turned up for the meeting last year, but the

theater can handle many more. We will have a display in the lobby

featuring many of our consumer products - candy, spray guns, shoes,

cutlery, encyclopedias, and the like. Among my favorites slated to

be there is a See's candy assortment that commemorates Mrs. B's

100th birthday and that features her picture, rather than Mrs.

See's, on the package.

今年的股东会预计在1994年4月25日，星期一早上9点30分在位于奥玛哈

市中心的Orpheum中心召开，去年股东会参加人数又创新高突破2,200人，

不过这个会场还可以容纳更多的人，会场中将展示我们所销售的许多产品，包含

糖果、水枪、鞋子、刀叉、百科全书等，其中喜斯糖果为了庆祝B太太100年

生日所推出的纪念礼盒是我的最爱，不同于原本喜斯太太的画像，礼盒上所附的

是B太太的画像。

We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations at one

of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms)

but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much

larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the

Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards

from Borsheim's, which is a twenty-minute drive from downtown. We

will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45

for the meeting and return after it ends.

我们建议大家最好先向以下旅馆预订房间(1)Radisson-Redick旅馆-就位在

Orpheum中心对街拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆(2)较大一点的Red Lion旅馆

-离Orpheum中心约五分钟路程，或是(3)Marriott位在奥玛哈西区，离波仙珠

宝店约100公尺，开车到市中心约需20分钟，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返

股东会会场。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With

the admission card, we will enclose information about parking

facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a

little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk

a few blocks.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

由于开会当天会场不好停车，如果你开车过来，记得早一点到，否则附近的车位

很快就会停满，你可能就必须要停远一点，再走路过来。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture

Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to

downtown hotels or the airport later. Those of you arriving early

can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from

10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on

Sundays. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open

for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday,

April 24.

一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭

店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天

到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星

期日则从中午开到下午5点30分，平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，在4月24

号当天会特别为股东与来宾开放。

In past trips to Borsheim's, many of you have met Susan

Jacques. Early in 1994, Susan was made President and CEO of the

company, having risen in 11 years from a $4-an-hour job that she

took at the store when she was 23. Susan will be joined at

Borsheim's on Sunday by many of the managers of our other

businesses, and Charlie and I will be there as well.

过去几年若你去过波仙，应该都碰到过Susan Jacques， 23岁那年她进入公

司从4美元时薪的小妹做起，经过11年的工作生涯，在1994年初Susan成

为波仙珠宝公司的总裁，星期天Susan连同Berkshire旗下许多经理人以及查

理和我都会出席。

On the previous evening, Saturday, April 23, there will be a

baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and

the Nashville Sounds (which could turn out to be Michael Jordan's

team). As you may know, a few years ago I bought 25% of the Royals

(a capital-allocation decision for which I will not become famous)

and this year the league has cooperatively scheduled a home stand

at Annual Meeting time.

在前一天4月23日，星期六晚上，在Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇

家队对Nashville (就是麦可乔登后来加入的那只棒球队)，或许大家知道，几年

前我个人买下皇家队25%的股权(一个我自己不太好意思让大家知道的资金分配

决策)，今年联盟特地将主场安排在Berkshire股东年会期间。

I will throw the first pitch on the 23rd, and it's a certainty

that I will improve on last year's humiliating performance. On

that occasion, the catcher inexplicably called for my "sinker" and

I dutifully delivered a pitch that barely missed my foot. This

year, I will go with my high hard one regardless of what the

catcher signals, so bring your speed-timing devices. The proxy

statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the

game. I regret to report that you won't have to buy them from

scalpers.

我将会担任开场的先发投手，而我绝对保证将一雪去年差劲的表现，记得当时捕

手突然向我做出投出下沉球的指示，我遵照指示投出却差点砸到我自己的脚，今

年不管捕手做出什么暗号，我都将祭出个人最拿手的上飘速球，所以大家最好把

测速器都带来，股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得入场的门票，大家千万不要向黄

牛买门票。

Warren E. Buffett

March 1, 1994 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1994年3月1日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1994 was $1.45 billion or 13.9%.

Over the last 30 years (that is, since present management took

over) our per-share book value has grown from $19 to $10,083, or

at a rate of 23% compounded annually.

1994年本公司的净值成长了14.5亿美元或是14.3%，总计过去30年以来，

也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的

10,083美元，年复合成长率约为23%。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner,

and I make few predictions. One we will confidently offer,

however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come

close to matching the performance of the past.

查理．孟格-Berkshire的主要合伙人跟我本身很少做预测，不过有一点我们倒

是很确定，那就是Berkshire未来的表现将很难再像过去那样的辉煌。

The problem is not that what has worked in the past will

cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that

our formula - the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that

have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able

people - is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect,

therefore, to keep on doing well.

问题不在于过去的方法在以后会不管用，相反的，我们认为我们的成功方程式-

那就是以合理的价格买进具有产业竞争优势同时由诚实有才干的人经营的做

法，在往后同样能够获致令人满意的结果，我们预估应该可以继续保持这种好成

绩。

A fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment

results. And Berkshire now has a net worth of $11.9 billion

compared to about $22 million when Charlie and I began to manage

the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever,

it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential

in relation to Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie regularly

reminds me, "If something is not worth doing at all, it's not

worth doing well.") We now consider a security for purchase only

if we believe we can deploy at least $100 million in it. Given

that minimum, Berkshire's investment universe has shrunk

dramatically.

然而皮夹子太厚，却是投资成果的大敌，目前Berkshire的净值已高达119亿

美元，还记得当初查理跟我开始经营这家公司时，公司的净值只有2,200万美

元，虽然还是一样有许多好的公司，但却很难在找到规模够大的对象，(就像是

查理常常说的，如果一件事情不值得去做，那么就算是你把它做的再好也没有用)

现在我们只考虑买进至少一亿美元以上的投资，在这样的高门槛下，Berkshire

的投资世界，一下子缩小了许多。

Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us

here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in

The Story of My Life, explains why: "My argument is, to be

a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the

first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out

of my happy zone, I'm not a .344 hitter. I might only be a .250

hitter." Charlie and I agree and will try to wait for

opportunities that are well within our own "happy zone."

尽管如此，我们才是会坚持让我们成功的方法，绝对不会放宽原有的标准，Ted

Williams在我妻子的故事中写到，我个人的看法是如果你想成为一个优秀的打

击者的话，首先你得先相中一颗好球来打，这是教科书里的第一课，如果强迫自

己在不中意的好球带挥棒，我绝对无法成为打击率3成44的强打者，而可能变

成2成5的普通球员，查理跟我都很同意这样的看法，所以我们宁愿静静的等

待球儿滑进我们喜欢的好球带。

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts,

which are an expensive distraction for many investors and

businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen the

huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two

oil shocks, the resignation of a president, the dissolution of

the Soviet Union, a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, or

treasury bill yields fluctuating between 2.8% and 17.4%.

对于坊间一般投资人与商业人士相当迷信的政治与经济的预测，我们仍将保持视

而不见的态度，三十年来，没有人能够正确地预测到越战会持续扩大、工资与价

格管制、两次的石油危机、总统的辞职下台以及苏联的解体、道琼在一天之内大

跌508点或者是国库券殖利率在2.8%与17.4%之间巨幅波动。

But, surprise - none of these blockbuster events made the

slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles. Nor did

they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses

at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us, then, if we had let

a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of

capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when

apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the

foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

不过令人惊讶的是，这些曾经轰动一时的重大事件却从未让班哲明．葛拉罕的投

资哲学造成丝毫的损伤，也从没有让以合理的价格买进优良的企业看起来有任何

的不妥，想象一下，若是我们因为这些莫名的恐惧而延迟或改变我们运用资金的

态度，将会使我们付出多少的代价，事实上，我们通常都是利用某些历史事件发

生，悲观气氛到达顶点时，找到最好的进场机会，恐惧虽然是盲从者的敌人，但

却是基本面信徒的好朋友。

A different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next

30 years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit

from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we

have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little

effect on our long-term results.

在往后的三十年间，一定还会有一连串令人震惊的事件发生，我们不会妄想要去

预测它或是从中获利，如果我们还能够像过去那样找到优良的企业，那么长期而

言，外在的意外对我们的影响实属有限。

What we promise you - along with more modest gains - is that

during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie

and I do. If you suffer, we will suffer; if we prosper, so will

you. And we will not break this bond by introducing compensation

arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside

than the downside.

而就像我曾经承诺过的，除了获利没办法像以前那么好之外，你们在Berkshire

股权所得到的待遇将会与查理和我一完全致，如果你遭受损失，我们也不好过，

如果我们吃香的，那么你们也就跟着喝辣的，而且我们绝对不会靠任何奖金报酬

制度让我们多占点便宜而破坏这样美好的关系。

We further promise you that our personal fortunes will

remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares: We will

not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money

elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment

portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many

friends who belonged to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in

the 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do our best.

此外我们也向大家保证我个人绝大部份的身家都将继续摆在Berkshire的股份

之上，我们不会在央求各位参与我们投资的同时，还把自己的钱摆在别的地方，

甚至于巴菲特家族以及查理跟我在1960年代经营合伙企业时期的老朋友，所拥

有的投资绝大部份也都是以Berkshire股份为主。

Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years

ago, in 1984, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities

having a value of $1.7 billion, or about $1,500 per Berkshire

share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those

securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only

about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various

manufacturing, retailing and service businesses, but they were

almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses

in our insurance business, corporate overhead and interest

expense.

值得庆幸的是，我们可以在一个很好的基础上努力打拼，十年前，也就是在1984

年，Berkshire的保险子公司持有价值17亿美元的股票投资组合，每股约当有

1,500美元的投资，扣除这部份的收益与资本利得不算，Berkshire当年的税前

盈余只有区区的600万美元，没错，虽然我们在制造、零售以及服务事业方面

依然有不错的利润，但是大部分的盈余都被保险事业的承保损失、营业费用以及

利息支出所抵消掉。

Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or over $15,000

per Berkshire share. If you again exclude all income from these

securities, our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million.

During the decade, employment has grown from 5,000 to 22,000

(including eleven people at World Headquarters).

时至今日，我们持有的股票投资组合价值超过180亿美元，每股约当有15,000

美元，若是再一次我们将这些股票投资所产生的收益扣除的话，我们在1994年

的税前盈余是3.84亿美元，十年来，雇用的员工人数从原先的5,000人增加到

22,000人，(包含企业总部的11人在内)。

We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps

of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some

ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing

a baseball team as "getting paid for home runs other fellows

hit." That's my formula at Berkshire, also.

之所以能有这样的成果，要归功于旗下这群特别的经理人，是他们让那些看起来

很普通平凡的事业能有不凡的结果，Casey曾经把他带领一支棒球队的工作，形

容为靠着别人击出全垒打赚钱过活，这也是我在Berkshire维生的方式。

The businesses in which we have partial interests are

equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will

illustrate their significance: In 1994, Coca-Cola sold about 280

billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on

each. But pennies add up. Through Berkshire's 7.8% ownership of

Coke, we have an economic interest in 21 billion of its servings,

which produce "soft-drink earnings" for us of nearly $200

million. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has

a 7% share of the world's razor and blade market (measured by

revenues, not by units), a proportion according us about $250

million of sales in 1994. And, at Wells Fargo, a $53 billion

bank, our 13% ownership translates into a $7 billion "Berkshire

Bank" that earned about $100 million during 1994.

我们持有少数股权企业的贡献，对Berkshire来说也功不可没，从一些统计数字

中，可以看出他们的重要性，1994年可口可乐总计卖出2,800亿罐八盎斯饮

料，每罐大概能赚一美分，不过积沙成塔，若按Berkshire拥有7.8%可口可乐

的股权比例，我们大概可以分配到210亿罐，总计光是饮料贡献给我们的盈余

就有二亿美元；同样的，透过对于吉列的持股，Berkshire大概可以分得全世界

刮胡刀7%的市场占有率(以营收而非销量计算)，约为2.5亿美元的销售额；另

外在拥有530亿美元资产的富国银行，我们持有13%的股权大概就等于是一家

拥有70亿美元资产同时每年获利一亿美元的银行。

It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope

diamond than 100% of a rhinestone, and the companies just

mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't

limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a

growing collection.

我们宁愿拥有天然钻石的一小部份，也不要有100%的人工钻石，而刚刚提到的

那些公司堪称为天然的稀有宝石，更难得的是我们不是只拥有现在这一些，以后

还会得到更多更多。

Stock prices will continue to fluctuate - sometimes sharply

- and the economy will have its ups and down. Over time,

however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of

businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a

satisfactory rate.

股票价格仍会持续波动，有时幅度会很大，同时经济景气的循环也会上上下下，

然而就长期而言，我们相信所拥有的这类优良企业的价值很有可能还会继续以稳

定的速度成长。

Book Value and Intrinsic Value

帐面价值与实质价值

We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily

calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly,

we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is

impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.

我们会固定公布每股的帐面价值，虽然它的用处不大，但这总算是一个比较容易

计算的数字，就像是我们一再提醒各位真正重要的是实质价值，虽然这个数字没

有办法准确计算但却有必要将以估算。

For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that

Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that

figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since

all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable

textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern

nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964,

then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance

sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a

Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the

liabilities are solid."

例如我们可以很确定的告诉大家1964年每股的帐面价值是19.46美元，不过

这个数字很明显的高于其实质的价值，因为公司的资产主要集中于获利不怎么理

想的纺织事业，我们纺织资产的继续经营或清算价值都远比不上帐面价值，所以

任何想要了解1964年Berkshire资产负债表健全性的人士，得到的答案跟恶名

昭彰的好莱坞大亨可能给你的答案一样，「放心好了，所有的负债都如假包

换！」。

Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the

businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying

value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette,

are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you

book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough,

albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's

intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in

concert: Book value gained 13.9%, and that was the approximate

gain in intrinsic value also.

如今Berkshire的情况已完全倒转，我们掌控的许多企业其实际的价值远高于帐

面价值，(至于无法掌控的公司，如可口可乐或吉列刮胡刀则是以目前市价列

示)，不过我们还是照旧提供各位帐面价值的数字，因为虽然这项数字被严重低

估，但仍然可以被当作为追踪Berkshire实质价值的一项指针，事实上，以去年

来说，这两项数字以颇为一致的速度变动，帐面价值增加了13.9%，而实质价

值大概也是以这个速度成长。

We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the

cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining

life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up

with a highly subjective figure that will change both as

estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates

move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is allimportant

and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative

attractiveness of investments and businesses.

我们将实质价值定义为一家企业在其生涯中所能产生现金流量的折现值，任何人

在计算实质价值都必须特别注意未来现金流量的修正与利率的变动都会影响到

最后计算出来的结果，虽然模糊难辨，但实质价值却是最重要的，也是唯一能够

作为评估投资标的与企业的合理方法。

To see how historical input (book value) and future output

(intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of

investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost

as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should

include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he

chose college rather than a job.

为了了解历史投入的帐面价值与未来产出的实质价值会有怎样不同的演变，让我

看看另外一种不同形式的投资-大学教育，假设把教育成本当作是帐面价值，再

算的仔细一点，还要包含学生因为读书而放弃工作收入的机会成本。

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic

benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic

value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate

will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an

estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his

education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must

then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to

graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic

value of the education.

在这里，我们姑且先不论非经济的效益而只专注于经济效益，首先，我们必须先

估计这位毕业生在毕业后终其一生的职场生涯所能得到的收入，然后再扣除要是

他没有接受这项教育，原本可以得到的收入，从而我们可以得到因为这项投资，

他可以获得的额外收入，当然之后还要利用一个适当的利率加以折现，得到截至

毕业日止的折现值，所得到的数字也就等于这场教育所能够带来的实质经济价

值。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their

education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever

paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other

cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its

book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In

all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an

indicator of intrinsic value.

有些毕业生可能会发现其帐面成本可能远高于计算出来的实质价值，这就代表着

不值得他去接受这样的教育，相对地，要是接受教育所产生的实质价值远高于投

入的成本，那么就表示这样的投资是明智的抉择，不过不管怎样，有一点很明确

的，那就是实质价值的多寡跟帐面投入成本一点关系都没有。

Now let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an

example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not

only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic

value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson that

I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've

chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to

be a huge winner.

若各位觉得这种说法学究气太重，就让我们以Berkshire本身实际投资史考特飞

兹的经验当做具体的例证，在这里我们不但可以解释帐面价值与实质价值之间的

关系会有多大的变化，同时可以藉此替大家上一课期待已久的会计学，当然这次

我选择说明的对象是一个相当成功的购并投资案。

Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986.

At the time, the company was a collection of 22 businesses, and

today we have exactly the same line-up - no additions and no

disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby,

and Campbell Hausfeld, but many other units are important

contributors to earnings as well.

Berkshire是在1986年初买下史考特飞兹的，在当时这家公司拥有22项不同

的事业，时至今日我们没有新增，也没有处分其中任何一项，史考特飞兹主要的

营运集中在世界百科全书、寇比吸尘器与Campbell空压机，当然其余的事业对

盈余的贡献也相当重要。

We paid $315.2 million for Scott Fetzer, which at the time

had $172.6 million of book value. The $142.6 million premium we

handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic

value was close to double its book value.

当时我们斥资3.152亿美元买下帐面价值1.726亿美元的史考特飞兹，超过的

1.426亿美元溢价，代表着我们认为这家公司的实质价值大概是其帐面价值的两

倍。

In the table below we trace the book value of Scott Fetzer,

as well as its earnings and dividends, since our purchase.

下表显示的是自我们买下史考特飞兹后，历年来的帐面价值以及它的获利与股利

收入。

(1) (4)

Beginning (2) (3) Ending

Year Book Value Earnings Dividends Book Value

---- ---------- -------- --------- ----------

(In $ Millions) (1)+(2)-(3)

1986 ............... $172.6 $ 40.3 $125.0 $ 87.9

1987 ............... 87.9 48.6 41.0 95.5

1988 ............... 95.5 58.0 35.0 118.6

1989 ............... 118.6 58.5 71.5 105.5

1990 ............... 105.5 61.3 33.5 133.3

1991 ............... 133.3 61.4 74.0 120.7

1992 ............... 120.7 70.5 80.0 111.2

1993 ............... 111.2 77.5 98.0 90.7

1994 ............... 90.7 79.3 76.0 94.0

Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott

Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire dividends of $125 million in

1986, though it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that

we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance

sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when

we purchased it to virtually no debt at all (except for debt used

by its finance subsidiary). Similarly, we have not sold plants

and leased them back, nor sold receivables, nor the like.

Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a

conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.

因为在购并交易完成当年，公司帐上有多余的现金，所以虽然史考特飞兹1986

年的获利只有4,030万美元，但却能够支付Berkshire 1.25亿美元的股利，另

外还有一点我必须强调的是，在史考特飞兹我们并没有运用任何的财务杠杆，事

实上，该公司在我们购并之初的负债便相当有限，之后甚至还掉了所有的债务(除

了财务子公司的借款)，同时我们也没有把工厂卖掉再租回来或是出售应收帐款

之类的举动，在我们拥有的这几年，史考特飞兹一直以相当保守的财务杠杆经营

并且维持相当高的流动性。

As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased

steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown

commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was

exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly

extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by

comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune 500,

a group it would qualify for if it were a stand-alone company.

大家可以看到，史考特飞兹的盈余在我们买下之后持续稳定的增加，不过在此同

时净值却未呈等比例的增加，也因此在我们买下该公司时，就已经相当不错的股

东权益报酬率，到现在又变得更加优异，我们甚至可以拿它与财星五百大作比

较，事实上以史考特飞兹的规模，若单独计便得以列入五百大之林。

Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list - the latest

available for inspection - the company's return on equity would

have ranked 4th. But that is far from the whole story. The top

three companies in return on equity were Insilco, LTV and Gaylord

Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993 and none

of which achieved meaningful earnings that year except for those

they realized when they were accorded debt forgiveness in

bankruptcy proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating

windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it

first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed,

Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company

ranking tenth.

以所能得到最新的1993年五百大名单来说，该公司的股东权益报酬率可以名列

第四，故事还没结束，前三名分别是Insilco、LTV与Gaylord，全部都是因为

当年度脱离破产边缘，除了当年因为债务获得免除致使盈余暴增之外，其它年度

的获利皆乏善可陈，因此若扣除这些没什么营运的烂果子的话，史考特飞兹的股

东权益报酬率足以名列财星五百大首位，远远比其它对手拋在脑后，甚至是第十

名的两倍之多。

You might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be

explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic

position, or leverage. But no such circumstances apply. Rather,

the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO

Ralph Schey, of whom I'll tell you more later.

或许你会认为史考特飞兹的成功不过是盈余循环的高峰、独占垄断或是靠财务杠

杆，不过全都不对，这家公司真正成功的原因在于总裁Ralph Schey优异的管

理技能，这点在后面我们还会详加报告。

First, however, the promised accounting lesson: When we

paid a $142.6 million premium over book value for Scott Fetzer,

that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet.

I'll spare you the details of how this worked (these were laid

out in an appendix to our 1986 Annual Report) and get to the

bottom line: After a premium is initially recorded, it must in

almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges

that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings

statement.

接下来是之前说过的会计课，我们支付超过史考特飞兹帐面价值1.426亿美元

的溢价，将会被记录在Berkshire的资产负债表上，详细的细节我就予以省略(这

些在我们1986年年报的附录都有)，而溢价在登录之后，不管怎样都必须按年

摊销当作成本，并显现在每年的盈余报表之上。

The following table shows, first, the annual charges

Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer

acquisition premium and, second, the premium that remains on our

books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay,

and are not, in our view, an economic cost (though many

accountants would disagree with us). They are merely a way for

us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so

that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott

Fetzer actually employs in its business.

下表显示，第一栏是Berkshire每年必须慢慢地摊销购买史考特飞兹所产生的溢

价的余额，第二栏是每年必须摊销的金额，这些费用对现金部位或税负支出都不

会有影响，同时就我们的观点而言，也没有任何实质的经济意义(虽然很多会计

师可能不同意我们的看法)，这不过是让我们的帐列投资成本能够慢慢减少，到

最后终与史考特飞兹本身帐列净值一致的方法而已。

Beginning Purchase-Premium Ending

Purchase Charge to Purchase

Year Premium Berkshire Earnings Premium

---- --------- ------------------ --------

(In $ Millions)

1986 ................ $142.6 $ 11.6 $131.0

1987 ................ 131.0 7.1 123.9

1988 ................ 123.9 7.9 115.9

1989 ................ 115.9 7.0 108.9

1990 ................ 108.9 7.1 101.9

1991 ................ 101.9 6.9 95.0

1992 ................ 95.0 7.7 87.2

1993 ................ 87.2 28.1 59.1

1994 ................ 59.1 4.9 54.2

Note that by the end of 1994 the premium was reduced to

$54.2 million. When this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's yearend

book value of $94 million, the total is $148.2 million, which

is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's

books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for

the company when it was acquired. Yet Scott Fetzer is now

earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic

value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have

just as consistently marked down its carrying value through

purchase-premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings and

net worth.

大家可能注意到截至1994年底为止，帐列的溢价还剩下5,420万美元，这个

数字若再加上史考特飞兹当年底的净值9,400万美元的话，就等于Berkshire

帐上持有该公司的投资成本1.482亿美元，这个数字甚至不到当初我们买下它

时的一半不到，然而史考特飞兹现在每年所赚的钱，却是当时的二倍，很明显的，

其实质价值一直都在成长，然而透过溢价摊销，Berkshire帐上持有的投资成本

却一再向下调整。

The difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and

its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge. As I

mentioned earlier - but am delighted to mention again - credit

for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, a focused, smart

and high-grade manager.

史考特飞兹实质价值与其在Berkshire帐上的帐面价值差距越来越大，如同先前

我曾经提到而现在也很高兴在重申一次，这种不对称的现象完全都要归功于

Ralph Schey-这位专注、聪明且高格调的经理人。

The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben

Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not

necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary

results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this

statement holds true in business management as well. What a

manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted.

That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals

and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side,

Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and

is self-confident without being self-important.

Ralph之所以能够成功的原因并不复杂，我的老师葛拉汉四十五年前就告诉我，

画蛇不必添足，尔后在我个人的投资生涯，我相当惊讶地发现，这道理也适用在

企业管理之上，经理人真正应该做的是把基本工夫做好而不分心，这正是Ralph

的做事方法，在设立好正确的目标后，并毫不犹豫放手去做，至于在私底下，

Ralph也是很好共事的人，对于问题他坦率直言，自信却不自大。

He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I

do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At

Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie

and I, at 71 and 64 respectively, now keep George Foreman's

picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a

mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.

我忘了经验丰富的Ralph今年真正的岁数? 但我确信他跟我们旗下其它许多经

理人一样，老早就过了65岁，在Berkshire，我们注重的是绩效，而不是年资，

查理今年71岁，而我64岁，两人都把拳王George Foreman的照片摆在桌上，

你可以记下，我们对于强制退休年龄的反感将会与日俱增。

Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation

实质价值与资金分配

Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers

as it is for investors. When managers are making capital

allocation decisions - including decisions to repurchase shares -

it's vital that they act in ways that increase per-share

intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle

may seem obvious but we constantly see it violated. And, when

misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.

了解实质价值，对经理人来说，其重要性与投资人一般，当经理人本身在做资金

分配的决策时-也包含决定买回股份，必须确定这些举动能够增加公司的实质价

值，并尽量避免损害实质价值的举动，这原则看来理所当然，但是违反的情况却

屡见不鲜，而只要不当的决策形成，股东的权益立即就会受到伤害。

For example, in contemplating business mergers and

acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the

transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings

per share (or, at financial institutions, to per-share book

value). An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going

back to our college-education example, imagine that a 25-year-old

first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic

interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA

student, a non-earner, would find that a "share-for-share" merger

of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer

would enhance his near-term earnings (in a big way!). But what

could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?

举例来说，在思考企业合并与购并活动时，许多经理人都会专注于每股盈余是会

被稀释或是反稀释(或是在金融机构，则是每股帐面价值)，过分强调这点是相当

危险的，回到我们先前所举大学教育的例子，假设一位25岁MBA一年级的学

生，考虑将他个人未来的经济利益与另一位25岁的工人做结合，他会发现如果

现在尚无谋生能力的他，要是现在与工人做一比一的合并的话，他往后几年的赚

钱能力将会立即大幅提升，但是你想这位MBA会笨到接受这样的提议吗?

In corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the wouldbe

purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective

acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of

non-operating assets, or a different capital structure. At

Berkshire, we have rejected many merger and purchase

opportunities that would have boosted current and near-term

earnings but that would have reduced per-share intrinsic value.

Our approach, rather, has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice:

"Go to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is." As a

result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer

than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.

谈到企业购并，对于可能的买主来说，只专注于现在的获利情况却不管潜在的卖

方拥有不同的前景、不一样的非营业资产或不同的资本结构，是一件很愚蠢的

事，在Berkshire我们不知拒绝了多少那种虽然会让短期盈余美观但却可能损及

每股实质价值的合并案或投资机会；总之我们的方式乃效法Wayne Gretzky的

建议，要紧盯小精灵的去向而不是它现在的位置，结果长期下来比起运用一般的

投资标准方法，我们的股东因此多赚了好几十亿美元。

The sad fact is that most major acquisitions display an

egregious imbalance: They are a bonanza for the shareholders of

the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the

acquirer's management; and they are a honey pot for the

investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But,

alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders,

often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer

typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives. Do that

enough, says John Medlin, the retired head of Wachovia Corp., and

"you are running a chain letter in reverse."

很遗憾的是，大部分的购并交易案都充满了不公平性，对于被购并方来说，算是

得到解脱，购并一方的管理阶层则名利双收，旁边的投资银行家与专业顾问也都

能跟着大捞一笔，只不过真正受害的却是购并方背后全体的股东，他们损失惨

重，原因在于购并公司最后所得到的实质价值通常远比得到的低，就像是

Wachovia公司已退休的领导人John Medlin说，这种事做太多，就好象是在倒

写连锁信一样。

Over time, the skill with which a company's managers

allocate capital has an enormous impact on the enterprise's

value. Almost by definition, a really good business generates

far more money (at least after its early years) than it can use

internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money

to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases. But

often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants or

investment bankers whether an acquisition or two might make

sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you

need a $50,000 rug.

就长期而言，公司经理然滥用公司资金将会对企业的价值有很大的影响，我们认

为一家好公司所能贡献出的现金(至少是在早期)，一定会超过其本身内部所需，

而公司当然可以透过分配股利或买回股份的方式回馈给股东，但是通常企业的

CEO会要求公司策略企划部门、顾问或是投资银行，做出购并一、两家公司的

必要性报告，这样的做法就好象是问你的室内设计师，你是否应该增添一条五万

美元的地毯。

The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological

bias: Many CEO's attain their positions in part because they

possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive

is heavily endowed with these qualities - which, it should be

acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages - they won't

disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged

by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a

teenage boy who is encouraged by his father to have a normal sex

life. It's not a push he needs.

这类购并问题又因为隐藏在背后的生物原始本能而变得更复杂，许多CEO之所

以能够做到这个位置，部份的原因在于他们先天拥有相当丰富的动物本能与自

尊，当然我们必须承认一位主管拥有这样的特质，有时对他们有极大的优势，然

而这种本能在他们爬上顶峰之后并不会消失，而当CEO被其顾问们鼓励去进行

购并交易时，我想他的反应跟一位青少年被父亲鼓励可以拥有正常的性生活一

样，这样的做法未免有点揠苗助长。

Some years back, a CEO friend of mine - in jest, it must be

said - unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals.

This friend, who ran a property-casualty insurer, was explaining

to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life

insurance company. After droning rather unpersuasively through

the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he

abruptly abandoned the script. With an impish look, he simply

said: "Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one."

几年前，我的一位CEO朋友半开玩笑地在无意间透露出许多大交易的病态心

理，我这位朋友经营的是一家产物意外险公司，当时他在董事会上向所有的成员

解释为何公司必须要取得一家人寿保险公司，在就经济与策略面解释了半天理由

之后，突然间他停止了演说，同时露出顽皮的眼神说道：「好吧！我承认，谁叫

其它人也都有一家。」

At Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn

extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses.

As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy

their earnings advantageously in their businesses. What's left,

they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those

funds in ways that build per-share intrinsic value. Our goal

will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we

believe we understand, that have good, sustainable underlying

economics, and that are run by managers whom we like, admire and

trust.

在Berkshire，我们的经理人不断地透过看似平凡普通的事业，赚取惊人的报

酬，这些经理人的第一步是先寻找可以充分利用其盈余的最佳方法，之后再把剩

余的资金交回给查理跟我，然后我们会试着为这些资金寻找更好的出路以创造出

更多的实质价值，我们的目标是取得我们熟悉了解、有持续竞争力且由我们喜

爱、崇拜与信任的经理人所经营的公司的部份或全部所有权。

Compensation

薪资报酬

At Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as

about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Schey

based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of

Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible

for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock

option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally

capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting

home runs at Scott Fetzer while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at

Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over.

Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon

Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire

but Scott Fetzer is lagging?

在Berkshire，有关薪资报酬这方面，我们试着采取与处理资金分配时一样合理

的做法，举例来说，我们给付给Ralph Schey的报酬是根据他在史考特飞兹而

非Berkshire的成绩而定，这样的方式再合理不过了，因为他负责的是单一部门

而非全Berkshire的营运，若是将他的报酬全部锁在Berkshire的荣枯身上，对

Ralph Schey来说，其报酬将会显得不公平，比如说有可能他在史考特飞兹击出

全垒打但查理跟我却在Berkshire把事情给搞砸了，最后使得他的功劳与我们的

过错相抵销，而万一要是Berkshire别的部门大放异彩的同时，史考特飞兹的表

现却平平，那么Ralph Schey又有什么理由跟其它人一样分享Berkshire的获

利与奖金呢?

In setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of

large carrots, but make sure their delivery is tied directly to

results in the area that a manager controls. When capital

invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge

managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and

credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release.

在设定薪资报酬标准时，我们不会吝啬提出重赏的承诺，但绝对必须是在各个经

理人的职权范围内论功行赏，当我们决定对某项营运投入大笔资金时，我们会将

高额的资金利息成本算在其经理人的头上，相对地，当他们将多余的资金释回给

我们时，我们也会对等的利息收入记在其经理人的功劳簿上。

The product of this money's-not-free approach is definitely

visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds

at good returns, it pays him to do so: His bonus increases when

earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge.

But our bonus calculation is symmetrical: If incremental

investment yields sub-standard returns, the shortfall is costly

to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this twoway

arrangement is that it pays Ralph - and pays him well - to

send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in his

business.

这种资金有价的游戏规则，在史考特飞兹决策上再清楚也不过了，如果Ralph

可以运用额外的资金创造出高额的报酬，那么他就绝对有理由这么做，因为当公

司的投资报酬超过一定的门槛后，他本身所获得的奖金也会跟着水涨船高，不过

我们的奖励方式可是赏罚分明，相对地，要是额外的投入的资金没有办法贡献足

够的报酬，Ralph本身连同Berkshire都将一体受害，另一方面，要是Ralph

能将多余用不到的资金送回奥玛哈给我们的话，他将可以因而获得丰厚的奖金报

酬。

It has become fashionable at public companies to describe

almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of

management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment

means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside.

Many "alignment" plans flunk this basic test, being artful forms

of "heads I win, tails you lose."

最近上市公司很流行强调管理阶层的利益与公司的股东是一致的，不过在我们的

赏罚簿上，所谓的"一致"是对等的，而不是只有当公司营运顺利时才如此，许多

公司的一致性就不符合我们的标准，因为表面上虽是如此，但其实骨子里玩的却

是"正面我赢，反面你输"的游戏。

A common form of misalignment occurs in the typical stock

option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the

option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings

are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the

combination of a ten-year option, a low dividend payout, and

compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has

done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even

note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to

the option-holding manager increases. I have yet to see this

vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders

to approve an option plan.

这种不一致的情况最明显的莫过于员工认股权了，因为认股权的认购价格并没有

定期予以检视调整，这等于是漠视公司本身随着盈余的累积自动可增加的获利能

力，假设一家公司给予员工十年的认股权，又该公司股利发放的比例很低，则经

理人就很有可能会得到超过其本身应得的报酬，计较一点的人甚至会发现，每年

支付给股东的盈余越来越少，但经理人透过认股权行使所得到的利益却越来越

多，到目前为止，我还没有在一般公司股东会的投票议案里，看到有要求股东表

决是否核准认股权计画案的。

I can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement

with Ralph Schey was worked out in about five minutes,

immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the

"help" of lawyers or compensation consultants. This arrangement

embodies a few very simple ideas - not the kind of terms favored

by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they

have established that you have a large problem (and one, of

course, that requires an annual review). Our agreement with

Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in

1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with

the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though

the terms of each agreement vary to fit the economic

characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some

cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, etc.

我忍不住要提到我们与史考特飞兹总裁Ralph Schey所做的薪资协议，在我们

正式买下史考特飞兹之后，只花了五分钟就达成这项协议，这中间没有律师或人

力资源顾问的"协助"，这些条件仅仅包含了几个简单的概念，与那些不得不提出

复杂的条款否则就无法附上高昂的帐单的人力资源顾问有很大的不同(而且这些

条款每年还须定期检视以决定是否有修正的必要)，反观我们与Ralph的协议到

目前为止从未更动过，当初在1986年我们双方认为公平合理的，至今仍然是如

此，同样的我们与旗下事业其它经理人的协议也都相当简单，当然依照产业特性

的不同以及部份经理人同时拥有部份所有权等情形，而有所变化。

In all instances, we pursue rationality. Arrangements that

pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal

accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who,

after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements

are wasteful to the company and cause the manager to lose focus

on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally,

irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative

behavior at subsidiaries.

在所有的个案中，我们强调的是公平合理，当然经理人对于高的不合理，或是名

不符实的报酬通常都来者不拒，必竟没有人会拒绝免费的热透彩，但是这类的安

排，对于公司的资源来说是一种浪费，同时也会导致经理人忘记他真正应该关心

的事，此外，母公司脱序的行为等于是间接鼓励旗下子公司起而效尤。

At Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial

responsibility for the entire business. Therefore, we are the

only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of

what the enterprise does as a whole. Even so, that is not a

compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed

both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with

people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few

boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of

the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the

heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't

expect shareholders to ante up loads of compensation for which we

have no possible need.

在Berkshire，只有查理跟我对公司整体的经营负全责，因此我们两人是唯一应

该以公司整体的表现作为薪资报酬的依据，即便如此，那也不是我们两人真正想

要的方式，我们花了相当的时间塑造我们的公司与工作模式，好让我们可以与我

们欣赏的人一起做我们想做的事，同时也让我们可以不会被迫去做一些无聊或是

不想做的工作，当这些物质与精神的报酬流向企业总部时，我们是最大的受惠

者，在这种田园诗歌般的工作环境下，我们不期望股东们还需要额外给予一些我

们不太需要的多余报酬。

Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be

delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe

to Ronald Reagan's creed: "It's probably true that hard work

never killed anyone, but I figure why take the chance."

事实上，就算不领薪水，查理跟我还是会乐在我们现在这种舒适的工作，最起码，

我们效法里根总统的信条，辛勤的工作不太可能要一个人的命，但我在想为何要

冒这个险呢。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table on the next page shows the main sources of

Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchasepremium

charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis

of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to

which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown

separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our

businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased

them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to

investors and managers than one utilizing GAAP, which requires

purchase premiums to be charged off, business-by-business. The

total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to

the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

------------------- -------------------

1994 1993 1994 1993

-------- -------- -------- --------

(000s omitted)

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............... $129,926 $ 30,876 $ 80,860 $ 20,156

Net Investment Income ...... 419,422 375,946 350,453 321,321

Buffalo News ................. 54,238 50,962 31,685 29,696

Fechheimer ................... 14,260 13,442 7,107 6,931

Finance Businesses ........... 21,568 22,695 14,293 14,161

Kirby ........................ 42,349 39,147 27,719 25,056

Nebraska Furniture Mart ...... 17,356 21,540 8,652 10,398

Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 39,435 38,196 24,909 23,809

See's Candies ................ 47,539 41,150 28,247 24,367

Shoe Group ................... 85,503 44,025* 55,750 28,829

World Book ................... 24,662 19,915 17,275 13,537

Purchase-Price Premium Charges (22,595) (17,033) (19,355) (13,996)

Interest Expense** ........... (60,111) (56,545) (37,264) (35,614)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions ............. (10,419) (9,448) (6,668) (5,994)

Other ........................ 36,232 28,428 22,576 15,094

-------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings ............. 839,365 643,296 606,239 477,751

Sales of Securities ............ 91,332 546,422 61,138 356,702

Decline in Value of

USAir Preferred Stock ..... (268,500) --- (172,579) ---

Tax Accruals Caused by

New Accounting Rules ...... --- --- --- (146,332)

-------- --------- -------- --------

Total Earnings - All Entities .. $662,197 $1,189,718 $494,798 $688,121

======== ======= ======= =======

* Includes Dexter's earnings only from the date it was acquired,

November 7, 1993.

*Dexter的盈余仅含购并日1993年11月7日以后的盈余

**Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

**不含商业与消费金融公司的利息费用。

A large amount of information about these businesses is given

on pages 37-48, where you will also find our segment earnings

reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 53-59, we have

rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-

GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and

I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the

financial information that we would wish you to give us if our

positions were reversed.

在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们

的目的是希望给你所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必要的资

讯。

"Look-Through" Earnings

透视盈余

In past reports, we've discussed look-through earnings, which

we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than

does our GAAP result. As we calculate them, look-through earnings

consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous

section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major

investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our

profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by

Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been

distributed to us. The "operating earnings" of which we speak here

exclude capital gains, special accounting items and major

restructuring charges.

之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，比起一般公认会计原则的数字，这是我们认为它

更能反应Berkshire本身实际的获利状况，其主要的组成份子有(1)前段所提到

的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应

在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能

要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企

业调整的主要支出。

If our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of 15%,

our look-through earnings, over time, must also increase at about

that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I

told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate

look-through earnings of about $1.8 billion by 2000. Because we've

since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85

billion.

长期而言，如果我们的实质价值想要以每年15%的幅度来成长的话，那么透视

盈余每年也必须增加以这个幅度来成长，几年前我第一次提到这个观念时曾表

示，到公元2000年为止，Berkshire若要以15%的目标，透视盈余必须成长

18亿美元以上，而由于1993年我们又发行了一些新股，所以现在的门槛提高

到18.5亿美元。

We are now modestly ahead of schedule in meeting our goal, but

to a significant degree that is because our super-cat insurance

business has recently delivered earnings far above trend-line

expectancy (an outcome I will discuss in the next section). Giving

due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target

but that, of course, is no sure thing.

到目前为止，我们稍微超越目标进度，但其中有一项很重要的原因是我们的霹雳

猫保险近年来的表现超乎预期的好 (有关这部份在下一段我还会详加叙述)，虽

然即使扣除这项不正常部份，我们还是符合当初预期，但还是不能保证一定达的

到。

The following table shows how we calculate look-through

earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very

rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been

included in the operating earnings itemized on page 12, mostly

under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数

字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益

项下)。

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend (in millions)

----------------------- ---------------------- -----------------

1994 1993 1994 1993

------ ------ ------ ------

American Express Company ...... 5.5% 2.4% $ 25(2) $ 16

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ...... 13.0% 13.0% 85 83(2)

The Coca-Cola Company ......... 7.8% 7.2% 116(2) 94

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 6.3%(1) 6.8%(1) 47(2) 41(2)

Gannett Co., Inc. ............. 4.9% --- 4(2) ---

GEICO Corp. ................... 50.2% 48.4% 63(3) 76(3)

The Gillette Company .......... 10.8% 10.9% 51 44

PNC Bank Corp. ................ 8.3% --- 10(2) ---

The Washington Post Company ... 15.2% 14.8% 18 15

Wells Fargo & Company ......... 13.3% 12.2% 73 53(2)

------ ------

Berkshire's share of undistributed

earnings of major investees $ 492 $422

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed

investee earnings(4) (68) (59)

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 606 478

------- ------

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $1,030 $ 841

(1) Does not include shares allocable to the minority interest

at Wesco

不包含Wesco的少数股权

(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year

以年平均持有股权比例计算

(3) Excludes realized capital gains, which have been both

recurring and significant

扣除重复发生且金额大的已实现资本利得，

(4) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays

on the dividends it receives

适用的税率为14%，这是Berkshire收到现金股利时的平均税率。

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our

insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we develop and,

second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In

an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require

that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually

takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve loss claims.

就像我们在过去年报跟各位解释过的，保险事业最重要的关键，第一是保险浮存

金的数量，第二是它的成本，浮存金是我们持有并非我们所有，保险事业营运之

所以能有浮存金的原因在于大部分的保单都要求保户必须预付保险费，另外更重

要的是保险公司在被知会并真正理赔之前，通常都要经过好长的一段时间。

Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover

the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an

"underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of float.

通常保险公司实际上收到的保费并不足以支应发生的损失与费用，所以大多会产

生承保的损失，而这就是浮存金的成本。

An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of

float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to

obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost of

its float is higher than market rates for money.

长期而言，保险公司的浮存金成本若能低于其它资金管道所需的成本就能获利，

但是要是其浮存金成本高于货币市场利率的话，其是否有存在的价值就有疑问。

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's

insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we

have compiled our float - which we generate in exceptional amounts

relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves, loss

adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and

unearned premium reserves and then subtracting agents' balances,

prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges

applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by

our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an

underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been

negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding

underwriting profit to float income.

如同下表中的数字所显示的，Berkshire的保险事业大获全胜，表中的浮存金，

系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣

金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮

存金部位算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而

定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负

的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利

益。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

------------ ------------- ------------- -------------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 .......... profit $ 17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 .......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 .......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 .......... $ 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 .......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 .......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 .......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 .......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 .......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 .......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 .......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 .......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 .......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 .......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 .......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 .......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 .......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 .......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 .......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 .......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 .......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 .......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 .......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 .......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 .......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992 .......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

1993 .......... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%

1994 .......... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%

Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in 1994 and

are even more pleased that it proved to be cost-free. But our

message this year echoes the one we delivered in 1993: Though we

have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently

looks.

查理跟我对于1994年的浮存金能够继续成长都感到相当高兴，更有甚者，这些

资金都是完全免费的，但是我们还是要像去年那样再强调一次，虽然我们的保险

事业经营得不错，但实际上并没有外界想象中的好。

The reason we must repeat this caution is that our "super-cat"

business (which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance

companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of megacatastrophes)

was again highly profitable. Since truly major

catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be

expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to

record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our

super-cat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994

should be regarded as close to a best-case. Our only significant

losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add

that we do not expect to suffer a major loss from the early-1995

Kobe earthquake.

我们之所以一再强调这一点的原因在于我们的霹雳猫业务(也就是专门提供保险

公司与再保公司规避重大天然灾害风险的保单)今年再度赚大钱，由于真正重大

的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，突然发

生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几

年才有办法看清，当然1994年绝对是相当好的一年，唯一的重大灾害要算是一

月所发生的加州大地震，另外在这里我要特别声明1995年初发生的神户大地震

对我们造成的损失并不大。

Super-cat policies are small in number, large in size and nonstandardized.

Therefore, the underwriting of this business

requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto

policies, for which a mass of data is available. Here Berkshire

has a major advantage: Ajit Jain, our super-cat manager, whose

underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply

enormous.

霹雳猫保单有数量少、金额高且非制式化的特性，因此，要承接这类业务必须仰

赖相当专业的判断，而不像一般的汽车保险有庞大的数据库可供参考，就这点而

言，Berkshire拥有一张王牌-Ajit Jain，他是我们霹雳猫业务的经理人，拥有最

精细的承保技巧，他可以说是我们的无价之宝。

In addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the supercat

business because of our towering financial strength, which

helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its

protection against true mega-catastrophes - such as a $50 billion

windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in

California - to be absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows

that the disaster making it dependent on a large super-cat recovery

is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default.

There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will

evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that

Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of

unthinkable proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.

此外，在霹雳猫业务，Berkshire还拥有一项特殊的优势，那就是我们雄厚的财

务实力，这对我们有相当大的帮助。首先，谨慎小心的保险公司都会希望对于真

正天大的灾害-比如说像是纽约长岛发生飓风或加州大地震这类可能造成五百亿

美元损失发生时，可以得到相当确切的依靠，但是保险公司也相当清楚，这类会

造成本身财务需要支持的灾害，同样也有可能导致许多再保公司自顾不暇而破

产，所以它们不太可能笨到将保费付出后，却换得无法兑现的承诺，也因此

Berkshire可以确保在不可预期的天灾发生时，仍然有办法拿得出钱来理赔的稳

当保证，就成为我们最佳的竞争优势。

The second benefit of our capital strength is that we can

write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For

example, during 1994, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term

policy for $400 million of California earthquake coverage and we

wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world

who would take a $400 million risk, or anything close to it, for

their own account.

再者雄厚的财务实力让我们可以签下别人想都不敢想的大额保单，举例来说，

1994年，有一家保险业者临时想要买一张金额高达4亿美元的加州地震险保

单，我们二话不说立刻接下来，我们敢说全世界除了我们以外，可能没有人敢独

立接下这样的保单。

Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts

by spreading the burden over a number of small policies. But, at

best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In

the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a

risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its wellbeing.

At Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for

coverage as great as $500 million on the same day that we are asked

to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.

一般来说，保险经纪人通常倾向将大额的保单拆成数张小额的保单以分散负担，

但是这样的作业安排却颇耗费时间，同时也使得本来想要寻求再保分散风险的保

险公司并须被迫面对它本来不愿意承担的风险，进而危及保险公司本身的利益，

相对地在Berkshire，我们对单一保单的投保上限最高可以到达5亿美元，这是

其它同业所做不到的。

By writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose

Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's totally acceptable to

us: Too often, insurers (as well as other businesses) follow suboptimum

strategies in order to "smooth" their reported earnings.

By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher

long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability.

虽然接下这类大额的保单，会使得Berkshire的经营成果变得很不稳定，但我们

完全可以接受这样的结果，通常保险同业(其实其它的行业也一样)总是倾向采取

比较保守的做法，使得营运数字可以平滑稳定一点，但是就这点而言，我们的做

法比较不一样，选择接受变动较大的前景，我们可以获致比前景确定的方式更高

的长期投资报酬。

Given the risks we accept, Ajit and I constantly focus on our

"worst case," knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge

what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island

hurricane, a California earthquake, and Super Cat X all in the same

year. Additionally, insurance losses could be accompanied by noninsurance

troubles. For example, were we to have super-cat losses

from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be

accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in See's,

Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac.

在承受这类风险时，Ajit跟我总是会将焦点摆在最坏的状况下，虽然我们知道实

在是很难去衡量，大家可以想象如果同一年发生长岛飓风、加州地震以及霹雳猫

X时，会是怎样的一个光景，此外，保险损失通常会伴随非保险的问题，例如假

设我们因为加州大地震而承受大量的霹雳猫损失，在此同时股市的大跌很有可能

也会伴随而来，此举将会使得我们在喜斯糖果、富国银行与弗迪麦的持股价值大

减。

All things considered, we believe our worst-case insurance

loss from a super-cat is now about $600 million after-tax, an

amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's annual earnings from

other sources. If you are not comfortable with this level of

exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after

the inevitable mega-catastrophe.

在考虑过所有的状况之后，我们认为在最坏的情况下，我们在霹雳猫保险所可能

产生的损失大约在6亿美元的上下，稍稍超过Berkshire每年从其它事业的盈

余，如果你对于这样的风险感到不自在，那么现在是你卖出Berkshire股份的最

佳时机，而不是等到这种无可避免的大灾难发生。

Our super-cat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices

for garden-variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent

of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few

years ago will be inclined to chase premiums, irrespective of their

adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important

group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of

business in 1995.

我们霹雳猫的业务量在1995年很有可能会下滑，因为保险的价格略微下滑，原

因在于几年前新加入再保市场的资金，正以不合理的价格竞逐保单，尽管如此，

我们还是拥有一些重要的客户群，可以稳定的贡献我们1995年业绩。

Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results

in 1994. Our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred; our workers'

compensation business, headed by Brad Kinstler; our credit card

operation, managed by the Kizer family; National Indemnity's

traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Wurster

- all of these generated significant underwriting profits

accompanied by substantial float.

Berkshire其它保险事业1994年的营运表现皆相当杰出，由Rod领导的住宅

保险、Brad带领的员工退休保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以

及由Don所领导的国家产险所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来

说，这四类业务都表现的相当不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保

险浮存金。。

We can conclude this section as we did last year: All in all,

we have a first-class insurance business. Though its results will

be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value

that exceeds its book value by a large amount - larger, in fact,

than is the case at any other Berkshire business.

总而言之，我们可以做出与去年同样的结论，我们拥有第一流的保险事业，虽然

他们的经营成果变化相当的大，但是其实质价值却远超过其帐面的价值，而事实

上，在Berkshire其它事业的身上也有类似的情况。

Common Stock Investments

股票投资

Below we list our common stockholdings having a value of over

$300 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to

subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们超过三亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关

系企业所持有。

12/31/94

Shares Company Cost Market

------ ------- ---------- ----------

(000s omitted)

27,759,941 American Express Company. .......... $ 723,919 $ 818,918

20,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ........... 345,000 1,705,000

100,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company. ............. 1,298,888 5,150,000

12,761,200 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

("Freddie Mac") ................. 270,468 644,441

6,854,500 Gannett Co., Inc. .................. 335,216 365,002

34,250,000 GEICO Corp. ........................ 45,713 1,678,250

24,000,000 The Gillette Company ............... 600,000 1,797,000

19,453,300 PNC Bank Corporation ............... 503,046 410,951

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company ........ 9,731 418,983

6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company .............. 423,680 984,727

Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in

concept: The truly big investment idea can usually be explained in

a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive

advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When

these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible

prices, it is hard to go wrong (a challenge we periodically manage

to overcome).

我们的投资组合持续保持集中、简单的风格，真正重要的投资概念通常可以用简

单的话语来作说明，我们偏爱具有持续竞争力并且由才能兼具、以股东利益为导

向的经理人所经营的优良企业，只要它们确实拥有这些特质，而且我们能够以合

理的价格买进，则要出错的机率可说是微乎其微(这正是我们一直不断要克服的

挑战)。

Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed

using Olympic-diving methods: Degree-of-difficulty doesn't count.

If you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent

on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and

enduring, the payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed

an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting

and complex variables.

投资人必须谨记，你的投资成绩并非像奥运跳水比赛的方式评分，难度高低并不

重要，你正确地投资一家简单易懂而竞争力持续的公司所得到的回报，与你辛苦

地分析一家变量不断、复杂难懂的公司可以说是不相上下。

We try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it

is folly to forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose

long-term future is predictable, because of short-term worries

about an economy or a stock market that we know to be

unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an

uninformed guess?

对于买进股份我们注意的只是价格而非时间，我们认为因为忧虑短期不可控制的

经济或是股市变量而放弃买进一家长期前景可合理的预期的好公司是一件很愚

蠢的事，为什么仅是因为短期不可知的猜测就放弃一个很明显的投资决策呢?

We purchased National Indemnity in 1967, See's in 1972,

Buffalo News in 1977, Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, and Scott

Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available

and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In

each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what

the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach

as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety,

why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of

wonderful businesses in the stock market?

我们分别在1967年买进国家产险公司、1972年买下喜斯糖果、1977年买下

水牛城日报、1983年买下内布拉斯加家具店、1986年买下史考特飞兹，而我

们都是趁它们难得求售时才得以买进，当然也因为它们的开价我们认为可以接

受，当初在评估每个案子时，我们关心的不是道琼指数的走势、联准会的动向或

是总体经济的发展，而是这些公司本身未来的前景；而如果我们觉得这样的方式

适用于买下整家公司的话，那么每当我们决定要透过股市买进一些好公司部份的

股权时，为什么就必须采取不一样的做法呢?

Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old

ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well

pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic

interest in See's or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to

add to a 100% holding. In the stock market, however, an investor

frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in

businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by

enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express.

在寻找新的投资标的之前，我们选择先增加旧有投资的部位，如果一家企业曾经

好到让我们愿意买进，我想再重复一次这样的程序应该也是相当不错的，若是能

够我们很愿意再增加在喜斯糖果或是史考特飞兹的持股，但要增加到100%的比

例实在是有困难，不过在股票市场中，投资人常常有很多的机会可以增加他有兴

趣的公司持股，像是去年我们就扩大了我们在可口可乐与美国运通的持股数。

Our history with American Express goes way back and, in fact,

fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of

past associations. In 1951, for example, GEICO shares comprised

70% of my personal portfolio and GEICO was also the first stock I

sold - I was then 20 - as a security salesman (the sale was 100

shares to my Aunt Alice who, bless her, would have bought anything

I suggested). Twenty-five years later, Berkshire purchased a major

stake in GEICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In

another instance, that of the Washington Post, about half of my

initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the

1940's. Three decades later Berkshire purchased a large position

in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola,

my first business venture - this was in the 1930's - was buying a

six-pack of Coke for 25 cents and selling each bottle for 5 cents.

It took only fifty years before I finally got it: The real money

was in the syrup.

我们投资美国运通的历史可以追溯到相当早的时期，而事实上也符合个人过去的

经验，举个例子在1951年，当时我还是年仅二十岁的股票业务员，GEICO保

险占我个人投资组合的70%，同时它也是我第一次卖掉的股票，我将100股的

GEICO股份卖给我的阿姨Alice，基本上只要是我建议的她都照单全收，二十五

年后，趁着该公司面临倒闭的危机，Berkshire买下GEICO一大部分的股份，

另一个例子就是华盛顿邮报，1940年代，我的第一笔投资资金有一半是来自发

送该报的收入，三十年后，Berkshire趁该公司上市两年后的股价低档买下一大

部分的股权，至于可口可乐，可以算得上是我生平从事的第一笔商业交易，1930

年当我还是个小孩子的时候，我花了25美元买了半打的可乐，然后再以每罐5

美分分售出去，而直到五十年后，我才终于搞懂真正有赚头的还是那糖水。

My American Express history includes a couple of episodes: In

the mid-1960's, just after the stock was battered by the company's

infamous salad-oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership

Ltd.'s capital into the stock - the largest investment the

partnership had ever made. I should add that this commitment gave

us over 5% ownership in Amex at a cost of $13 million. As I write

this, we own just under 10%, which has cost us $1.36 billion.

(Amex earned $12.5 million in 1964 and $1.4 billion in 1994.)

我个人在美国运通的投资历史包含好几段插曲，在1960年代中期，趁着该公司

为色拉油丑闻所苦时，我们将巴菲特合伙企业40%的资金压在这只股票上，这

是合伙企业有史以来最大的一笔投资，总计花了1,300万美元买进该公司5%的

股份，时至今日，我们在美国运通的持股将近10%，但帐列成本却高达13.6亿

美元，(美国运通1964年的获利为1,250万美元，1994年则增加至14亿美

元)。

My history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about

a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I

first purchased stock in IDS in 1953 when it was growing rapidly

and selling at a price-earnings ratio of only 3. (There was a lot

of low-hanging fruit in those days.) I even produced a long report

- do I ever write a short one? - on the company that I sold for $1

through an ad in the Wall Street Journal.

我对美国运通IDS部门的投资可以追溯更早，该部门目前占公司整体获利来源的

三分之一，我在1953年第一次买进成长快速的IDS股份，当时的本益比只有三

倍(在那个年代，结实累累的果子垂手可得)，为此我甚至还特别写了一篇长篇报

告(不过印象中我好象没有写过短的)，并在华尔街日报刊登广告，以一美元对外

公开销售。

Obviously American Express and IDS (recently renamed American

Express Financial Advisors) are far different operations today from

what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long-term

familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in

evaluating it.

当然很显然的美国运通与IDS(最近已更名为美国运通财务顾问)今日的营运模式

与过去已有很大的不同，但是我还是发现对于该公司与其提供的产品内容长久以

来的熟悉度，仍然有助于我们的评估。

Mistake Du Jour

新鲜出炉的错误

Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our

mistake-du-jour award, however, when the foolishness of the

decision become obvious. By this measure, 1994 was a vintage year

with keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to

tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie.

But whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to

grow.

错误通常在做决策时就已经造成，不过我们只能将新鲜错误奖颁给那些很明显的

愚蠢决策，照这种标准，1994年可算是竞争相当激烈的一年，在这里我必须特

别指出以下大部分的错误都是查理造成的，不过每当我这样说时，我的鼻子就会

跟着开始变长。

And the nominees are . . .

获得提名的有. . .

Late in 1993 I sold 10 million shares of Cap Cities at $63; at

year-end 1994, the price was $85.25. (The difference is $222.5

million for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating

the damage yourself.) When we purchased the stock at $17.25 in

1986, I told you that I had previously sold our Cap Cities holdings

at $4.30 per share during 1978-80, and added that I was at a loss

to explain my earlier behavior. Now I've become a repeat offender.

Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.

1993年底，我将1,000万股资本城股份以每股63美元卖出，不幸的是到了

1994年底，该公司股价变成85.25美元，(我可以直接告诉各位我们损失了

2.225亿美元的差价，如果你心痛到不愿去算的话)；而当我们在1986年以每

股17.25美元买进该公司股份时，就曾经向各位报告，在更早之前，也就是在

1978年到1980年间，我就曾经以每股4.3美元卖掉该公司股份，并强调对于

个人这样的行为感到心痛，没想到现在我却又明知故犯，看起来我似乎应该要找

个监护人来好好监管一下。

Egregious as it is, the Cap Cities decision earns only a

silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago

that fully ripened in 1994: Our $358 million purchase of USAir

preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September.

In the 1990 Annual Report I correctly described this deal as an

"unforced error," meaning that I was neither pushed into the

investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, this was a

case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the

fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever

the reason, the mistake was large.

更不幸的是，资本城一案只能得到银牌，金牌的得主要算是我在五年前就犯下的

一项错误，但直到1994年才爆发出来，那就是我们在美国航空3.58亿美元的

特别股投资，去年九月，该公司宣布停止发放特别股股息，早在1990年，我就

很准确地形容这项交易属于非受迫性的失误，意思是说，没有人强迫我投资，同

时也没有人误导我，完全要归咎于我个人草率的分析，这项挫败导因于我们过于

自大的心态，不论如何，这是一项重大的错误。

Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems

that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high

and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these lifethreatening

costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected

from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high

costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were

also high.

在做这项投资之前，我竟然没有把注意力摆在一直为航空深深所苦、居高不下的

成本问题之上，在早年，高成本还不致构成重大的威胁，因为当时航空业受到法

令的管制，航空业者可以将成本反映在票价之上转嫁给消费者。

When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change

the picture: The capacity of low-cost carriers was so small that

the high-cost lines could, in large part, maintain their existing

fare structures. During this period, with the longer-term problems

largely invisible but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were

non-sustainable became further embedded.

在法令松绑的初期，产业界并未立即反应此状况，主要是由于低成本的业者规模

尚小，所以大部分高成本的主要业者仍然勉力维持现行的票价结构，不过随着时

间慢慢地发酵，在长久以来隐而未见的问题逐渐浮现的同时，旧有业者完全无竞

争力的高成本结构却早已积重难返。

As the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their

fares began to force the old-line, high-cost airlines to cut their

own. The day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by

infusions of capital (such as ours into USAir), but eventually a

fundamental rule of economics prevailed: In an unregulated

commodity business, a company must lower its costs to competitive

levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious

to your Chairman, but I missed it.

随着低成本营运业者座位容量的大幅扩增，超低的票价迫使那些高成本的老牌航

空公司也不得不跟进，然而额外资金的挹注(也包含我们在美国航空的那笔投

资)，延迟这些老牌航空公司发现这项问题的时机，然而终究到最后，基本的经

济法则还是战胜一切，在一个没有管制的商品制式化产业，一家公司不是降低成

本增加竞争力，就是被迫倒闭关门，这道理对于身为公司负责人的我，可说是再

清楚也不过了，但是我竟然疏忽了。

Seth Schofield, CEO of USAir, has worked diligently to correct

the company's historical cost problems but, to date, has not

managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with

a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having

obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefitted

from "fresh-start" costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings.

(As Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said:

"Bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa.")

Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline

employees who contractually receive above-market salaries will

resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to

clear.

美国航空的总裁-Seth Schofield一直致力于改正该公司长久以来的成本结构问

题，不过到目前为止，仍然力有未殆，一部份的原因在于，他所面对的是一个不

断变动的目标，因为部份航空业者幸运地取得劳资双方的协议，另一些业者则受

惠于破产法令的保护，可以有一个全新出发的成本，(就像是西南航空的总裁-

Herb Kelleher所说的破产法对于航空业者来说，就好象是得到了一次健康的

spa)，此外，对于哪些在合约上受到保护得以获得高于市场水准薪资的劳工来

说，只要他们发现自己的薪资支票仍能按时兑现，就会全力地抵制减薪的提议。

Despite this difficult situation, USAir may yet achieve the

cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long-term. But

it is far from sure that will happen.

尽管面临目前的困境，美国航空还是有可能完成降低成本的任务，以维持长期继

续生存的能力，不过到目前为止，还很难确定一定能够成功。

Accordingly, we wrote our USAir investment down to $89.5

million, 25 cents on the dollar at yearend 1994. This valuation

reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value

fully or largely restored and an opposite possibility that the

stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we

will heed a prime rule of investing: You don't have to make it

back the way that you lost it.

因此，在1994年底，我们将美国航空帐面的投资金额调降为8,950万美元，

当初一美元的投资等于仅剩下25美分的价值，这样的举动反应出将来我们的特

别股有可能完全或大部分地恢复其价值，但同时也有可能到后来变得一文不值，

不论最后的结果为何，我们必须谨记一项投资的基本原则，那就是你不一定要靠

那些已失去的赚回来。

The accounting effects of our USAir writedown are complicated.

Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry

all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value.

Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were

carrying our USAir preferred at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In

other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for

USAir that was far below our $358 million cost.

本次打销美国航空投资价值的会计影响有点复杂，根据一般公认会计原则的规

定，保险公司在资产负债表上必须将它们的投资以市价列示，因此截至去年第三

季止，我们在美国航空投资的帐面价值是8,950万美元，大概只有原始成本3.58

亿美元的25%，换句话说，在当时我们的净值就已反应了这项调整。

But in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in

value was, in accounting terms, "other than temporary," and that

judgment required us to send the writedown of $269 million through

our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth-quarter

effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth, because the

diminution of value had already been reflected.

不过到了第四季，我们认为这种下跌的情况，套句会计的专有名词，并非属于暂

时性的，所以我们必须将这笔向下调整的金额反应在损益表之上，然而这个动作

对于本公司的净值并不会再造成任何的影响，因为早在第三季我们便已反应过

了。

Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to USAir's board

at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with

us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can.

在即将召开的美国航空年度股东会中，查理跟我决定不再续任董事，当然要是

Seth总裁觉得有任何需要我们帮忙的地方，我们愿意提供任何咨询服务。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

Two CEO's who have done great things for Berkshire

shareholders retired last year: Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC

and Carl Reichardt of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very

tough industry conditions in recent years. But their skill as

managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these

periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects.

Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and

left their companies in outstanding hands. We owe them our

gratitude.

去年有两位对Berkshire贡献卓著的经理人决定退休，分别是资本城/ABC的

Dan Burke与富国银行的Carl Reichardt，Dan与Carl近年来在各自的产业都

面临到相当大的挑战，但他们杰出的管理能力使得他们经营的事业在这段期间内

仍能保有出色的盈余，并赋予公司光明与璀璨的前景，此外，对于他们的离开，

Dan与Carl都已作好准备，将公司交由能干的人才接手，我们对他们报以深深

的敬意。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's

1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions

made through the program were $10.4 million and 3,300 charities

were recipients.

大约有95.7%的有效股权参与1994年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,040万

美元捐出的款项分配给3,300家慈善机构。

Every year a few shareholders miss participating in the

program because they either do not have their shares registered in

their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail

to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period

allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when

requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old

read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions

program that appears on pages 50-51.

每年都有一小部份的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天

的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计画，

凡是不符合规定者，都不能参加这项计画，也因此我们敦促不管是原有或新加入

的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，

To participate in future programs, you must make sure your

shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995

program.

想要参加这项计画者，请确定您的股份是登记在自己而非股票经纪人或保管银行

的名下，同时必须在1995年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1995年

的捐赠计画。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

We made only one minor acquisition during 1994 - a small

retail shoe chain - but our interest in finding good candidates

remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or

mergers is detailed in the appendix on page 21.

1994年我们只进行了一项小型的购并案-那是一家鞋业的连锁店，然而对于寻

找好的候选对象，我们的兴致与过去一样热烈，对于买进与购并标准请参阅附

录。

Last spring, we offered to merge with a large, familycontrolled

business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible

preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this

episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to

authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move

quickly if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear.

Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a

large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms

set by the Board of Directors. You can be sure that Charlie and I

will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that

we are receiving as much in intrinsic value as we are giving.

去年春天，我们曾经对一家大型的家族企业提出购并的提议，交易的内容包含发

行Berkshire可转换的特别股，虽然后来双方未能达成协议，但这次的经验提醒

我们必须先取得Berkshire股东们的同意，授权董事会发行特别股，好让我们在

合适的购并机会出现时，可以做出快速的响应，因此，在今年的股东会议案中，

包含了一项授权董事会在适当的时机发行特别股的提案，当然大家可以百分之百

地相信，除非我们认为所得到的实质价值跟我们所付出的相当，否则查理跟我绝

对不会轻易地发行这些股份。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I hope you can come to the Annual Meeting - at a

new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's

seating capacity of 2,750, and therefore we will assemble at 9:30

a.m. on Monday, May 1, 1995, at the Holiday Convention Centre. The

main ballroom at the Centre can handle 3,300, and if need be, we

will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of

handling another 1,000 people.

查理跟我很希望各位都能够来参加今年的股东会，由于去年参加的人数稍微超过

了Orpheum中心2,750的座位容量，因此今年股东会我们决定于1995年5

月1日，星期一早上9点30分在新的场地-Holiday会议中心召开，新场地的

大厅可以容纳3,300人，若有必要，藉由视听器材的辅助，旁边还有一个可以

容纳1,000人的会议室。

Last year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the

meeting, and as a result sold about 800 pounds of candy, 507 pairs

of shoes, and over $12,000 of World Books and related publications.

All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like

to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember

that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the

collection plate.

去年我们在会场上展示了一些Berkshire的产品，结果总计卖出了800磅的糖

果、507双的鞋子以及价值超过12,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品，

今年这些商品会再度与会，虽然我们认为这次会议的意义主要在于精神层面，但

我们不要忘记，即使是最神圣的宗教典礼，也包含的奉献捐献的仪式。

Of course, what you really should be purchasing is a video

tape of the 1995 Orange Bowl. Your Chairman views this classic

nightly, switching to slow motion for the fourth quarter. Our

cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach, Tom

Osborne, and his Cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I

urge you to wear Husker red to the annual meeting and promise you

that at least 50% of your managerial duo will be in appropriate

attire.

当然大家绝对不能错过的是1995年橘子杯的录像带，本人利用晚上的时间观看

这场经典的赛事，甚至还用慢动作播放精彩的第四节，我们以今年封面的颜色表

示对内布拉斯加美式足球队教练-Tom Osborne以及其所带领的全美最佳队伍

-Cornhuskers队的敬意，我敦促大家一定要穿Huskers队的红色出席今年的

股东会，而我也可以向各位保证Berkshire的经营双人组会有50%以上穿著正

确的服色出席。

We recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the

meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be

downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may wish to stay at the

Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel or at the

much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of

the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms), Homewood Suites (118

rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another recommended spot is

the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is about 100 yards from

Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the Centre. There will be

buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:45 and 9:00 for the

meeting and return after it ends.

由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订房间，想要住在市中心

的人(距离会场约6英哩)可以选择拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆-Radisson-

Redick旅馆或是旁边较大一点的Red Lion旅馆，至于会场附近则有Holiday

Inn (403个房间)、Homewood Suites (118个房间)或Hampton Inn (136个

房间)，另一个推荐的旅馆是位在奥玛哈西区的Marriott，离波仙珠宝店约100

公尺，距离会场约10分钟的车程，届时在哪里将会有巴士接送大家往返股东会

会场。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A

good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who

stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be

able to walk to the meeting.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

当天会场有相当大的停车场，住在Holiday Inn 、Homewood Suites或

Hampton Inn的人可以直接走路过来开会。

As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska

Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you

from there to hotels or the airport later. I hope you make a

special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has

opened the Mega Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells

electronics, appliances, computers, CD's, cameras and audio

equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you

will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their

display on the floor.

一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭

店与机场，我希望大家特别能到内布拉斯加家具店参观，因为今年新开幕的超大

卖场，贩卖各式家电、电子信息、CD唱片、摄影机与视听产品，自开幕以来，

销售业绩惊人，到了现场之后，你绝对会对产品的多样与展示方式印象深刻。

The Mega Mart, adjacent to NFM's main store, is on our 64-acre

site about two miles north of the Centre. The stores are open from

10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on Fridays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and

noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. When you're there be sure to say hello

to Mrs. B, who, at 101, will be hard at work in our Mrs. B's

Warehouse. She never misses a day at the store - or, for that

matter, an hour.

位于NFM主馆旁边的超级大卖场距离会场约2英哩远，营业时间平日从早上

10点到下午9点，星期六从早上10点到下午6点，星期日则从中午开到下午

6点，到了那里记得向高龄101岁的B太太Say hello，她每天都会到B太太仓

库工作，或者应该说是每个小时。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for

shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday. This

is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises.

Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more

reasons than one Charlie and I hope to see you there.

平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，在股东会当天会特别为股东与来宾开放，从中午

开到下午6点，这天总是相当的特别，我们会试着让大家得到一些意外的惊喜，

而通常那天也是该店全年营业额最高的一天，这也是查理跟我希望能在那里看到

各位的主要原因之一。

On Saturday evening, April 29, there will be a baseball game

at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo

Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob

Rich, Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to

entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a

capitalist's Randy Johnson - young, strong and athletic - and not

the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season. So I will

need plenty of vocal support.

在前一天4月29日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家

队对水牛城水牛队的比赛，水牛队的老板是我的好朋友-Mindy跟Bob，我希望

他们也能参加，若他们真的来了，我会引诱Bob与我在投手丘上来一场对决，

Bob可以称得上是资本家的强森巨投，年轻、健壮且精力充沛，绝对是你在球季

中不会想要遇到的对手，所以届时我希望大家都能到场给予我声援。

The proxy statement will include information about obtaining

tickets to the game. About 1,400 shareholders attended the event

last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff and threw a

strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What

many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my

fast ball and instead delivered my change-up. This year it will be

all smoke.

股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得入场的门票，去年大约有1,400位股东出席这

项盛会，当晚开赛前，我投出一只时速高达8英哩的好球，只是许多球迷在当

场并没有看到我不顾的捕手要求投出快速球的指示反而祭出我的上飘球，至于今

年我要投出的球路至今仍然是个谜。

Warren E. Buffett

March 7, 1995 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1995年3月7日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1995 was $5.3 billion, or

45.0%. Per-share book value grew by a little less, 43.1%,

because we paid stock for two acquisitions, increasing our shares

outstanding by 1.3%. Over the last 31 years (that is, since

present management took over) per-share book value has grown from

$19 to $14,426, or at a rate of 23.6% compounded annually.

1995年本公司的净值成长了45 %约53亿美元，但由于去年以发行股份的方式

并购了两家公司，使得发行在外股份增加了1.3%，所以每股净值仅成长了

43.1%，而总计过去31年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值

由当初的19元成长到现在的14,426美元，年复合成长率约为23.6%。

There's no reason to do handsprings over 1995's gains. This

was a year in which any fool could make a bundle in the stock

market. And we did. To paraphrase President Kennedy, a rising

tide lifts all yachts.

对于1995年能够有这样的成果并没有什么值得好高兴的，因为在去年那样的股

票市场状况，任何一个笨蛋都可以很轻易在市场上有所斩获，我们当然也不例

外，套句甘乃迪总统说过的一句话，只要一波大浪来就可以撑起所有的船只。

Putting aside the financial results, there was plenty of

good news at Berkshire last year: We negotiated three

acquisitions of exactly the type we desire. Two of these,

Helzberg's Diamond Shops and R.C. Willey Home Furnishings, are

included in our 1995 financial statements, while our largest

transaction, the purchase of GEICO, closed immediately after the

end of the year. (I'll tell you more about all three acquisitions later in

the report.)

先不管亮丽的财务数字，去年对Berkshire来说，有许多令人振奋的好消息，我

们总共谈成了三件我们渴望已久的公司购并交易，其中两家-Helzberg钻石店

与R.C. Willey家具店，将可列入Berkshire 1995年的财务报表之中，而另外

一项更大的交易-买进GEICO剩余全部的股权，则在年度结束后不久正式敲定

(在年报后面会再详加叙述这三件并购交易)。

These new subsidiaries roughly double our revenues. Even

so, the acquisitions neither materially increased our shares

outstanding nor our debt. And, though these three operations

employ over 11,000 people, our headquarters staff grew only from

11 to 12. (No sense going crazy.)

这些新加入的子公司将使我们的营收增加一倍，然而购并之后公司流通在外的股

份或是负债并没有增加多少；另外，虽然这三家公司旗下员工人数合计高达

11,000人，但集团总部的人员却仅由11人增加为12人，(我们还没有到走火

入魔的地步)。

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner,

and I want to build a collection of companies - both wholly- and

partly-owned - that have excellent economic characteristics and

that are run by outstanding managers. Our favorite acquisition

is the negotiated transaction that allows us to purchase 100% of

such a business at a fair price. But we are almost as happy when

the stock market offers us the chance to buy a modest percentage

of an outstanding business at a pro-rata price well below what it

would take to buy 100%. This double-barrelled approach -

purchases of entire businesses through negotiation or purchases

of part-interests through the stock market - gives us an

important advantage over capital-allocators who stick to a single

course. Woody Allen once explained why eclecticism works: "The

real advantage of being bisexual is that it doubles your chances

for a date on Saturday night."

Berkshire的副主席，同时也是我的主要合伙人-查理．曼格以及我本人一直致

力于建立起一个拥有绝佳竞争优势，且由杰出经理人领导的企业所组成的集团，

其中一部份是100%持有，一部份则是持有部份股权，当然我们最希望的方式还

是透过协商以公平合理的价格取得全部的股权，不过如果我们在股票市场中有机

会能够找到以低于购并整家公司所需的平均价格，取得一家好公司相当程度的股

份的话，我们也很乐于尝试，事实上这种双管齐下的做法，(也就是经由协议买

下整家公司或是透过股市买进部份股权)，使得我们比起其它坚持单一做法的资

金分配者来说，拥有绝佳的优势。伍迪．艾伦曾经用以下的方式来形容为什么会

有折衷派出现，他说：双性恋者最大的好处就是可以让他们在周末时，比一般人

整整多出一倍的约会机会。

Over the years, we've been Woody-like in our thinking,

attempting to increase our marketable investments in wonderful

businesses, while simultaneously trying to buy similar businesses

in their entirety. The following table illustrates our progress

on both fronts. In the tabulation, we show the marketable

securities owned per share of Berkshire at ten-year intervals. A

second column lists our per-share operating earnings (before

taxes and purchase-price adjustments but after interest and

corporate overhead) from all other activities. In other words,

the second column shows what we earned excluding the dividends,

interest and capital gains that we realized from investments.

Purchase-price accounting adjustments are ignored for reasons we

have explained at length in previous reports and which, as an act

of mercy, we won't repeat. (We'll be glad to send masochists the

earlier explanations, however.)

多年来，我们的看法一直与伍迪一致，在努力增加我们非凡企业的投资部位的同

时，也试着买下一些同样优秀企业的全部所有权，下表充分显示了我们在这两方

面的进展，表中列示出在十年间Berkshire每股所拥有的股票价值以及每股在扣

除利息与营业费用之后来自其它活动的营业利益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计

调整数)，换言之，后者所代表的是在扣除我们从股票投资所得的股利、利息收

入与资本利得之后的盈余收益，至于购买法会计调整数不列入的原因，在以前的

年报中，我们已经花了相当的篇幅解释过了，在这个地方我们就不再重复了，当

然如果你有被虐待的倾向的话，我们也不介意再复述一次。

Pre-tax Earnings Per Share

Marketable Securities Excluding All Income from

Year Per Share Investments

---- --------------------- --------------------------

1965 ................ $ 4 $ 4.08

1975 ................ 159 (6.48)

1985 ................ 2,443 18.86

1995 ................ 22,088 258.20

Yearly Growth Rate: 1965-95 33.4% 14.7%

These results have not sprung from some master plan that we

concocted in 1965. In a general way, we knew then what we hoped

to accomplish but had no idea what specific opportunities might

make it possible. Today we remain similarly unstructured: Over

time, we expect to improve the figures in both columns but have

no road map to tell us how that will come about.

当初在1965年时，我们并未刻意规划什么伟大的计画，来达成以上的成果，我

们只知道我们应该朝这个方向做，但却不晓得到底会有什么样的机会会出现，时

至今日，我们同样是漫无目标，只能够预期这两栏的数字都能够持续地精进，至

于应该要如何达成，并没有一个明确的概念。

We proceed with two advantages: First, our operating

managers are outstanding and, in most cases, have an unusually

strong attachment to Berkshire. Second, Charlie and I have had

considerable experience in allocating capital and try to go at

that job rationally and objectively. The giant disadvantage we

face is size: In the early years, we needed only good ideas, but

now we need good big ideas. Unfortunately, the difficulty of

finding these grows in direct proportion to our financial

success, a problem that increasingly erodes our strengths.

我们拥有两项优势，首先，我们旗下事业的经理人都相当优秀，且大部分的经理

人都与Berkshire保持紧密的关系，第二，查理跟我本人在资金分配方面拥有相

当丰富的经验，可以理性客观地执行这项工作，我们所面临最大的劣势是规模太

大，在早年，我们只需要好的投资方案，但是现在我们需要的却是又"大"又好的

投资方案，然而不幸的是，要找到能够与Berkshire发展速度相匹配的公司的难

度日益升高，这个问题持续地侵蚀我们的竞争优势。

I will have more to say about Berkshire's prospects later in

this report, when I discuss our proposed recapitalization.

在报告的后段讨论有关公司所提的股权重组提案，我会再详加说明Berkshire未

来的前景。

Acquisitions

并购活动

It may seem strange that we exult over a year in which we

made three acquisitions, given that we have regularly used these

pages to question the acquisition activities of most managers.

Rest assured, Charlie and I haven't lost our skepticism: We

believe most deals do damage to the shareholders of the acquiring

company. Too often, the words from HMS Pinafore apply: "Things

are seldom what they seem, skim milk masquerades as cream."

Specifically, sellers and their representatives invariably

present financial projections having more entertainment value

than educational value. In the production of rosy scenarios,

Wall Street can hold its own against Washington.

以往到了这里，通常是我们质疑其它公司从事的并购活动的时间，然而大家对于

我们在去年突然发神经地进行了三件并购案可能会感到相当奇怪，不过大家倒是

可以放心，查理跟我本人从来就没有失去我们原来保持的怀疑态度，我们坚信大

部分的并购活动会大大损及发起并购公司背后所代表的股东利益，HMS 围裙说

得没有错︰事情通常不是他们外表所看到得的那样，去脂牛奶会被冒充成奶油，

犹有甚者，卖方与其代表人总是会提出一些娱乐性质高于教育性质的财务预估数

字，在规划出美丽的大饼这招方面，华尔街的能力可是不会输给华府的。

In any case, why potential buyers even look at projections

prepared by sellers baffles me. Charlie and I never give them a

glance, but instead keep in mind the story of the man with an

ailing horse. Visiting the vet, he said: "Can you help me?

Sometimes my horse walks just fine and sometimes he limps." The

vet's reply was pointed: "No problem - when he's walking fine,

sell him." In the world of mergers and acquisitions, that horse

would be peddled as Secretariat.

我实在不了解为什么有些可能的买主会相信卖方提出的预估数字，查理跟我连看

都懒得看他们一眼，我们一再谨记一位拥有跛脚马主人的故事，他牵着病马去给

兽医看说到︰「你可以帮帮我吗? 我实在是搞不懂为什么这匹马的表现时好时

坏。」，兽医的回答正中要害，「没问题，趁它表现正常的时候，赶快把它卖掉」，

在并购的世界中，这样的跛脚马往往被装饰成圣物到处行骗。

At Berkshire, we have all the difficulties in perceiving the

future that other acquisition-minded companies do. Like they

also, we face the inherent problem that the seller of a business

practically always knows far more about it than the buyer and

also picks the time of sale - a time when the business is likely

to be walking "just fine."

在Berkshire，我们无从了解这些有意从事并购的公司到底怎么会做出这样的举

动，与他们一样，我们也面临一个先天上的问题，那就是卖方永远比买方了解内

情，所以很自然地，他们一定会挑选卖出的最佳时机，也就是当跛脚马表现的都

很正常的时候。

Even so, we do have a few advantages, perhaps the greatest

being that we don't have a strategic plan. Thus we feel no need

to proceed in an ordained direction (a course leading almost

invariably to silly purchase prices) but can instead simply

decide what makes sense for our owners. In doing that, we always

mentally compare any move we are contemplating with dozens of

other opportunities open to us, including the purchase of small

pieces of the best businesses in the world via the stock market.

Our practice of making this comparison - acquisitions against

passive investments - is a discipline that managers focused

simply on expansion seldom use.

尽管如此，我们还是拥有几项优势，其中最有利的大概就是我们并没有一套策略

计画，所以我们就没有必要依照固定的模式(一种几乎注定会以离谱的价钱成交

的模式)，而是完全以股东本身的利益为优先，在这样的心态之下，我们随时可

以客观地将购并案与其它潜在的几十种投资机会做比较，其中也包含经由股票市

场买进部份股权，我们习惯性地做比较，购并vs被动的投资，是一昧地想要扩

张经营版图的经理人绝对做不出来的。

Talking to Time Magazine a few years back, Peter Drucker got

to the heart of things: "I will tell you a secret: Dealmaking

beats working. Dealmaking is exciting and fun, and working is

grubby. Running anything is primarily an enormous amount of

grubby detail work . . . dealmaking is romantic, sexy. That's

why you have deals that make no sense."

管理大师彼得．杜拉克几年前在对时代杂志的一次专访中，切中要点的提到︰让

我告诉你一个秘密，促成交易比辛勤工作好，促成交易刺激有趣，而工作却尽是

一些骯脏污龊的事，经营任何事业无可避免的是一大堆繁杂的工作，而促成交易

相对的就很性感浪漫，而这也是为什么通常交易的发生都没什么道理可循。

In making acquisitions, we have a further advantage: As

payment, we can offer sellers a stock backed by an extraordinary

collection of outstanding businesses. An individual or a family

wishing to dispose of a single fine business, but also wishing to

defer personal taxes indefinitely, is apt to find Berkshire stock

a particularly comfortable holding. I believe, in fact, that

this calculus played an important part in the two acquisitions

for which we paid shares in 1995.

在从事并购案时，我们还有一项优势，那就是我们可以提供给卖方，一种背后由

众多优秀企业所组成的股份当作对价，当一家公司的老板或家族想要处分绩优的

家族产业，同时希望相关的税负能够继续递延下去时，应该会发现Berkshire的

股票是一种相当好的选择，事实上，我相信这样的盘算在我们1985年促成以股

份交换的两项购并案中扮演极关键的角色。

Beyond that, sellers sometimes care about placing their

companies in a corporate home that will both endure and provide

pleasant, productive working conditions for their managers. Here

again, Berkshire offers something special. Our managers operate

with extraordinary autonomy. Additionally, our ownership

structure enables sellers to know that when I say we are buying

to keep, the promise means something. For our part, we like

dealing with owners who care what happens to their companies and

people. A buyer is likely to find fewer unpleasant surprises

dealing with that type of seller than with one simply auctioning

off his business.

此外，有些卖方也会关心他们的公司是否能够找到一个稳定可靠的美满归宿，可

以让其旗下员工有一个良好的工作环境，而就这点而言，Berkshire绝对与众不

同，我们旗下事业的经理人拥有绝对的自主权，此外我们的股权结构使得卖方可

以相信当我们在购并时，所做出的每一个承诺将会被信守，对我们而言，我们也

希望能与真正关心购并后其公司与员工会有怎样结局的老板打交道，就我们的经

验而言，这类的卖主通常会较那些一心要把所拥有的公司拍卖掉的人，要让我们

少发现许多令人不愉快的意外。

In addition to the foregoing being an explanation of our

acquisition style, it is, of course, a not-so-subtle sales pitch.

If you own or represent a business earning $25 million or more

before tax, and it fits the criteria listed on page 23, just

give me a call. Our discussion will be confidential. And if you

aren't interested now, file our proposition in the back of your

mind: We are never going to lose our appetite for buying

companies with good economics and excellent management.

以上算是对于我们购并模式的一些解释，当然在这里我也要打一点小广告，如果

你拥有或代表一家每年税前获利超过2,500万美元的公司，同时也符合我们表

列的各项标准的话，记得打个电话给我，我们谈话的内容将会完全保密，当然若

是你现在没有兴趣，也请你把我们的这些条件记在脑海，因为我们从来就不会放

弃买下拥有优良的竞争优势与杰出经理人的公司的意愿。

Concluding this little dissertation on acquisitions, I can't

resist repeating a tale told me last year by a corporate

executive. The business he grew up in was a fine one, with a

long-time record of leadership in its industry. Its main

product, however, was distressingly glamorless. So several

decades ago, the company hired a management consultant who -

naturally - advised diversification, the then-current fad.

("Focus" was not yet in style.) Before long, the company

acquired a number of businesses, each after the consulting firm

had gone through a long - and expensive - acquisition study. And

the outcome? Said the executive sadly, "When we started, we were

getting 100% of our earnings from the original business. After

ten years, we were getting 150%."

为了将以上购并论点做一个总结，我忍不住再重复一遍，去年一位企业经理人告

诉我的一则小故事︰他提到他原来经营一家由他一手扶持的好公司，在其所处的

产业拥有长期的领导地位，只是其前景显得有些黯淡，所以几十年前，这家公司

特别聘请了一家管理顾问公司，很自然的管理顾问建议他们应该要多角化经营，

这在当时还是股风潮(专注本业的论调还未成形)，不久之后，这家公司在经过顾

问公司一连串冗长且收费昂贵的购并调查之后，陆续买进了好几家公司，你一定

会想要问，最后结果如何? 这位主管很难过的说，一开始我们的盈余百分之百是

来自于我们原来的本业，但是过了十年后，这个比例变成百分之一百五十!

Helzberg's Diamond Shops

Helzberg 钻石店

A few years back, management consultants popularized a

technique called "management by walking around" (MBWA). At

Berkshire, we've instituted ABWA (acquisitions by walking

around).

几年前，管理顾问专家有一句相当流行的术语-走动式管理，在Berkshire我们

运用的则是走动式并购。

In May 1994, a week or so after the Annual Meeting, I was

crossing the street at 58th and Fifth Avenue in New York, when a

woman called out my name. I listened as she told me she'd been

to, and had enjoyed, the Annual Meeting. A few seconds later, a

man who'd heard the woman stop me did so as well. He turned out

to be Barnett Helzberg, Jr., who owned four shares of Berkshire

and had also been at our meeting.

1994年五月，在年度股东会过后不久，正当我在纽约第五大道与58街交叉路

口准备过马路时，突然有一位妇人叫我的名字，我停下驻足，她提到自己很喜欢

参加Berkshire的股东会，过了一会儿，旁边一位先生听到这位妇人的谈话，也

如法炮制的把我给拦下来，没想到他竟是Barnett Helzberg二世，他持有

Berkshire四股的股份，同时也曾参加过我们的股东会。

In our few minutes of conversation, Barnett said he had a

business we might be interested in. When people say that, it

usually turns out they have a lemonade stand - with potential, of

course, to quickly grow into the next Microsoft. So I simply

asked Barnett to send me particulars. That, I thought to myself.

will be the end of that.

在我们短暂的交谈之中，Barnett表示他拥有一家我们可能会有兴趣的公司，普

通当人们这样说的时候，一般都是指一些茶水摊，当然搞不好，也有可能会变成

微软第二，所以我只是简单地请Barnett将他的资料送给我，然后我想一切将就

此结束。

Not long after, Barnett sent me the financial statements of

Helzberg's Diamond Shops. The company had been started by his

grandfather in 1915 from a single store in Kansas City and had

developed by the time we met into a group with 134 stores in 23

states. Sales had grown from $10 million in 1974 to $53 million

in 1984 and $282 million in 1994. We weren't talking lemonade

stands.

过了不久，Barnett果然把Helzberg钻石店的财务报表送给我，这家公司是在

1915年由其祖父创立，当初只不过是在堪萨斯市的一家单店，然而直到我们碰

面时，该公司已发展成在全美23个州拥有134家分店的集团，营业额也从1974

年的1,000万美元成长到1984年的5,300万美元，乃至于1994年的二亿

8,200万美元，这显然不是一间茶水摊。

Barnett, then 60, loved the business but also wanted to feel

free of it. In 1988, as a step in that direction, he had brought

in Jeff Comment, formerly President of Wanamaker's, to help him

run things. The hiring of Jeff turned out to be a homerun, but

Barnett still found that he couldn't shake a feeling of ultimate

responsibility. Additionally, he owned a valuable asset that was

subject to the vagaries of a single, very competitive industry,

and he thought it prudent to diversify his family's holdings.

Barnett现年六十岁，很热爱这项事业，但也很希望能够减轻负担，在1988年

他跨出第一步，找到Wanamaker前任总裁-Jeff Comment来协助他经营事

业，这个决定事后证明相当正确，但Barnett还是觉得他的压力相当沉重，而且，

他虽然拥有价值不菲的事业，但却面临单一且竞争相当激烈的产业，因此他认为

有必要要分散家族持股的风险。

Berkshire was made to order for him. It took us awhile to

get together on price, but there was never any question in my

mind that, first, Helzberg's was the kind of business that we

wanted to own and, second, Jeff was our kind of manager. In

fact, we would not have bought the business if Jeff had not been

there to run it. Buying a retailer without good management is

like buying the Eiffel Tower without an elevator.

Berkshire被要求提出一个报价，我们花了一段时间才在价格上达成协议，然而

此外从头到尾我都没有太多的疑问，首先，Helzberg是那种我们想要拥有的事

业，第二Jeff，是属于我们这喜欢的经理人类型，事实上，要是这项事业不是由

Jeff所经营的话，我们可能就不会考虑买下它，买下一家没有优良管理的零售

业，就好象是买下一座没有电梯的艾菲尔铁塔。

We completed the Helzberg purchase in 1995 by means of a

tax-free exchange of stock, the only kind of transaction that

interested Barnett. Though he was certainly under no obligation

to do so, Barnett shared a meaningful part of his proceeds from

the sale with a large number of his associates. When someone

behaves that generously, you know you are going to be treated

right as a buyer.

我们在1995年完成对Helzberg的并购案，以免税的股权交换方式进行，这也

是Barnett唯一愿意接受的方式，虽然没有法令规定，但是他还是将并购后的所

得与其众多的员工一起分享，就这点而言，你可以确信对员工如此慷慨的人，相

信也会公平合理地对待新加入的买主。

The average Helzberg's store has annual sales of about $2

million, far more than competitors operating similarly-sized

stores achieve. This superior per-store productivity is the key

to Helzberg's excellent profits. If the company continues its

first-rate performance - and we believe it will - it could grow

rather quickly to several times its present size.

Helzberg单店年平均营业额大约是二百万美元，这个数字远比其它相同规模的

竞争对手多得多，这种高生产力正是Helzberg拥有高获利的关键因素，如果这

家公司能够继续这种一流的表现，(我们相信绝对没问题)，则在不久的将来它将

可以发展为数倍于现在的规模。

Helzberg's, it should be added, is an entirely different

sort of operation from Borsheim's, our Omaha jewelry business,

and the two companies will operate independently of each other.

Borsheim's had an excellent year in 1995, with sales up 11.7%.

Susan Jacques, its 36-year-old CEO, had an even better year,

giving birth to her second son at the start of the Christmas

season. Susan has proved to be a terrific leader in the two

years since her promotion.

有一点必须强调的是，Helzberg经营的形态与我们原有在奥玛哈的珠宝事业-

波仙珠宝店完全不同，两家公司仍然会维持各自独立的营运，波仙1995年的业

绩相当理想，营收较去年又增加了11.7%，该公司总裁-Susan Jacques的表现

更是优异，去年圣诞节前夕她产下第二个儿子，在接任二年后，Susan证明自己

是位相当杰出的领导者。

R.C. Willey Home Furnishings

R.C. Willey家具店

It was Nebraska Furniture Mart's Irv Blumkin who did the

walking around in the case of R.C. Willey, long the leading home

furnishings business in Utah. Over the years, Irv had told me

about the strengths of that company. And he had also told Bill

Child, CEO of R.C. Willey, how pleased the Blumkin family had

been with its Berkshire relationship. So in early 1995, Bill

mentioned to Irv that for estate tax and diversification reasons,

he and the other owners of R.C. Willey might be interested in

selling.

关于R.C. Willey家具店-这家犹他州最大家具店的并购案，这次换做是内布拉

斯加家具店的Irv Blumkin做走动式并购，多年以来，Irv一直向我提及这家公

司所拥有的竞争力，而他也不断地告诉R.C. Willey总裁-Bill Child，Blumkin

家族与Berkshire的合作关系是多么地令人愉快，终于到了1995年，Bill向Irv

提及基于资产税负与分散风险考量，他自己本身与R.C. Willey其它股东有意出

售该公司股份。

From that point forward, things could not have been simpler.

Bill sent me some figures, and I wrote him a letter indicating

my idea of value. We quickly agreed on a number, and found our

personal chemistry to be perfect. By mid-year, the merger was

completed.

从那一刻开始，事情就变得再简单也不过了，Bill给了我一些数字，而我则回信

表达我对价值的看法，我们很快地就达成价格上的协议，而后续所产生的化学变

化可说是再完美不过了，一直到年中，整个合并案大功告成。

R.C. Willey is an amazing story. Bill took over the

business from his father-in-law in 1954 when sales were about

$250,000. From this tiny base, Bill employed Mae West's

philosophy: "It's not what you've got - it's what you do with

what you've got." Aided by his brother, Sheldon, Bill has built

the company to its 1995 sales volume of $257 million, and it now

accounts for over 50% of the furniture business in Utah. Like

Nebraska Furniture Mart, R.C. Willey sells appliances,

electronics, computers and carpets in addition to furniture.

Both companies have about the same sales volume, but NFM gets all

of its business from one complex in Omaha, whereas R.C. Willey

will open its sixth major store in the next few months.

R.C. Willey有一段相当精彩的故事，1954年当Bill从其岳父手中接下这项事业

时，该公司的年营业额只有25万美元，从那个基础开始，Bill运用Mae West

的哲学，重点不在于你得到的是什么，重点在于你将得到的如何运用，在其兄弟

Sheldon的协助之下，Bill将公司的营业额一举提升到1995年的2亿5,700

万美元，目前拥有犹他州超过50%以上的市场占有率，就像是NFM一样，除了

家具以外，R.C. Willey也贩卖小家电、电子信息与地毯等商品，两家公司的营

业额相当，只是NFM的营收全部来自在奥玛哈惟一的一家总店，而R.C. Willey

却即将在几个月后成立第六家分店。

Retailing is a tough business. During my investment career,

I have watched a large number of retailers enjoy terrific growth

and superb returns on equity for a period, and then suddenly

nosedive, often all the way into bankruptcy. This shooting-star

phenomenon is far more common in retailing than it is in

manufacturing or service businesses. In part, this is because a

retailer must stay smart, day after day. Your competitor is

always copying and then topping whatever you do. Shoppers are

meanwhile beckoned in every conceivable way to try a stream of

new merchants. In retailing, to coast is to fail.

零售业的经营相当不易，在我个人的投资生涯中，我看过许多零售业曾经拥有极

高的成长率与股东权益报酬率，但是到最后，突然间表现急速下滑，很多甚至被

迫以倒闭关门收场，比起一般制造业或服务业，这种剎那间的永恒在零售业履见

不鲜，部份的原因是这些零售业者必须时时保持聪明警戒，因为你的竞争对手随

时准备复制你的做法，然后超越你，同时消费者绝对不会吝于给予新加入业者尝

试的机会，在零售业一但业绩下滑，注定就会失败。

In contrast to this have-to-be-smart-every-day business,

there is what I call the have-to-be-smart-once business. For

example, if you were smart enough to buy a network TV station

very early in the game, you could put in a shiftless and backward

nephew to run things, and the business would still do well for

decades. You'd do far better, of course, if you put in Tom

Murphy, but you could stay comfortably in the black without him.

For a retailer, hiring that nephew would be an express ticket to

bankruptcy.

相对于这种必须时时保持警戒的产业，还有一种我称之为只要聪明一时的产业，

举个例子来说，如果你在很早以前就懂得睿智地买下一家地方电视台，你甚至可

以把它交给懒惰又差劲的亲人来经营，而这项事业却仍然可以好好地经营个几十

年，当然若是你懂得将Tom Murphy摆在正确的位置之上，你所获得的将会更

惊人，但是对零售业来说，要是用人不当的话，就等于买了一张准备倒闭关门的

门票。

The two retailing businesses we purchased this year are

blessed with terrific managers who love to compete and have done

so successfully for decades. Like the CEOs of our other

operating units, they will operate autonomously: We want them to

feel that the businesses they run are theirs. This means no

second-guessing by Charlie and me. We avoid the attitude of the

alumnus whose message to the football coach is "I'm 100% with you

- win or tie." Our basic goal as an owner is to behave with our

managers as we like our owners to behave with us.

不过今年我们买下的这两家零售业，却很幸运的拥有喜欢面对竞争挑战的经理

人，同时过去几十年来也表现的相当优异，就像是我们旗下其它事业的经理人，

他们将可以独立自主地经营事业，我们希望他们觉得就好象是在经营自己的事业

一样，没错就是这样，查理跟我绝没有其它的意思，我们尽量避免像校友会常常

对足球校队教练所说的那样︰不论赢或是打平，我们永远与你站在同一阵线，身

为所有权人，我们的基本原则是期望我们自己的行为与我们要求旗下的经理人的

表现一样。

As we add more operations, I'm sometimes asked how many

people I can handle reporting to me. My answer to that is

simple: If I have one person reporting to me and he is a lemon,

that's one too many, and if I have managers like those we now

have, the number can be almost unlimited. We are lucky to have

Bill and Sheldon associated with us, and we hope that we can

acquire other businesses that bring with them managers of similar

caliber.

而在我们又新增旗下事业的同时，我被问及我一个人到底可以应付多少个经理人

同时向我报告，我的回答相当简单，要是我只管一个经理人，而他是一颗酸柠檬，

那么管一个人对我来说，实在是太多了，相反的，要是我所面对的是像我们现在

所拥有的经理人的话，那么这个数目将没有任何限制，很幸运的是，这回新加入

的是Bill跟Sheldon，而我们也很希望在不久的未来，还能有更多相同水准的经

理人加入我们的行列。

GEICO Corporation

盖可保险营运

Right after yearend, we completed the purchase of 100% of

GEICO, the seventh largest auto insurer in the United States,

with about 3.7 million cars insured. I've had a 45-year

association with GEICO, and though the story has been told

before, it's worth a short recap here.

就在去年底，我们完成买进盖可保险100%股权的动作，盖可是全美第七大的汽

车保险公司，约有370万辆汽车加保，我个人与盖可保险的关系长达45年以

上，虽然这段故事已经说过很多遍，我认为还是有必要在这里稍微复述一次。

I attended Columbia University's business school in 1950-51,

not because I cared about the degree it offered, but because I

wanted to study under Ben Graham, then teaching there. The time

I spent in Ben's classes was a personal high, and quickly induced

me to learn all I could about my hero. I turned first to Who's

Who in America, finding there, among other things, that Ben was

Chairman of Government Employees Insurance Company, to me an

unknown company in an unfamiliar industry.

我是在1950年-1951年间就读于哥伦比亚商学院，当时的目的倒不在于取得

学位，重点还在于我可以受教于当时在该校任教的班哲明．葛拉汉门下，上葛拉

汉的课实在是一种享受，很快的就让我从偶像哪里学习到许多东西，有一回我翻

开全美名人录，发现我的恩师葛拉汉是公务人员保险公司-GEICO的董事会主

席，对于当时的我而言，那完全是一家陌生产业的不知名公司。

A librarian next referred me to Best's Fire and Casualty

insurance manual, where I learned that GEICO was based in

Washington, DC. So on a Saturday in January, 1951, I took the

train to Washington and headed for GEICO's downtown headquarters.

To my dismay, the building was closed, but I pounded on the door

until a custodian appeared. I asked this puzzled fellow if there

was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he said he'd seen

one man working on the sixth floor.

一位好心的图书馆员，介绍我看看全美最佳火险与意外险公司手册，我发现

GEICO的总部位于华盛顿特区，所以在1951年一月的某个星期六，我搭乘火

车前往位于华盛顿的GEICO总部，一到当地，令人失望的是总部大门深锁，朝

着大门敲了半天，终于有位守卫前来应门，我向这位一脸疑惑的警卫先生问到，

公司是否有人可以跟我谈一谈，他老兄说六楼有人在加班，你可以去找他试一

试。

And thus I met Lorimer Davidson, Assistant to the President,

who was later to become CEO. Though my only credentials were

that I was a student of Graham's, "Davy" graciously spent four

hours or so showering me with both kindness and instruction. No

one has ever received a better half-day course in how the

insurance industry functions nor in the factors that enable one

company to excel over others. As Davy made clear, GEICO's method

of selling - direct marketing - gave it an enormous cost

advantage over competitors that sold through agents, a form of

distribution so ingrained in the business of these insurers that

it was impossible for them to give it up. After my session with

Davy, I was more excited about GEICO than I have ever been about

a stock.

就这样我遇到了当时还是副总裁的Lorimer Davidson，后来他成为GEICO的

总裁，虽然我唯一的经历背景只是葛拉汉的一名学生，大卫还是很好心的花了四

个小时左右的时间，好好地给我上了一课，我想大概没有人能够像我这样，可以

幸运地接受如何经营保险业的半天课程，大卫很坦白地告诉我，GEICO的竞争

优势在于-直接行销，这使得该公司相较于一般竞争同业必须透过传统的业务仲

介的经营方式所负担的成本要低得许多，后者受限传统无法摆脱行之有年的行销

网络，而在上过大卫的课之后，GEICO也成为我有生以来觉得最心动的一支股

票。

When I finished at Columbia some months later and returned

to Omaha to sell securities, I naturally focused almost

exclusively on GEICO. My first sales call - on my Aunt Alice,

who always supported me 100% - was successful. But I was then a

skinny, unpolished 20-year-old who looked about 17, and my pitch

usually failed. Undaunted, I wrote a short report late in 1951

about GEICO for "The Security I Like Best" column in The

Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a leading financial

publication of the time. More important, I bought stock for my

own account.

在我从哥伦比亚大学毕业的几个月后，我回到奥玛哈担任股票业务员，自然而然

的，我把重心全部摆在GEICO这只股票之上，我作成的第一笔生意就是把它介

绍给总是最支持我的阿姨Alice，不过当时的我只是个20岁初出茅庐的小伙子，

所以我的话总是没有人愿意相信，即便如此，我还是在1951年写了一篇最佳推

荐个股-GEICO并刊登在当时最大的金融时报专栏之上，当然最重要的是我自己

也买了这家公司的股票。

You may think this odd, but I have kept copies of every tax

return I filed, starting with the return for 1944. Checking

back, I find that I purchased GEICO shares on four occasions

during 1951, the last purchase being made on September 26. This

pattern of persistence suggests to me that my tendency toward

self-intoxication was developed early. I probably came back on

that September day from unsuccessfully trying to sell some

prospect and decided - despite my already having more than 50% of

my net worth in GEICO - to load up further. In any event, I

accumulated 350 shares of GEICO during the year, at a cost of

$10,282. At yearend, this holding was worth $13,125, more than

65% of my net worth.

你可能会觉得很奇怪，不过打从1944年开始报税到现在，我都保留每年个人报

税的资料，在将这些资料拿出来比对之后，我发现在1951年我总共分四次买进

GEICO股份，最后一次是在9月26日，这样的做法让我觉得自己很早就有自

我沉醉的倾向，印象中我那时是在向别人推销这批股票不成之后，决定自己吃下

这批股票，尽管在当时我已将个人50%以上的身家全都押在这支股票之上，而

在加码之后，我总共持有350股的GEICO股份，成本为10,282美元，到了年

底，这些股票的市值成为13,125美元，超过个人净值的65%。

You can see why GEICO was my first business love. Furthermore,

just to complete this stroll down memory lane, I should add

that I earned most of the funds I used to buy GEICO shares by

delivering The Washington Post, the chief product of a

company that much later made it possible for Berkshire to turn

$10 million into $500 million.

所以大家可以看出GEICO公司可以说是我投资生涯的初恋，还有一点也相当具

有纪念价值的，我买下GEICO大部分的资金是来自于派送华盛顿邮报的收入，

而后来经由Berkshire我靠着华盛顿邮报，将1,000万美元变成五亿美元。

Alas, I sold my entire GEICO position in 1952 for $15,259,

primarily to switch into Western Insurance Securities. This act

of infidelity can partially be excused by the fact that Western

was selling for slightly more than one times its current earnings,

a p/e ratio that for some reason caught my eye. But in the next

20 years, the GEICO stock I sold grew in value to about $1.3

million, which taught me a lesson about the inadvisability of

selling a stake in an identifiably-wonderful company.

可惜的是，在1952年我以15,259美元的价钱将全部的GEICO股份出清，然

后将所得资金投入到西方保险证券公司之上，这项变心的举动，一部份的原因是

因为西方保险证券当时的股价相当吸引人，本益比只有一倍左右，然而在往后的

二十年间，当时被我卖的的GEICO股份的价值却成长到1,300万美元，这样的

结局让我体会到绝对不能卖掉一家明显的好公司的原则。

In the early 1970's, after Davy retired, the executives

running GEICO made some serious errors in estimating their claims

costs, a mistake that led the company to underprice its policies

- and that almost caused it to go bankrupt. The company was

saved only because Jack Byrne came in as CEO in 1976 and took

drastic remedial measures.

1970年代初期，在大卫退休后不久，继任的管理阶层犯了一连串严重的错误，

他们低估了保险理赔的成本，使得公司对外销售保单的订价过低，此举导致公司

几乎面临倒闭的命运，所幸后来由Jack Byrne在1976年接掌公司，并采取紧

急的补救措施后，才使得公司幸免于难。

Because I believed both in Jack and in GEICO's fundamental

competitive strength, Berkshire purchased a large interest in the

company during the second half of 1976, and also made smaller

purchases later. By yearend 1980, we had put $45.7 million into

GEICO and owned 33.3% of its shares. During the next 15 years,

we did not make further purchases. Our interest in the company,

nonetheless, grew to about 50% because it was a big repurchaser

of its own shares.

由于我相信Jack以及该公司原本拥有的竞争优势，Berkshire在1976年下半

年买进大量的GEICO股份，之后又小幅加码，到了1980年底，我们总共投入

4,570万美元取得该公司33.3%的股权，然而在往后的15年内，我们并没有再

增加持股，不过由于该公司不断地购回自家公司的股份，使得我们在GEICO的

持股比例逐渐增加到50%左右。

Then, in 1995, we agreed to pay $2.3 billion for the half of

the company we didn't own. That is a steep price. But it gives

us full ownership of a growing enterprise whose business remains

exceptional for precisely the same reasons that prevailed in

1951. In addition, GEICO has two extraordinary managers: Tony

Nicely, who runs the insurance side of the operation, and Lou

Simpson, who runs investments.

然后到了1995年，我们同意以23亿美元买下另一半原来不属于我们的股份，

这是实在是天价，不过它让我们可以百分之百拥有一家深具成长潜力的企业，且

其竞争优势从1951年到现在一直都维持不变，更重要的是，GEICO拥有两位

相当优秀的经理人，一位是专门负责保险部门营运的Tony Nicely，一位是专门

负责投资部门营运的Lou Simpson。

Tony, 52, has been with GEICO for 34 years. There's no one

I would rather have managing GEICO's insurance operation. He has

brains, energy, integrity and focus. If we're lucky, he'll stay

another 34 years.

52岁的Tony在GEICO任职已有34年了，兼具智能、精力、品格与专注力，

他是我心目中经营GEICO保险部门的不二人选，如果我们够幸运的话，Tony

应该还能再为我们经营GEICO 34年以上。

Lou runs investments just as ably. Between 1980 and 1995,

the equities under Lou's management returned an average of 22.8%

annually vs. 15.7% for the S&P. Lou takes the same conservative,

concentrated approach to investments that we do at Berkshire, and

it is an enormous plus for us to have him on board. One point

that goes beyond Lou's GEICO work: His presence on the scene

assures us that Berkshire would have an extraordinary

professional immediately available to handle its investments if

something were to happen to Charlie and me.

另一方面，Lou在管理投资同样出色，从1980年到1995年的这段期间，GEICO

的投资在Lou的管理之下，年度平均投资报酬率高达22.8%，同期间S&P只有

15.7%，Lou在GEICO所采取谨慎保守、专注集中的投资方式与Berkshire一

致，有他在，对Berkshire来说绝对有相当大的帮助，而他的存在同时也使得

Berkshire可以确保查理跟我本人万一要是有任何突发状况时，能够有一位杰出

的专业人士可以立即接手我们的工作。

GEICO, of course, must continue both to attract good

policyholders and keep them happy. It must also reserve and

price properly. But the ultimate key to the company's success is

its rock-bottom operating costs, which virtually no competitor

can match. In 1995, moreover, Tony and his management team

pushed underwriting and loss adjustment expenses down further to

23.6% of premiums, nearly one percentage point below 1994's

ratio. In business, I look for economic castles protected by

unbreachable "moats." Thanks to Tony and his management team,

GEICO's moat widened in 1995.

GEICO如同过往一般，持续地吸引优良的保户前来，而GEICO的服务也确实令

他们满意，当然订价与提列准备必须适当，但是该公司能够成功的最重要关键，

还在于超低的成本结构，这实在是其它竞争同业远远比不上的，1995年在Tony

与其领导的经营阶层的努力之下，该公司的承保损失与营业费用比率进一步压低

到保费收入的23.6%，比起1994年又低了一个百分点，在商业的世界，我致

力于寻找拥有无可侵犯护城河所保护的企业堡垒，感谢Tony跟他的经营团队，

GEICO周围的护城河又更加宽了许多。

Finally, let me bring you up to date on Davy. He's now 93

and remains my friend and teacher. He continues to pay close

attention to GEICO and has always been there when the company's

CEOs - Jack Byrne, Bill Snyder and Tony - have needed him. Our

acquisition of 100% of GEICO caused Davy to incur a large tax.

Characteristically, he still warmly supported the transaction.

最后让我向各位报告一下大卫的近况，高龄93岁的他，对我而言亦师亦友，到

现在他还是一样关心GEICO的情况，而当公司现任的主管-Jack Byrne、Bill

Snnder与Tony有任何需要他的地方，他都会随时挺身相助，虽然这次的并购

案将使得大卫必须承担大笔的税负，但他还是一样支持这项交易。

Davy has been one of my heroes for the 45 years I've known

him, and he's never let me down. You should understand that

Berkshire would not be where it is today if Davy had not been so

generous with his time on a cold Saturday in 1951. I've often

thanked him privately, but it is fitting that I use this report

to thank him on behalf of Berkshire's shareholders.

自从我认识大卫后，45年以来他一直就是我崇拜的偶像之一，而他确实也从未

让我失望过，大家必须了解如果没有大卫在1951年那个寒冷的星期六慷慨解

说，Berkshire就绝对不可能会有今天的成就，多年来私底下，我已不知感谢他

多少次了，但是今天在这里我觉得应该借着今年的年报代替Berkshire所有的股

东向他致上深深的感谢之意。

Insurance Operations

保险事业营运

In addition to acquiring GEICO, we enjoyed other favorable

developments in insurance during 1995.

除了取得GEICO保险公司全部的股权，1995年我们其它保险事业也都有相当

不错的发展。

As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our

insurance business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate

and, second, its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't

own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most

policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly,

because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and

resolve loss claims.

就像我们在过去年报跟各位解释过的，保险事业最重要的关键，第一是保险浮存

金的数量，第二是它的成本，浮存金是我们持有并非我们所有，保险事业营运之

所以能有浮存金的原因在于大部分的保单都会要求保户必须预付保险费，另外更

重要的是保险公司在被知会并真正理赔之前，通常都要经过好长的一段时间。

Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not

cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it

running an "underwriting loss" - and that loss is the cost of

float. An insurance business is profitable over time if its cost

of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur

to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the

cost of its float is higher than market rates for money.

通常保险公司实际上收到的保费并不足以支应实际发生的损失与费用，所以大多

会产生承保的损失，而这就是浮存金的成本，长期而言，保险公司的浮存金成本

若能低于其它资金管道所需的成本就算是获利，但是要是其浮存金成本高于货币

市场利率的话，其是否有存在的价值就有疑问。

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's

insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we

have calculated our float - which we generate in exceptional

amounts relative to our premium volume - by adding loss reserves,

loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed

and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents'

balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred

charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is

determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years

when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last three,

our cost of float has been negative, which means we have

calculated our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit

to float income.

如同下表中的数字所显示的，Berkshire的保险事业大获全胜，表中的浮存金，

系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣

金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮

存金部位算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而

定，在某些年度由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负

的，此时我们的保险事业盈余等于是由原先从浮存金获取的利益再加上承保利

益。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

------------ ------------- --------------- -------------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 ...... profit 17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 ...... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 ...... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 ...... 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 ...... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 ...... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 ...... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 ...... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 ...... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 ...... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 ...... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 ...... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 ...... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980 ...... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981 ...... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982 ...... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983 ...... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984 ...... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985 ...... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 ...... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 ...... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 ...... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 ...... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 ...... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 ...... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992 ...... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

1993 ...... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%

1994 ...... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%

1995 ...... profit 3,607.2 less than zero 5.95%

Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float

has grown at an annual compounded rate of 20.7%. In more years

than not, our cost of funds has been less than nothing. This

access to "free" money has boosted Berkshire's performance in a

major way.

自从1967年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金每年以20.7%复合成长率增

加，大部分的年度，我们的资金成本都低于零以下，受惠于这些免费的资金，大

大地帮助Berkshire的绩效提升。

Any company's level of profitability is determined by three

items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost;

and (3) its utilization of "leverage" - that is, the degree to

which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity.

Over the years, we have done well on Point 1, having produced high

returns on our assets. But we have also benefitted greatly - to a

degree that is not generally well-understood - because our

liabilities have cost us very little. An important reason for this

low cost is that we have obtained float on very advantageous terms.

The same cannot be said by many other property and casualty

insurers, who may generate plenty of float, but at a cost that

exceeds what the funds are worth to them. In those circumstances,

leverage becomes a disadvantage.

任何一家公司的获利能力决定于(1)资产报酬率(2)负债的成本(3)财务杠杆的运

用-也就是其运用负债而非股东权益来支应资产取得的程度。多年以来，我们在

第一项表现的相当不错，运用资产所产生的报酬很高，然而在另外一方面由于资

金成本极低，也使得我们受惠不少，这点就比较不为人所知，资金成本之所以可

以压得很低，主要是由于我们可以用很有利的条件取得保险浮存金，关于这点在

其它同业身上就不敢说了，通常他们也能取得大量的保险浮存金，但是取得的成

本可能远超过应该付的代价，在这种状况下，运用财务杠杆反而变得相当不利。

Since our float has cost us virtually nothing over the years,

it has in effect served as equity. Of course, it differs from true

equity in that it doesn't belong to us. Nevertheless, let's assume

that instead of our having $3.4 billion of float at the end of

1994, we had replaced it with $3.4 billion of equity. Under this

scenario, we would have owned no more assets than we did during

1995. We would, however, have had somewhat lower earnings because

the cost of float was negative last year. That is, our float threw

off profits. And, of course, to obtain the replacement equity, we

would have needed to sell many new shares of Berkshire. The net

result - more shares, equal assets and lower earnings - would have

materially reduced the value of our stock. So you can understand

why float wonderfully benefits a business - if it is obtained at a

low cost.

由于多年来这些保险浮存金几乎没有让我们增加任何额外的成本，所以它们实际

上等同于股本，当然不同于真正的股本，这些资金并不真正属于我们，不过假设

在1994年我们持有的不是34亿美元的浮存金，而是34亿美元的股本的话，

在这种情况下，我们拥有的总资产一点都不会增加，而且我们的盈余却可能还会

不增反减，因为去年浮存金的成本是负的，也就是说浮存金的存在对于我们的获

利还有额外的贡献，而资本的增加却代表着Berkshire必须额外再发行许多新

股，所以想当然尔，更多的股份代表着更低的每股盈余，等于大大地减损了每股

股份的价值，所以大家应该能够了解，为什么浮存金对于一个企业来说如此的重

要，尤其是当它们取得的成本极低之时。

Our acquisition of GEICO will immediately increase our float

by nearly $3 billion, with additional growth almost certain. We

also expect GEICO to operate at a decent underwriting profit in

most years, a fact that will increase the probability that our

total float will cost us nothing. Of course, we paid a very

substantial price for the GEICO float, whereas virtually all of the

gains in float depicted in the table were developed internally.

在购并GEICO之后，我们的保险浮存金马上增加近30亿美元，而且展望未来

这数字还会继续成长，此外我们也预期GEICO每年还能够继续拥有相当的承保

获利，这等于保证这些浮存金不但不须负担资金成本还能额外贡献给我们获利，

当然就内部转拨而言，我们还是必须支付GEICO一笔相当的对价以取得浮存

金。

Our enthusiasm over 1995's insurance results must be tempered

once again because we had our third straight year of good fortune

in the super-cat business. In this operation, we sell policies

that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves

from the effects of mega-catastrophes. Since truly major

catastrophes occur infrequently, our super-cat business can be

expected to show large profits in most years but occasionally to

record a huge loss. In other words, the attractiveness of our

super-cat business will take many years to measure. We know that

the results of years like the past three will be at least partially

offset by some truly terrible year in the future. We just hope

that "partially" turns out to be the proper adverb.

对于1995年我们的保险营运绩效的兴奋程度可能要再度稍微降温一下，原因在

于我们的霹雳猫再保业务连续第三年大放异彩，我们出售保单给保险公司与再保

公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，由于真正重大的灾害并不

常发生，所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，才突然发生重大的

损失，换句话说，我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几年才有办

法看得清，我们很清楚的了解过去三年来优异的成果一定会被未来某些悲惨的年

度给抵消掉部份的效果，当然我们希望所谓的"部份"是个适当的形容词。

There were plenty of catastrophes last year, but no super-cats

of the insured variety. The Southeast had a close call when Opal,

sporting winds of 150 miles per hour, hovered off Florida.

However, the storm abated before hitting land, and so a second

Andrew was dodged. For insurers, the Kobe earthquake was another

close call: The economic damage was huge - perhaps even a record -

but only a tiny portion of it was insured. The insurance industry

won't always be that lucky.

去年天灾不断，但没有一个逾越霹雳猫的界限，曾有一个强风Opal在美国东南

部以每小时150英哩的速度徘徊在佛罗里达附近，所幸它在登陆前及时转弱，

而避免成为第二个Andrew飓风，另外对保险公司来说，阪神大地震同样令人

印象深刻，不可讳言，那次造成的总体经济损失可算是空前，不过由于其中仅有

一小部份有保险，所以最后真正保险理赔的金额有限，当然保险业不可能永远都

那么幸运。

Ajit Jain is the guiding genius of our super-cat business and

writes important non-cat business as well. In insurance, the term

"catastrophe" is applied to an event, such as a hurricane or

earthquake, that causes a great many insured losses. The other

deals Ajit enters into usually cover only a single large loss. A

simplified description of three transactions from last year will

illustrate both what I mean and Ajit's versatility. We insured: (1)

The life of Mike Tyson for a sum that is large initially and that,

fight-by-fight, gradually declines to zero over the next few years;

(2) Lloyd's against more than 225 of its "names" dying during the

year; and (3) The launch, and a year of orbit, of two Chinese

satellites. Happily, both satellites are orbiting, the Lloyd's folk

avoided abnormal mortality, and if Mike Tyson looked any healthier,

no one would get in the ring with him.

Ajit Jain可说是我们霹雳猫业务的天纵英才，当然他同时也负责许多重要的非霹

雳猫业务，在保险业所谓的灾害，系指可能导致许多理赔损失的事件，诸如飓风

或地震等，另外Ajit也负责受理一些单一重大事件的投保，以下三件个案应该

可充分以说明我所说的意思，同时展现Ajit的多才多艺，我们受理(1)拳王泰森

的生命险，当然一开始金额相当的高，但随着一场场的比赛在几年后逐渐递减到

最后变成零(2)英国最大保险劳埃氏总计225人的生命险以及(3)保证两颗中国

卫星的发射及在轨道上周转一年；结果所幸中国卫星发射顺利，并在轨道上正常

运转，同时劳埃氏的死亡率还算正常，而拳王泰森看起来再健康不过，看不出有

谁可以从他手上抢下冠军戒指。

Berkshire is sought out for many kinds of insurance, both

super-cat and large single-risk, because: (1) our financial

strength is unmatched, and insureds know we can and will pay our

losses under the most adverse of circumstances; (2) we can supply a

quote faster than anyone in the business; and (3) we will issue

policies with limits larger than anyone else is prepared to write.

Most of our competitors have extensive reinsurance treaties and

lay off much of their business. While this helps them avoid shock

losses, it also hurts their flexibility and reaction time. As you

know, Berkshire moves quickly to seize investment and acquisition

opportunities; in insurance we respond with the same exceptional

speed. In another important point, large coverages don't frighten

us but, on the contrary, intensify our interest. We have offered a

policy under which we could have lost $1 billion; the largest

coverage that a client accepted was $400 million.

Berkshire目前积极寻求各类保险业务，包含霹雳猫与大型单一风险，因为(1)

我们无与伦比的财务实力，使得投保客户可以确定不论在多糟的状况下，他们都

可以顺利获得理赔(2)我们可以最快的速度向客户完成报价(3)我们可以签下比其

他保险公司金额更高的保单，其它竞争同业大多都有范围广阔的再保条款，并将

大部分的业务分保出去，虽然这样的做法可以让他们避免重大的损失意外，但却

也破坏掉他们的弹性与反应时间，大家都知道，Berkshire抓住投资与购并的动

作向来相当的快，在保险业务方面我们的反应速度也是如此，另外还有很重要的

一点，高额的保险上限吓唬不了我们，相反地更能引起我们的兴趣，我们可以接

受的最高理赔上限是10亿美元，相较之下，其它同业所能容忍的最高限度仅为

4亿美元。

We will get hit from time to time with large losses. Charlie

and I, however, are quite willing to accept relatively volatile

results in exchange for better long-term earnings than we would

otherwise have had. In other words, we prefer a lumpy 15% to a

smooth 12%. Since most managers opt for smoothness, we are left

with a competitive advantage that we try to maximize. We do,

though, monitor our aggregate exposure in order to keep our "worst

case" at a level that leaves us comfortable.

总有一天我们会碰上大麻烦，但是查理跟我本人却相当可以接受这种变动剧烈的

结局，只要长期来说我们的报酬可以令人满意，讲的再白一点，我们比较喜欢上

下变动的15%，更甚于平淡无奇的12%，而正因为大部分的经理人倾向平淡，

这使得我们长期报酬极大化的目标享有绝对的竞争优势，当然我们会密切注意避

免让最坏的状况超越我们可以容忍的范围。

Indeed, our worst case from a "once-in-a-century" super-cat is

far less severe - relative to net worth - than that faced by many

well-known primary companies writing great numbers of property

policies. These insurers don't issue single huge-limit policies as

we do, but their small policies, in aggregate, can create a risk of

staggering size. The "big one" would blow right through the

reinsurance covers of some of these insurers, exposing them to

uncapped losses that could threaten their survival. In our case,

losses would be large, but capped at levels we could easily handle.

事实上，即使是发生百年一次的超级大灾难的最坏情况下，我们净值所可能受到

的损害程度可以远比其它签下一大堆产物意外险保单的知名保险业者要来的轻

微许多，虽然这些同业没有像我们一样签下单一极高上限的保单，但是所谓积沙

成塔，他们累积的小额保单却可能造成无以弥补的后果，因为后者可能会直接穿

越再保险的防护罩，使他们必须承担没有上限的损失与生存的危机，至于我们，

损失数字虽然很大，但却是在我们可以轻易化解的范围之内。

Prices are weakening in the super-cat field. That is

understandable considering the influx of capital into the

reinsurance business a few years ago and the natural desire of

those holding the capital to employ it. No matter what others may

do, we will not knowingly write business at inadequate rates. We

unwittingly did this in the early 1970's and, after more than 20

years, regularly receive significant bills stemming from the

mistakes of that era. My guess is that we will still be getting

surprises from that business 20 years from now. A bad reinsurance

contract is like hell: easy to enter and impossible to exit.

近年来霹雳猫保单的价格一直萎糜不振，这点可以理解的原因在于几年前大量的

资金流进再保业界竞逐有限的保单生意，然而不管别人怎么做，我们是绝对不会

以不合理的价格赔钱做生意的，早在1970年代初期，我们就一直在不知情的情

况下，犯下类似的错误，结果在往后的二十年内，因为那个年代错误所付出的代

价，化成理赔损失的帐单不断地涌进本公司，而我有预感我们将会为20年前所

犯的错误继续付出代价，一张糟糕的再保合约就像是地狱一样，进去容易，但想

要出来可就难了。

I actively participated in those early reinsurance decisions,

and Berkshire paid a heavy tuition for my education in the

business. Unfortunately, reinsurance students can't attend school

on scholarship. GEICO, incidentally, suffered a similar,

disastrous experience in the early 1980's, when it plunged

enthusiastically into the writing of reinsurance and large risks.

GEICO's folly was brief, but it will be cleaning things up for at

least another decade. The well-publicized problems at Lloyd's

further illustrate the perils of reinsurance and also underscore

how vital it is that the interests of the people who write

insurance business be aligned - on the downside as well as the

upside - with those of the people putting up the capital. When

that kind of symmetry is missing, insurers almost invariably run

into trouble, though its existence may remain hidden for some time.

早年我积极参与再保业务，结果使得Berkshire必须为我这一堂课付出昂贵的学

费，更不幸的是，修再保课程的学生根本没有办法拿到奖学金，碰巧的是GEICO

在1980年代初期，也面临过类似悲惨的命运，当时该公司一头热地栽进再保与

大型灾害保险的业务，虽然GEICO愚昧的举动为期不久，但是它却必须花费十

年以上的工夫收拾残局，著名的英国劳埃氏保险的困境进一步说明了不当再保可

能造成的灾难以及共同投入资金参与保险业务出资人的利益，基本上就是一个生

命共同体，不管是在顺境与逆境皆然，一旦人们失去对于这点观念的聚焦，保险

业者就注定会发生问题，而且通常必须经历一段时间后，问题才会逐渐地浮上台

面。

A small, apocryphal story about an insurance CEO who was

visited by an analyst tells a lot about this industry. To the

analyst's questions about his business, the CEO had nothing but

gloomy answers: Rates were ridiculously low; the reserves on his

balance sheet weren't adequate for ordinary claims, much less those

likely to arise from asbestos and environmental problems; most of

his reinsurers had long since gone broke, leaving him holding the

sack. But then the CEO brightened: "Still, things could be a lot

worse," he said. "It could be my money." At Berkshire, it's our

money.

有一段小故事是有关一位保险公司总裁接受一位分析师访问谈到保险业的经

营，面对分析师询问关于其公司的情况时，得到的答案显得相当无奈，费率低得

离谱、财务报表上所提的准备连一般理赔都不够，更不要说其它那些因为石绵与

环保问题所引发的重大损害赔偿，想到许多以往依靠的再保公司都已倒闭，只剩

他一个人独撑大局，突然间这位总裁略微释怀的说到，当然情况有可能会更糟，

再来可能就会轮到我的荷包，天啊!在Berkshire，这可是我们的荷包呢!

Berkshire's other insurance operations, though relatively

small, performed magnificently in 1995. National Indemnity's

traditional business had a combined ratio of 84.2 and developed, as

usual, a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over

the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had an

average combined ratio of 85.6. Our homestate

operation, managed by Rod Eldred, grew at a good rate in 1995 and

achieved a combined ratio of 81.4. Its three-year combined ratio

is an amazing 82.4. Berkshire's California workers' compensation

business, run by Brad Kinstler, faced fierce price-cutting in 1995

and lost a great many renewals when we refused to accept inadequate

rates. Though this operation's volume dropped materially, it

produced an excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at

Central States Indemnity, continues to do an extraordinary job.

His premium volume was up 23% in 1995, and underwriting profit grew

by 59%. Ajit, Don, Rod, Brad and John are all under 45, an

embarrassing fact demolishing my theory that managers only hit

their stride after they reach 70.

Berkshire其它的保险营运，虽然规模相对较小，但在1995年的表现却同样极

为出色，国家产物保险传统业务的综合比率只有84.2，同时以其保费收入来看，

还贡献了大量的浮存金，过去三年以来，这个由Don Wurster负责的部门平均

的综合比率只有85.6；另外由Rod Eldred负责的Homestate业务也有相当幅

度的成长，去年的综合比率更只有81.4，过去三年平均为82.4；由Brad负责

的加州劳工退休基金在1995年面对激烈的价格竞争，同时还因为拒绝不合理的

降价要求而失去续约的机会，虽然此举使得业务量大幅缩减，但整体的承保利益

仍然相当可观；最后负责中央州立产险公司营运的John则依然表现出色，1995

年的保费收入成长23%，承保利益更大幅增加59%，Ajit、Don、Rod、Brad

与John的年纪都在45岁以下，这种情况也让我以往认为经理人要到70之后

才能随心所欲的论点破功。

To sum up, we entered 1995 with an exceptional insurance

operation of moderate size. By adding GEICO, we entered 1996 with

a business still better in quality, much improved in its growth

prospects, and doubled in size. More than ever, insurance is our

core strength.

总的来说，1995年我们规模适中的保险事业缴出漂亮的成绩单，而展望1996

年，在GEICO加入之后，在维持保险事业原有的品质之下，规模与成长皆可期，

较之以往，保险事业已成为我们核心竞争事业。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table below shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported

earnings. In this presentation, purchase-premium charges are not

assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are

instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you

view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been

reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation

seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one

utilizing GAAP, which requires purchase-premiums to be charged off,

business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are,

of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial

statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

(in millions)

---------------------------------------

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

------------------ ------------------

1995 1994 1995 1994

-------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting ............... $ 20.5 $129.9 $ 11.3 $ 80.9

Net Investment Income ...... 501.6 419.4 417.7 350.5

Buffalo News ................. 46.8 54.2 27.3 31.7

Fechheimer ................... 16.9 14.3 8.8 7.1

Finance Businesses ........... 20.8 22.1 12.6 14.6

Home Furnishings ............. 29.7(1) 17.4 16.7(1) 8.7

Jewelry ...................... 33.9(2) ---(3) 19.1(2) ---(3)

Kirby ........................ 50.2 42.3 32.1 27.7

Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 34.1 39.5 21.2 24.9

See's Candies ................ 50.2 47.5 29.8 28.2

Shoe Group ................... 58.4 85.5 37.5 55.8

World Book ................... 8.8 24.7 7.0 17.3

Purchase-Price Premium Charges (27.0) (22.6) (23.4) (19.4)

Interest Expense(4) .......... (56.0) (60.1) (34.9) (37.3)

Shareholder-Designated

Contributions ............ (11.6) (10.4) (7.0) (6.7)

Other ........................ 37.4 35.7 24.4 22.3

-------- -------- -------- --------

Operating Earnings ............. 814.7 839.4 600.2 606.2

Sales of Securities ............ 194.1 91.3 125.0 61.1

Decline in Value of

USAir Preferred Stock ...... --- (268.5) --- (172.6)

--------- -------- -------- --------

Total Earnings - All Entities $1,008.8 $662.2 $725.2 $494.8

======= ======= ====== ======

(1) Includes R.C. Willey from June 29, 1995.

(1)包含R.C. Willey 1995年6月29日以后的盈余

(2) Includes Helzberg's from April 30, 1995.

(2)包含Helzberg 1995年4月30日以后的盈余

(3) Jewelry earnings were included in "Other" in 1994.

(3)珠宝事业1994年的盈余包含在其它项目之下

(4) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

(4)扣除金融事业的利息支出

A large amount of information about these businesses is given

on pages 41-52, where you will also find our segment earnings

reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 57-63, we have

rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-

GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and

I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the

financial information that we would wish you to give us if our

positions were reversed.

在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，至于我们

的目的是希望能够给大家，所有查理跟我认为在评估Berkshire价值时，应该必

要的信息。

At Berkshire, we believe in Charlie's dictum - "Just tell me

the bad news; the good news will take care of itself" - and that is

the behavior we expect of our managers when they are reporting to

us. Consequently, I also owe you - Berkshire's owners - a report

on three operations that, though they continued to earn decent (or

better) returns on invested capital, experienced a decline in

earnings last year. Each encountered a different type of problem.

在Berkshire，我们相信查理的格言，只管告诉我坏消息，因为好消息绝对会不

胫而走，而这也是我们希望旗下事业经理人向我们报告时所采取的态度，也因此

身为Berkshire负责人的我有义务向大家报告，去年总共有三个事业营运发生问

题，虽然投资在他们身上的资金所取得的报酬率仍然相当的不错(或甚至是更

好)，但每个事业都面临了不同的问题。

Our shoe business operated in an industry that suffered

depressed earnings throughout last year, and many of our

competitors made only marginal profits or worse. That means we at

least maintained, and in some instances widened, our competitive

superiority. So I have no doubt that our shoe operations will

climb back to top-grade earnings in the future. In other words,

though the turn has not yet occurred, we believe you should view

last year's figures as reflecting a cyclical problem, not a secular

one.

去年一整年我们的鞋类事业一直面临产业困境，有些同业只能勉强赚取蝇头小

利，甚至是亏钱，当然这也代表在某个层面来说，至少我们与同业间仍维持着甚

至是扩大了竞争差距，所以我依然坚信在未来，我们的鞋类事业一定能够回复以

往的高获利，换句话说，虽然目前尚未看到反转的迹象，但我认为大家可以将去

年的数字视为景气即将反转的底部，而不是永远的谷底。

The Buffalo News, though still doing very well in comparison

to other newspapers, is another story. In this case, industry

trends are not good. In the 1991 Annual Report, I explained that

newspapers had lost a notch in their economic attractiveness from

the days when they appeared to have a bullet-proof franchise.

Today, the industry retains its excellent economics, but has lost

still another notch. Over time, we expect the competitive strength

of newspapers to gradually erode, though the industry should

nevertheless remain a fine business for many years to come.

至于水牛城新闻报的表现，较之同业虽然还是相当不错，却也面临另外的问题，

那就是报业前景不佳，在1991年的年报中，我就曾说过报业早已失去以往金刚

不摧的特许事业所享有的竞争优势，虽然时至今日，报业经营还算稳定，但却逐

渐失去另一项竞争优势，我们预期报业的竞争力将与日剧减，虽然这产业在未来

可见的年度内还是一项不错的投资。

Berkshire's most difficult problem is World Book, which

operates in an industry beset by increasingly tough competition

from CD-ROM and on-line offerings. True, we are still profitable,

a claim that perhaps no other print encyclopedia can make. But our

sales and earnings trends have gone in the wrong direction. At the

end of 1995, World Book made major changes in the way it

distributes its product, stepped up its efforts with electronic

products and sharply reduced its overhead costs. It will take time

for us to evaluate the effects of these initiatives, but we are

confident they will significantly improve our viability.

在Berkshire目前状况最多的就属世界百科全书，面临来自CD与网络激烈的竞

争，虽然我们仍能勉强维持获利，(大概没有其它百科全书业者敢这样说)，不过

业绩与获利却直线下滑，因此在1995年底，世界百科全书决定大幅改变行销方

式，加强电子产品内容并大幅降低营运成本，当然这些做法的成效还有待观察，

不过我个人相信此举绝对有助于我们继续维持生存。

All of our operations, including those whose earnings fell

last year, benefit from exceptionally talented and dedicated

managers. Were we to have the choice of any other executives now

working in their industries, there is not one of our managers we

would replace.

我们旗下所有的事业，也包含几个获利大幅衰退的公司，一直都由杰出专注的经

理人所经营，就算我们有机会能够挖到业界最好的经理人，但我们还是不会考虑

将给他们取代掉。

Many of our managers don't have to work for a living, but

simply go out and perform every day for the same reason that

wealthy golfers stay on the tour: They love both doing what they

do and doing it well. To describe them as working may be a

misnomer - they simply prefer spending much of their time on a

productive activity at which they excel to spending it on leisure

activities. Our job is to provide an environment that will keep

them feeling this way, and so far we seem to have succeeded:

Thinking back over the 1965-95 period, I can't recall that a single

key manager has left Berkshire to join another employer.

我们有许多经理人根本就不必靠这份工作过活，但每天还是一样全力以赴，就像

是口袋麦克麦克的职业高尔夫球选手还是继续打巡回赛一样，他们喜欢现在从事

的工作，而且把它做的很好，把他们形容是在工作或许是个错误的名词，他们只

不过是把他们大部分的时间花在他们所擅长的生产活动而非休闲活动之上而

已，而我的工作则是努力维持一个让他们有这样感觉的环境，截至目前为止，我

们做的还算是相当成功，回顾过去1965年到1995年这三十年间，Berkshire

没有任何一位主要经理人发生琵琶别抱的情况。

Common Stock Investments

股票投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a

market value of more than $600 million are itemized.

下表是我们超过六亿美元以上的普通股投资。

12/31/95

Shares Company Cost Market

---------- ------- -------- --------

(dollars in millions)

49,456,900 American Express Company ............. $1,392.7 $2,046.3

20,000,000 Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ............. 345.0 2,467.5

100,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company ................ 1,298.9 7,425.0

12,502,500 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.

("Freddie Mac") ................... 260.1 1,044.0

34,250,000 GEICO Corp. .......................... 45.7 2,393.2

48,000,000 The Gillette Company ................. 600.0 2,502.0

6,791,218 Wells Fargo & Company ................ 423.7 1,466.9

Others ............................... 1,379.0 2,655.4

-------- ---------

Total Common Stocks .................. $5,745.1 $22,000.3

======= =======

We continue in our Rip Van Winkle mode: Five of our six top

positions at yearend 1994 were left untouched during 1995. The

sixth was American Express, in which we increased our ownership to

about 10%.

我们继续做着我们的李伯大梦，在1994年持有的前六大持股中，有五支在1995

年维持不动，唯一有变动的是美国运通，我们将持有股权比例提高到10%左右。

In early 1996, two major events affected our holdings: First,

our purchase of the GEICO stock we did not already own caused that

company to be converted into a wholly-owned subsidiary. Second, we

exchanged our Cap Cities shares for a combination of cash and

Disney stock.

在1996年初期，有两个重大事件影响到我们的持股，首先在买下GEICO剩余

一半的股份之后，GEICO变成我们百分之百持有的子公司，第二，我们将资本

城股份转换成现金与迪士尼股票。

In the Disney merger, Cap Cities shareholders had a choice of

actions. If they chose, they could exchange each of their Cap

Cities shares for one share of Disney stock plus $65. Or they

could ask for - though not necessarily get - all cash or all stock,

with their ultimate allotment of each depending on the choices made

by other shareholders and certain decisions made by Disney. For

our 20 million shares, we sought stock, but do not know, as this

report goes to press, how much we were allocated. We are certain,

however, to receive something over 20 million Disney shares. We

have also recently bought Disney stock in the market.

在迪士尼的并购案中，原来资本城的股东可以有好几种选择，他们可以选择将原

有一股转换成迪士尼的一股外加65美元现金，或者他们可以要求全部换成现金

或是股票，但是最终可获得的分配结果还要视其它股东的选择以及迪士尼本身的

态度而定，以我们持有2,000万股来说，我们选择全部转换成股票，不过到年

报截止日为止，我们还不确定到底可以分配到多少股份，当然可以确定的是最后

收到的股数一定会超过2,000万股，除此之外，我们还透过公开市场继续收购

迪士尼的股份。

One more bit of history: I first became interested in Disney

in 1966, when its market valuation was less than $90 million, even

though the company had earned around $21 million pre-tax in 1965

and was sitting with more cash than debt. At Disneyland, the $17

million Pirates of the Caribbean ride would soon open. Imagine my

excitement - a company selling at only five times rides!

再透露一点历史，我第一次对迪士尼发生兴趣是在1966年，当时它的股票市值

还不到9,000万美元，虽然该公司在前一年度-1965年的税前净利是2,100万

美元，而且所拥有的现金甚至多过于负债，当时迪斯奈乐园斥资1,700万美元

的加勒比海海盗船才刚要开幕，而这家公司的卖价只不过是这艄海盗船的五倍!

Duly impressed, Buffett Partnership Ltd. bought a significant

amount of Disney stock at a split-adjusted price of 31?per share.

That decision may appear brilliant, given that the stock now sells

for $66. But your Chairman was up to the task of nullifying it:

In 1967 I sold out at 48?per share.

印象深刻的我，利用巴菲特合伙企业的资金，买进一大笔的股份，照分割调整后

的平均成本约31美元一股，这样的决定显然很正确，因为现在的股价大概是

66美元一股，各位的董事长却在1967年以每股48美元将这批股票卖出，使

得其效果大打折扣。

Oh well - we're happy to be once again a large owner of a

business with both unique assets and outstanding management.

不过还好，绕了半天，我们很高兴能够再度成为这家拥有独特资产与杰出管理阶

层公司的大股东。

Convertible Preferred Stocks

可转换特别股

As many of you will remember, Berkshire made five private

purchases of convertible preferred stocks during the 1987-91 period

and the time seems right to discuss their status. Here are the

particulars:

大家可能都还记得，Berkshire在1987年到1991年透过与公司私下协议的方

式，取得五种可转换特别股，现在的时机很适合来谈谈它们现在的状况，以下是

一些重点摘要。

Dividend Year of Market

Company Rate Purchase Cost Value

------- -------- -------- ------ --------

(dollars in millions)

Champion International Corp. ... 9 1/4% 1989 $300 $388(1)

First Empire State Corp. ....... 9% 1991 40 110

The Gillette Company ........... 8 3/4% 1989 600 2,502(2)

Salomon Inc .................... 9% 1987 700 728(3)

USAir Group, Inc. .............. 9 1/4% 1989 358 215

(1) Proceeds from sale of common we received through conversion in 1995.

(2) 12/31/95 value of common we received through conversion in 1991.

(3) Includes $140 we received in 1995 from partial redemption.

(1)系1995年转换为普通股后，出售股票的收入。

(2)系1991年转换为普通股后的股票市值。

(3)包含1995年收到部份赎回的1.4亿美元收入。

In each case we had the option of sticking with these

preferreds as fixed-income securities or converting them into

common stock. Initially, their value to us came primarily from

their fixed-income characteristics. The option we had to convert

was a kicker.

每一个案子我们都有权选择维持原来以固定收益证券为主的特别股形式或是将

它们转换成普通股，刚开始它们的价值主要来自于固定收益证券的特质，至于其

所附带的转换权利只不过具有加分的作用而已。

Our $300 million private purchase of American Express "Percs"

- described in the 1991 Annual Report - is not included in the

table because that security was a modified form of common stock

whose fixed-income characteristics contributed only a minor portion

of its initial value. Three years after we bought them, the Percs

automatically were converted to common stock. In contrast, the

five securities in the table were set to become common stocks only

if we wished them to - a crucial difference.

另外在1991年的年报中已经介绍过，我们透过私募所取得的美国运通Percs，

并未包含在本表之中，其原因主要是因为Percs事实上是一种普通股的修订版，

其固定收益的特性只占其原始价值的一小部份，在我们买下它们的三年后已经自

动转为美国运通的普通股，相对的，本表所提到的五种有价证券只有在我们有意

愿的状况下，才会转变成一般的普通股，基本上这之间有相当大的差异。

When we purchased our convertible securities, I told you that

we expected to earn after-tax returns from them that "moderately"

exceeded what we could earn from the medium-term fixed-income

securities they replaced. We beat this expectation - but only

because of the performance of a single issue. I also told you that

these securities, as a group, would "not produce the returns we can

achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects."

Unfortunately, that prediction was fulfilled. Finally, I said

that "under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to

return us our money plus dividends." That's one I would like to

have back. Winston Churchill once said that "eating my words has

never given me indigestion." My assertion, however, that it was

almost impossible for us to lose money on our preferreds has caused

me some well-deserved heartburn.

当我们买进这些可转换证券时，我曾经跟各位提到我们预期这些投资的税后报酬

率应该可以略高于其所取代的中期固定收益证券，幸运的是结果超乎预期，原因

是因为其中有一个案子发了，同时我也提醒过各位，这些投资可能无法与真正找

到具有竞争优势好公司的投资相比，不幸的就这点而言，我一语中的，最后我还

说过，不论在任何状况下，我们完全可以预期这些投资一定能够回收本金再加上

股息，这句话我想要收回来，虽然英国前首相丘吉尔曾说过︰把说过的话吞回

去，并不会让人消化不良，但是关于我说过"特别股一定不会让我们赔钱的这句

话"确实让我感到心痛。

Our best holding has been Gillette, which we told you from the

start was a superior business. Ironically, though, this is also

the purchase in which I made my biggest mistake - of a kind,

however, never recognized on financial statements.

其中表现最佳的是吉列特别股，从一开始我就跟各位说过这是一家相当好的公

司，不过讽刺的是，这也是我犯过的一个大错之一，虽然这项错误从未反应在财

务报表之上。

We paid $600 million in 1989 for Gillette preferred shares

that were convertible into 48 million (split-adjusted) common

shares. Taking an alternative route with the $600 million, I

probably could have purchased 60 million shares of common from the

company. The market on the common was then about $10.50, and given

that this would have been a huge private placement carrying

important restrictions, I probably could have bought the stock at a

discount of at least 5%. I can't be sure about this, but it's

likely that Gillette's management would have been just as happy to

have Berkshire opt for common.

我们在1989年以六亿美元取得吉列可转换特别股，之后并转换为4,800万股

吉列的普通股(分割调整后)，然而要是当初我们选择直接投资该公司的普通股，

这笔钱将可以买到6,000万股，因为吉列当时每股的市价为10.5美元，而由于

那次的私募对于我们有诸多的限制条款，所以拿到5%左右的折扣应该不成问

题，我不知道这样说对不对，我认为当时要是我们选择直接以取得普通股的方式

投资，该公司的管理阶层可能会更高兴。

But I was far too clever to do that. Instead, for less than

two years, we received some extra dividend income (the difference

between the preferred's yield and that of the common), at which

point the company - quite properly - called the issue, moving to do

that as quickly as was possible. If I had negotiated for common

rather than preferred, we would have been better off at yearend

1995 by $625 million, minus the "excess" dividends of about $70

million.

可惜人算不如天算，虽然在这两年内我们另外还收到额外的特别股股息(这是普

通股所没有的)，如果当初我选择普通股而非特别股的话，截至1995年止我们

将可多获得6.25亿美元的利益，当然还要再扣除7,000万美元的特别股股息。

In the case of Champion, the ability of the company to call

our preferred at 115% of cost forced a move out of us last August

that we would rather have delayed. In this instance, we converted

our shares just prior to the pending call and offered them to the

company at a modest discount.

另外在Champion这个案子，由于公司可以以115%的价位赎回我们持有的特

别股，使得我们被迫于去年八月有所动作，这个案子就在公司即将有权动用赎回

权的前夕，以略微打折的价格申请转换为普通股。

Charlie and I have never had a conviction about the paper

industry - actually, I can't remember ever owning the common stock

of a paper producer in my 54 years of investing - so our choice in

August was whether to sell in the market or to the company.

Champion's management had always been candid and honorable in

dealing with us and wished to repurchase common shares, so we

offered our stock to the company. Our Champion capital gain was

moderate - about 19% after tax from a six-year investment - but the

preferred delivered us a good after-tax dividend yield throughout

our holding period. (That said, many press accounts have

overstated the after-tax yields earned by property-casualty

insurance companies on dividends paid to them. What the press has

failed to take into account is a change in the tax law that took

effect in 1987 and that significantly reduced the dividends

received credit applicable to insurers. For details, see our 1986

Annual Report.)

查理跟我对造纸业从来没有涉猎，事实上在我长达54年的投资生涯中，印象中

从来就没有持有过纸类股的股票，所以去年八月我们可以做的选择大概就是将这

笔投资在市场上卖掉或是任由公司赎回，在我们投资Champion的过程中，该

公司经营阶层对我们的态度一向坦白自重，而他们也希望将这批股票买回，所以

到最后我们决定顺应公司的要求，这项举动让我们有19%的税后资本利得，当

然还要再加上持有六年期间所收到的特别股股息，(附带一提，许多新闻报导都

过度高估一般产物意外险业者所收到股利收入的税后报酬率，原因在于媒体记者

忘了将1987年通过的新税法列入考虑，这项税法大大减少了保险业者最后可以

得到的利益，相关的细节请参阅1986年的年报)。

Our First Empire preferred will be called on March 31, 1996,

the earliest date allowable. We are comfortable owning stock in

well-run banks, and we will convert and keep our First Empire

common shares. Bob Wilmers, CEO of the company, is an outstanding

banker, and we love being associated with him.

我们在第一帝国银行的特别股在1996年3月1日进行转换，这是可以转换的

最早日期，我们对于能够继续持有这家经营良好银行的股份感到相当安心，该公

司的总裁Bob Wilmers是位相当优秀的银行家，我们很高兴能够与他一起合

作。

Our other two preferreds have been disappointing, though the

Salomon preferred has modestly outperformed the fixed-income

securities for which it was a substitute. However, the amount of

management time Charlie and I have devoted to this holding has been

vastly greater than its economic significance to Berkshire.

Certainly I never dreamed I would take a new job at age 60 -

Salomon interim chairman, that is - because of an earlier purchase

of a fixed-income security.

另外两个特别股投资个案的结果就让人相当失望，虽然所罗门特别股最后的投资

报酬率仍高于其替代的固定收益证券投资，不过若考量查理跟我本人在这项投资

上所花费的心思，其所得与付出实在是不成正比，当然我根本就没有料到到了

60岁的这把年纪，会因为一笔固定收益证券的投资，还能够接下这项担任所罗

门临时董事会主席的新工作。

Soon after our purchase of the Salomon preferred in 1987, I

wrote that I had "no special insights regarding the direction or

future profitability of investment banking." Even the most

charitable commentator would conclude that I have since proved my

point.

1987年就在我们刚刚买下所罗门特别股不久之后，我就曾经说过我们对于投资

银行业的发展前景与获利能力并没有特殊的见地，我想事后看来就算是最好心的

评论家，也会觉得我当时说的那段话很有道理。

To date, our option to convert into Salomon common has not

proven of value. Furthermore, the Dow Industrials have doubled

since I committed to buy the preferred, and the brokerage group has

performed equally as well. That means my decision to go with

Salomon because I saw value in the conversion option must be graded

as very poor. Even so, the preferred has continued under some

trying conditions to deliver as a fixed-income security, and the

9% dividend is currently quite attractive.

到目前为止，我们拥有将这笔投资转换为所罗门普通股的权利，其价值尚未浮

现，另外自从买进这笔投资后，道琼指数已经涨了一倍，而券商的表现也相当不

错，这代表我因为判断转换权利相当有价值而决定继续与所罗门交往的决策品质

相当的差，不过即便如此，这笔特别股投资还是相当勉力地继续当作我们的固定

收益证券投资，毕竟每年9%的股息收入还是相当诱人的。

Unless the preferred is converted, its terms require

redemption of 20% of the issue on October 31 of each year, 1995-99,

and $140 million of our original $700 million was taken on schedule

last year. (Some press reports labeled this a sale, but a senior

security that matures is not "sold.") Though we did not elect to

convert the preferred that matured last year, we have four more

bites at the conversion apple, and I believe it quite likely that

we will yet find value in our right to convert.

除非我们选择转换，否则这项投资有一条款约定从1995年10月31日开始的

五年，该公司每年都可赎回20%的投资，所以去年我们总计7亿的投资中，1.4

亿已按计画由公司赎回，(有些新闻报导将这笔交易称呼为出售，事实上债券到

期后应该称之为"赎回")，虽然去年我们放弃转换选择而被赎回，不过我们还有四

次机会，而我也相信未来我们应该很有可能在这些转换的权利中找到一些价值存

在。

I discussed the USAir investment at length in last year's

report. The company's results improved in 1995, but it still faces

significant problems. On the plus side for us is the fact that our

preferred is structurally well-designed: For example, though we

have not been paid dividends since June 1994, the amounts owed us

are compounding at 5% over the prime rate. On the minus side is

the fact that we are dealing with a weak credit.

去年我花了相当大的篇幅讨论美国航空，这家公司今年的表现略微好转，不过还

是着面临许多的问题，幸运的是我们的特别股投资条款当初订的对我们较有利，

比如说，虽然从1994年起本来应该付给我们的特别股股息就已跳票，但是欠我

们的股息每年还是必须以5%的基放利率加计利息，不过不幸的是跟我们打交道

的是一家债信不良的公司。

We feel much better about our USAir preferred than we did a

year ago, but your guess is as good as mine as to its ultimate

value. (Indeed, considering my record with this investment, it's

fair to say that your guess may be better than mine.) At yearend

we carried our preferred (in which there is no public market) at

60% of par, though USAir also has outstanding a junior preferred

that is significantly inferior to ours in all respects except

conversion price and that was then trading at 82% of par. As I

write this, the junior issue has advanced to 97% of par. Let's

hope the market is right.

关于美国航空特别股的情况，比起一年前，我们现在乐观许多，不过这家公司最

后到底会变成怎样，我跟各位一样还是没有任何头绪，(事实上，观诸过去本人

在这项投资上的经验，或许各位的看法要比起我个人来得具参考价值)，截至去

年底，我们帐列的特别股投资金额是票面金额的60%(此特别股并没有公开明确

的市价)，虽然在此同时，美国航空还有另一项发行在外，除了转换价格之外，

其余的条件包含抵押顺位都不如我们的特别股，系以票面金额的82%左右的价

位进行交易，而就在我写这份年报的同时，其交易的价格已上涨为票面金额的

97%，衷心期盼市场的看法是对的。

Overall, our preferreds have performed well, but that is true

only because of one huge winner, Gillette. Leaving aside Gillette,

our preferreds as a group have delivered us after-tax returns no

more than equal to those we could have earned from the medium-term

fixed-income issues that they replaced.

总的来说，我们的特别股投资绩效算是相当不错的了，不过主要的原因还在于压

对了吉列特别股这个宝，若扣除吉列不记，我们其它的特别股投资带给我们的税

后盈余，大概仅与原先他们所取代的中期固定收益债券的投资报酬率差不了多

少。

A Proposed Recapitalization

股权重组提案

At the Annual Meeting you will be asked to approve a

recapitalization of Berkshire, creating two classes of stock. If

the plan is adopted, our existing common stock will be designated

as Class A Common Stock and a new Class B Common Stock will be

authorized.

今年的股东会将会有一项股权重组提案需要各位进行投票表决，一旦获得通过，

Berkshire原来发行的股份，将会被分拆为两种普通股，一种为A级普通股，一

种为B级普通股。

Each share of the "B" will have the rights of 1/30th of an "A"

share with these exceptions: First, a B share will have 1/200th of

the vote of an A share (rather than 1/30th of the vote). Second,

the B will not be eligible to participate in Berkshire's

shareholder-designated charitable contributions program.

B级普通股拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利，除了以下两点，第一，B级普通

股的投票权只有A级普通股的二百分之一(而不是三十分之一)，第二，B级普通

股不能参加Berkshire股东指定捐赠计画。

When the recapitalization is complete, each share of A will

become convertible, at the holder's option and at any time, into 30

shares of B. This conversion privilege will not extend in the

opposite direction. That is, holders of B shares will not be able

to convert them into A shares.

当股权重组完成之后，每一股A级普通股可以依持有人的自由意志在任何时候，

选择转换成30股的B级普通股，但反之则不行，也就是说30股的B级普通股

不能要求转换成一股的A级普通股。

We expect to list the B shares on the New York Stock Exchange,

where they will trade alongside the A stock. To create the

shareholder base necessary for a listing - and to ensure a liquid

market in the B stock - Berkshire expects to make a public offering

for cash of at least $100 million of new B shares. The offering

will be made only by means of a prospectus.

跟A级普通股一样，B级普通股也将在纽约证券交易所中挂牌交易，而为了维持

挂牌之后的流通性，Berkshire预计将会发行总金额1亿美元以上的B级普通

股，整个释股的过程将以透过公开说明书的方式进行。

The market will ultimately determine the price of the B

shares. Their price, though, should be in the neighborhood of

1/30th of the price of the A shares.

市场最终将会决定B级普通股的合理价格，当然若无特殊情况，B级普通股将会

以A级普通股三十分之一左右的价位进行交易。

Class A shareholders who wish to give gifts may find it

convenient to convert a share or two of their stock into Class B

shares. Additionally, arbitrage-related conversions will occur if

demand for the B is strong enough to push its price to slightly

above 1/30th of the price of A.

持有A级普通股的股东若有赠与的计画，将可以很轻易地先将持有的股份转为B

级普通股，当然可能也会有一些转换套利方面的交易可能使得B级普通股股价略

高于A级普通股股价的三十分之一。

However, because the Class A stock will entitle its holders to

full voting rights and access to Berkshire's contributions program,

these shares will be superior to the Class B shares and we would

expect most shareholders to remain holders of the Class A - which

is precisely what the Buffett and Munger families plan to do,

except in those instances when we ourselves might convert a few

shares to facilitate gifts. The prospect that most shareholders

will stick to the A stock suggests that it will enjoy a somewhat

more liquid market than the B.

然而，由于A级普通股还是享有完整的投票权以及参与Berkshire股东指定捐

赠计画的权利，所以就这方面而言，A级普通股还是比B级普通股来得好，所以

我们预期大部分的股东，就像巴菲特与曼格家族一样，还是会选择继续持有A

级普通股，除非有股东有赠与的考量时，可能会将少部份的股份进行转换，而由

于我们预期大部分会选择维持不变，所以A级普通股的流通性应该会比B级普

通股来得高。

There are tradeoffs for Berkshire in this recapitalization.

But they do not arise from the proceeds of the offering - we will

find constructive uses for the money - nor in any degree from the

price at which we will sell the B shares. As I write this - with

Berkshire stock at $36,000 - Charlie and I do not believe it

undervalued. Therefore, the offering we propose will not diminish

the per-share intrinsic value of our existing stock. Let me also

put our thoughts about valuation more baldly: Berkshire is selling

at a price at which Charlie and I would not consider buying it.

这次的股权重组对Berkshire来说有利有弊，原因不在于发行新股所带来的资

金，我们一定可以找到合理的用途，也不在于发行新股的价格，就在我撰写年报

的时刻，Berkshire的股价约为每股36,000美元，查理跟我本人都不认为这样

的价位过于低估，因此此次发行新股并不会使得公司原本的每股实质价值受到损

害，讲的再白一点，以现在的价位而言，查理跟我都不会考虑再加码买进

Berkshire的股份。

What Berkshire will incur by way of the B stock are certain

added costs, including those involving the mechanics of handling a

larger number of shareholders. On the other hand, the stock should

be a convenience for people wishing to make gifts. And those of

you who have hoped for a split have gained a do-it-yourself method

of bringing one about.

当然因为B级普通股的发行，Berkshire公司本身必须承担处理更多股东所带来

的股务作业，不过对于那些有赠与计画的股东来说，却变得方便许多，而对于喜

欢股票分割的投资人来说，也多了一个自助式分割的管道。

We are making this move, though, for other reasons - having to

do with the appearance of expense-laden unit trusts purporting to

be low-priced "clones" of Berkshire and sure to be aggressively

marketed. The idea behind these vehicles is not new: In recent

years, a number of people have told me about their wish to create

an "all-Berkshire" investment fund to be sold at a low dollar

price. But until recently, the promoters of these investments

heard out my objections and backed off.

当然，之所以会有这样的举动还有其它理由，主要是由于目前坊间出现一种模仿

Berkshire的信托基金，号称价位低，只要收取部份费用，人人都投资得起，这

样的主意并不是首次出现，近几年来，有一些人向我传达想要设立一种所谓的仿

Berkshire投资基金，以较低的价位对外发行，不过由于我个人并不赞同这样的

做法，所以这些人才没有进一步的举动。

I did not discourage these people because I prefer large

investors over small. Were it possible, Charlie and I would love

to turn $1,000 into $3,000 for multitudes of people who would find

that gain an important answer to their immediate problems.

对于这些人我不会一昧地打压，因为毕竟我们的目标锁定在大额投资人，如果可

能，查理跟我当然希望公司的净值可以直接由1,000美元翻个两、三翻立刻变

成3,000美元，如此一来大家因为这样的资本利得肯定不会再有其它的意见。

In order to quickly triple small stakes, however, we would

have to just as quickly turn our present market capitalization of

$43 billion into $129 billion (roughly the market cap of General

Electric, America's most highly valued company). We can't come

close to doing that. The very best we hope for is - on average - to

double Berkshire's per-share intrinsic value every five years, and

we may well fall far short of that goal.

为了将这些小筹码成长三倍，我们可能必须让Berkshire的市值从原本的430

亿美元，一下子暴增为1,290亿美元(这相当于通用电气-目前股票市场上市值

最高的公司)，这根本就不可能办得到，所以我们比较希望的是，平均而言，

Berkshire的每股价值每五年能够翻一番，当然要达到这样的目标并不容易。

In the end, Charlie and I do not care whether our shareholders

own Berkshire in large or small amounts. What we wish for are

shareholders of any size who are knowledgeable about our

operations, share our objectives and long-term perspective, and are

aware of our limitations, most particularly those imposed by our

large capital base.

总而言之，查理跟我不太在乎我们的股东们拥有公司股份的多寡，我们衷心期盼

的是不论是大、小股东，都能了解我们的营运模式、与我们拥有共同的目标与长

期投资理念，同时也能够明暸我们受到的限制，尤其是股本过大本身加诸予我们

的负荷。

The unit trusts that have recently surfaced fly in the face of

these goals. They would be sold by brokers working for big

commissions, would impose other burdensome costs on their

shareholders, and would be marketed en masse to unsophisticated

buyers, apt to be seduced by our past record and beguiled by the

publicity Berkshire and I have received in recent years. The sure

outcome: a multitude of investors destined to be disappointed.

这些基金最近纷纷以这样的号召浮上台面，通常它们都是透过经纪人以高额佣金

销售，所以加入的投资人必须背负相当沉重的成本，而一些不知情的投资人，可

能冲着Berkshire过去的成绩以及查理与我本人近年来的高知名度而受骗上

当，最后的结果肯定是︰投资大众注定会大失所望。

Through our creation of the B stock - a low-denomination

product far superior to Berkshire-only trusts - we hope to make the

clones unmerchandisable.

所以透过B级普通股的诞生-一种低面额但远优于仿Berkshire基金的产物，我

们希望可以让那些模仿的假货无法在市场上生存。

But both present and prospective Berkshire shareholders should

pay special attention to one point: Though the per-share intrinsic

value of our stock has grown at an excellent rate during the past

five years, its market price has grown still faster. The stock, in

other words, has outperformed the business.

不过我们还是必须再次提醒Berkshire现有以及未来可能的股东，虽然在过去五

年间本公司的实质价值以相当快速的速度成长，不过公司本身的股价涨升速度却

有过之而无不及，换句话说，在这期间股票的市价表现远过于公司本业的表现。

That kind of market overperformance cannot persist indefinitely,

neither for Berkshire nor any other stock. Inevitably, there

will be periods of underperformance as well. The price

volatility that results, though endemic to public markets, is

not to our liking. What we would prefer instead is to have the

market price of Berkshire precisely track its intrinsic value.

Were the stock to do that, every shareholder would benefit during

his period of ownership in exact proportion to the progress

Berkshire itself made in the period.

这样的情况不太可能无止尽的持续下去，不管是Berkshire或是其它股票都一

样，无可避免的，总有一天股价的表现会逊于本业的表现，我们不太愿意见到公

司的股价受到股票市场影响而剧烈波动，我们比较喜欢的模式是Berkshire的股

价能够与其所代表的实质价值一致，如此一来我们就可以确保每位股东在持有本

公司股份的期间所获得的报酬皆能与Berkshire本身事业的发展状况一致。

Obviously, the market behavior of Berkshire's stock will never

conform to this ideal. But we will come closer to this goal than

we would otherwise if our present and prospective shareholders are

informed, business-oriented and not exposed to high-commission

salesmanship when making their investment decisions. To that end,

we are better off if we can blunt the merchandising efforts of the

unit trusts - and that is the reason we are creating the B stock.

很显然的Berkshire的股价不可能以这样理想的方式演变，不过若是我们能够确

定现有与未来的股东在做投资决策时，能得到充分的信息、以公司发展为导向且

不会受到高佣金的营业员所引诱，我们就越有可能达到这样的目标，基于这样的

前提，我们必须降低那些想要推销仿Berkshire基金的动机，这也是我们决定推

出B级普通股的主要原因。

We look forward to answering your questions about the

recapitalization at the Annual Meeting.

当然若大家对于本次股权重组还有任何问题，欢迎在股东年会上提出讨论。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

Berkshire isn't the only American corporation utilizing the

new, exciting ABWA strategy. At about 1:15 p.m. on July 14, 1995,

Michael Eisner, CEO of The Walt Disney Company, was walking up

Wildflower Lane in Sun Valley. At the same time, I was leaving a

lunch at Herbert Allen's home on that street to meet Tom Murphy,

CEO of Cap Cities/ABC, for a golf game.

Berkshire并不是第一家采用新颖有趣的ABWA走动式并购策略的美国企业，

1995年7月14日下午1点15分，当时华德迪士尼的总裁Michael Eisner

正在Sun Valley的野花大道上行走，在此同时，我刚好从同一条街上Herber

Allen家中一场午宴离开，赶赴与资本城/ABC总裁Tom Murphy的一场高尔夫

球会。

That morning, speaking to a large group of executives and

money managers assembled by Allen's investment bank, Michael had

made a brilliant presentation about Disney, and upon seeing him, I

offered my congratulations. We chatted briefly - and the subject

of a possible combination of Disney and Cap Cities came up. This

wasn't the first time a merger had been discussed, but progress had

never before been made, in part because Disney wanted to buy with

cash and Cap Cities desired stock.

就在当天早上，面对由Allen的投资银行召集一大群企业总裁与基金经理人，

Michael做了一场有关迪士尼相当精彩的演讲，会后在街上遇到他，于是我上前

向他致意，我们做了短暂的交谈，聊到迪士尼与资本城进行合并的可能性，这并

不是第一次讨论有关合并的可能，先前之所以一直没有进展，一部份的原因是由

于迪士尼希望用现金进行交易，而资本城想要拿股票。

Michael and I waited a few minutes for Murph to arrive, and in

the short conversation that ensued, both Michael and Murph

indicated they might bend on the stock/cash question. Within a few

weeks, they both did, at which point a contract was put together in

three very busy days.

Michael跟我花了几分钟等候Murph的到来，在接下来短暂的会谈后，双方同

意在现金/股票的问题上互做让步，几个星期后，双方达成协议，而经过连续三

天马不停蹄的谈判后，终于拟订了合并契约。

The Disney/Cap Cities deal makes so much sense that I'm sure

it would have occurred without that chance encounter in Sun Valley.

But when I ran into Michael that day on Wildflower Lane, he was

heading for his plane, so without that accidental meeting the deal

certainly wouldn't have happened in the time frame it did. I

believe both Disney and Cap Cities will benefit from the fact that

we all serendipitously met that day.

我认为迪士尼与资本城的合并案是天造地设的一对，即使没有那天在Sun Valley

的巧遇，双方终究还是会结合，不过要不是那天刚好我在野花大道碰到正要赶飞

机的Michael，整个合并案可能不会那么快地顺利完成，不可讳言的，迪士尼与

资本城都将因为我们那天的巧遇而受惠良多。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

It's appropriate that I say a few words here about Murph. To

put it simply, he is as fine an executive as I have ever seen in my

long exposure to business. Equally important, he possesses human

qualities every bit the equal of his managerial qualities. He's an

extraordinary friend, parent, husband and citizen. In those rare

instances in which Murph's personal interests diverged from those

of shareholders, he unfailingly favored the owners. When I say

that I like to be associated with managers whom I would love to

have as a sibling, in-law, or trustee of my will, Murph is the

exemplar of what I mean.

在这里我特别要提一下Murph，简单的说，他是我在投资生涯中，遇到最好的

经理人之一，同时除了优秀的管理特质之外，他也拥有同等的人格特质，他是一

位杰出的朋友、父亲、丈夫与公民，许多时候当其个人利益与股东利益相冲突时，

他毫不犹豫地会选择后者，每当我提到我喜欢与那种我希望他们能够成为我的子

孙、女婿或遗嘱执行人的经理人共事时，Murph就是我所能引用的最佳典范。

If Murph should elect to run another business, don't bother to

study its value - just buy the stock. And don't later be as dumb

as I was two years ago when I sold one-third of our holdings in Cap

Cities for $635 million (versus the $1.27 billion those shares

would bring in the Disney merger).

如果Murph决定另创事业，不必费心去研究其可行性，闭着眼睛投资就对了，

而且绝对不要笨到像我前年一样把资本城三分之一的持股以6.35亿美元卖掉，

这批股票在与迪士尼合并后，价值超过12.7亿美元。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 96.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's

1995 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions

made were $11.6 million and 3,600 charities were recipients. A

full description of the shareholder-designated contributions

program appears on pages 54-55.

大约有96.3%的有效股权参与1995年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,160万

美元捐出的款项分配给3,600家慈善机构，详细的名单参阅附录。

Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because

they don't have their shares registered in their own names on the

prescribed record date or because they fail to get their

designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. That

second problem pained me especially this year because two good

friends with substantial holdings missed the deadline. We had to

deny their requests to be included because we can't make exceptions

for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.

每年都有一小部份的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天

的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计画，

尤其是第二个原因让我感到特别头痛，因为今年有二位Berkshire大股东同时也

是我个人的好朋友，未能在截止日以前将表格送达，我们必须忍痛将他们的指定

捐赠剔除，因为我们不可能在拒绝其它不符合规定股东的同时，还破例让他们参

与。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares

that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the

nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so

registered on August 31, 1996, will be ineligible for the 1996

program. When you get the form, return it promptly so that it does

not get put aside or forgotten.

想要参加这项计画者，请必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自

己而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1996年8月31日之前完成

登记，才有权利参与1996年的捐赠计画，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，

以免被丢在一旁给忘记了。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

When it comes to our Annual Meetings, Charlie and I are

managerial oddballs: We thoroughly enjoy the event. So come join

us on Monday, May 6. At Berkshire, we have no investor relations

department and don't use financial analysts as a channel for

disseminating information, earnings "guidance," or the like.

Instead, we prefer direct manager-to-owner communication and

believe that the Annual Meeting is the ideal place for this

interchange of ideas. Talking to you there is efficient for us and

also democratic in that all present simultaneously hear what we

have to say.

每次提到年度股东会，查理跟我就变成啰唆的老头，我们实在是很喜欢这场盛

会，所以请大家务必在五月六日星期一大驾光临，在Berkshire我们没有投资人

公关部门，也从不依赖股票分析师当作信息沟通的桥梁，盈余的预估解说等等，

相反地，我们比较喜欢股东与经理人直接面对面的沟通，而且相信年度股东会正

是观念沟通的最佳场所，与各位一谈对我们来说一点也不会浪费时间，同时也让

各位以相当民主的方式听到我们想要跟各位传达的理念。

Last year, for the first time, we had the Annual Meeting at

the Holiday Convention Centre and the logistics seemed to work.

The ballroom there was filled with about 3,200 people, and we had a

video feed into a second room holding another 800 people. Seating

in the main room was a little tight, so this year we will probably

configure it to hold 3,000. This year we will also have two rooms

for the overflow.

去年我们首度在Holiday会议中心召开年度股东会，当初预定的准备动作事后

看起来相当正确，中央大厅坐满了3,200个人，同时藉由视听器材的辅助，旁

边的会议室还有800人得以参与，大厅显得有点拥挤，所以今年我们打算只排

3,000个座位，同时另外会再准备二间会议室以容纳更多的人参与。

All in all, we will be able to handle 5,000 shareholders. The

meeting will start at 9:30 a.m., but be warned that last year the

main ballroom was filled shortly after 8:00 a.m.

会场总共可以容纳5,000人，会议预定在9点30分开始，不过大家可能要早

一点到，因为去年中央大厅在8点过后不久便已座无虚席。

Shareholders from 49 states attended our 1995 meeting - where

were you, Vermont? - and a number of foreign countries, including

Australia, Sweden and Germany, were represented. As always, the

meeting attracted shareholders who were interested in Berkshire's

business - as contrasted to shareholders who are primarily

interested in themselves - and the questions were all good.

Charlie and I ate lunch on stage and answered questions for about

five hours.

来自49个州的股东参与1995年的年度股东会，你从哪里来，是佛蒙特州吗? 另

外还有一些股东来自海外地区，包含澳洲、瑞典与德国等国家，一如往常，年会

吸引了许多真正关心公司发展的股东参加，与其它只关心自己利益别的公司的股

东相较有很大的不同，所提出的问题也相当好，查理跟我花了五个多小时回答问

题，连午餐都直接在台上解决。

We feel that if owners come from all over the world, we should

try to make sure they have an opportunity to ask their questions.

Most shareholders leave about noon, but a thousand or so hardcore

types usually stay to see whether we will drop. Charlie and I are

in training to last at least five hours again this year.

因为我们认为股东们从世界各地远道而来，所以总是希望让他们都有机会可以发

问，大部分的股东在中午过后就纷纷离席，但还是有一千多名比较死忠的股东想

要瞧瞧我们到底能够撑多久，今年查理跟我希望尽量努力能够像去年那样至少撑

五个小时以上。

We will have our usual array of Berkshire products at the

meeting and this year will add a sales representative from GEICO.

At the 1995 meeting, we sold 747 pounds of candy, 759 pairs of

shoes, and over $17,500 of World Books and related publications.

In a move that might have been dangerous had our stock been weak,

we added knives last year from our Quikut subsidiary and sold 400

sets of these. (We draw the line at soft fruit, however.) All of

these goods will again be available this year. We don't consider a

cultural event complete unless a little business is mixed in.

依照惯例，我们在会场上展示了一些Berkshire的产品，今天将会新增一位

GEICO保险公司的业务代表，去年股东会总计卖出了747磅的糖果、759双的

鞋子以及价值超过17,500美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品，另外我们临时还

增加了旗下子公司Quikut所生产的小刀，总计卖出400把(幸好去年公司股价

表现不错，否则这可能是相当危险的一项举动)，今年这些商品将再度与会，我

觉得这项盛会总要带点商业气息才算完整圆满。

Because we expect a large crowd for the meeting, we recommend

that you promptly get both plane and hotel reservations. Those of

you who like to be downtown (about six miles from the Centre) may

wish to stay at the Radisson Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but

nice hotel, or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away.

In the vicinity of the Centre are the Holiday Inn (403 rooms),

Homewood Suites (118 rooms) and Hampton Inn (136 rooms). Another

recommended spot is the Marriott, whose west Omaha location is

about 100 yards from Borsheim's and a ten-minute drive from the

Centre. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at

7:30, 8:00 and 8:30 for the meeting and return after it ends.

由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，想要住在

市中心的人(距离会场约6英哩)可以选择拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆-

Radisson-Redick旅馆或是旁边较大一点的Red Lion旅馆，至于会场附近则有

Holiday Inn (403个房间)、Homewood Suites (118个房间)或Hampton Inn

(136个房间)，另一个推荐的旅馆是位在奥玛哈西区的Marriott，离波仙珠宝店

约100公尺，距离会场约10分钟的车程，届时在哪里将会有巴士分7:30、8:00

跟8:30三班，接送大家往返股东会会场。

An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can

obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A

good-sized parking area is available at the Centre, while those who

stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites and Hampton Inn will be

able to walk to the meeting. As usual, we will have buses to take

you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting

and to take you from there to hotels or the airport later.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

当天会场有相当大的停车场，住在Holiday Inn 、Homewood Suites或

Hampton Inn的人可以直接走路过来开会，一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大

家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场。

NFM's main store, on its 64-acre site about two miles north of

the Centre, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to

6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Rose Blumkin -

"Mrs. B" - is now 102, but will be hard at work in Mrs. B's

Warehouse. She was honored in November at the opening of The Rose,

a classic downtown theater of the 20's that has been magnificently

restored, but that would have been demolished had she not saved it.

Ask her to tell you the story.

占地60英亩的NFM主馆距离会场约2英哩远，营业时间平日从早上10点到

下午9点，星期六从早上10点到下午6点，星期日则从中午开到下午6点，

Rose Blumkin-B太太今年高龄102岁，不过每天还是会到B太太仓库工作，

去年十一月她应邀到Rose表演中心担任开幕剪彩嘉宾，原本是20年代老旧的

戏院在B太太大力的支持下得以重新修复，记得问她有关这一段的故事。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for

shareholders and their guests from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 5th.

Additionally, we will have a special opening for shareholders on

Saturday, the 4th, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. Last year, on

Shareholders Day, we wrote 1,733 tickets in the six hours we were

open - which is a sale every 13 seconds. Remember, though, that

records are made to be broken.

平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在五月五日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开

放，从中午开到下午6点，此外今年在五月四日星期六股东会的前一晚从下午6

点到晚上9点，还将特地为股东开放，去年股东会当天，在短短六个小时的营

业时间内，我们总共收到1,733张订单，等于每13秒就有一笔生意成交，各位

请记得记录本来就是用来打破的。

At Borsheim's, we will also have the world's largest faceted

diamond on display. Two years in the cutting, this inconspicuous

bauble is 545 carats in size. Please inspect this stone and let it

guide you in determining what size gem is appropriate for the one

you love.

在波仙珠宝店，将会展出一颗全世界最大的平面钻石，花费两年的时间切割，这

颗不甚起眼的玩意儿总共有545克拉重，请大家好好看看这一颗石头，然后再

决定你应该为你心爱的人买一颗多大的宝石。

On Saturday evening, May 4, there will be a baseball game at

Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Louisville

Redbirds. I expect to make the opening pitch - owning a quarter of

the team assures me of one start per year - but our manager, Mike

Jirschele, will probably make his usual mistake and yank me

immediately after. About 1,700 shareholders attended last year's

game. Unfortunately, we had a rain-out, which greatly disappointed

the many scouts in the stands. But the smart ones will be back

this year, and I plan to show them my best stuff.

在前一天5月4日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家

队对路易维里红鸟队的比赛，我准备在开幕时担任开球工作，拥有该队四分之一

的所有权确保我可以每年担任一次先发，不过一如往常我们的球队经理-Mike

大概都会做出错误的决定，很快地就把我拉下场，去年大约有1,700位股东出

席这项盛会，可惜的是当晚因雨停赛，使得旁边的球僮失望不已，今年好戏将会

重新上演，而我也准备将拿手绝活展现出来。

Our proxy statement will include information about obtaining

tickets to the game. We will also offer an information packet this

year listing restaurants that will be open on Sunday night and

describing various things that you can do in Omaha on the weekend.

股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得入场的门票，同时我们也会提供星期天晚上会开

张的餐厅信息，同时列出假日期间在奥玛哈你可以从事的活动介绍。

For years, I've unsuccessfully tried to get my grade school

classmate, "Pal" Gorat, to open his steakhouse for business on the

Sunday evening preceding the meeting. But this year he's relented.

Gorat's is a family-owned enterprise that has thrived for 52

years, and if you like steaks, you'll love this place. I've told

Pal he will get a good crowd, so call Gorat's at 402-551-3733 for a

reservation. You'll spot me there - I'll be the one eating the

rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.

多年来我一直无法成功说服我的小学同学-Gorat所开的餐厅在年会当天晚上开

门营业，不过今年他终于屈服，Gorat's是一家有52年历史的老牌餐厅，如果

你爱吃牛排，包准你会爱上这个地方，我已向Gorat拍胸脯保证一定会有很多

顾客上门，所以记得打电话(402-551-3733)去预订，我保证大家一定可以在

那里看到我，通常我会点一大份丁骨牛排加上双份的肉丸。

Warren E. Buffett

March 1, 1996 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1996年3月1日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1996 was $6.2 billion, or 36.1%. Pershare

book value, however, grew by less, 31.8%, because the number of

Berkshire shares increased: We issued stock in acquiring FlightSafety

International and also sold new Class B shares.* Over the last 32 years

(that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has

grown from $19 to $19,011, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.

1996年本公司的净值成长了36.1%，约62亿美元，不过每股净值仅成长了31.8%，

原因在于去年我们以发行新股的方式并购了国际飞安公司，同时另外还追加发行了一

些B级普通股*，总计过去32年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值

由当初的19元成长到现在的19,011美元，年复合成长率约为23.8%。

* Each Class B share has an economic interest equal to 1/30th of

that possessed by a Class A share, which is the new designation for

the only stock that Berkshire had outstanding before May 1996.

Throughout this report, we state all per-share figures in terms of

"Class A equivalents," which are the sum of the Class A shares

outstanding and 1/30th of the Class B shares outstanding.

* B级普通股拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利，这是从1996年五月开始Berkshire新增的股份类

型，在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，亦即全部流通在外的A级普通股数加上

流通在外的B级普通股数的三十分之一。

For technical reasons, we have restated our 1995 financial

statements, a matter that requires me to present one of my less-thanthrilling

explanations of accounting arcana. I'll make it brief.

基于技术性原因，我们必须将1995年的财务报表予以重编，这使我能够再度展现令

人震摄的会计密技，相信我，我会试着长话短说。

The restatement was required because GEICO became a wholly-owned

subsidiary of Berkshire on January 2, 1996, whereas it was previously

classified as an investment. From an economic viewpoint - taking into

account major tax efficiencies and other benefits we gained - the value

of the 51% of GEICO we owned at year-end 1995 increased significantly

when we acquired the remaining 49% of the company two days later.

Accounting rules applicable to this type of "step acquisition," however,

required us to write down the value of our 51% at the time we moved to

100%. That writedown - which also, of course, reduced book value -

amounted to $478.4 million. As a result, we now carry our original 51%

of GEICO at a value that is both lower than its market value at the time

we purchased the remaining 49% of the company and lower than the value at

which we carry that 49% itself.

重编的原因是因为原先被列为被投资的GEICO保险在1996年1月2日正式成为

Berkshire 100%持有的子公司，从经济观点来看，考量可观的租税优惠与其它优点，

我们原先在1995年底持有的51%的GEICO股权，其价值在二天后我们取得剩余49%

股权之后大幅增加，然而对于这种渐进式购并，一般公认会计原则却要求我们必须在

取得100%股权时，将原因帐上51%的成本反向予以调减，使得帐面价值减少为4.784

亿美元，这结果使得原来51%股权的帐面价值不但远低于后来49%股权的取得市价，

也低于我们持有后来这49%股权的帐面价值。

There is an offset, however, to the reduction in book value I have

just described: Twice during 1996 we issued Berkshire shares at a

premium to book value, first in May when we sold the B shares for cash

and again in December when we used both A and B shares as part-payment

for FlightSafety. In total, the three non-operational items affecting

book value contributed less than one percentage point to our 31.8% pershare

gain last year.

不过除了刚刚提到净值的减少之外，我们在1996年两度溢价发行股份，第一次是在

五月办理现金增资发行B级普通股，第二次是在十二月发行A级与B级普通股，以购

并国际飞安公司，总的来说，以上三项非营业项目对于去年本公司31.8%的每股净值

成长率的净影响还不到1%。

I dwell on this rise in per-share book value because it roughly

indicates our economic progress during the year. But, as Charlie Munger,

Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I have repeatedly told you, what counts at

Berkshire is intrinsic value, not book value. The last time you got that

message from us was in the Owner's Manual, sent to you in June after we

issued the Class B shares. In that manual, we not only defined certain

key terms - such as intrinsic value - but also set forth our economic

principles.

今年我之所以一再强调每股净值，原因在于它大约就等于我们在去年的实质进展，不

过就像是查理跟我一再提醒各位的，对Berkshire来说，真正重要的不是帐面价值，

而是实质价值，最近一次跟各位提到是在今年六月本公司发行B级普通股时，在送给

各位的股东手册当中，我们不但对于一些名词予以定义，诸如实质价值等，同时也揭

露了我们的企业宗旨。

For many years, we have listed these principles in the front of our

annual report, but in this report, on pages 58 to 67, we reproduce the

entire Owner's Manual. In this letter, we will occasionally refer to the

manual so that we can avoid repeating certain definitions and

explanations. For example, if you wish to brush up on "intrinsic value,"

see pages 64 and 65.

多年来，我们在年报前头揭示这些宗旨，在这里我们偶尔也会提到股东手册，这样我

们就可以不必再重复解释一些常用的名词，比如说如果你想要了解一下什么叫实质价

值，建议大家可以再翻翻那本手册的第64、65页。

Last year, for the first time, we supplied you with a table that

Charlie and I believe will help anyone trying to estimate Berkshire's

intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we

trace two key indices of value. The first column lists our per-share

ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second

column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses

before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments but after all interest

and corporate overhead expenses. The operating-earnings column excludes

all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the

investments presented in the first column. In effect, the two columns

show what Berkshire would have reported had it been broken into two parts.

从去年开始我们首度提供给各位一张查理跟我本人认为可以帮助大家估计Berkshire

公司实质价值的表格，在下面这张经过更新资料的表上，我们可以发现到两项与价值

相关的重要指针，第一栏是我们平均每股持有的投资金额(包含现金与约当现金)，第

二栏则是每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，来自本业的营业利益(但未扣除所得税与购

买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏投资所贡献的股利收入、利息

收入与资本利得，事实上，若是把Berkshire拆成两部份的话，这两栏数字将分别代

表这两个部门的损益绩效。

Pre-tax Earnings Per Share

Investments Excluding All Income from

Year Per Share Investments

---- ----------- -------------------------

1965................................$ 4 $ 4.08

1975................................ 159 (6.48)

1985................................ 2,443 18.86

1995................................ 22,088 258.20

1996................................ 28,500 421.39

Annual Growth Rate, 1965-95......... 33.4% 14.7%

One-Year Growth Rate, 1995-96 ...... 29.0% 63.2%

As the table tells you, our investments per share increased in 1996

by 29.0% and our non-investment earnings grew by 63.2%. Our goal is to

keep the numbers in both columns moving ahead at a reasonable (or, better

yet, unreasonable) pace.

从这张表大家可以看出，我们1996年的每股投资金额增加了29%，而非投资的本业

盈余则增加了63.2%，我们的目标是让这两栏的数字以合理的速度稳定地成长，当然

若是偶尔能以不合理的速度暴增也不错。

Our expectations, however, are tempered by two realities. First,

our past rates of growth cannot be matched nor even approached:

Berkshire's equity capital is now large - in fact, fewer than ten

businesses in America have capital larger - and an abundance of funds

tends to dampen returns. Second, whatever our rate of progress, it will

not be smooth: Year-to-year moves in the first column of the table above

will be influenced in a major way by fluctuations in securities markets;

the figures in the second column will be affected by wide swings in the

profitability of our catastrophe-reinsurance business.

不过这样的预期可能会受到两项现实的因素所干扰，首先，我们很难再达到或接近过

去那样高的成长速度，原因在于Berkshire现在的资本规模实在是太庞大了，事实上

以我们现在的资本规模已经可以排在全美企业的前十名，过多的浮滥资金一定会影响

到整体的报酬率，第二点，不管成长的速度如何，铁定很难以平稳的速度增加，第一

栏的数字将很容易随着股市大环境上下波动，第二栏的数字则会跟着超级灾害再保业

务获利的不稳定变动而变化。

In the table, the donations made pursuant to our shareholderdesignated

contributions program are charged against the second column,

though we view them as a shareholder benefit rather than as an expense.

All other corporate expenses are also charged against the second column.

These costs may be lower than those of any other large American

corporation: Our after-tax headquarters expense amounts to less than two

basis points (1/50th of 1%) measured against net worth. Even so, Charlie

used to think this expense percentage outrageously high, blaming it on my

use of Berkshire's corporate jet, The Indefensible. But Charlie has

recently experienced a "counter-revelation": With our purchase of

FlightSafety, whose major activity is the training of corporate pilots,

he now rhapsodizes at the mere mention of jets.

在这张表中，股东指定捐赠的款项被列为第二栏的减项，虽然我们将之视为股东的福

利而非支出，企业其它的支出同样也被放在第二栏当作减项，这些开支远低于其它美

国大企业的平均水准，每年我们企业总部的费用占净值的比率大约不到万分之五，即

便如此查理还是认为这样的比率高得离谱，我想主要要怪罪于我个人所使用的

Berkshire企业专机-无可辩解号，不过最近在我们买下国际飞安-这家专门负责训练

飞行的公司之后，查理的态度有了180度的转变，现在只要一提到飞机他就狂乐不

已。

Seriously, costs matter. For example, equity mutual funds incur

corporate expenses - largely payments to the funds' managers - that

average about 100 basis points, a levy likely to cut the returns their

investors earn by 10% or more over time. Charlie and I make no promises

about Berkshire's results. We do promise you, however, that virtually

all of the gains Berkshire makes will end up with shareholders. We are

here to make money with you, not off you.

认真的说，控制成本开支绝对重要，举例来说很多共同基金每年的营业费用大多在

2%上下，这等于间接剥削了投资人将近10%的投资报酬，虽然查理跟我不敢向各位

保证我们的投资绩效，但我们却可以向各位打包票，Berkshire所赚的每一分钱一定

会分文不差地落入股东的口袋里，我们是来帮各位赚钱，而不是帮各位花钱的。

The Relationship of Intrinsic Value to Market Price

实质价值与股票市价的关系

In last year's letter, with Berkshire shares selling at $36,000, I

told you: (1) Berkshire's gain in market value in recent years had

outstripped its gain in intrinsic value, even though the latter gain had

been highly satisfactory; (2) that kind of overperformance could not

continue indefinitely; (3) Charlie and I did not at that moment consider

Berkshire to be undervalued.

去年当Berkshire的股价约在36,000美元时，我曾向各位报告过(1)Berkshire这几

年的股价表现远超越实质价值，虽然后者的成长幅度也相当令人满意，(2)这样的情况

不可能无限制地持续下去，(3)查理跟我不认为当时Berkshire的价值有被低估的可能

性。

Since I set down those cautions, Berkshire's intrinsic value has

increased very significantly - aided in a major way by a stunning

performance at GEICO that I will tell you more about later - while the

market price of our shares has changed little. This, of course, means

that in 1996 Berkshire's stock underperformed the business.

Consequently, today's price/value relationship is both much different

from what it was a year ago and, as Charlie and I see it, more

appropriate.

自从我下了这些批注之后，Berkshire的实质价值又大幅地增加了，主要的原因在于

GEICO惊人的表现，(关于这点在后面还会向大家详细报告)，而在此同时Berkshire

的股价却维持不动，这代表在1996年Berkshire的实质价值表现优于股价，也就是

说，在今日Berkshire的价格/价值比比起一年以前而言，又有很大的不同，这同时

也是查理跟我认为比较合理的情况。

Over time, the aggregate gains made by Berkshire shareholders must

of necessity match the business gains of the company. When the stock

temporarily overperforms or underperforms the business, a limited number

of shareholders - either sellers or buyers - receive outsized benefits at

the expense of those they trade with. Generally, the sophisticated have

an edge over the innocents in this game.

就长期而言，Berkshire股东的整体利得一定会与企业经营的获利一致，当公司股价

的表现暂时优于或劣于企业经营时，少部份的股东-不管是买进的人或是卖出的人，

将会因为做出这样的举动而从交易的对方身上占到一些便宜，通常来说，都是老经验

的一方在这场游戏中占上风。

Though our primary goal is to maximize the amount that our

shareholders, in total, reap from their ownership of Berkshire, we wish

also to minimize the benefits going to some shareholders at the expense

of others. These are goals we would have were we managing a family

partnership, and we believe they make equal sense for the manager of a

public company. In a partnership, fairness requires that partnership

interests be valued equitably when partners enter or exit; in a public

company, fairness prevails when market price and intrinsic value are in

sync. Obviously, they won't always meet that ideal, but a manager - by

his policies and communications - can do much to foster equity.

虽然我们主要的目标是希望让Berkshire的股东经由持有公司所有权所获得的利益极

大化，但在此同时我们也期望能让一些股东从其它股东身上所占到的便宜能够极小

化，我想这是一般人在经营家族企业时相当重视的，不过我们相信这也适用在上市公

司的经营之上，对合伙企业来说，合伙权益在合伙人加入或退出时必须能够以合理的

方式评量，才能维持公平，同样地，对于上市公司来说，惟有让公司的股价与实质价

值一致，公司股东的公平性才得以维持，当然很明显，这样理想的情况很难一直维持，

不过身为公司经理人可以透过其政策与沟通的方式来大力维持这样的公平性。

Of course, the longer a shareholder holds his shares, the more

bearing Berkshire's business results will have on his financial

experience - and the less it will matter what premium or discount to

intrinsic value prevails when he buys and sells his stock. That's one

reason we hope to attract owners with long-term horizons. Overall, I

think we have succeeded in that pursuit. Berkshire probably ranks number

one among large American corporations in the percentage of its shares

held by owners with a long-term view.

当然股东持有股份的时间越长，那么Berkshire本身的表现与他的投资经验就会越接

近，而他买进或卖出股份时的价格相较于实质价值是折价或溢价的影响程度也就越

小，这也是为什么我们希望能够吸引具有长期投资意愿的股东加入的原因之一，总的

来说，我认为就这点而言，我们算是做的相当成功，Berkshire大概是所有美国大企

业中拥有最多具长期投资观点股东的公司。

Acquisitions of 1996

1996年的并购案

We made two acquisitions in 1996, both possessing exactly the

qualities we seek - excellent business economics and an outstanding

manager.

我们在1996年进行了两件并购案，两者皆拥有我们想要的特质-那就是绝佳的竞争

优势与优秀的经理人。

The first acquisition was Kansas Bankers Surety (KBS), an insurance

company whose name describes its specialty. The company, which does

business in 22 states, has an extraordinary underwriting record, achieved

through the efforts of Don Towle, an extraordinary manager. Don has

developed first-hand relationships with hundreds of bankers and knows

every detail of his operation. He thinks of himself as running a company

that is "his," an attitude we treasure at Berkshire. Because of its

relatively small size, we placed KBS with Wesco, our 80%-owned

subsidiary, which has wanted to expand its insurance operations.

第一桩购并案是堪萨斯银行家保险-从字面上可知，这是一家专门提供银行业者保险

的保险公司，在全美22个州从事相关业务，拥有相当不错的承保记录，全仰赖Don

Towle这位杰出的经理人的努力，Don与上百位银行家皆保持良好的关系，而且也了

解他所从事业务的每一项细节，那种感觉就好象是在经营"自己"的事业一样，这种精

神是Berkshire最欣赏的，由于它的规模不太大，同时正好Berkshire 持有80%股

权的Wesco有意拓展保险事业，所以我们决定把它摆在Wesco之下成为其子公司。

You might be interested in the carefully-crafted and sophisticated

acquisition strategy that allowed Berkshire to nab this deal. Early in

1996 I was invited to the 40th birthday party of my nephew's wife, Jane

Rogers. My taste for social events being low, I immediately, and in my

standard, gracious way, began to invent reasons for skipping the event.

The party planners then countered brilliantly by offering me a seat next

to a man I always enjoy, Jane's dad, Roy Dinsdale - so I went.

大家或许会对我们这次精心设计的购并计画感到兴趣，在1996年初我受邀参加侄媳

妇Jane 40岁的生日宴会，由于我个人对于社交活动通常不太感兴趣，所以很自然地

我按照惯例想出许多理由以婉拒这项邀请，不过对方显然有备而来，特别将我安排在

另外一位我极有兴趣打交道的对象-Roy Dinsdale也就是Jane的父亲，此举使得我

无法拒绝而欣然赴会。

The party took place on January 26. Though the music was loud - Why

must bands play as if they will be paid by the decibel? - I just managed

to hear Roy say he'd come from a directors meeting at Kansas Bankers

Surety, a company I'd always admired. I shouted back that he should let

me know if it ever became available for purchase.

生日宴会在1月26日举行，虽然当时现场音乐震耳欲聋(我实在搞不懂为何乐队总是

要弹得那么大声，难道他们的出场费是按照分贝数计算的吗?)，不过我还是听到Roy

说他刚参加完堪萨斯银行家保险的董事会，这是我一直相当欣赏的一家公司，我大声

地响应他说，如果这家公司有意出售的话，记得一定要通知我。

On February 12, I got the following letter from Roy: "Dear Warren:

Enclosed is the annual financial information on Kansas Bankers Surety.

This is the company that we talked about at Janie's party. If I can be

of any further help, please let me know." On February 13, I told Roy we

would pay $75 million for the company - and before long we had a deal.

I'm now scheming to get invited to Jane's next party.

2月12日我收到一封Roy的来函，上面写到：亲爱的华伦，随函附送一份堪萨斯银

行家保险的年度财务报表，就是上次在Janie的生日宴会上提到的那一家公司，如果

你有任何需要，请务必让我知道。2月13日，我告诉Roy愿意出7,500万美元买下

这家公司，不久之后，整个交易就搞定，现在的我正盘算明年还要再参加Jane的生

日宴会。

Our other acquisition in 1996 - FlightSafety International, the

world's leader in the training of pilots - was far larger, at about $1.5

billion, but had an equally serendipitous origin. The heroes of this

story are first, Richard Sercer, a Tucson aviation consultant, and

second, his wife, Alma Murphy, an ophthalmology graduate of Harvard

Medical School, who in 1990 wore down her husband's reluctance and got

him to buy Berkshire stock. Since then, the two have attended all our

Annual Meetings, but I didn't get to know them personally.

1996年发生的另一件购并案，全世界最大的飞行员训练公司-国际飞安公司，其规

模比起前一个案子要大得多了，总金额高达15亿美元，不过这个案子发生的过程一

样充满戏剧性，本案的功臣首推Richard Sercer-他是塔克森市的飞行顾问，当然还

要归功于他的妻子-Alma Murphy，哈佛医学院眼科学系毕业的她好不容易在1990

年说服她的丈夫买进Berkshire的股份，而且在那之后每年都到奥玛哈参加我们的股

东会，只是我一直没有机会与他们认识。

Fortunately, Richard had also been a long-time shareholder of

FlightSafety, and it occurred to him last year that the two companies

would make a good fit. He knew our acquisition criteria, and he thought

that Al Ueltschi, FlightSafety's 79-year-old CEO, might want to make a

deal that would both give him a home for his company and a security in

payment that he would feel comfortable owning throughout his lifetime.

So in July, Richard wrote Bob Denham, CEO of Salomon Inc, suggesting that

he explore the possibility of a merger.

碰巧的是，Richard同时也是国际飞安公司长期投资的股东，刚好在去年他认为这两

家公司应该有机会可以做一个结合，他相当了解Berkshire购并公司的标准，同时也

知道国际飞安79岁的总裁-Al Ueltschi想要为自己的公司找一个理想的归宿，以为

自己的股权找到一层保障，所以就在七月份，Richard写信给所罗门公司的总裁-Bob

Denham请他研究这项合并交易的可能性。

Bob took it from there, and on September 18, Al and I met in New

York. I had long been familiar with FlightSafety's business, and in

about 60 seconds I knew that Al was exactly our kind of manager. A month

later, we had a contract. Because Charlie and I wished to minimize the

issuance of Berkshire shares, the transaction we structured gave

FlightSafety shareholders a choice of cash or stock but carried terms

that encouraged those who were tax-indifferent to take cash. This nudge

led to about 51% of FlightSafety's shares being exchanged for cash, 41%

for Berkshire A and 8% for Berkshire B.

Bob于是接手进行这个案子，在9月18日我和Al正式在纽约碰面，我对国际飞安

这家公司的经营状况本来就相当熟悉，而在60秒内我马上就知道Al正是符合我们类

型的经理人，一个月后，合约正式敲定，由于查理跟我希望能够尽量避免再发行

Berkshire的新股份，所以在这项交易中，虽然我们提供国际飞安原股东换取股票或

现金两种选择，但是交易条件等于间接鼓励这些税负没有太大差异的股东选择领取现

金，结果总计最后有51%的股份领取现金，41%换得Berkshire A级普通股，另外

8%换得Berkshire B级普通股。

Al has had a lifelong love affair with aviation and actually piloted

Charles Lindbergh. After a barnstorming career in the 1930s, he began

working for Juan Trippe, Pan Am's legendary chief. In 1951, while still

at Pan Am, Al founded FlightSafety, subsequently building it into a

simulator manufacturer and a worldwide trainer of pilots (single-engine,

helicopter, jet and marine). The company operates in 41 locations,

outfitted with 175 simulators of planes ranging from the very small, such

as Cessna 210s, to Boeing 747s. Simulators are not cheap - they can cost

as much as $19 million - so this business, unlike many of our

operations, is capital intensive. About half of the company's revenues

are derived from the training of corporate pilots, with most of the

balance coming from airlines and the military.

Al 一生热爱飞行，曾经驾驶过查理林登号，在经过1930年代轰轰烈烈的飞行事业

之后，他开始担任泛美航空的机长，之后并在1951年创立国际飞安公司，将这家公

司塑造成飞行仿真器制造与飞行员训练的世界级领导公司(单引擎、直升机、客机与水

上飞机)，营业据点遍布41个地方，拥有175座的飞行仿真器，大至波音747客机，

小到Cessna 210型小飞机，大家要知道飞行仿真器的造价可不便宜，有的要价甚至

高达1,900万美金，所以这一行不像我们原来拥有的其它事业，算是相当资本密集

的，该公司大约有一半的营业收入来自于训练飞行员的收入，其余则来自于航空公司

与军事单位。

Al may be 79, but he looks and acts about 55. He will run

operations just as he has in the past: We never fool with success. I

have told him that though we don't believe in splitting Berkshire stock,

we will split his age 2-for-1 when he hits 100.

Al 今年虽然已经79岁，不过外表举止看起来像55岁，他将一如往常继续经营这家

公司，我们从来不会把成功搞混，我甚至跟他开玩笑说，虽然我们从没想过将

Berkshire的股份予以分割，不过等他满100岁时，我们倒是可以考虑把他的年纪一

分为二。

An observer might conclude from our hiring practices that Charlie

and I were traumatized early in life by an EEOC bulletin on age

discrimination. The real explanation, however, is self-interest: It's

difficult to teach a new dog old tricks. The many Berkshire managers who

are past 70 hit home runs today at the same pace that long ago gave them

reputations as young slugging sensations. Therefore, to get a job with

us, just employ the tactic of the 76-year-old who persuaded a dazzling

beauty of 25 to marry him. "How did you ever get her to accept?" asked

his envious contemporaries. The comeback: "I told her I was 86."

有人可能会怀疑我们现在雇用人的政策，可能是缘于早期年龄歧视政策所受到的创

伤，其实真正的原因乃是出于自私的观点，因为我们认为实在是很难教新狗老把戏！

在Berkshire，许多经理人虽然已经年过70，但是他们还是像年轻时一样活跃，频频

击出全垒打，所以如果各位有意到本公司谋得一职，请记得运用一位高龄76岁老翁

如何追到25岁年轻辣妹的技巧，当同年龄的同伴很钦羡地问他：你到底是如何说服

对方同意的呢?? 他回答到：很简单，我告诉她我今年86岁!

* * * * * * * * * * * *

And now we pause for our usual commercial: If you own a large

business with good economic characteristics and wish to become associated

with an exceptional collection of businesses having similar

characteristics, Berkshire may well be the home you seek. Our

requirements are set forth on page 21. If your company meets them - and

if I fail to make the next birthday party you attend - give me a call.

接下来休息一下，顺便做点广告，如果你拥有具极佳竞争优势的大企业同时想要与拥

有同样特质的企业群为伍的话，Berkshire可以提供你绝佳的归宿，我们的要求条件

详如附件，若是你的公司符合这些条件，而我又没能来得及参加你的生日派对，记得

打电话给我。

Insurance Operations - Overview

保险事业盈余-总检讨

Our insurance business was terrific in 1996. In both primary

insurance, where GEICO is our main unit, and in our "super-cat"

reinsurance business, results were outstanding.

在1996年，我们保险事业的营运大放异彩，不管是初级保险-其中以GEICO车险为

主，或者是霹雳猫再保业务的表现都很杰出。

As we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance

business is, first, the amount of "float" we generate and, second, its

cost to us. These are matters that are important for you to understand

because float is a major component of Berkshire's intrinsic value that is

not reflected in book value.

就像是在过去年报中一再跟各位解释的，对于我们的保险事业来说，真正重要的，第

一是我们因此取得的保险浮存金，第二就是取得它的成本，这两点相当的重要，大家

必须了解浮存金虽然不会反应在公司净值之上，但却是Berkshire实质价值构成的关

键因素之一。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an

insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before

losses are paid. Secondly, the premiums that an insurer takes in

typically do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay.

That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of

float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is

less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds.

But the business is an albatross if the cost of its float is higher than

market rates for money.

更进一步说，浮存金是一项我们持有但不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮

存金的产生原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，

而通常保险业者收取的保费不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，于是保险公

司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当浮存金成本长期而言低于从其它管

道取得资金的成本时，保险公司就有存在的价值，不过保险事业取得浮存金的成本若

远高于资金市场利率时，它就像是一只在陆地上笨重的信天翁。

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance

business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our

float - which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium

volume - by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held

under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then

subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes

and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of

float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years

when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last four, our cost

of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding

money.

不过如同下表中的数字所显示的，Berkshire的保险事业可说是大获全胜，表中的浮

存金，系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣

金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金

部位算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失或利益而定，在某

些年度，就像是最近四年，由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚

至是负的，光是持有这些资金我们就已经开始赚钱了。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximat on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

------------ ------------- ---------------- -------------

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967.......... profit 17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968.......... profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969.......... profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970.......... 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971.......... profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972.......... profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973.......... profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974.......... 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975.......... 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976.......... profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977.......... profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978.......... profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979.......... profit 227.3 less than zero 10.08%

1980.......... profit 237.0 less than zero 11.94%

1981.......... profit 228.4 less than zero 13.61%

1982.......... 21.56 220.6 9.77% 10.64%

1983.......... 33.87 231.3 14.64% 11.84%

1984.......... 48.06 253.2 18.98% 11.58%

1985.......... 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986.......... 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987.......... 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988.......... 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989.......... 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990.......... 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991.......... 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992.......... 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

1993.......... profit 2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%

1994.......... profit 3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%

1995.......... profit 3,607.2 less than zero 5.95%

1996.......... profit 6,702.0 less than zero 6.64%

Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has

grown at an annual compounded rate of 22.3%. In more years than not, our

cost of funds has been less than nothing. This access to "free" money has

boosted Berkshire's performance in a major way. Moreover, our acquisition

of GEICO materially increases the probability that we can continue to

obtain "free" funds in increasing amounts.

自从1967年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金每年以22.3%复合成长率增加，大

部分的年度，我们的资金成本都在零以下，受惠于这些免费的资金，大大地帮助

Berkshire的绩效提升。更甚者，在完成对GEICO的并购之后，我们取得免费资金的

成长速度又加快了许多。

Super-Cat Insurance

霹雳猫保险业务

As in the past three years, we once again stress that the good results

we are reporting for Berkshire stem in part from our super-cat business

having a lucky year. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance

and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of

mega-catastrophes. Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences,

our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years

- and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the

attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to

measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year

in the super-cat business is not a possibility - it's a certainty. The

only question is when it will come.

与过去三年一样，我们再次强调今年Berkshire保险事业之所以能够有这么好的成

绩，部份的原因要归功于霹雳猫业务又渡过幸运的一年，从事这类业务，我们出售保

单给保险公司与再保公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，由于真正

重大的灾害并不常发生，所以我们的霹雳猫业务有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，才突然

发生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项霹雳猫业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几年

才有办法看得清，不过大家必须明了，所谓的重大损失的年头不是可能会发生，而是

肯定会发生，唯一的问题是它什么时候会降临。

I emphasize this lugubrious point because I would not want you to

panic and sell your Berkshire stock upon hearing that some large

catastrophe had cost us a significant amount. If you would tend to react

that way, you should not own Berkshire shares now, just as you should

entirely avoid owning stocks if a crashing market would lead you to panic

and sell. Selling fine businesses on "scary" news is usually a bad

decision. (Robert Woodruff, the business genius who built Coca-Cola over

many decades and who owned a huge position in the company, was once

asked when it might be a good time to sell Coke stock. Woodruff had a

simple answer: "I don't know. I've never sold any.")

我之所以会把丑话说在前头，是因为我不希望大家那天突然听到Berkshire因为某某

大型意外灾害须理赔一大笔钱时，恐慌地拋售手中的持股，而如果届时你真的会有这

种反应，那么你根本就不应该拥有本公司的股份，就像是如果你是那种碰到股市崩

盘，会恐慌性的拋售手中股票的人，我建议你最好不要投资股票，听到坏消息而把手

中的好股票卖掉通常不会是一个明智的决定，(数十年前创办可口可乐的天才企业家

-Robert Woodruff曾经被问到，什么情况下是出售可口可乐股票的好时机，

Woodruff简短的回答到，我不知道，我从来就没有卖过!)。

In our super-cat operation, our customers are insurers that are

exposed to major earnings volatility and that wish to reduce it. The

product we sell - for what we hope is an appropriate price - is our

willingness to shift that volatility to our own books. Gyrations in

Berkshire's earnings don't bother us in the least: Charlie and I would

much rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%. (After all, our

earnings swing wildly on a daily and weekly basis - why should we demand

that smoothness accompany each orbit that the earth makes of the sun?)

We are most comfortable with that thinking, however, when we have

shareholder/partners who can also accept volatility, and that's why we

regularly repeat our cautions.

谈到霹雳猫保险业务，我们的客户主要是一些想要降低本身必须承担盈余变动剧烈风

险的保险公司，而我们贩卖的产品-当然一定要以合理的价格，将这些盈余变动的风

险转移到本公司的帐上，因为我们对于Berkshire公司盈余剧烈的变动一点都不会介

意，查理跟我宁可接受上下变动但平均可达15%的结果，也不要平稳的12%，(就像

是我们知道公司的盈余每天、每周都会变动，那么我们又何必强求公司的盈余变化一

定要跟地球环绕太阳轨道的时间一致呢?) 我想如果Berkshire的股东合伙人也能有

这样的看法，那么我们执行业务时便能更得心应手，而这也是为什么我们要一再提出

相同警告的原因。

We took on some major super-cat exposures during 1996. At mid-year

we wrote a contract with Allstate that covers Florida hurricanes, and though

there are no definitive records that would allow us to prove this point, we

believe that to have then been the largest single catastrophe risk ever

assumed by one company for its own account. Later in the year, however, we

wrote a policy for the California Earthquake Authority that goes into

effect on April 1, 1997, and that exposes us to a loss more than twice that

possible under the Florida contract. Again we retained all the risk for

our own account. Large as these coverages are, Berkshire's after-tax

"worst-case" loss from a true mega-catastrophe is probably no more than

$600 million, which is less than 3% of our book value and 1.5% of our market

value. To gain some perspective on this exposure, look at the table on

page 2 and note the much greater volatility that security markets have

delivered us.

我们在1996年陆续接了好几件大业务，在年中我们与全美保险签约承保佛罗里达飓

风险，虽然没有确切的资料可供左证，但我们相信这应该是单一公司独力承受单一风

险的最高记录，接着到年底，我们又与加州地震局签约承保比佛罗里达飓风高出一倍

的理赔上限，保单预计从1997年4月1日开始生效，再一次我们独立承揽所有的风

险，虽然承保的金额相当庞大，但是即使在最坏的状况下，任何一件大型灾害的税后

损失也不会超过六亿美元，大约不到Berkshire净值的3%或市值的1.5%，大家要了

解这类风险的影响性，比起年报第二页所示的股票市场变动对我们的影响性来说，前

者可谓是小巫见大巫。

In the super-cat business, we have three major competitive advantages.

First, the parties buying reinsurance from us know that we both can and

will pay under the most adverse of circumstances. Were a truly cataclysmic

disaster to occur, it is not impossible that a financial panic would

quickly follow. If that happened, there could well be respected reinsurers

that would have difficulty paying at just the moment that their clients

faced extraordinary needs. Indeed, one reason we never "lay off" part of

the risks we insure is that we have reservations about our ability to

collect from others when disaster strikes. When it's Berkshire promising,

insureds know with certainty that they can collect promptly.

在霹雳猫保险业务，我们主要有三项竞争优势，首先向我们投保再保险的客户都知道

我们有能力，也会在最糟糕的情况下履约付款，因为万一真的发生什么样的大灾难，

很难保证金融恐慌就不会接踵而至，届时在其客户最需要援助时，可能连一些原本享

有盛誉的再保公司都拿不出钱来，而事实上我们之所以从来不将风险再转嫁出去的一

个原因也是因为我们对于灾难发生时，其它保险公司能否顺利支付赔款的能力有所保

留，反之只要是Berkshire做出的保证，所有的保户都可以百分之百确定一定可以立

即得到理赔。

Our second advantage - somewhat related - is subtle but important.

After a mega-catastrophe, insurers might well find it difficult to obtain

reinsurance even though their need for coverage would then be particularly

great. At such a time, Berkshire would without question have very

substantial capacity available - but it will naturally be our long-standing

clients that have first call on it. That business reality has made major

insurers and reinsurers throughout the world realize the desirability of

doing business with us. Indeed, we are currently getting sizable "standby"

fees from reinsurers that are simply nailing down their ability to get

coverage from us should the market tighten.

我们的第二项优势，跟第一项有点关联，虽然不显著但却相当重要，当一件大灾害发

生后，保险公司最迫切需要重新办理投保时，可能会发现很难再找到新保单，在这个

时候，Berkshire保证绝对可以提供任何服务，当然我们会优先受理原来与我们有长

期往来的客户，这个经验已经使得全世界的保险公司与再保公司了解与我们维持往来

的必要性，事实上，我们现在正从许多再保公司那里收取预备准备费，以防万一市场

情况紧绷时，他们可以确保取得再保的优先机会。

Our final competitive advantage is that we can provide dollar

coverages of a size neither matched nor approached elsewhere in the

industry. Insurers looking for huge covers know that a single call to

Berkshire will produce a firm and immediate offering.

我们拥有的最后一项优势是我们能够提供别处得不到单一最高的投保上限，保险业者

都知道只要打一通电话到Berkshire，就可以立即得到确定满意的答复。

A few facts about our exposure to California earthquakes - our largest

risk - seem in order. The Northridge quake of 1994 laid homeowners' losses

on insurers that greatly exceeded what computer models had told them to

expect. Yet the intensity of that quake was mild compared to the "worstcase"

possibility for California. Understandably, insurers became - ahem -

shaken and started contemplating a retreat from writing earthquake coverage

into their homeowners' policies.

有关加州大地震方面有几点需要在这里做说明，因为这是我们最大的风险部位所在，

1994年发生的北岭大地震使得保险业的住宅保险损失远超过计算机所估算的预期范

围，不过这次地震的震度比起预估可能的最坏情况，最还算是相对轻微的，所以可想

而知某些保险业者肯定都吓坏了，因此开始考虑将地震险从他们的住宅险保单条款中

撤掉。

In a thoughtful response, Chuck Quackenbush, California's insurance

commissioner, designed a new residential earthquake policy to be written by

a state-sponsored insurer, The California Earthquake Authority. This

entity, which went into operation on December 1, 1996, needed large layers

of reinsurance - and that's where we came in. Berkshire's layer of

approximately $1 billion will be called upon if the Authority's aggregate

losses in the period ending March 31, 2001 exceed about $5 billion. (The

press originally reported larger figures, but these would have applied only

if all California insurers had entered into the arrangement; instead only

72% signed up.)

深富远见的加州保险委员会委员Chuch Quackenbush立即规划出一张由加州地震

局背后支持新的住宅地震保单，然而这项预计从1996年12月1日开始正式生效的

措施极需要再保险的庇护，这时候就轮到我们上场了，Berkshire总共提供10亿美

元的再保险防护，当地震局在2001年3月31日之前因地震发生的损失超过50亿

美元时，(媒体原先报导的数字比这更高，不过那是在所有保险业者都一同加入时的情

况，总计最后只有72%的业者参与签约)。

So what are the true odds of our having to make a payout during the

policy's term? We don't know - nor do we think computer models will help

us, since we believe the precision they project is a chimera. In fact,

such models can lull decision-makers into a false sense of security and

thereby increase their chances of making a really huge mistake. We've

already seen such debacles in both insurance and investments. Witness

"portfolio insurance," whose destructive effects in the 1987 market crash

led one wag to observe that it was the computers that should have been

jumping out of windows.

大家一定会问在保单有效期间我们最后真正必须支付理赔的机率到底有多大?? 老实

说我们实在是不知道，而我们也不认为用计算机运算出来的程序可以帮我们什么忙，基

本上计算机做出的预测根本就是垃圾，它们反而会让做决策的人误以为得到某种确定的

假象，从而使得他们犯下大错的机会大增，过去不管是在保险或投资业者，这种离谱

的情况屡见不鲜，看看投资组合保险在1987年股市大崩盘时所造成的惨况，有人开

玩笑说，当时应该要跳楼是计算机而不是那些被它所愚弄的人。

Even if perfection in assessing risks is unattainable, insurers can

underwrite sensibly. After all, you need not know a man's precise age to

know that he is old enough to vote nor know his exact weight to recognize

his need to diet. In insurance, it is essential to remember that virtually

all surprises are unpleasant, and with that in mind we try to price our

super-cat exposures so that about 90% of total premiums end up being

eventually paid out in losses and expenses. Over time, we will find out

how smart our pricing has been, but that will not be quickly. The supercat

business is just like the investment business in that it often takes a

long time to find out whether you knew what you were doing.

虽然保险业者无法准确地评估风险到底有多大，不过我们却还是可以合理的接下保

单，就像是你并不一定要真的知道一个人的实际年龄，才能判断他是否可以去投票或

是一定要知道一个人几公斤重才认为他该不该减肥，同样的，从事保险这一行，大家

必须谨记的是，基本上所有的意外都不会让人感到愉快，所以在接下保单时，我们心

里早有预备，准备把90%的保费收入花在损失理赔与相关费用之上，慢慢的一段时间

下来，我们就会发现，这样的订价是否合理，这绝对需要时间来证明，霹雳猫保险这

一行就像是投资事业一样，绝对需要一段很长的时间，你才能确定知道自己到底在干

什么。

What I can state with certainty, however, is that we have the best

person in the world to run our super-cat business: Ajit Jain, whose value

to Berkshire is simply enormous. In the reinsurance field, disastrous

propositions abound. I know that because I personally embraced all too

many of these in the 1970s and also because GEICO has a large runoff

portfolio made up of foolish contracts written in the early-1980s, able

though its then-management was. Ajit, I can assure you, won't make

mistakes of this type.

不过有一点我绝对可以向各位保证的是，我们拥有全世界最优秀的霹雳猫保险保险专

家，那就是Ajit Jain，他在Berkshire的价值大到难以想象，在再保险这一行，恐怖

的灾难时常发生，我很清楚的原因是我个人在1970年代就抱了不少个地雷，而

GEICO在1980年代初期，即使当时拥有最能干的经理人，也同样签了一堆愚蠢的保

险合约，不过提到Ajit，我可以向各位保证，绝对不会再犯同样的错误。

I have mentioned that a mega-catastrophe might cause a catastrophe in

the financial markets, a possibility that is unlikely but not far-fetched.

Were the catastrophe a quake in California of sufficient magnitude to tap

our coverage, we would almost certainly be damaged in other ways as well.

For example, See's, Wells Fargo and Freddie Mac could be hit hard. All in

all, though, we can handle this aggregation of exposures.

另一方面我也说过，自然灾害的发生同样也会间接导致金融风暴的发生，这样的可能

性不大，但也不是不可能，要是加州真的发生规模大到我们理赔下限的大地震，我们

旗下其它事业也可能会受到严重的打击，比如说喜斯糖果、富国银行或Freddie Mac

等，不过总的来说，我们应该可以妥善处理发生的状况。

In this respect, as in others, we try to "reverse engineer" our future

at Berkshire, bearing in mind Charlie's dictum: "All I want to know is

where I'm going to die so I'll never go there." (Inverting really works:

Try singing country western songs backwards and you will quickly regain

your house, your car and your wife.) If we can't tolerate a possible

consequence, remote though it may be, we steer clear of planting its seeds.

That is why we don't borrow big amounts and why we make sure that our

super-cat business losses, large though the maximums may sound, will not

put a major dent in Berkshire's intrinsic value.

就这方面而言，我们试着事先规划Berkshire的未来，时时谨记查理常说的一句格言，

「希望能够知道自己最后会死在哪里，然后打死都不去那里！」(事先回想真的有效，

大家可以试着多唱唱以前流行的乡村歌曲，很快的你就会发现重新找回你的房子、车

子跟老婆)，如果我们没办法承担可能的后果，不管其可能性有多小，那么我们就必须

避免播下罪恶的种子，这也是为什么我们不大幅举债的原因，同时虽然霹雳猫损失理

赔的上限金额看起来很大，但对Berkshire本身价值的影响却极其有限。

Insurance - GEICO and Other Primary Operations

保险事业营运-GEICO以及其它主要保险

When we moved to total ownership of GEICO early last year, our

expectations were high - and they are all being exceeded. That is true

from both a business and personal perspective: GEICO's operating chief,

Tony Nicely, is a superb business manager and a delight to work with.

Under almost any conditions, GEICO would be an exceptionally valuable

asset. With Tony at the helm, it is reaching levels of performance that

the organization would only a few years ago have thought impossible.

去年当我们完全取得GEICO的所有权之后，我们曾对它抱以深切的期望，如今这些

期望不但全部实现，甚至是有过之而无不及，不论是从企业或个人的观点来看皆是如

此，GEICO的领导者Tony Nicely不但是一个杰出的经理人同时也是令人感到愉快

的工作伙伴，不论在任何的情况下，GEICO永远都是我们价值不菲的珍贵资产，有

Tony负责掌舵，GEICO甚至迈入几年前根本就想象不到的营运高峰。

There's nothing esoteric about GEICO's success: The company's

competitive strength flows directly from its position as a low-cost

operator. Low costs permit low prices, and low prices attract and retain

good policyholders. The final segment of a virtuous circle is drawn when

policyholders recommend us to their friends. GEICO gets more than one

million referrals annually and these produce more than half of our new

business, an advantage that gives us enormous savings in acquisition

expenses - and that makes our costs still lower.

GEICO的成功没有任何深奥的道理，该公司的竞争优势完全拜其超低成本的经营模式

所赐，低成本代表低售价，低售价自然能够吸引并留住优良的保险客户，而整个营业

流程在满意的客户向他们的朋友推荐GEICO时划下完美的句点，靠着客户的推荐，

GEICO每年至少因此增加100万张保单，占新接业务量的半数以上，也使得我们新

接业务成本大幅下降，从而又进一步降低我们的成本。

This formula worked in spades for GEICO in 1996: Its voluntary auto

policy count grew 10%. During the previous 20 years, the company's bestever

growth for a year had been 8%, a rate achieved only once. Better yet,

the growth in voluntary policies accelerated during the year, led by major

gains in the nonstandard market, which has been an underdeveloped area at

GEICO. I focus here on voluntary policies because the involuntary business

we get from assigned risk pools and the like is unprofitable. Growth in

that sector is most unwelcome.

这种模式在1996年大放异彩，自动上门的保险量成长了10%，过去二十年来，该公

司最高也不过是在有一年达到8%而已，更好的是，这些自愿保单的增加主要源自于

非制式的保单市场，这个市场对GEICO来说算是亟待开发的一块，我之所以一再强

调自愿保单的原因在于，从别处分配到的集体性非自愿的保单根本就没什么利润，那

方面的成长就可有可无。

GEICO's growth would mean nothing if it did not produce reasonable

underwriting profits. Here, too, the news is good: Last year we hit our

underwriting targets and then some. Our goal, however, is not to widen our

profit margin but rather to enlarge the price advantage we offer customers.

Given that strategy, we believe that 1997's growth will easily top that of

last year.

如果不能产生合理的承保获利，GEICO保费收入的成长就没有任何意义，不过再一次

我们得到的答案是正面的肯定，去年我们顺利达到原先设定的承保目标，甚至还超

越，不过我们真正的目标不是要扩大承保的利差，而是将利润透过价格的调整回馈给

客户，在这样的策略之下，我们相信1997年的成长一定还会超越1996年的表现。

We expect new competitors to enter the direct-response market, and

some of our existing competitors are likely to expand geographically.

Nonetheless, the economies of scale we enjoy should allow us to maintain or

even widen the protective moat surrounding our economic castle. We do best

on costs in geographical areas in which we enjoy high market penetration.

As our policy count grows, concurrently delivering gains in penetration, we

expect to drive costs materially lower. GEICO's sustainable cost advantage

is what attracted me to the company way back in 1951, when the entire

business was valued at $7 million. It is also why I felt Berkshire should

pay $2.3 billion last year for the 49% of the company that we didn't then

own.

同时我们也预期会有新的竞争者加入直效行销的市场，而现有的一些竞争同业也有可

能会扩大他们的营业区域，不过不管怎样，我们目前所建立的规模经济，绝对可以确

保甚至是扩大我们现在占有的经济堡垒，我们在拥有最高市占率的地区尽量降低成

本，预期还会将成本进一步地降低，GEICO永续性的成本优势是当初在1951年吸引

我投资该公司的主要原因，当时整家公司的市值不过只有700万美元，而那也是为

什么我在去年愿意花23亿美元买下另外一半不属于Berkshire的股权的原因。

Maximizing the results of a wonderful business requires management and

focus. Lucky for us, we have in Tony a superb manager whose business focus

never wavers. Wanting also to get the entire GEICO organization

concentrating as he does, we needed a compensation plan that was itself

sharply focused - and immediately after our purchase, we put one in.

想要让一家好公司的表现发挥到极致，必须依赖优秀的管理人员与明确的目标方向，

值得庆幸的是我们已经有像Tony这样优秀的专业经理人以及绝对不会动摇的目标，

而为了确保GEICO所有的组织成员都能像Tony一样专注一致，我们需要一套能够

搭配的薪资酬劳计画，所以在整个购并案完成之后，我们立刻落实执行。

Today, the bonuses received by dozens of top executives, starting with

Tony, are based upon only two key variables: (1) growth in voluntary auto

policies and (2) underwriting profitability on "seasoned" auto business

(meaning policies that have been on the books for more than one year). In

addition, we use the same yardsticks to calculate the annual contribution

to the company's profit-sharing plan. Everyone at GEICO knows what counts.

现在，以Tony为首的几个主要高阶经理人所领取的薪资奖励主要就看两个指数︰(1)

自愿性保单的成长，以及(2)常态性保单承保的获利(指留在公司超过一年的保单)，此

外，我们也将同样的标准运用于公司每年员工盈余分配的计画，所以基本上在GEICO

每个人都知道真正重要的是什么。

The GEICO plan exemplifies Berkshire's incentive compensation

principles: Goals should be (1) tailored to the economics of the specific

operating business; (2) simple in character so that the degree to which

they are being realized can be easily measured; and (3) directly related to

the daily activities of plan participants. As a corollary, we shun

"lottery ticket" arrangements, such as options on Berkshire shares, whose

ultimate value - which could range from zero to huge - is totally out of

the control of the person whose behavior we would like to affect. In our

view, a system that produces quixotic payoffs will not only be wasteful for

owners but may actually discourage the focused behavior we value in

managers.

GEICO这项计画充分说明的Berkshire薪资奖励的原则，那就是必须要能够达到以下

目标(1)适用于个别公司经营状况(2)简单明了的规则，如此可以很清楚的加以衡量(3)

与每个参与的员工直接相关；所以很自然的，我们避免给予员工不劳而获的乐透彩，

比如说Berkshire的认股权，其最终的价值可能由极少到极大，但这却不是那些我们

想要影响其行为的人员所能够直接控制影响的，在我们的观念中，不合理的薪资奖励

办法，不但是浪费股东的钱，同时也会让旗下的经理人分心而产生不当的行为。

Every quarter, all 9,000 GEICO associates can see the results that

determine our profit-sharing plan contribution. In 1996, they enjoyed the

experience because the plan literally went off the chart that had been

constructed at the start of the year. Even I knew the answer to that

problem: Enlarge the chart. Ultimately, the results called for a record

contribution of 16.9% ($40 million), compared to a five-year average of

less than 10% for the comparable plans previously in effect. Furthermore,

at Berkshire, we never greet good work by raising the bar. If GEICO's

performance continues to improve, we will happily keep on making larger

charts.

每一季，GEICO公司总共9,000名的员工都可以看到根据盈余分配计画所计算出来

的结果，1996年他们确实享受到这项成果，因为根据这项计画所计算出来的数字早

已打破当初规划时的最高上限，连我也知道要如何解决这个问题，那就是把上限再扩

大，到最后，员工总共分配到年度获利的16.9%，金额将近有4,000万美元，远高

于过去五年平均不到10%的比率，同时在Berkshire对于员工辛勤工作的表现，我们

绝对不会回以更高的门槛，如果GEICO的员工继续保持如此优异的表现，我们还会

继续提高奖励的上限。

Lou Simpson continues to manage GEICO's money in an outstanding

manner: Last year, the equities in his portfolio outdid the S&P 500 by 6.2

percentage points. In Lou's part of GEICO's operation, we again tie

compensation to performance - but to investment performance over a fouryear

period, not to underwriting results nor to the performance of GEICO as

a whole. We think it foolish for an insurance company to pay bonuses that

are tied to overall corporate results when great work on one side of the

business - underwriting or investment - could conceivably be completely

neutralized by bad work on the other. If you bat .350 at Berkshire, you

can be sure you will get paid commensurately even if the rest of the team

bats .200. In Lou and Tony, however, we are lucky to have Hall-of-Famers

in both key positions.

负责管理GEICO资金的Lou Simpson同样继续其优异的表现，去年他的投资组合超

越S&P 500指数整整6.2个百分点，关于Lou在GEICO的表现，再一次我们将其

奖励计画跟其投资绩效绑在一起，不看GEICO的承保绩效或整体的成绩，而是以过

去四年平均的投资绩效为准，对于有些保险公司不分承保部门或投资部门，完全不顾

一方优异的表现可能被另一方糟糕的表现所抵消掉的情况，而将其薪资奖励计画完全

绑在一起，一视同仁的做法感到愚不可及，在Berkshire如果你的打击率高达三成五，

我可以向你保证绝对不会亏待你，即使其它同队的球员平均打击率只有二成而已，不

过很庆幸在GEICO，不论是在保险或投资部门，我们都拥有像Lou与Tony这类足

以列入名人堂的优秀球员。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Though they are, of course, smaller than GEICO, our other primary

insurance operations turned in equally stunning results last year.

National Indemnity's traditional business had a combined ratio of 74.2 and,

as usual, developed a large amount of float compared to premium volume.

Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don

Wurster, has had an average combined ratio of 83.0. Our homestate

operation, managed by Rod Eldred, recorded a combined ratio of 87.1 even

though it absorbed the expenses of expanding to new states. Rod's threeyear

combined ratio is an amazing 83.2. Berkshire's workers' compensation

business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, has now moved into six

other states and, despite the costs of that expansion, again achieved an

excellent underwriting profit. Finally, John Kizer, at Central States

Indemnity, set new records for premium volume while generating good

earnings from underwriting. In aggregate, our smaller insurance operations

(now including Kansas Bankers Surety) have an underwriting record virtually

unmatched in the industry. Don, Rod, Brad and John have all created

significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is more to come.

虽然比起GEICO，我们其它主要保险事业规模要小得多，但他们在去年同样缴出惊人

的成绩单，国家赔偿公司的传统业务综合比率只有74.2，同时以其保费收入来看，

还贡献了大量的浮存金，过去三年以来，这个由Don Wurster负责的部门平均的综

合比率只有83.0；另外由Rod Eldred负责的Homestate业务也有相当幅度的成长，

去年虽然必须负担开拓新州业务的费用，但综合比率仍只有87.1，过去三年平均为

83.2；另外原先由Brad负责的加州劳工退休基金现在已将业务重心移到其它六个

州，虽然初期须负担沉重的开办费用，但是仍然能维持可观的承保获利；最后负责中

央州立产险公司营运的John Kizer则依然表现出色，保费收入不但大幅成长，同时

承保利益更大幅增加，总的来说，我们几个小型保险事业(包含堪萨斯银行家保险在内)

的表现是其它同业所比不上的，Don、Rod、Brad与John全都替Berkshire创造了

可观的价值，而我们也相信他们未来的潜力仍然可期。

Taxes

租税问题

In 1961, President Kennedy said that we should ask not what our

country can do for us, but rather ask what we can do for our country. Last

year we decided to give his suggestion a try - and who says it never hurts

to ask? We were told to mail $860 million in income taxes to the U.S.

Treasury.

1961年，甘乃迪总统曾经说过一句名言︰不要问国家能为你做些什么，问问你能为

国家做些什么! 去年我们决定照他的建议试一试，不过不知道是谁说问问没有关系

的?? 我们最后得到的答案是总共要缴8.6亿美元的所得税给美国国库。

Here's a little perspective on that figure: If an equal amount had

been paid by only 2,000 other taxpayers, the government would have had a

balanced budget in 1996 without needing a dime of taxes - income or Social

Security or what have you - from any other American. Berkshire

shareholders can truly say, "I gave at the office."

这个数字到底有多大呢? 如果全美能够有2,000名跟Berkshire一样的纳税义务人的

话，则美国国库不需要再征收其它任何的所得税、社会安全捐或任何你想得到名目的

税捐，1996年的预算收支就能够打平，所以Berkshire的股东可以大声地说自己，

功在国库。

Charlie and I believe that large tax payments by Berkshire are

entirely fitting. The contribution we thus make to society's well-being is

at most only proportional to its contribution to ours. Berkshire prospers

in America as it would nowhere else.

查理跟我本人对于Berkshire必须支付如此高额的税负感到完全接受，我们对于整个

社会的贡献远远比不上社会对我们所作的贡献，要不是身在美国，Berkshire不可能

有这样的荣景。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported

earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not

assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead

aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings

of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased

them. For the reasons discussed on pages 65 and 66, this form of

presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than

one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which

require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The

total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP

total in our audited financial statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

(in millions)

--------------------------------------

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-tax Earnings minority interests)

---------------- -------------------

1996 1995(1) 1996 1995(1)

------- -------- ------- -------

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting.....................$ 222.1 $ 20.5 $ 142.8 $ 11.3

Net Investment Income............ 726.2 501.6 593.1 417.7

Buffalo News........................... 50.4 46.8 29.5 27.3

Fechheimer............................. 17.3 16.9 9.3 8.8

Finance Businesses..................... 23.1 20.8 14.9 12.6

Home Furnishings....................... 43.8 29.7(2) 24.8 16.7(2)

Jewelry................................ 27.8 33.9(3) 16.1 19.1(3)

Kirby.................................. 58.5 50.2 39.9 32.1

Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group....... 50.6 34.1 32.2 21.2

See's Candies.......................... 51.9 50.2 30.8 29.8

Shoe Group............................. 61.6 58.4 41.0 37.5

World Book............................. 12.6 8.8 9.5 7.0

Purchase-Accounting Adjustments........ (75.7) (27.0) (70.5) (23.4)

Interest Expense(4).................... (94.3) (56.0) (56.6) (34.9)

Shareholder-Designated Contributions.. (13.3) (11.6) (8.5) (7.0)

Other.................................. 58.8 37.4 34.8 24.4

------- -------- -------- -------

Operating Earnings....................... 1,221.4 814.7 883.1 600.2

Sales of Securities...................... 2,484.5 194.1 1,605.5 125.0

------- -------- -------- -------

Total Earnings - All Entities........... $3,705.9 $1,008.8 $2,488.6 $ 725.2

====== ======= ======= ======

1. Before the GEICO-related restatement.

(1)不包含GEICO重编部份。

(2) Includes R.C. Willey from June 29, 1995.

(2)包含R.C. Willey 1995年6月29日以后的盈余

(3) Includes Helzberg's from April 30, 1995.

(3)包含Helzberg 1995年4月30日以后的盈余

(4) Excludes interest expenseof Finance Businesses.

(4)扣除金融事业的利息支出

In this section last year, I discussed three businesses that reported

a decline in earnings - Buffalo News, Shoe Group and World Book. All, I'm

happy to say, recorded gains in 1996.

去年到这段时，我曾提到有三个事业盈余大幅下滑-水牛城新闻报、鞋子事业与世界

百科全书，今年我们高兴向大家报告，这几个事业都大有进步。

World Book, however, did not find it easy: Despite the operation's

new status as the only direct-seller of encyclopedias in the country

(Encyclopedia Britannica exited the field last year), its unit volume fell.

Additionally, World Book spent heavily on a new CD-ROM product that began

to take in revenues only in early 1997, when it was launched in association

with IBM. In the face of these factors, earnings would have evaporated had

World Book not revamped distribution methods and cut overhead at

headquarters, thereby dramatically reducing its fixed costs. Overall, the

company has gone a long way toward assuring its long-term viability in both

the print and electronic marketplaces.

不过对于世界百科全书来说，这可不是一件简单的事，尽管如今它们是全美仅存以直

销的方式销售百科全书的业者(大英百科全书在去年退出了这个市场)，不过它的销售

数量还是呈现下滑的状态，另外世界百科全书还投入大笔的经费在CD版的新产品之

上，但其效益至少要等到1997年初与IBM的合作正式展开后才有可能显现，在种种

不利的状况下，世界百科全书如果不能大力改革通路方式并降低总部营运开销，以彻

底降低固定成本的话，盈余可能会消失殆尽，不过总的来说，该公司已想尽各种方法

以确保自身能够在竞争激烈的印刷与电子出版市场上继续存活下去。

Our only disappointment last year was in jewelry: Borsheim's did

fine, but Helzberg's suffered a material decline in earnings. Its expense

levels had been geared to a sizable increase in same-store sales,

consistent with the gains achieved in recent years. When sales were

instead flat, profit margins fell. Jeff Comment, CEO of Helzberg's, is

addressing the expense problem in a decisive manner, and the company's

earnings should improve in 1997.

去年唯一让我们感到失望的反而是珠宝事业，波仙还不错，不过Helzberg的盈余却

大幅下滑，单店平均费用持续大幅增加，但是当营收表现平平时，获利自然缩减，针

对这个问题该公司总裁-Jeff Comment已经采取必要的措施，我想它们1997年的

盈余表现应该能够有所改善。

Overall, our operating businesses continue to perform exceptionally,

far outdoing their industry norms. For this, Charlie and I thank our

managers. If you should see any of them at the Annual Meeting, add your

thanks as well.

不过总的来说，我们旗下所有的营利事业的表现，比起其同业来说仍然相当杰出，对

此查理跟我本身向所有经理人致上深深的敬意，而如果各位在年会上遇到他们，也请

大家不吝给予掌声。

More information about our various businesses is given on pages 36-

46, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP

basis. In addition, on pages 51-57, we have rearranged Berkshire's

financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation

that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our

intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish

you to give us if our positions were reversed.

在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，另外你还可以

找到经过重编，依照Berkshire四大部门的信息，这是查理跟我能够完整呈现

Berkshire现况的模式，我们的目的是希望能够换个角度设想，提供大家所有必要的

信息。

"Look-Through" Earnings

完整透视盈余

Reported earnings are a poor measure of economic progress at

Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented

earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees - though

these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings

attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money,

since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as

more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason is simple:

Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high

rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?

我们认为帐列盈余很难表现Berkshire实际的营运状况，部份原因在于列示在本公司

帐上的股利收入，事实上仅占被投资公司收益的一小部份，其实对我们而言，我们更

重视未分配的那一部份，因为他们可以为我们创造出更高的价值，原因很简单，因为

我们的被投资公司往往比母公司更有机会把资金投入到高投资报酬的用途之上，既然

如此又何必一定要强迫他们把盈余分配回来呢?

To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than

reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through"

earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating

earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the

retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP

accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for

the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of

investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating

earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as

capital gains and other major non-recurring items.

为了要能更真实的反应Berkshire实际的经营状况，于是乎我们运用了完整透视盈余

的观念，这个数字总共包含(1)前段所提到的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保

留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若这些未反应的

盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营业盈余系已扣除资

本利得、特别会计调整与企业其它非常态的项目。

The following table sets forth our 1996 look-through earnings,

though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since

they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us

by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized

on page 12, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")

各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算出1996年透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位

这些数字只不过是估计数，很多都是基于简单的判断，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入

已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益项下)。

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend(1) (in millions)(2)

------------------------ ----------------------- ------------------

American Express Company........ 10.5% $ 132

The Coca-Cola Company........... 8.1% 180

The Walt Disney Company......... 3.6% 50

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 8.4% 77

The Gillette Company............ 8.6% 73

McDonald's Corporation.......... 4.3% 38

The Washington Post Company..... 15.8% 27

Wells Fargo & Company........... 8.0% 84

------

Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees.. 661

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3).... (93)

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire........................ 954

------

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire.................. $1,522

======

(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests

(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year

(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on

the dividends it receives

Common Stock Investments

股票投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market

value of more than $500 million are itemized.

下表是我们市价超过五亿美元以上的普通股投资。

12/31/96

Shares Company Cost* Market

----------- --------------------------------- -------- ---------

(dollars in millions)

49,456,900 American Express Company...........$1,392.7 $ 2,794.3

200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company.............. 1,298.9 10,525.0

24,614,214 The Walt Disney Company............ 577.0 1,716.8

64,246,000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.. 333.4 1,772.8

48,000,000 The Gillette Company............... 600.0 3,732.0

30,156,600 McDonald's Corporation............. 1,265.3 1,368.4

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company........ 10.6 579.0

7,291,418 Wells Fargo & Company.............. 497.8 1,966.9

Others............................. 1,934.5 3,295.4

-------- ---------

Total Common Stocks................ $7,910.2 $27,750.6

====== =======

* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.2 billion

less than GAAP cost.

*系以税务为基础的成本，比一般公认会计原则的帐面成本少12亿美元。

Our portfolio shows little change: We continue to make more money

when snoring than when active.

我们的投资组合还是没有多大变动，我们打盹时赚的钱比起醒着时多很多。

Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most

business managers would dream of feverishly trading highly-profitable

subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Reserve's discount rate

was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views

on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently with our minority

positions in wonderful businesses? The art of investing in public

companies successfully is little different from the art of successfully

acquiring subsidiaries. In each case you simply want to acquire, at a

sensible price, a business with excellent economics and able, honest

management. Thereafter, you need only monitor whether these qualities

are being preserved.

按兵不动对我们来说是一项明智的行为，就像是我们或其它经理人不可能因为谣传联

准会可能调整贴放利率或是华尔街那帮土匪大幅改变他们对股市前景的看法，就决定

把旗下高获利的金鸡母卖来卖去一样，我们也不会对拥有部份所有权的好公司股票任

意出脱，投资上市公司股票的秘诀与取得百分之百的子公司的方法没有什么两样，都

是希望能够以合理的价格取得拥有绝佳竞争优势与才德兼备的经理人，也因此大家真

正应该关心注意的是这些特质是否有任何改变。

When carried out capably, an investment strategy of that type will

often result in its practitioner owning a few securities that will come

to represent a very large portion of his portfolio. This investor would

get a similar result if he followed a policy of purchasing an interest

in, say, 20% of the future earnings of a number of outstanding college

basketball stars. A handful of these would go on to achieve NBA stardom,

and the investor's take from them would soon dominate his royalty stream.

To suggest that this investor should sell off portions of his most

successful investments simply because they have come to dominate his

portfolio is akin to suggesting that the Bulls trade Michael Jordan

because he has become so important to the team.

只要执行得当，运用这样投资策略的投资人到最后会发现，少数几家公司的股份将会

占他投资组合的一大部分，这样的方式就好象一个人买下假设一群极具潜力的大学明

星篮球队员20%的未来权益，其中有一小部份的球员可能可以进到NBA殿堂打球，

那么投资人会发现其因此从中收取的权利金将会占其收入的绝大部分，要是有人建议

把这部份的权益转让掉就好象是要公牛队把麦可乔登交易出去一样，只因为他对球队

来说实在是太重要了。

In studying the investments we have made in both subsidiary

companies and common stocks, you will see that we favor businesses and

industries unlikely to experience major change. The reason for that is

simple: Making either type of purchase, we are searching for operations

that we believe are virtually certain to possess enormous competitive

strength ten or twenty years from now. A fast-changing industry

environment may offer the chance for huge wins, but it precludes the

certainty we seek.

不管是研究买下整家公司或股票投资时，大家会发现我们偏爱变化不大的公司与产

业，原因很简单，我们希望买到的公司是能够持续拥有竞争优势达十年或二十年以上

者，变迁快速的产业环境或许可能让人一夕之间大发利市，但却无法提供我们想要的

稳定性。

I should emphasize that, as citizens, Charlie and I welcome change:

Fresh ideas, new products, innovative processes and the like cause our

country's standard of living to rise, and that's clearly good. As

investors, however, our reaction to a fermenting industry is much like

our attitude toward space exploration: We applaud the endeavor but

prefer to skip the ride.

另一方面我必须强调的是，身为公民的一份子，查理跟我相当欢迎改变，因为新的观

念、新的产品或创新的方法可以提升我们的生活水准，这点很明显的对我们有好处，

不过身为投资人对于热门流行产业的态度就好象在太空探险一样，对于这种勇猛的行

为我们给予喝采，但是若要我们自己上场，那就再说吧!

Obviously all businesses change to some extent. Today, See's is

different in many ways from what it was in 1972 when we bought it: It

offers a different assortment of candy, employs different machinery and

sells through different distribution channels. But the reasons why

people today buy boxed chocolates, and why they buy them from us rather

than from someone else, are virtually unchanged from what they were in

the 1920s when the See family was building the business. Moreover, these

motivations are not likely to change over the next 20 years, or even 50.

当然所有的产业都会变化，在今日喜斯糖果的经营形态与我们当初在1972年买下这

家公司时又有很大的不同，喜斯提供了更多样的糖果、生产设备与销售通路也大不相

同，不过人们为什么要购买盒装巧克力的动机，与购买盒装巧克力又为什么一定要选

择喜斯的原因，自从喜斯在1920年代由喜太太家族创立以来就从来没有变过，而我

想这原因在往后20年，乃至于50年都不会有所改变。

We look for similar predictability in marketable securities. Take

Coca-Cola: The zeal and imagination with which Coke products are sold

has burgeoned under Roberto Goizueta, who has done an absolutely

incredible job in creating value for his shareholders. Aided by Don

Keough and Doug Ivester, Roberto has rethought and improved every aspect

of the company. But the fundamentals of the business - the qualities

that underlie Coke's competitive dominance and stunning economics - have

remained constant through the years.

在买进股票时我们同样的也追求可预测的未来，以可口可乐来说，可口可乐产品所代

表的热情与想象在总裁古崔塔的带领下升华到极点，此举为公司股东创造出可观的价

值，在Don Keough与Doug Ivester的协助之下，古崔塔从头到尾重新塑造公司的

每一部份，不过这家公司的本质-可口可乐强力的竞争优势与主导性，多年来却从未

改变。

I was recently studying the 1896 report of Coke (and you think that

you are behind in your reading!). At that time Coke, though it was

already the leading soft drink, had been around for only a decade. But

its blueprint for the next 100 years was already drawn. Reporting sales

of $148,000 that year, Asa Candler, the company's president, said: "We

have not lagged in our efforts to go into all the world teaching that

Coca-Cola is the article, par excellence, for the health and good feeling

of all people." Though "health" may have been a reach, I love the fact

that Coke still relies on Candler's basic theme today - a century later.

Candler went on to say, just as Roberto could now, "No article of like

character has ever so firmly entrenched itself in public favor." Sales

of syrup that year, incidentally, were 116,492 gallons versus about 3.2

billion in 1996.

最近我正在研读可口可乐1896年的年报(所以大家现在看我们的年报应该还不嫌太

晚)，虽然当时可口可乐已经成为冷饮市场的领导者，但那也不过只有十年的光景，然

而在当时该公司却早已规划好未来的百年大计，面对年仅14.8万美元的销售额，公

司总裁Asa Candler表示：「我们从没有放弃告诉全世界，可口可乐是能够提升人类

健康与快乐、最卓越超凡的一件东西。」虽然我认为健康这档子事还有待努力，但我

很高兴可口可乐在一百年后的今天，始终还是遵循Candler当初立下的愿景，Candler

又继续谈到：「没有其它东西的味道能够像可乐一样深植人心。」当年的可乐糖浆销

售量不过只有11.6万加仑，时至今日，销售量已达到32亿加仑。

I can't resist one more Candler quote: "Beginning this year about

March 1st . . . we employed ten traveling salesmen by means of which,

with systematic correspondence from the office, we covered almost the

territory of the Union." That's my kind of sales force.

我实在忍不住想要在引用Candler的另一段话：「从今年三月开始，我们雇用了十位

业务员，在与总公司保持密切联系下巡回各地推销产品，基本上我们的业务范围已涵

盖整个美联共和国。」这才是我心目中的销售力量。

Companies such as Coca-Cola and Gillette might well be labeled "The

Inevitables." Forecasters may differ a bit in their predictions of exactly

how much soft drink or shaving-equipment business these companies

will be doing in ten or twenty years. Nor is our talk of inevitability

meant to play down the vital work that these companies must continue to

carry out, in such areas as manufacturing, distribution, packaging and

product innovation. In the end, however, no sensible observer - not even

these companies' most vigorous competitors, assuming they are assessing

the matter honestly - questions that Coke and Gillette will dominate

their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime. Indeed, their

dominance will probably strengthen. Both companies have significantly

expanded their already huge shares of market during the past ten years,

and all signs point to their repeating that performance in the next

decade.

像可口可乐与吉列这类的公司应该可以被归类为"永恒的持股"，分析师对于这些公司

在未来一、二十年饮料或刮胡刀市场的预测可能会有些许的不同，而我们所说的永恒

并不意味这些公司可以不必继续贯彻在制造、配销、包装与产品创新上的努力，只是

就算是最没有概念的观察家或甚至是其最主要的竞争对手，也不得不承认可口可乐与

吉列，在终其一生的投资生涯，仍将在其各自的领域中独领风骚，甚至于他们的优势

还有可能会继续增强，过去十年来，两家公司在原有极大的市占率又扩大许多，而所

有的迹象显示，在往后的十年间，他们还会继续以此态势扩大版图。

Obviously many companies in high-tech businesses or embryonic

industries will grow much faster in percentage terms than will The

Inevitables. But I would rather be certain of a good result than hopeful

of a great one.

当然比起一些具爆发性高科技或新创的事业来说，这些被永恒持股公司的成长力略显

不足，但与其两鸟在林，还不如一鸟在手。

Of course, Charlie and I can identify only a few Inevitables, even

after a lifetime of looking for them. Leadership alone provides no

certainties: Witness the shocks some years back at General Motors, IBM

and Sears, all of which had enjoyed long periods of seeming

invincibility. Though some industries or lines of business exhibit

characteristics that endow leaders with virtually insurmountable

advantages, and that tend to establish Survival of the Fattest as almost

a natural law, most do not. Thus, for every Inevitable, there are dozens

of Impostors, companies now riding high but vulnerable to competitive

attacks. Considering what it takes to be an Inevitable, Charlie and I

recognize that we will never be able to come up with a Nifty Fifty or

even a Twinkling Twenty. To the Inevitables in our portfolio, therefore,

we add a few "Highly Probables."

虽然查理跟我本人终其一生追求永恒的持股，但能够真正让我们找到的却属鳞毛凤

角，光是取得市场领导地位并不足以保证成功，看看过去几年来通用汽车、IBM与西

尔斯这些公司，都曾是领导一方的产业霸主，在所属的产业都被赋予其无可取代的优

势地位，大者恒存的自然定律似乎牢不可破，但实际结果却不然，也因此在找到真正

的真命天子之前，旁边可能还有好几打假冒者，这些公司虽然曾经红极一时，但却完

全经不起竞争的考验，换个角度来看，既然能够被称为永恒的持股，查理跟我早就有

心理准备，其数量绝对不可能超过五十家或甚至是不到二十家，所以就我们的投资组

合来说，除了几家真正够格的公司之外，还有另外几家则是属于极有可能的潜在候选

人。

You can, of course, pay too much for even the best of businesses.

The overpayment risk surfaces periodically and, in our opinion, may now

be quite high for the purchasers of virtually all stocks, The Inevitables

included. Investors making purchases in an overheated market need to

recognize that it may often take an extended period for the value of even

an outstanding company to catch up with the price they paid.

当然有时你也很有可能以过高的价格买下一家好的公司，这种风险并不是没有，而以

我个人的看法，像现在的时机买任何股票就都有可能必须承担这样的风险，当然也包

含永恒的持股在内，在过热的股市进场买股票的投资人必须要先做好心理准备，那就

是对于付出高价买进的优良企业来说，必须要有更长的一段时间才有办法让他们的价

值得以彰显。

A far more serious problem occurs when the management of a great

company gets sidetracked and neglects its wonderful base business while

purchasing other businesses that are so-so or worse. When that happens,

the suffering of investors is often prolonged. Unfortunately, that is

precisely what transpired years ago at both Coke and Gillette. (Would

you believe that a few decades back they were growing shrimp at Coke and

exploring for oil at Gillette?) Loss of focus is what most worries

Charlie and me when we contemplate investing in businesses that in

general look outstanding. All too often, we've seen value stagnate in

the presence of hubris or of boredom that caused the attention of

managers to wander. That's not going to happen again at Coke and

Gillette, however - not given their current and prospective managements.

有一个问题倒是很值得注意，那就是有一些体质原本不错的公司，由于经营阶层规划

的方向产生偏差，将原本良好的本业基础弃之不顾，反而跑去购并一堆平凡普通的公

司，当这种状况发生时，其投资人所须承受的煎熬便会加重加长，而不幸的这正是几

年前发生在可口可乐与吉列身上的惨事，(大家可以想象十几年前，可口可乐大举投入

养虾事业，而吉列竟热衷于石油探勘吗?)，失去聚焦是查理跟我在思考是否投资一些

外表看起来很不错的公司时最关心的重点，我想傲慢或不甘寂寞的出现，使得这些经

理人胡思乱想进而导致企业的价值停滞不前，这种情形屡见不鲜，不过还好这种情况

应该不会再在可口可乐与吉列现在与未来储备的管理阶层身上发生。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most

investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way

to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees.

Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees

and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment

professionals.

对于各位个人的投资方式，让我提供一点心得给各位参考，大部分的投资人，不管法

人或是散户，可能会认为投资股票最好的方式是直接去买手续费低廉的指数型基金，

当然这样的做法所得到的结果(在扣除相关手续费用之后)，应该可以很轻易地击败市

场上大部分的投资专家。

Should you choose, however, to construct your own portfolio, there

are a few thoughts worth remembering. Intelligent investing is not

complex, though that is far from saying that it is easy. What an

investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses.

Note that word "selected": You don't have to be an expert on every

company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies

within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very

important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.

其实你也可以选择建立自己的投资组合，但有几点是大家必须特别注意的，智能型投

资并不复杂，当然它也不是一件容易的事，投资人真正需要具备的是给予所选择的企

业正确评价的能力，请特别注意"所选择"这个字，你不必像很多专家一样同时研究许

多家公司，相反的你要做的只是选择少数几家在你能力范围之内的公司就好，能力范

围的大小并不重要，要紧的是你要很清楚自己的能力范围。

To invest successfully, you need not understand beta, efficient

markets, modern portfolio theory, option pricing or emerging markets.

You may, in fact, be better off knowing nothing of these. That, of

course, is not the prevailing view at most business schools, whose

finance curriculum tends to be dominated by such subjects. In our view,

though, investment students need only two well-taught courses - How to

Value a Business, and How to Think About Market Prices.

投资要成功，你不需要研究什么是Beta值、效率市场、现代投资组合理论、选择权

定价或是新兴市场，事实上大家最好不要懂得这一些理论，当然我这种看法与目前以

这些课程为主流的学术界有明显不同，就我个人认为，有志从事投资的学生只要修好

两门课程-亦即"如何给予企业正确的评价"以及"思考其与市场价格的关系"即可。

Your goal as an investor should simply be to purchase, at a rational

price, a part interest in an easily-understandable business whose

earnings are virtually certain to be materially higher five, ten and

twenty years from now. Over time, you will find only a few companies

that meet these standards - so when you see one that qualifies, you

should buy a meaningful amount of stock. You must also resist the

temptation to stray from your guidelines: If you aren't willing to own a

stock for ten years, don't even think about owning it for ten minutes.

Put together a portfolio of companies whose aggregate earnings march

upward over the years, and so also will the portfolio's market value.

身为一位投资人，大家其实只要以合理的价格买进一些很容易了解且其盈余在未来五

到十年内会大幅成长的企业的部份股权，当然一段时间下来，你会发现只有少数几家

公司符合这样的标准，所以要是你真的找到这样的公司，那就一定要买进足够份量的

股权，在这期间，你必须尽量避免自己受到外界诱惑而偏离这个准则，如果你不打算

持有一家公司股份十年以上，那最好连十分钟你都不要拥有它，在慢慢找到这样盈余

加总能持续累积的投资组合后，你就会发现其市值也会跟着稳定增加。

Though it's seldom recognized, this is the exact approach that has

produced gains for Berkshire shareholders: Our look-through earnings

have grown at a good clip over the years, and our stock price has risen

correspondingly. Had those gains in earnings not materialized, there

would have been little increase in Berkshire's value.

虽然我们很少承认，但这正是Berkshire股东累积财富的唯一方式，我们的透视盈余

在过去几年间大幅跃进，而同期间我们的股票价格也跟着大涨，要不是我们的盈余大

幅增加，Berkshire所代表的价值就不可能大幅成长。

The greatly enlarged earnings base we now enjoy will inevitably

cause our future gains to lag those of the past. We will continue,

however, to push in the directions we always have. We will try to build

earnings by running our present businesses well - a job made easy because

of the extraordinary talents of our operating managers - and by

purchasing other businesses, in whole or in part, that are not likely to

be roiled by change and that possess important competitive advantages.

当然我们现在背负庞大的资金基础将无可避免地会影响到我们未来盈余成长的能

力，但我们还是会按照和过去一致的方向，在现有的基础之上，这部份的难度较低，

因为我们拥有一群杰出的经理人，同时继续买进全部或部份一些不会受外界环境影响

且拥有竞争优势的新事业。

USAir

美国航空

When Richard Branson, the wealthy owner of Virgin Atlantic Airways,

was asked how to become a millionaire, he had a quick answer: "There's

really nothing to it. Start as a billionaire and then buy an airline."

Unwilling to accept Branson's proposition on faith, your Chairman decided

in 1989 to test it by investing $358 million in a 9.25% preferred stock of

USAir.

当Richard Branson-维京亚特兰大航空公司的老板被问到要如才能够变成一个百万

富翁，他的回答很简单：其实也没有什么! 首先你要先成为一个亿万富翁，然后再去

买一家航空公司就成了! 但由于各位的董事长-也就是我本人不信邪，所以我在1989

年决定以3.58亿美元投资取得美国航空年利率9.25%的特别股。

I liked and admired Ed Colodny, the company's then-CEO, and I still

do. But my analysis of USAir's business was both superficial and wrong.

I was so beguiled by the company's long history of profitable

operations, and by the protection that ownership of a senior security

seemingly offered me, that I overlooked the crucial point: USAir's

revenues would increasingly feel the effects of an unregulated, fiercelycompetitive

market whereas its cost structure was a holdover from the

days when regulation protected profits. These costs, if left unchecked,

portended disaster, however reassuring the airline's past record might

be. (If history supplied all of the answers, the Forbes 400 would

consist of librarians.)

那时我相当喜爱同时也崇拜美国航空当时的总裁-Ed Colodny，直到现在仍是如此，

不过我对于美国航空业的分析研究实在是过于肤浅且错误百出，我被该公司过去历年

来的获利能力所蒙骗，同时过分相信特别股可以提供给我们在债权上的保护，以致于

忽略了最关键的一点︰那就是美国航空的营收受到毫无节制的激烈价格竞争而大幅

下滑的同时，其成本结构却仍旧停留在从前管制时代的高档，这样的高成本结构若不

能找到有效解决的办法，将成为灾难的前兆，不管以前航空业曾经享有多么辉煌的历

史(如果历史可以给人们所有的答案，那么富比士四百大富翁不就应该都是图书馆员了

吗?)。

To rationalize its costs, however, USAir needed major improvements

in its labor contracts - and that's something most airlines have found it

extraordinarily difficult to get, short of credibly threatening, or

actually entering, bankruptcy. USAir was to be no exception.

Immediately after we purchased our preferred stock, the imbalance between

the company's costs and revenues began to grow explosively. In the 1990-

1994 period, USAir lost an aggregate of $2.4 billion, a performance that

totally wiped out the book equity of its common stock.

要让成本结构合理化，美国航空必须大幅修改其劳资契约，不过这偏偏又是航空公司

难以达成的罩门，除了公司真正面临倒闭的威胁或甚至是真的倒闭，而美国航空也不

例外，就在我们投资该公司特别股不久之后，公司营收与支出的缺口突然开始大幅扩

大，在1990年至1994年间，美国航空累计亏损了24亿美元，此举让公司普通股

的股东权益几乎耗损殆尽。

For much of this period, the company paid us our preferred

dividends, but in 1994 payment was suspended. A bit later, with the

situation looking particularly gloomy, we wrote down our investment by

75%, to $89.5 million. Thereafter, during much of 1995, I offered to

sell our shares at 50% of face value. Fortunately, I was unsuccessful.

在这段期间内，美国航空还是继续支付特别股股利给我们，直到1994年才停止，也

因此在不久后，由于该公司前景展望不太乐观，我们决定将美国航空特别股投资的帐

面价值调减75%，只剩下8,950万美元，从而到了1995年，我甚至对外提出以面

额50%的折价，打算出售这笔投资，所幸最后并没有成功出脱。

Mixed in with my many mistakes at USAir was one thing I got right:

Making our investment, we wrote into the preferred contract a somewhat

unusual provision stipulating that "penalty dividends" - to run five

percentage points over the prime rate - would be accrued on any

arrearages. This meant that when our 9.25% dividend was omitted for two

years, the unpaid amounts compounded at rates ranging between 13.25% and 14%.

幸运的是在投资美国航空所犯的一连串错误当中，我总算做对了一件事，那就是当初

在投资时，我们在特别股投资合约当中，特地加了一项"惩罚股息"条款，也就是说万

一该公司延迟支付股息的话，除原有欠款外，还必须外加依基本利率5%的利息，也

就是说因为这两年我们没有收到9.25%的股息，所以以后美国航空必须就未支付的款

项加计13.25%与14%的利息。

Facing this penalty provision, USAir had every incentive to pay

arrearages just as promptly as it could. And in the second half of 1996,

when USAir turned profitable, it indeed began to pay, giving us $47.9

million. We owe Stephen Wolf, the company's CEO, a huge thank-you for

extracting a performance from the airline that permitted this payment.

Even so, USAir's performance has recently been helped significantly by an

industry tailwind that may be cyclical in nature. The company still has

basic cost problems that must be solved.

面对这样的惩罚条款将督促美国航空尽快清偿对我们的欠款，而等到1996年下半年

美国航空开始转亏为盈时，他们果真开始清偿这笔合计4,790万美元的欠款，为此我

们特别要感谢美国航空现任总裁-Stephen Wolf，是他让这家落难的航空公司得以付

出这笔钱，同时美国航空的表现也归因于航空业景气复苏，当然该公司还是有成本结

构的问题有待解决。

In any event, the prices of USAir's publicly-traded securities tell

us that our preferred stock is now probably worth its par value of $358

million, give or take a little. In addition, we have over the years

collected an aggregate of $240.5 million in dividends (including $30

million received in 1997).

不过不论如何，目前美国航空普通股的市价显示我们所持有特别股的价值应该回复到

3.58亿美元的面额左右，另外不要忘了，这几年来我们还陆陆续续从该公司收到2.4

亿美元的股息(包含1997年的3,000万美元在内)。

Early in 1996, before any accrued dividends had been paid, I tried

once more to unload our holdings - this time for about $335 million.

You're lucky: I again failed in my attempt to snatch defeat from the

jaws of victory.

在稍早1996年初，我们还尚未收到积欠的股息之前，我再度尝试以3.35亿美元把

这笔投资卖掉，所幸这次的举动又没有成功，使得我们得以从胜利之神口中逃过失败

的命运。

In another context, a friend once asked me: "If you're so rich, why

aren't you smart?" After reviewing my sorry performance with USAir, you

may conclude he had a point.

在另外一个场合，有一位朋友问我：「你很有钱，可是为什么还这么笨? 」在进一步

检讨本人在美国航空这个案子上的表现后，你可能会觉得他说得很有道理。

Financings

财务融资

We wrote four checks to Salomon Brothers last year and in each case

were delighted with the work for which we were paying. I've already

described one transaction: the FlightSafety purchase in which Salomon was

the initiating investment banker. In a second deal, the firm placed a

small debt offering for our finance subsidiary.

去年我们总共付了四次钱给所罗门兄弟公司，而很高兴每一张支票都代表着该公司为

我们提供了不错的服务，先前我已经说明过其中的一项交易-那就是买进国际飞安公

司的交易，所罗门担任这项交易的投资银行顾问，第二个案子是所罗门帮我们旗下的

财务子公司安排了一项融资案。

Additionally, we made two good-sized offerings through Salomon, both

with interesting aspects. The first was our sale in May of 517,500

shares of Class B Common, which generated net proceeds of $565 million.

As I have told you before, we made this sale in response to the

threatened creation of unit trusts that would have marketed themselves as

Berkshire look-alikes. In the process, they would have used our past,

and definitely nonrepeatable, record to entice naive small investors and

would have charged these innocents high fees and commissions.

此外，透过所罗门我们完成另外两件案子，两者也都有相当有趣的特点，一件是在五

月我们发行了517,500股的B级股，总共募得5.65亿美元的资金，关于这件案子，

先前我就已经做过相关的说明，主要是因应坊间有些模仿Berkshire的基金，避免他

们以Berkshire过去傲人的绩效记录对外吸引一些不知情的小额投资人，在收取高昂

的手续费与佣金之后，却无法提供给投资人一个令人满意的投资结果。

I think it would have been quite easy for such trusts to have sold

many billions of dollars worth of units, and I also believe that early

marketing successes by these trusts would have led to the formation of

others. (In the securities business, whatever can be sold will be sold.)

The trusts would have meanwhile indiscriminately poured the proceeds of

their offerings into a supply of Berkshire shares that is fixed and

limited. The likely result: a speculative bubble in our stock. For at

least a time, the price jump would have been self-validating, in that it

would have pulled new waves of naive and impressionable investors into

the trusts and set off still more buying of Berkshire shares.

我相信这些仿Berkshire基金可以很容易募得大笔的资金，而我也认为在这些基金成

功募集到资金之后，一定还会有更多的基金跟进打着我们的旗号对外吸收资金，在证

券业，没有什么是卖不掉的东西，而这些基金无可避免的会将所募得的资金大举投入

到Berkshire现有少数的股票投资组合，最后的结果很可能是Berkshire本身以及其

概念股股价暴涨而泡沫化，然后股价的上涨很可能又会吸引新一波的无知且敏感的投

资人蜂拥投入这些基金，造成进一步的恶性循环。

Some Berkshire shareholders choosing to exit might have found that

outcome ideal, since they could have profited at the expense of the

buyers entering with false hopes. Continuing shareholders, however,

would have suffered once reality set in, for at that point Berkshire

would have been burdened with both hundreds of thousands of unhappy,

indirect owners (trustholders, that is) and a stained reputation.

有些Berkshire的股东可能会发现这是一个大好的机会，因为可以利用新加入者不当

的预期而想要趁机出脱持股赚取额外的利益，但在此同时选择继续留下来的股东却必

须承担后来的苦果，因为等到回归现实后，我们会发现Berkshire会有一群成千上万

高档套牢的间接股东(亦即基金投资人)，以及受到毁损的企业清誉。

Our issuance of the B shares not only arrested the sale of the

trusts, but provided a low-cost way for people to invest in Berkshire if

they still wished to after hearing the warnings we issued. To blunt the

enthusiasm that brokers normally have for pushing new issues - because

that's where the money is - we arranged for our offering to carry a

commission of only 1.5%, the lowest payoff that we have ever seen in a

common stock underwriting. Additionally, we made the amount of the

offering open-ended, thereby repelling the typical IPO buyer who looks

for a short-term price spurt arising from a combination of hype and

scarcity.

B级普通股的发行正可以抑止这些仿Berkshire基金的销售，同时提供小额投资人投

资Berkshire的低成本管道，如果在他们听过我之前所提出的警告后仍执意要投资的

话，而为了降低经纪人一般喜欢推销新股发行的习惯(因为这是真正有赚头的所在)，

我们刻意将承销佣金降到1.5%，这是所有发行新股承销佣金最低的比率，此外我们

对发行新股的数量不设上限，以避免一些专门投资初次上市股票抢帽子的投机客，利

用新股数量稀少而刻意炒作赚取短期股价飙涨的差价。

Overall, we tried to make sure that the B stock would be purchased

only by investors with a long-term perspective. Those efforts were

generally successful: Trading volume in the B shares immediately

following the offering - a rough index of "flipping" - was far below the

norm for a new issue. In the end we added about 40,000 shareholders,

most of whom we believe both understand what they own and share our time

horizons.

总而言之，我们希望买进B级普通股的投资人是真正希望长期投资的，事实证明我们

的做法相当成功，在公开发行后的B级普通股成交量(亦即代表换手的情形)远低于一

般初次上市的股票，结果总计我们因此新增了40,000名的股东，我相信他们大部分

都了解他们到底在投资什么，同时与我们拥有相同的经营理念。

Salomon could not have performed better in the handling of this

unusual transaction. Its investment bankers understood perfectly what we

were trying to achieve and tailored every aspect of the offering to meet

these objectives. The firm would have made far more money - perhaps ten

times as much - if our offering had been standard in its make-up. But

the investment bankers involved made no attempt to tweak the specifics in

that direction. Instead they came up with ideas that were counter to

Salomon's financial interest but that made it much more certain

Berkshire's goals would be reached. Terry Fitzgerald captained this

effort, and we thank him for the job that he did.

在这次不常见的交易中，所罗门的表现好得不能再好了，身为我们的投资银行，他们

充分了解我们想要达成的目标，从而量身订做，提供符合我们需要的服务，事实上若

是按照一般的标准模式，所罗门应该可以赚进更多钱，有可能比现在多十倍以上，不

过他们并没有刻意引导我们这样子去做，相反地有时他们还是提出一些对自己本身利

益冲突，但却有助于Berkshire达成目的的一些建议，感谢Terry这次为我们操刀所

做的努力与贡献。

Given that background, it won't surprise you to learn that we again

went to Terry when we decided late in the year to sell an issue of

Berkshire notes that can be exchanged for a portion of the Salomon shares

that we hold. In this instance, once again, Salomon did an absolutely

first-class job, selling $500 million principal amount of five-year notes

for $447.1 million. Each $1,000 note is exchangeable into 17.65 shares

and is callable in three years at accreted value. Counting the original

issue discount and a 1% coupon, the securities will provide a yield of 3%

to maturity for holders who do not exchange them for Salomon stock. But

it seems quite likely that the notes will be exchanged before their

maturity. If that happens, our interest cost will be about 1.1% for the

period prior to exchange.

基于这样的背景，大家不难想象当Berkshire决定发行以所持有的所罗门股份做为转

换标的的可转换票券时，我们又再度找上Terry，再一次所罗门的表现一流，卖出以

五年为期、总面额五亿美元的票券，共取得4.471亿美元的资金，每张面额1,000

美元的票券可以转换成17.65股的所罗门股份，同时有权在三年后要求以帐面价值卖

回，总计原先票面折价加上1%的票面利息，此证券可以给予到期不选择转换成所罗

门股份的投资人3%的报酬率，不过我想投资人在到期前选择不转换的机率微乎其

微，若果真如此，在转换前我们实际负担的利率成本大约在1.1%左右。

In recent years, it has been written that Charlie and I are unhappy

about all investment-banking fees. That's dead wrong. We have paid a

great many fees over the last 30 years - beginning with the check we

wrote to Charlie Heider upon our purchase of National Indemnity in 1967 -

and we are delighted to make payments that are commensurate with

performance. In the case of the 1996 transactions at Salomon Brothers,

we more than got our money's worth.

近年来，媒体不断报导查理跟我对于支付投资银行所有的费用都很感冒，这样的报导

完全不对，事实上做过去三十年来，从1967年我们请Charlie Heider协助我们买

下国家赔偿保险公司开始，我们就很乐于签支票给他们，只要他们所提供的服务与表

现值得的话，而以1996年所罗门这次的案子来说，我们就觉得物超所值。

Miscellaneous

其它事项

Though it was a close decision, Charlie and I have decided to enter

the 20th Century. Accordingly, we are going to put future quarterly and

annual reports of Berkshire on the Internet, where they can be accessed

via http://www.berkshirehathaway.com. We will always "post" these

reports on a Saturday so that anyone interested will have ample time to

digest the information before trading begins. Our publishing schedule

for the next 12 months is May 17, 1997, August 16, 1997, November 15,

1997, and March 14, 1998. We will also post any press releases that we

issue.

虽然这个决定有点赶，查理跟我本人已决定正式跨入二十世纪，我们决定从现在开始

将在公司网络上公布每季与每年最新的Berkshire年报，大家可以透过以下这个网址

http://www.berkshirehathaway.com.找到相关的讯息，我们会固定选在星期六把

报告摆上去，主要的目的是希望大家能够有充足的时间在股市开盘做出进出的决定，

预计未来一年内公布报告的时间为1997年5月17日、8月16日、11月15日以

及1998年3月14日，同时网站上也会有我们对外发布的其它公开讯息。

At some point, we may stop mailing our quarterly reports and simply

post these on the Internet. This move would eliminate significant costs.

Also, we have a large number of "street name" holders and have found

that the distribution of our quarterlies to them is highly erratic: Some

holders receive their mailings weeks later than others.

在此同时，我们也将停止过去邮寄每季季报的习惯，而直接将它们公布在公司网站

上，此举不但可以大幅减少邮寄的成本，同时也因为我们有一些股东的股份是登记在

别人的名下，这使得季报最后送到真正股东手上的时间很不一定，有的股东收到报告

的时间整整比其它股东晚了好几个礼拜。

The drawback to Internet-only distribution is that many of our

shareholders lack computers. Most of these holders, however, could

easily obtain printouts at work or through friends. Please let me know

if you prefer that we continue mailing quarterlies. We want your input -

starting with whether you even read these reports - and at a minimum will

make no change in 1997. Also, we will definitely keep delivering the

annual report in its present form in addition to publishing it on the

Internet.

当然透过网络公布也有一个很大的缺点，那就是许多我们的股东从来不使用计算机，当

然大家还是可以透过同事或朋友的帮助把它们给打印下来，如果大家觉得还是用寄得

比较好的话可以向我反应，我们很想听听大家的意见，至少在1997年还是会持续原

来的做法，另外必须强调的是，每年的年报除了在网络上公布之外，依然还是会用邮

寄的方式送到各位的手上。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1996

shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made were

$13.3 million, and 3,910 charities were recipients. A full description

of the shareholder-designated contributions program appears on pages 48-

49.

大约有97.2%的有效股权参与1996年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,330万

美元捐出的款项分配给3,910家慈善机构，详细的名单参阅附录。

Every year a few shareholders miss out on the program because they

don't have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed

record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us

within the 60-day period allowed. This is distressing to Charlie and me.

But if replies are received late, we have to reject them because we

can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing to make them

for others.

每年都有一小部份的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天

的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计画，

对此查理跟我感到相当头痛，不过我们必须忍痛将这些指定捐赠剔除，因为我们不

可能在拒绝其它不符合规定股东的同时，还破例让这些人参与。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that

are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a

broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1997,

will be ineligible for the 1997 program. When you get the form, return

it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.

想要参加这项计画者，请必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自

己而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1997年8月31日之前完成

登记，才有权利参与1997年的捐赠计画，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，

以免被丢在一旁给忘记了。

The Annual Meeting

股东年会

Our capitalist's version of Woodstock -the Berkshire Annual Meetingwill

be held on Monday, May 5. Charlie and I thoroughly enjoy this

event, and we hope that you come. We will start at 9:30 a.m., break for

about 15 minutes at noon (food will be available - but at a price, of

course), and then continue talking to hard-core attendees until at least

3:30. Last year we had representatives from all 50 states, as well as

Australia, Greece, Israel, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and

the United Kingdom. The annual meeting is a time for owners to get their

business-related questions answered, and therefore Charlie and I will

stay on stage until we start getting punchy. (When that happens, I hope

you notice a change.)

资本家版的伍斯达克音乐会-Berkshire股东年会将在五月五日星期一举行，查理跟我

实在是很喜欢这场盛会，所以我们很希望大家都能来，会议预计从早上9点半正式开

始，中午休息15分钟(现场备有餐点，不过必须付费)，然后会继续与许多死忠的股

东谈到下午三点半，去年全美50州都有股东代表出席，另外还有来自海外地区，如

澳洲、希腊、以色列、葡萄牙、新加坡、瑞典、瑞士以及英国等国家，股东年会是公

司股东可以得到有关公司经营所有问题解答的场合，所以查理跟我一定会竭尽所能地

回答各位提出的问题，直到我们头昏脑胀为止(如果查理跟我有异状时，希望各位能及

时发现)。

Last year we had attendance of 5,000 and strained the capacity of

the Holiday Convention Centre, even though we spread out over three

rooms. This year, our new Class B shares have caused a doubling of our

stockholder count, and we are therefore moving the meeting to the

Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 10,000 and also has a huge parking

lot. The doors will open for the meeting at 7:00 a.m., and at 8:30 we

will - upon popular demand - show a new Berkshire movie produced by Marc

Hamburg, our CFO. (In this company, no one gets by with doing only a

single job.)

去年总共有5,000名股东与会，虽然我们预先另外准备了三间小会议室，不过还是把

当时的会场- Holiday会议中心给挤爆了，今年由于发行B级普通股的关系使得我们

的股东人数又增加了整整一倍，因此我们决定把开会的场地移到可以容纳10,000人

同时备有宽广停车场的阿肯萨本体育馆，大门会在当天早上七点开放，同时在八点

半，我们会播放由财务长Marc Hamburg制作的全新Berkshire电影短片供大家欣

赏(在Berkshire所有人都必须身兼数职)。

Overcoming our legendary repugnance for activities even faintly

commercial, we will also have an abundant array of Berkshire products for

sale in the halls outside the meeting room. Last year we broke all

records, selling 1,270 pounds of See's candy, 1,143 pairs of Dexter

shoes, $29,000 of World Books and related publications, and 700 sets of

knives manufactured by our Quikut subsidiary. Additionally, many

shareholders made inquiries about GEICO auto policies. If you would like

to investigate possible insurance savings, bring your present policy to

the meeting. We estimate that about 40% of our shareholders can save

money by insuring with us. (We'd like to say 100%, but the insurance

business doesn't work that way: Because insurers differ in their

underwriting judgments, some of our shareholders are currently paying

rates that are lower than GEICO's.)

为了克服大家对于商业气息的厌恶，我们在会场外大厅备有Berkshire各式各样的产

品供大家选购，去年我们打破记录，总共卖出1,270磅的糖果、1,143双的鞋子以

及价值超过29,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品，外加700只由旗下子公司

Quikut所生产的小刀，另外在现场许多股东询问有关GEICO汽车保险的信息，如果

你想在汽车保险费上省一笔钱，记得把你现在的保单带到现场，我们估计至少有40%

的股东可以因此而节省不少保费(我很想说100%，不过保险业实务的经营并非如此，

因为每家保险业者对于风险的估计都不同，事实上，我们有些股东支付的保费就比跟

GEICO投保要来得低)。

An attachment to the proxy material enclosed with this report

explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the

meeting. We expect a large crowd, so get both plane and hotel

reservations promptly. American Express (800-799-6634) will be happy to

help you with arrangements. As usual, we will have buses servicing the

larger hotels to take you to and from the meeting, and also to take you

to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport after it is over.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通(电话

800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会安排巴士接

送大家往返各大旅馆与会场之间，并在会后接送大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝

店或是到饭店与机场。

NFM's main store, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from

Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.

on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. Come by and say hello to

"Mrs. B" (Rose Blumkin). She's 103 now and sometimes operates with an

oxygen mask that is attached to a tank on her cart. But if you try to

keep pace with her, it will be you who needs oxygen. NFM did about $265

million of business last year - a record for a single-location home

furnishings operation - and you'll see why once you check out its

merchandise and prices.

占地75英亩的NFM主馆距离会场约1英哩远，营业时间平日从早上10点到

下午9点，星期六从早上10点到下午6点，星期日则从中午开到下午6点，

记得去向Rose Blumkin-B太太问好，她今年高龄103岁，有时还会戴上氧气罩在

轮椅上工作，不过如果你想要跟得上她的脚步，需要氧气的可能是你，NFM去年的

营业额高达2.65亿美元，这是全美单一家具店营业的新高记录，记得去现场查一查

商品的种类与标价，你就会知道原因了。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for

shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 4th. Last year on

"Shareholder Sunday" we broke every Borsheim's record in terms of

tickets, dollar volume and, no doubt, attendees per square inch. Because

we expect a capacity crowd this year as well, all shareholders attending

on Sunday must bring their admission cards. Shareholders who prefer a

somewhat less frenzied experience will get the same special treatment on

Saturday, when the store is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., or on Monday

between 10 a.m. and 8 p.m. Come by at any time this year and let Susan

Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, and her skilled associates perform a painless

walletectomy on you.

平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在五月四日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开放，从

中午开到下午6点，去年在星期六股东会前一天，我们打破了波仙单日的订单量与营

业额记录，当然还包括每平方英吋的参观人数记录，今年我们考量到参观人数还会再

增加，所以大家在当天一定要准备好入场证，当然不想人挤人的股东可以选择在前一

天或后一天前往参观，星期六从早上10点开到下午5点半，星期一则从早上10点

开到晚上8点，无论如何今年大家一定要来看看波仙的总裁Susan是如何施展她的

技巧将你的荷包给掏空。

My favorite steakhouse, Gorat's, was sold out last year on the

weekend of the annual meeting, even though it added an additional seating

at 4 p.m. on Sunday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1st

(but not earlier) by calling 402-551-3733. I will be at Gorat's on

Sunday after Borsheim's, having my usual rare T-bone and double order of

hashbrowns. I can also recommend - this is the standard fare when Debbie

Bosanek, my invaluable assistant, and I go to lunch - the hot roast beef

sandwich with mashed potatoes and gravy. Mention Debbie's name and you

will be given an extra boat of gravy.

我个人最爱的牛排馆-Gorat's去年在股东年会的那个周末完全客满，虽然临时还在星

期天下午四点多排出的一个空档，今年该餐厅从四月一号开始接受预订(电话402-

551-3733)，我会在星期天参加完波仙珠宝的活动后到Gorat's享用我最常点的丁骨

牛排加上双份的肉丸，当然我也推荐我的宝贝助理Debbie标准的菜单-生烤牛肉三

明治外加马铃薯泥与肉汤，记得报上Debbie的名号，你就可以多得到一碗肉汤。

The Omaha Royals and Indianapolis Indians will play baseball on

Saturday evening, May 3rd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Pitching in my normal

rotation - one throw a year - I will start.

在前一天5月3日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家队对印

第安纳拿波里市印第安人队的比赛，一如往年轮到由我先发，每一年就投那么一球。

Though Rosenblatt is normal in appearance, it is anything but: The

field sits on a unique geological structure that occasionally emits short

gravitational waves causing even the most smoothly-delivered pitch to

sink violently. I have been the victim of this weird phenomenon several

times in the past but am hoping for benign conditions this year. There

will be lots of opportunities for photos at the ball game, but you will

need incredibly fast reflexes to snap my fast ball en route to the plate.

虽然Rosenblatt球场的外观看起来与其它球场没有多大的不同，不过它的投手丘地

形却相当特殊，有时会发出特殊的重力短波，导致本来很平稳投出的球突然急速往下

坠，过去有好几次我都成为这种怪异自然现象的受害者，不过我还是希望今年的情况

会好一点，虽然当天会场有许多拍照的机会，不过我还是奉劝大家的快门要抓准一

点，才能完整捕捉由我投出向本垒板急速奔去的快速球。

Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining tickets to

the game. We will also provide an information packet listing restaurants

that will be open on Sunday night and describing various things that you

can do in Omaha on the weekend. The entire gang at Berkshire looks

forward to seeing you.

股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，同时我们也会提供星期天晚上会开

张的餐厅信息，同时列出假日期间在奥玛哈你可以从事的活动介绍，Berkshire总部

所有成员都期待能够见到大家。

Warren E. Buffett

February 28, 1997 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1997年2月28日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

1997 Chairman's Letter

1997年董事长致股东信

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

Our gain in net worth during 1997 was $8.0 billion, which

increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B

stock by 34.1%. Over the last 33 years (that is, since present

management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to

$25,488, a rate of 24.1% compounded annually.(1)

1997年本公司的净值增加了80亿美元，每股帐面净值不管是A级股或B级股

皆成长了34.1%，总计过去33年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每

股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的25,488美元，年复合成长率约为24.1%*。

1. All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares,

the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding

before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th

that of the A.

*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在

外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。

Given our gain of 34.1%, it is tempting to declare victory and move

on. But last year's performance was no great triumph: Any investor can

chalk up large returns when stocks soar, as they did in 1997. In a bull

market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks

boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills

have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead

compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on

the pond.

看到我们高达34.1%的超高报酬率，大家可能忍不住要高呼胜利口号，并勇往

前进，不过若是考量去年股市的状况，任何一个投资人都能靠着股票的飙涨而大

赚一票，面对多头的行情，大家一定要避免成为一只呱呱大叫的骄傲鸭子，以为

是自己高超的泳技让他冲上了天，殊不知面对狂风巨浪，小心的鸭子反而会谨慎

地看看大浪过后，其它池塘里的鸭子都到哪里去了。

So what's our duck rating for 1997? The table on the facing page

shows that though we paddled furiously last year, passive ducks that

simply invested in the S&P Index rose almost as fast as we did. Our

appraisal of 1997's performance, then: Quack.

那么我们这只鸭子在1997年的表现又如何呢? 报表显示虽然去年我们拼命的

向前划，不过到最后我们发现其它被动投资S&P 500指数的鸭子的表现一点也

不比我们差，所以总结我们在1997年的表现是︰呱呱!

When the market booms, we tend to suffer in comparison with the

S&P Index. The Index bears no tax costs, nor do mutual funds, since

they pass through all tax liabilities to their owners. Last year, on the

other hand, Berkshire paid or accrued $4.2 billion for federal income

tax, or about 18% of our beginning net worth.

当股市正热时，相较于S&P 500指数，我们比较吃亏，因为指数或共同基金不

必负担租税成本，他们可以直接将税负转嫁到投资人的身上，相对地在另一方面

Berkshire光是去年就必须认为高达42亿美元的联邦所得税，这相当于我们年

初净值的18%。

Berkshire will always have corporate taxes to pay, which means it

needs to overcome their drag in order to justify its existence. Obviously,

Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I won't

be able to lick that handicap every year. But we expect over time to

maintain a modest advantage over the Index, and that is the yardstick

against which you should measure us. We will not ask you to adopt the

philosophy of the Chicago Cubs fan who reacted to a string of lackluster

seasons by saying, "Why get upset? Everyone has a bad century now and

then."

由于Berkshire必须要负担企业所得税，所以为了要证明其存在的意义，它就一

定要能够克服这先天的障碍，不过很显然的Berkshire的主要合伙人查理曼格跟

我很难每年都打败这样的差杆，当然就长期而言，我们还是预期Berkshire能够

打败大盘指数，这也是大家可以评断我们表现的最低标准，我想我们应该不会让

大家像芝加哥小熊队球迷在面对连续几个战绩不佳球季时，自我调侃所说的︰有

什么好沮丧的?? 谁都可能有不好过的一世纪。

Gains in book value are, of course, not the bottom line at Berkshire.

What truly counts are gains in per-share intrinsic business value.

Ordinarily, though, the two measures tend to move roughly in tandem,

and in 1997 that was the case: Led by a blow-out performance at GEICO,

Berkshire's intrinsic value (which far exceeds book value) grew at nearly

the same pace as book value.

帐面净值的增加当然不是经营Berkshire的最终目标，因为真正重要的是每股实

质价值，虽然在Berkshire通常两者会以相当接近的频率波动，就像是1997年

便是如此，受惠于GEICO爆炸性的成长，Berkshire的实质价值(远高于帐面价

值)以接近帐面价值成长的幅度增加。

For more explanation of the term, intrinsic value, you may wish to

refer to our Owner's Manual, reprinted on pages 62 to 71. This manual

sets forth our owner-related business principles, information that is

important to all of Berkshire's shareholders.

有关"实质价值"等名词的解释，请大家参阅股东手册，手册中揭示了本公司经营

的宗旨，也包含了许多对Berkshire股东相当重要的信息。

In our last two annual reports, we furnished you a table that Charlie

and I believe is central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the

updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key

components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of

investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column

shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses

before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on

pages 69 and 70), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The

second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we

realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect,

the columns show what Berkshire would look like were it split into two

parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating

all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.

在过去两年的年报中，我们提供给各位一张查理跟我认为最能够估计Berkshire

实质价值的表，在下面这张更新过数字的表中，主要有两项跟价值息息相关的指

标，第一栏是我们平均每股持有的投资金额(包含现金与约当现金)，第二栏则是

每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，来自本业的营业利益(但未扣除所得税与购买

法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏投资所贡献的股利收入、

利息收入与资本利得，事实上，若是把Berkshire拆成两部份的话，就等于是一

家持有我们投资部位的控股公司，以及另一家经营旗下所有事业负担全部成本盈

亏的营利事业。

Pre-tax Earnings Per Share

Investments Excluding All Income from

Year Per Share Investments

1967 $ 41 $ 1.09

1977 372 12.44

1987 3,910 108.14

199738,043 717.82

Pundits who ignore what our 38,000 employees contribute to the

company, and instead simply view Berkshire as a de facto investment

company, should study the figures in the second column. We made our

first business acquisition in 1967, and since then our pre-tax operating

earnings have grown from $1 million to $888 million. Furthermore, as

noted, in this exercise we have assigned all of Berkshire's corporate

expenses -- overhead of $6.6 million, interest of $66.9 million and

shareholder contributions of $15.4 million -- to our business

operations, even though a portion of these could just as well have been

assigned to the investment side.

对于那些无视于我们38,000名辛勤奉献员工的存在，而武断地将Berkshire当

做是一家投资公司的乡野匹夫，应该要请他们看看第二栏的数字，打从1967年

我们进行第一次的并购开始，本公司的税前营业盈余已从当时的100万美元成

长到现在的8.88亿美元，这还是吸收了Berkshire全部的开销，包含660万

美元的企业营运费用、6,690万美元的利息支出与1,540万美元的股东指定捐

赠款后的结余，虽然这其中有一部份是与投资活动相关的支出。

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

下表是这两个部门每十年的成长率︰

Pre-tax Earnings Per Share

Investments Excluding All Income from

Decade Ending Per Share Investments

1977 24.6% 27.6%

1987 26.5% 24.1%

1997 25.5% 20.8%

Annual Growth

Rate, 1967-1997 25.6% 24.2%

During 1997, both parts of our business grew at a satisfactory rate,

with investments increasing by $9,543 per share, or 33.5%, and

operating earnings growing by $296.43 per share, or 70.3%. One

important caveat: Because we were lucky in our super-cat insurance

business (to be discussed later) and because GEICO's underwriting gain

was well above what we can expect in most years, our 1997 operating

earnings were much better than we anticipated and also more than we

expect for 1998.

回顾1997年Berkshire两个部份都缴出漂亮的成绩单，每股投资金额增加了

9,543美元，约33.5%；而每股营业盈余则增加了296.43美元，约70.3%，

当然其中有一个很重要的关键，那就是我们的霹雳猫保险业务(后面还会在详加

说明)的运气不错，同时GEICO保险的表现甚至优于以往，这使得1997年的营

业表现超乎当初的预期，甚至超过未来1998年可能的表现。

Our rate of progress in both investments and operations is certain

to fall in the future. For anyone deploying capital, nothing recedes like

success. My own history makes the point: Back in 1951, when I was

attending Ben Graham's class at Columbia, an idea giving me a $10,000

gain improved my investment performance for the year by a full 100

percentage points. Today, an idea producing a $500 million pre-tax

profit for Berkshire adds one percentage point to our performance. It's

no wonder that my annual results in the 1950s were better by nearly

thirty percentage points than my annual gains in any subsequent

decade. Charlie's experience was similar. We weren't smarter then, just

smaller. At our present size, any performance superiority we achieve

will be minor.

我相信未来不管是投资或营业盈余的成长速度一定会向下滑落，对于任何负责资

金运用的人而言，成功必然导致衰退，就拿我个人的投资历史来说，回想当初我

在1951年进入哥伦大学拜在葛拉汉名下时，只要抓住能够赚到1万美元的投

资机会就能让我的投资绩效超过百分之百，不过时至今日，一笔能赚5亿美元

的成功投资个案，也不过只能让Berkshire增加区区一个百分点的投资绩效，也

难怪个人在1950年代早期的投资绩效会比接下来几十年的年度绩效差距达30

个百分点以上，而查理本身的经历也很相似，不是我们变笨了，而是因为我们目

前的规模实在是太大了，现在任何一项重大进展都会因为规模庞大的关系而显得

微不足道。

We will be helped, however, by the fact that the businesses to

which we have already allocated capital -- both operating subsidiaries

and companies in which we are passive investors -- have splendid

long-term prospects. We are also blessed with a managerial corps that

is unsurpassed in ability and focus. Most of these executives are wealthy

and do not need the pay they receive from Berkshire to maintain their

way of life. They are motivated by the joy of accomplishment, not by

fame or fortune.

当然只要我们投资的子公司以及股票具有远景，我们绝对能够因此受益，同时也

要感谢旗下这群卓越的能力与专注力的经营管理团队，大家要知道这些经理人本

身大多都已经很有钱了，根本就不需要靠Berkshire这份薪水过活，他们不为

名，也不为利，纯粹是冲着那份成就感。

Though we are delighted with what we own, we are not pleased

with our prospects for committing incoming funds. Prices are high for

both businesses and stocks. That does not mean that the prices of

either will fall -- we have absolutely no view on that matter -- but it

does mean that we get relatively little in prospective earnings when we

commit fresh money.

虽然对于现有的投资部位感到相当满意，但是我们也对于陆续进来的资金找不到

理想的去路而感到忧心，目前不管是整家公司或是单一股票的市场价格都过高，

但我并不是要预言股价将会下跌，我们从来就不对股市发表任何看法，这样说的

意思只是要提醒大家未来新投入资金的预期报酬将会大大减少。

Under these circumstances, we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of

discipline. In his book The Science of Hitting, Ted explains that he

carved the strike zone into 77 cells, each the size of a baseball.

Swinging only at balls in his "best" cell, he knew, would allow him to

bat .400; reaching for balls in his "worst" spot, the low outside corner of

the strike zone, would reduce him to .230. In other words, waiting for

the fat pitch would mean a trip to the Hall of Fame; swinging

indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the minors.

在这种情况下，我们试着学习职棒传奇明星Ted Williams的作法，在他的"打击

的科学"一书中解释到，他把打击区域划分为77个框框，每个框框就约当一个

棒球的大小，只有当球进入最理想的框框时，他才挥棒打击，因为他深深知道只

有这样做，他才能维持四成的超高打击率，反之要是勉强去挥击较差的框框，将

会使得他的打击率骤降到二成三以下，换句话说，只有耐心等待超甜的好球，才

是通往名人堂的大道，好坏球照单全收的人，迟早会面临被降到小联盟的命运。

If they are in the strike zone at all, the business "pitches" we now

see are just catching the lower outside corner. If we swing, we will be

locked into low returns. But if we let all of today's balls go by, there can

be no assurance that the next ones we see will be more to our liking.

Perhaps the attractive prices of the past were the aberrations, not the

full prices of today. Unlike Ted, we can't be called out if we resist three

pitches that are barely in the strike zone; nevertheless, just standing

there, day after day, with my bat on my shoulder is not my idea of fun.

目前迎面朝我们而来的"投"资机会大多只在好球带边缘，如果我们选择挥棒，则

得到的成绩可能会不太理想，但要是我们选择放弃不打，则没有人敢跟你保证下

一球会更好，或许过去那种吸引人的超低价格已不复存在，所幸我们不必像Ted

Williams一样，可能因为连续三次不挥棒而遭三振出局，只是光是扛着棒子站

在那里，日复一日，也不是一件令人感到愉快的事。

Unconventional Commitments

非常态性投资

When we can't find our favorite commitment -- a well-run and

sensibly-priced business with fine economics -- we usually opt to put

new money into very short-term instruments of the highest quality.

Sometimes, however, we venture elsewhere. Obviously we believe that

the alternative commitments we make are more likely to result in profit

than loss. But we also realize that they do not offer the certainty of profit

that exists in a wonderful business secured at an attractive price.

Finding that kind of opportunity, we know that we are going to make

money -- the only question being when. With alternative investments,

we think that we are going to make money. But we also recognize that

we will sometimes realize losses, occasionally of substantial size.

有时我们的资金不一定能够找到最理想的去处-也就是经营良好、价码合理的企

业，这时我们就会将资金投入到一些期间较短但品质不错的投资工具上，虽然我

们很明白这样的做法可能无法像我们买进好公司那样稳健的获利，甚至在少数的

状况下有可能赔大钱，不过总得来说我们相信赚钱的机率还是远高于赔钱，唯一

的关键在于其获利何时能够实现。

We had three non-traditional positions at yearend. The first was

derivative contracts for 14.0 million barrels of oil, that being what was

then left of a 45.7 million barrel position we established in 1994-95.

Contracts for 31.7 million barrels were settled in 1995-97, and these

supplied us with a pre-tax gain of about $61.9 million. Our remaining

contracts expire during 1998 and 1999. In these, we had an unrealized

gain of $11.6 million at yearend. Accounting rules require that

commodity positions be carried at market value. Therefore, both our

annual and quarterly financial statements reflect any unrealized gain or

loss in these contracts. When we established our contracts, oil for future

delivery seemed modestly underpriced. Today, though, we have no

opinion as to its attractiveness.

截至年底，我们总共有三项异于往常的投资，首先是1,400万桶的原油期货合

约，这是我们在1994-1995年间所建立4,570万桶原油的剩余部位，预计在

1998-1999年陆续到期，目前未实现获利约有1,160万美元，而已经结仓的

3,170万桶原油合约总共贡献我们6,190万美元的获利，会计原则规定期货合

约必须依市场价格评价，因此这些合约所有未实现的损益皆已反应在我们年度或

每季的财务报表上，当初我们之所以会建立这些部位，主要考量当时的石油期货

价位有些低估，至于现在的市场状况我们则没有任何意见。

Our second non-traditional commitment is in silver. Last year, we

purchased 111.2 million ounces. Marked to market, that position

produced a pre-tax gain of $97.4 million for us in 1997. In a way, this is

a return to the past for me: Thirty years ago, I bought silver because I

anticipated its demonetization by the U.S. Government. Ever since, I

have followed the metal's fundamentals but not owned it. In recent

years, bullion inventories have fallen materially, and last summer

Charlie and I concluded that a higher price would be needed to establish

equilibrium between supply and demand. Inflation expectations, it

should be noted, play no part in our calculation of silver's value.

至于第二项则是白银，去年我们一口气买进总共1.112亿盎斯的白银，以目前

的市价计算，总共贡献1997年9,740万美元的税前利益，某个角度来说，这

仿佛又让我回到过去，记得在三十年前，我因为预期美国政府货币将自由化而买

进白银，自此之后，我便一直追踪贵金属的基本面，只是并没有其它的买进动作，

直到最近这几年，银条的存货突然大幅下滑，查理跟我得到一个结论，那就是白

银的价格应该要稍微向上调整以维持供给与需求的平衡，至于一般人较注意的通

膨预期则不在我们计算价值的范围之内。

Finally, our largest non-traditional position at yearend was $4.6

billion, at amortized cost, of long-term zero-coupon obligations of the

U.S. Treasury. These securities pay no interest. Instead, they provide

their holders a return by way of the discount at which they are

purchased, a characteristic that makes their market prices move rapidly

when interest rates change. If rates rise, you lose heavily with zeros, and

if rates fall, you make outsized gains. Since rates fell in 1997, we ended

the year with an unrealized pre-tax gain of $598.8 million in our zeros.

Because we carry the securities at market value, that gain is reflected in

yearend book value.

最后一项是46亿美元以帐面摊销长期的美国零息债券，这些债券不支付利息，

相反的是以透过折价发行的方式回馈给债券持有人，也因此这类债券的价格会因

市场利率变动而大幅波动，如果利率上升，持有零息债券的人可能损失惨重，反

之若利率下跌，投资人就可能因此大赚一笔，而因为1997年的利率大幅下滑，

所以光是1997年我们的未实现利益就高达5.98亿美元，这些利益已全数反应

在公司年底的帐上。

In purchasing zeros, rather than staying with cash-equivalents, we

risk looking very foolish: A macro-based commitment such as this

never has anything close to a 100% probability of being successful.

However, you pay Charlie and me to use our best judgment -- not to

avoid embarrassment -- and we will occasionally make an

unconventional move when we believe the odds favor it. Try to think

kindly of us when we blow one. Along with President Clinton, we will be

feeling your pain: The Munger family has more than 90% of its net worth

in Berkshire and the Buffetts more than 99%.

当然不把现金好好的摆着而拿去投资零息债券不是没有风险的，这种基于总体经

济分析的投资绝对不敢保证百分之百能够成功，不过查理跟我绝对会运用我们最

佳的判断能力，大家可不是请我们来闲闲没事干，当我们认为胜算颇大时，我们

就会大胆地去做一些异于往常的举动，当然万一不小心突锤时，还请大家多多包

含，就如同柯林顿总统一样，我们绝对与各位感同身受，因为曼格家族有90%

的资产系于Berkshire，而巴菲特家族更高达99%。

How We Think About Market Fluctuations

我们对于股市波动的看法

A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life

and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices

for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are

not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices?

These questions, of course, answer themselves.

一则小谜语︰如果你打算一辈子吃汉堡维生，自己又没有养牛，那么你是希望牛

肉价格上涨或是下跌呢? 同样的要是你三不五时会换车，自己又不是卖车的，你

会希望车子的价格上涨或是下跌呢? 这些问题的答案很显然显而易见。

But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during

the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market

during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though

they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they

are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect,

they rejoice because prices have risen for the "hamburgers" they will

soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be

sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks

rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.

最后我再问各位一个问题︰假设你预估未来五年内可以存一笔钱，那么你希望这

期间的股票市场是涨还是跌? 这时许多投资人对于这个问题的答案就可能是错

的，虽然他们在未来的期间内会陆续买进股票，不过当股价涨时他们会感到高

兴，股价跌时反而觉得沮丧，这种感觉不等于是当你去买汉堡吃时，看到汉堡涨

价却欣喜若狂，这样的反应实在是没有什么道理，只有在短期间准备卖股票的人

才应该感到高兴，准备买股票的人应该期待的是股价的下滑。

For shareholders of Berkshire who do not expect to sell, the choice

is even clearer. To begin with, our owners are automatically saving even

if they spend every dime they personally earn: Berkshire "saves" for

them by retaining all earnings, thereafter using these savings to

purchase businesses and securities. Clearly, the more cheaply we make

these buys, the more profitable our owners' indirect savings program

will be.

对于不准备卖股票的Berkshire股东来说，这样的选择再明显也不过了，首先就

算他们将赚来的每一分钱都花掉，Berkshire也会自动帮他们存钱，因为

Berkshire会透过将所赚得的盈余再投资其它事业与股票，所以只要我们买进这

些投资标的的成本越低，他们将来间接所获得的报酬自然而然就越高。

Furthermore, through Berkshire you own major positions in

companies that consistently repurchase their shares. The benefits that

these programs supply us grow as prices fall: When stock prices are low,

the funds that an investee spends on repurchases increase our

ownership of that company by a greater amount than is the case when

prices are higher. For example, the repurchases that Coca-Cola, The

Washington Post and Wells Fargo made in past years at very low prices

benefitted Berkshire far more than do today's repurchases, made at

loftier prices.

此外，Berkshire许多重要的投资部位都持续不断地买回自家公司的股份，在这

种情况下，股票价格越低对我们越有利，因为这代表同样的一笔钱可以买进更多

的股份，从而间接提高我们持股的比例，举例来说，过去几年可口可乐、华盛顿

邮报与富国银行皆以非常低的价格大量买回自家股票，其所带来的效益要比在现

在的高价再进行要来得有利的多。

At the end of every year, about 97% of Berkshire's shares are held

by the same investors who owned them at the start of the year. That

makes them savers. They should therefore rejoice when markets decline

and allow both us and our investees to deploy funds more advantageously.

每年度结束，大约有97%的Berkshire股东会选择继续持有本公司的股份，这

些人都是储蓄爱好者，所以每当股市下跌时，他们都会感到高兴，因为这代表我

们以及被投资公司的资金可以作更好的运用。

So smile when you read a headline that says "Investors lose as

market falls." Edit it in your mind to "Disinvestors lose as market falls -

- but investors gain." Though writers often forget this truism, there is a

buyer for every seller and what hurts one necessarily helps the other.

(As they say in golf matches: "Every putt makes someone happy.")

所以下次当你看到"股市爆跌-投资人损失不贷"的新闻头条时，就知道应该要改

成"股市爆跌-不投资的人损失不贷而投资的人赚翻了"，虽然记者常常忘记这样

的真理，不过只要有卖方就代表会有买方，一方损失就代表有另一方会得利，就

像是高尔夫球场上常讲的，每当一个柏忌出现时，就会有人在旁边暗爽。

We gained enormously from the low prices placed on many equities

and businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. Markets that then were hostile

to investment transients were friendly to those taking up permanent

residence. In recent years, the actions we took in those decades have

been validated, but we have found few new opportunities. In its role as a

corporate "saver," Berkshire continually looks for ways to sensibly

deploy capital, but it may be some time before we find opportunities

that get us truly excited.

当初我们靠着在1970与1980年代股价低迷时所做的一些投资，确实让我们赚

了不少，这是一个对股市短暂过客不利却对股市长期住户有利的市场，近几年

来，我们在那个年代所做的一些投资决策陆续获得了验证，不过现在我们却找不

到类似的机会，身为企业资金的积蓄者，Berkshire致力于寻找资金合理运用的

方法，不过以现在的状况来看，我们可能还需要一段时间才能再找到真正让我们

感到兴奋的投资机会。

Insurance Operations -- Overview

保险事业营运-总检讨

What does excite us, however, is our insurance business. GEICO is

flying, and we expect that it will continue to do so. Before we expound

on that, though, let's discuss "float" and how to measure its cost. Unless

you understand this subject, it will be impossible for you to make an

informed judgment about Berkshire's intrinsic value.

真正令我们感到兴奋的是保险事业的营运，GEICO正处于爆炸性的成长阶段，

而且这种情况预期还会继续维持下去，在进一步说明之前，让我们先解释一下何

谓浮存金，以及如何来衡量它的取得成本，因为除非你对于这个课题有所了解，

否则你根本就不可能有办法对Berkshire实际的价值做合理的判断。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an

insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before

losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years.

During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant

activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in

usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay.

That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float.

An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than

the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the

business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for

money.

首先浮存金是一项我们持有但不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存金

的产生原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，

在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要付出

代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费用，

于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得浮存

金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价值，否

则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗酸柠

檬。

A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be

estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their

underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to

calculate a company's true cost of float. Estimating errors, usually

innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these

miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer

can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public

can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I

have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have

implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be

conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we

have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.

有一点必须特别注意的是，因为损失成本必须仰赖估算，所以保险业者对于承保

结算的成绩有相当大伸缩的空间，连带使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司

真正的浮存金成本，估计错误，通常是无心，但有时却是故意，与真实的结果往

往会有很大的差距，而这种结果直接反映在公司的损益表上，有经验的行家通常

可以经由公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误，但对于一般投资大众来说，除了

被迫接受财务报表的数字之外，别无他法，而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师

事务所背书的财务报告所吓到，至于就Berkshire本身而言，查理跟我在编列财

务报表时，都尽量采取最保守的做法，因为就我们个人的经验而言，保险业所发

生的意外，通常都不是什么好消息。

As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance

business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our

float -- which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium

volume -- by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds

held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and

then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid

taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost

of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years

when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last five, our cost

of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding

money.

不过如同下表中的数字所显示的，Berkshire的保险事业可说是大获全胜，表中

的浮存金，系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣

除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，相对于我们的保费收入总额，

我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损失

或利益而定，在某些年度，就像是最近五年，由于我们有承保利益，所以换句话

说，我们的资金成本甚至是负的，光是持有这些资金我们就已经开始让我们赚钱

了。

(1) (2) Yearend Yield

Underwriting Approximate on Long-Term

Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt. Bonds

(In $ Millions) (Ratio of 1 to 2)

1967 profit 17.3 less than zero 5.50%

1968 profit 19.9 less than zero 5.90%

1969 profit 23.4 less than zero 6.79%

1970 0.37 32.4 1.14% 6.25%

1971 profit 52.5 less than zero 5.81%

1972 profit 69.5 less than zero 5.82%

1973 profit 73.3 less than zero 7.27%

1974 7.36 79.1 9.30% 8.13%

1975 11.35 87.6 12.96% 8.03%

1976 profit 102.6 less than zero 7.30%

1977 profit 139.0 less than zero 7.97%

1978 profit 190.4 less than zero 8.93%

1979 profit 227.3 less than zero10.08%

1980 profit 237.0 less than zero11.94%

1981 profit 228.4 less than zero13.61%

1982 21.56 220.6 9.77%10.64%

1983 33.87 231.3 14.64%11.84%

1984 48.06 253.2 18.98%11.58%

1985 44.23 390.2 11.34% 9.34%

1986 55.84 797.5 7.00% 7.60%

1987 55.43 1,266.7 4.38% 8.95%

1988 11.08 1,497.7 0.74% 9.00%

1989 24.40 1,541.3 1.58% 7.97%

1990 26.65 1,637.3 1.63% 8.24%

1991 119.59 1,895.0 6.31% 7.40%

1992 108.96 2,290.4 4.76% 7.39%

1993 profit2,624.7 less than zero 6.35%

1994 profit3,056.6 less than zero 7.88%

1995 profit3,607.2 less than zero 5.95%

1996 profit6,702.0 less than zero 6.64%

1997 profit7,093.1 less than zero 5.92%

Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has

grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us

nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting

irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it

has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth

would have had.

自从1967年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金每年就以21.7%复合成长率

增加，更棒的是，这些资金完全不用成本，事实上它还能帮我们赚钱，可惜讽刺

的是，就会计原则而言，浮存金在会计报表系属于负债，但实际上，这些负债对

于Berkshire而言，其价值远高于列在帐上的其它股东权益。

The expiration of several large contracts will cause our float to

decline during the first quarter of 1998, but we expect it to grow

substantially over the long term. We also believe that our cost of float

will continue to be highly favorable.

虽然在1998第一季几项重大合约到期后，我们拥有的浮存金会略微减少，但就

长期而言，我们还是预期浮存金会大幅成长，同时我们也相信取得浮存金的成本

仍然会继续维持这种令人满意的态势。

Super-Cat Insurance

巨灾保险

Occasionally, however, the cost of our float will spike severely. That

will occur because of our heavy involvement in the super-cat business,

which by its nature is the most volatile of all insurance lines. In this

operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies

purchase in order to limit their losses when mega-catastrophes strike.

Berkshire is the preferred market for sophisticated buyers: When the

"big one" hits, the financial strength of super-cat writers will be tested,

and Berkshire has no peer in this respect.

然而有时候我们浮存金的成本也会突然大幅上扬，主要的原因在于我们从事的巨

灾保险业务，本身属于保险业中变动最大的一种险种，从事这类业务，我们将保

单卖给其它保险公司与再保公司以分散其面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风

险，事实上，Berkshire是有经验的业者最喜爱往来的对象，因为他们深深知道

当有"大事"真正发生时，所有巨灾保险的承保业者都会面临财务实力的严峻挑

战，而Berkshire无疑的是同业之最。

Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences, our super-cat

business can be expected to show large profits in most years -- and to

record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the attractiveness of our

super-cat business will take a great many years to measure. What you

must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year in the super-cat

business is not a possibility -- it's a certainty. The only question is when

it will come.

而由于真正重大的灾害并不是每年都发生，所以我们的巨灾业务极有可能在连续

几年赚大钱后，突然又发生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项巨灾保险业务到底

有多吸引人可能要花上好几年才有办法看得清，不过大家必须明了，所谓的重大

损失的年头不是可能会发生，而是肯定会发生，唯一的问题是它什么时候会降

临。

Last year, we were very lucky in our super-cat operation. The world

suffered no catastrophes that caused huge amounts of insured damage,

so virtually all premiums that we received dropped to the bottom line.

This pleasant result has a dark side, however. Many investors who are

"innocents" -- meaning that they rely on representations of salespeople

rather than on underwriting knowledge of their own -- have come into

the reinsurance business by means of purchasing pieces of paper that

are called "catastrophe bonds." The second word in this term, though, is

an Orwellian misnomer: A true bond obliges the issuer to pay; these

bonds, in effect, are contracts that lay a provisional promise to pay on

the purchaser.

去年我们在巨灾业务的表现还算不错，全世界一整年到头都没有发生足以造成重

大损失的大型灾害，也就是说基本上一整年收到的所有保费都自动落到我们的口

袋里，只是事情并不如想象中完美，有许多不知情的投资人，并非基于本身对于

保险承保的认识而是在业务人员的怂恿推销之下，进场买进一种叫做"巨灾债券"

的有价证券，事实上这根本就是一个错误的名词，真正的债券意指到期后发行人

有义务支付债款，然而这种债券，本质上其实是一种给予买方一种附条件承诺限

制的合约。

This convoluted arrangement came into being because the

promoters of the contracts wished to circumvent laws that prohibit the

writing of insurance by entities that haven't been licensed by the state. A

side benefit for the promoters is that calling the insurance contract a

"bond" may also cause unsophisticated buyers to assume that these

instruments involve far less risk than is actually the case.

这种拐弯抹角的做法主要是推销业者为了要规避政府禁止非保险业从事相关业

务而衍生出来的商品，而业者之所以将它取名叫做债券的原因在于这样的做法可

以吸引不知情的投资人，承担远比其表面上还高的许多的风险。

Truly outsized risks will exist in these contracts if they are not

properly priced. A pernicious aspect of catastrophe insurance, however,

makes it likely that mispricing, even of a severe variety, will not be

discovered for a very long time. Consider, for example, the odds of

throwing a 12 with a pair of dice -- 1 out of 36. Now assume that the

dice will be thrown once a year; that you, the "bond-buyer," agree to pay

$50 million if a 12 appears; and that for "insuring" this risk you take in

an annual "premium" of $1 million. That would mean you had

significantly underpriced the risk. Nevertheless, you could go along for

years thinking you were making money -- indeed, easy money. There is

actually a 75.4% probability that you would go for a decade without

paying out a dime. Eventually, however, you would go broke.

这些商品若未经过仔细的核算价格的话，很可能会形成极高的风险，更严重的是

灾害保险通常还有一种特色，那就是问题要经过许久之后才会慢慢地浮现，举个

例来说明，二颗骰子要掷出十二点的机率约为36分之一，现在假设我们一年只

掷一次，每次可以收取100万的赌注，但一旦掷出十二点时庄家的你必须支付

五千万美元，或许刚开始你会以为这100万美元得来全不费工夫，甚至有75.4%

的机率保证你在前十年都不必付出一毛钱，但最后你会发现就长期而言，接受这

样的赌注对庄家来说实际上是亏大了，甚至有可能让你倾家荡产。

In this dice example, the odds are easy to figure. Calculations

involving monster hurricanes and earthquakes are necessarily much

fuzzier, and the best we can do at Berkshire is to estimate a range of

probabilities for such events. The lack of precise data, coupled with the

rarity of such catastrophes, plays into the hands of promoters, who

typically employ an "expert" to advise the potential bond-buyer about

the probability of losses. The expert puts no money on the table.

Instead, he receives an up-front payment that is forever his no matter

how inaccurate his predictions. Surprise: When the stakes are high, an

expert can invariably be found who will affirm -- to return to our

example -- that the chance of rolling a 12 is not 1 in 36, but more like 1

in 100. (In fairness, we should add that the expert will probably believe

that his odds are correct, a fact that makes him less reprehensible --

but more dangerous.)

在玩这种骰子游戏时，其机率还很容易计算，但是要说到估算大型飓风与地震的

发生机率的难度就高的多了，我们自认能做的最多只有大约估计一个范围，然而

缺乏详细的信息，加上大型的灾害本来就很少发生，正好让一些有心人士有机可

乘，通常他们会雇用一些"专家"对有意投资这类债券的客户解说发生损失的可能

性，而这些所谓的专家玩得根本就是一种无本生意，因为不论他估算的到底准不

准，事先都可以拿到一笔订金，更令人讶异的是，回到前面的主题，你会发现无

论赌注有多高，专家永远会告诉你掷出12点的机率不是36分之一，而是100

分之一，(平心而论，我们必须强调这些专家可能真的认为自己的看法是对的，

这虽然让人不忍予以苛责但却更加凸显他们的危险性)。

The influx of "investor" money into catastrophe bonds -- which

may well live up to their name -- has caused super-cat prices to

deteriorate materially. Therefore, we will write less business in 1998. We

have some large multi-year contracts in force, however, that will

mitigate the drop. The largest of these are two policies that we

described in last year's report -- one covering hurricanes in Florida and

the other, signed with the California Earthquake Authority, covering

earthquakes in that state. Our "worst-case" loss remains about $600

million after-tax, the maximum we could lose under the CEA policy.

Though this loss potential may sound large, it is only about 1% of

Berkshire's market value. Indeed, if we could get appropriate prices, we

would be willing to significantly increase our "worst-case" exposure.

越来越多的资金涌入投资这类巨灾债券，使得巨灾的投保费率大幅下滑，其结果

可能真如其名，终将导致巨大的灾害，为此我们大幅减少1998年在这方面的业

务量，还好我们先前已签了好几件长期的合约使得冲击相对减小，其中最大的两

件在去年的年报中已向各位报告过，一件是佛罗里达的飓风险，另一个是与加州

地震局CEA签订的加州地震险，在最坏的状况下，我们必须承受的损失是税后

六亿美元，这也是CEA保单规定的上限，虽然这个数字看起来很大，但占

Berkshire市值的比例也不过只有1%，当然我必须再强调的是，只要保费合理，

我们很愿意大幅提高最坏状况的风险上限。

Our super-cat business was developed from scratch by Ajit Jain,

who has contributed to Berkshire's success in a variety of other ways as

well. Ajit possesses both the discipline to walk away from business that

is inadequately priced and the imagination to then find other

opportunities. Quite simply, he is one of Berkshire's major assets. Ajit

would have been a star in whatever career he chose; fortunately for us,

he enjoys insurance.

Berkshire的巨灾保险业务在Ajit Jain的努力下，从无到有，对Berkshire可谓

贡献良多，Ajit一方面有拒绝订价不合理保单的勇气，一方面又发挥创造力，开

创新的业务，他可以称得上是Berkshire最珍贵的资产之一，我觉得他不论从事

什么行业都可以成为那一行的明星，还好他对于保险业还算是相当有兴趣。

Insurance -- GEICO (1-800-555-2756) and Other Primary Operations

保险-盖可及其它主要保险事业

Last year I wrote about GEICO's Tony Nicely and his terrific

management skills. If I had known then what he had in store for us in

1997, I would have searched for still greater superlatives. Tony, now 54,

has been with GEICO for 36 years and last year was his best. As CEO, he

has transmitted vision, energy and enthusiasm to all members of the

GEICO family -- raising their sights from what has been achieved to

what can be achieved.

去年我提到盖可的Tony Nicely以及他优异的管理技能，不过我要是早知道他

在1997年的表现，我可能会试着去用更好的形容词，现年54岁的Tony在盖

可服务已有36年之久，在去年更达到个人事业的巅峰，身为公司的总裁，他的

识见、能量与热情感染到公司上上下下的每一个人，激励他们不断地超越巅峰。

We measure GEICO's performance by first, the net increase in its

voluntary auto policies (that is, not including policies assigned us by the

state) and, second, the profitability of "seasoned" auto business,

meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year and are

thus past the period in which acquisition costs cause them to be

money-losers. In 1996, in-force business grew 10%, and I told you how

pleased I was, since that rate was well above anything we had seen in

two decades. Then, in 1997, growth jumped to 16%.

我们运用好几种方法来衡量盖可的表现，首先是自愿加入汽车保单数量的净增加

数(也就是不包含州政府分配给我们的保单数)，第二长期汽车保单业务的获利状

况，系指那些持续一年以上，已经过了初次取得成本而开始赚钱的保单，1996

年有效保单的数量成长了10%，当时我曾告诉大家这是相当令人兴奋的一件事，

因为这是20年来的新高，不过到了1997年，保单数量的成长率又大幅跃升为

16%!

Below are the new business and in-force figures for the last five years:

下表是新加入自愿保单以及有效保单数量的统计:

New Voluntary Voluntary Auto

Years Auto Policies Policies in Force

1993354,882 2,011,055

1994396,217 2,147,549

1995461,608 2,310,037

1996617,669 2,543,699

1997913,176 2,949,439

Of course, any insurer can grow rapidly if it gets careless about

underwriting. GEICO's underwriting profit for the year, though, was

8.1% of premiums, far above its average. Indeed, that percentage was

higher than we wish it to be: Our goal is to pass on most of the benefits

of our low-cost operation to our customers, holding ourselves to about

4% in underwriting profit. With that in mind, we reduced our average

rates a bit during 1997 and may well cut them again this year. Our rate

changes varied, of course, depending on the policyholder and where he

lives; we strive to charge a rate that properly reflects the loss

expectancy of each driver.

当然任何一家保险公司都可以不顾承保品质而快速的成长，然而盖可本年度的承

保获利却是保费收入的8.1%，这数字远优于一般同业水准，确实这数字也远高

于我们本身的预期，我们原先的目标是将低成本营运所贡献的获利回馈给我们的

客户，仅保留4%的获利比例，基于这样的信念，我们将1997年的保险费率再

度略微调降，同时在明年有可能也会采取相同的做法，当然最后的费率还须参酌

保户本身状况以及居住的地区，我们最终还是希望费率的改变可以合理地反映每

位驾驶人发生损失的预期机率。

GEICO is not the only auto insurer obtaining favorable results these

days. Last year, the industry recorded profits that were far better than it

anticipated or can sustain. Intensified competition will soon squeeze

margins very significantly. But this is a development we welcome: Long

term, a tough market helps the low-cost operator, which is what we are

and intend to remain.

盖可并不是近年来唯一取得好成绩汽车保险业者，去年整个产业获得高于原先预

期的获利成果，但这种好光景很难维持下去，因为来自同业激烈的竞争很快地就

会压缩获利的空间，然而面对可能的发展，我们胸有成竹，就长期而言，艰困的

市场环境有利于低成本营运的业者生存，这也是一直以来我们努力维持的竞争优

势。

Last year I told you about the record 16.9% profit-sharing

contribution that GEICO's associates had earned and explained that two

simple variables set the amount: policy growth and profitability of

seasoned business. I further explained that 1996's performance was so

extraordinary that we had to enlarge the chart delineating the possible

payouts. The new configuration didn't make it through 1997: We

enlarged the chart's boundaries again and awarded our 10,500

associates a profit-sharing contribution amounting to 26.9% of their

base compensation, or $71 million. In addition, the same two variables

-- policy growth and profitability of seasoned business -- determined

the cash bonuses that we paid to dozens of top executives, starting with

Tony.

去年我也曾跟各位报告过盖可员工为自己挣得高达16.9%的盈余分红比例，同

时也解释只有两项简单的参数计算出这个比例，那就是保单的成长率与长期业务

的获利状况，我还说由于1996年的表现实在是超乎预期以致于原先预估支付奖

金的图表，因不敷使用而必须加大，不过到了今年新的图表竟然又不够用，为此

我们再度提高上限，总计全公司上上下下的10,500名员工，一共可以领到相当

于底薪的26.9%，总金额高达7,100万美元，当然这两项参数，同时也适用于

包含Tony在内，数十位高阶经理人的奖金红利。

At GEICO, we are paying in a way that makes sense for both our

owners and our managers. We distribute merit badges, not lottery

tickets: In none of Berkshire's subsidiaries do we relate compensation to

our stock price, which our associates cannot affect in any meaningful

way. Instead, we tie bonuses to each unit's business performance, which

is the direct product of the unit's people. When that performance is

terrific -- as it has been at GEICO -- there is nothing Charlie and I enjoy

more than writing a big check.

在盖可，我们支付薪资红利的方式很能够获得劳资双方的认同，我们颁发的是红

利奖章而不是乐透彩券，Berkshire旗下的子公司员工的薪资报酬与母公司的股

价一点关系都没有，因为前者并没有能力直接影响后者，相反地，我们将子公司

的薪资与各单位的各自表现完全绑在一起，因为后者的成败必须由前者负全部的

责任，当某事业单位的表现杰出时，就像盖可去年的情况一样，查理跟我乐于签

发大笔大笔的支票。

GEICO's underwriting profitability will probably fall in 1998, but the

company's growth could accelerate. We're planning to step on the gas:

GEICO's marketing expenditures this year will top $100 million, up 50%

from 1997. Our market share today is only 3%, a level of penetration

that should increase dramatically in the next decade. The auto

insurance industry is huge -- it does about $115 billion of volume

annually -- and there are tens of millions of drivers who would save

substantial money by switching to us.

不过盖可1998年的承保获利很可能会下滑，但是保单数量应该还会继续成长，

我们已准备好加紧油门，盖可保险今年预计的行销费用将突破一亿美元的大关，

这数字比起1997年要增加50%以上，截至目前为止，我们的市场占有率约为

3%，预计在未来的十年内还会大幅增加，整个汽车保险市场的大饼相当可观，

每年约有1,150亿美元的市场胃纳量，预估将有上千万的驾驶人因为将保单转

移到我们这边而节省相当可观的保费。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In the 1995 report, I described the enormous debt that you and I

owe to Lorimer Davidson. On a Saturday early in 1951, he patiently

explained the ins and outs of both GEICO and its industry to me -- a

20-year-old stranger who'd arrived at GEICO's headquarters uninvited

and unannounced. Davy later became the company's CEO and has

remained my friend and teacher for 47 years. The huge rewards that

GEICO has heaped on Berkshire would not have materialized had it not

been for his generosity and wisdom. Indeed, had I not met Davy, I might

never have grown to understand the whole field of insurance, which

over the years has played such a key part in Berkshire's success.

在1995年的年报中，我曾经提到我们欠Lorimer Davidson一个大人情，因为

要不是当年他很有耐心地跟一个素未谋面却冒冒失失闯入GEICO公司总部的二

十岁小毛头深入浅出地介绍GEICO以及其所属产业种种的话，也不会有今天的

Berkshire跟我本人，Davy后来也成为该公司的总裁，并与我维持长达47年

亦师亦友的情谊，没有他的宽容与智能，Berkshire也没有办法靠着GEICO的

成功而发扬光大。

Davy turned 95 last year, and it's difficult for him to travel.

Nevertheless, Tony and I hope that we can persuade him to attend our

annual meeting, so that our shareholders can properly thank him for his

important contributions to Berkshire. Wish us luck.

Davy去年已高龄95岁，旅途奔波对他来说是一件很辛苦的事，不过Tony跟

我还是会尽量说服他参与今年的股东会，好让大家能够藉这个机会好好地感谢他

对Berkshire所做的贡献，希望我们能够如愿。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Though they are, of course, far smaller than GEICO, our other

primary insurance operations turned in results last year that, in

aggregate, were fully as stunning. National Indemnity's traditional

business had an underwriting profit of 32.9% and, as usual, developed a

large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three

years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had a

profit of 24.3%. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred,

recorded an underwriting profit of 14.1% even though it continued to

absorb the expenses of geographical expansion. Rod's three-year

record is an amazing 15.1%. Berkshire's workers' compensation

business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, had a modest

underwriting loss in a difficult environment; its three-year underwriting

record is a positive 1.5%. John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, set a

new volume record while generating good underwriting earnings. At

Kansas Bankers Surety, Don Towle more than lived up to the high

expectations we had when we purchased the company in 1996.

当然除了GEICO保险以外，我们其它主要的保险事业，虽然规模较小，但所缴

出来的成绩单总的来说，同样令人激赏，国家产险传统业务的承保获利率高达

32.9%，同时也贡献出相较于保费收入高比例的浮存金，累计过去三年，这个由

Don Wurster领导的部门平均获利率为24.3%，另外在由Rod Eldred 领导的

Homestate业务部份，在必须吸收地区业务扩展的费用下，仍然缴出14.1%的

承保获利，累计最近三年的获利率为15.1%，此外Berkshire的劳工退休金业

务部份，在加州的Brad Kinstler主持下，虽然面临困难的环境，但产生承保损

失的程度相对轻微，平均三年的承保成绩是正的1.5%，还有由John Kizer领导

的Central States保险在保费收入缔造新高的同时，也贡献相当不错的承保获

利，最后是我们在1996年买进的Kansas银行家保险，Don Towle的表现甚

至超过我们当初设立的高标准。

In aggregate, these five operations recorded an underwriting profit

of 15.0%. The two Dons, along with Rod, Brad and John, have created

significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is more to come.

总计下来，这五家保险子公司平均的承保获利率是15.0%，两位Dons加上

Rod、Brad及John，为Berkshire创造了可观的利益，而且我们也相信后势可

期。

Sources of Reported Earnings

帐列盈余的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's

reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting

adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they

apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure

lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been

reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on

pages 69 and 70, this form of presentation seems to us to be more

useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted

accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be

charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the

table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial

statements.

下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

师查核的数字一致。

(in millions)

Berkshire's Share

of Net Earnings

(after taxes and

Pre-Tax Earnings minority interests)

1997 19961997 1996

Operating Earnings:

Insurance Group:

Underwriting -- Super-Cat. . . . . . . .$ 283.0 $ 167.0 $ 182.7 $ 107.4

Underwriting -- Other Reinsurance. . . . (155.2) (174.8) (100.1) (112.4)

Underwriting -- GEICO. . . . . . . . . . 280.7 171.4 181.1 110.2

Underwriting -- Other Primary. . . . . . 52.9 58.534.1 37.6

Net Investment Income. . . . . . . . . . 882.3 726.2 703.6 593.1

Buffalo News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 50.432.7 29.5

Finance Businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.1 23.118.0 14.9

FlightSafety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139.53.1(1) 84.41.9(1)

Home Furnishings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.8(2) 43.832.2(2) 24.8

Jewelry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.6 27.818.3 16.1

Scott Fetzer(excluding finance operation). 118.9 121.777.3 81.6

See's Candies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6 51.935.0 30.8

Shoe Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48.8 61.632.2 41.0

Purchase-Accounting Adjustments. . . . . . (104.9) (75.7) (97.0) (70.5)

Interest Expense(3). . . . . . . . . . . . (106.6) (94.3) (67.1) (56.6)

Shareholder-Designated Contributions . . . (15.4) (13.3) (9.9) (8.5)

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.7 73.037.0 42.2

------- ------- ------- --------

Operating Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,715.7 1,221.4 1,194.5 883.1

Capital Gains from Investments . . . . . . . 1,111.9 2,484.5 707.1 1,605.5

------ ------- ------- -------

Total Earnings - All Entities. . . . . . . .$2,827.6 $3,705.9 $1,901.6 $2,488.6

====== ====== ===== =====

　　　　　　(1) From date of acquisition, December 23, 1996.

　 From date of acquisition, December 23, 1996.

　　　　(2) Includes Star Furniture from July 1, 1997.

　y 1, 1997.

　　　　(3) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

Overall, our operating businesses continue to perform

exceptionally well, far outdoing their industry norms. We are

particularly pleased that profits improved at Helzberg's after a

disappointing 1996. Jeff Comment, Helzberg's CEO, took decisive steps

early in 1997 that enabled the company to gain real momentum by the

crucial Christmas season. In the early part of this year, as well, sales

remained strong.

总的来说，我们旗下的营利事业的表现远优于一般的同业，尤其是Helzberg钻

石在渡过令人失望的1996年之后，获利状况大幅提升，Helzberg公司的总裁

Jeff Comment在1997年初断然地采取各项措施，带领整个公司在重要的圣诞

旺季大有斩获，而截至今年上半年为止，销售状况依旧强劲。

Casual observers may not appreciate just how extraordinary the

performance of many of our businesses has been: If the earnings history

of, say, Buffalo News or Scott Fetzer is compared to the records of their

publicly-owned peers, their performance might seem to have been

unexceptional. But most public companies retain two-thirds or more of

their earnings to fund their corporate growth. In contrast, those

Berkshire subsidiaries have paid 100% of their earnings to us, their

parent company, to fund our growth.

一般的人可能无法体会，我们众多旗下事业的表现到底有多杰出，虽然相较于其

他已上市的同业，水牛城新闻报或是史考特飞兹的获利表现看起来并不突出，不

过大家要了解，大部分的上市公司通常会将三分之二以上的盈余保留不分配以支

应内部的成长，但是Berkshire大部分的子公司却将所赚取的盈余分毫不差的缴

回母公司，是他们贡献的资金促成母公司Berkshire进一步的成长。

In effect, the records of the public companies reflect the cumulative

benefits of the earnings they have retained, while the records of our

operating subsidiaries get no such boost. Over time, however, the

earnings these subsidiaries have distributed have created truly huge

amounts of earning power elsewhere in Berkshire. The News, See's and

Scott Fetzer have alone paid us $1.8 billion, which we have gainfully

employed elsewhere. We owe their managements our gratitude for

much more than the earnings that are detailed in the table.

事实上这些上市公司的盈余对于其获利表现有累积效果，相较之下，我们的子公

司却没有这方面的支助，然而就长期而言，这些子公司上缴的资金对于

Berkshire在其它地方的获利能力却有极大的贡献，总计水牛城新闻、喜斯糖果

与史考特飞兹，这三家公司这几年来贡献的盈余就高达18亿美元，而我们也得

以好好地运用这些资金，所以我们对于这些经理人的感谢绝不仅止于帐面上所看

到的那些盈余数字而已。

Additional information about our various businesses is given on

pages 36 - 50, where you will also find our segment earnings reported

on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 55 - 61, we have rearranged

Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a

presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the

company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that

we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.

在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，另外你还

可以找到经过重编，依照Berkshire四大部门的信息，这是查理跟我能够完整呈

现Berkshire现况的模式，我们的目的是希望能够换个角度设想，提供大家所有

必要的信息。

Look-Through Earnings

完整透视盈余

Reported earnings are a poor measure of economic progress at

Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented

earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees -- though

these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings

attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money,

since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as

more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason is simple: Our

investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates

of return. So why should we want them paid out?

我们认为帐列盈余很难表现Berkshire实际的营运状况，部份原因在于列示在本

公司帐上的股利收入，事实上仅占被投资公司收益的一小部份，其实我们并不要

求盈余一定要分配，事实上对我们而言，我们更重视未分配的那一部份，因为他

们极可能为我们创造出更高的价值，原因很简单，因为我们的被投资公司往往比

母公司更有机会把资金投入到高投资报酬的用途之上，既然如此又何必一定要强

迫他们把盈余分配回来呢?

To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than

reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through"

earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating

earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the

retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP

accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the

tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of

investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating

"operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting

adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring

items.

为了要更真实的反应Berkshire实际的经营状况，于是乎我们运用了完整透视盈

余的观念，这个数字总共包含(1)前段所提到的帐列盈余，加上(2)主要被投资公

司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除(3)若

这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的营

业盈余系已扣除资本利得、特别会计调整与企业其它非常态的项目。

The following table sets forth our 1997 look-through earnings,

though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate,

since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid

to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings

itemized on page 11, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment

Income.")

各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算出1997年透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒

各位这些数字只不过是估计数，很多都是基于简单的判断，(被投资公司所分配

的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益项下)。

Berkshire's Share

of Undistributed

Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings

Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend(1) (in millions)(2)

American Express Compa 10.7% $161

The Coca-Cola Company8.1% 216

The Walt Disney Company 3.2% 65

Freddie Mac 8.6% 86

The Gillette Company 8.6% 82

The Washington Post Company16.5% 30

Wells Fargo & Company 7.8% 103

------

Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees 743

Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3) (105)

Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 1,292

------

Total look-through earnings of Berkshire $1,930

======

　　　　　　(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests

　　　　　(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year

　　　　　(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire

pays on the dividends it receives

Acquisitions of 1997

1997年的购并活动

In 1997, we agreed to acquire Star Furniture and International Dairy

Queen (a deal that closed early in 1998). Both businesses fully meet our

criteria: They are understandable; possess excellent economics; and are

run by outstanding people.

1997年我们同意买下星辰家具与国际乳品皇后(后者在1998年初正式敲定)，

两家公司都完全符合我们的标准，产业性质单纯、拥有绝佳的竞争优势且由杰出

的人才所经营。

The Star transaction has an interesting history. Whenever we buy

into an industry whose leading participants aren't known to me, I always

ask our new partners, "Are there any more at home like you?" Upon our

purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, therefore, the Blumkin

family told me about three outstanding furniture retailers in other parts

of the country. At the time, however, none was for sale.

星辰家具的交易有个相当有趣的故事，每当我们跨足一个原本我们不熟悉的产

业，我都会习惯性地问一问新加入的合作伙伴，"除了你们以外，还有没有像你

们一样的企业?"，早在1983年我们买下内布拉斯加家具店时，我就问过B太太

家族这个问题，当时她告诉我全美其它地方还有三家不错的家具零售商可以考

虑，不过很可惜在当时没有任何一家有出售的意愿。

Many years later, Irv Blumkin learned that Bill Child, CEO of R.C.

Willey -- one of the recommended three -- might be interested in

merging, and we promptly made the deal described in the 1995 report.

We have been delighted with that association -- Bill is the perfect

partner. Furthermore, when we asked Bill about industry standouts, he

came up with the remaining two names given me by the Blumkins, one

of these being Star Furniture of Houston. But time went by without there

being any indication that either of the two was available.

多年后，B太太家族的Irv得知当初获得推荐的三家公司之一-R.C. Willey家具

总裁Bill Child有意与人合并，我们立刻把握良机促成交易，这项交易也在1995

年的年报向各位报告过，事后我们也很满意这次的结合，Bill是再理想不过的合

作伙伴，当然我也不忘问问Bill相同的问题，请他推荐其它杰出的同业，结果得

到的答案与B太太所说的一致，其中一家就是位于修士顿的星辰家具，只是随着

时光的流逝没有一家有意愿出售。

On the Thursday before last year's annual meeting, however, Bob

Denham of Salomon told me that Melvyn Wolff, the long-time

controlling shareholder and CEO of Star, wanted to talk. At our

invitation, Melvyn came to the meeting and spent his time in Omaha

confirming his positive feelings about Berkshire. I, meanwhile, looked at

Star's financials, and liked what I saw.

而就在去年年度股东会的前一个星期四，所罗门公司的董事长丹汉告诉我星辰家

具的大股东兼总裁-Melvyn Wolff，有意愿跟我谈谈，于是在我们的邀约下，

Melvyn光临奥玛哈与我们会谈，进一步确认对于Berkshire的正面观感，而在

此同时我也看了星辰家具的财务报表，一切正如我所预期。

A few days later, Melvyn and I met in New York and made a deal in

a single, two-hour session. As was the case with the Blumkins and Bill

Child, I had no need to check leases, work out employment contracts,

etc. I knew I was dealing with a man of integrity and that's what counted.

几天后，Melvyn与我再度在纽约碰面，前后只花了两个钟头的会谈就把整个交

易敲定，而如同先前与B太太家族及Bill Child的经验一样，我不需要再去查核

租约、员工雇用合约等，我知道我正在和一位具有正直人格的人打交道，这样就

足够了。

Though the Wolff family's association with Star dates back to 1924,

the business struggled until Melvyn and his sister Shirley Toomin took

over in 1962. Today Star operates 12 stores -- ten in Houston and one

each in Austin and Bryan -- and will soon move into San Antonio as well.

We won't be surprised if Star is many times its present size a decade

from now.

虽然Wolff家族与星辰家具的关系可以追溯到1924年以前，但是该公司直到

Melvyn跟他姐姐Shirly在1962年接手经营后才有起色，时至今日，星辰总共

有12家分店，其中十家在修士顿、另外两家在奥斯丁与拜伦，还有一家新店即

将在圣安东尼奥开张，我想星辰要是在未来十年内以倍数的方式扩张，我一点都

不会感到意外。

Here's a story illustrating what Melvyn and Shirley are like: When

they told their associates of the sale, they also announced that Star

would make large, special payments to those who had helped them

succeed -- and then defined that group as everyone in the business.

Under the terms of our deal, it was Melvyn and Shirley's money, not

ours, that funded this distribution. Charlie and I love it when we become

partners with people who behave like that.

下面的一则故事充分说明Melvyn与Shirley是怎么样的人︰当星辰家具正式宣

布出售公司时，他们同时也公布将支付一笔大额的红利给所有帮助公司成功的人

士，范围包含公司上上下下所有的员工，而根据交易的合约内容，这笔钱将由

Melvyn与Shirley自掏腰包，查理跟我相当赞赏即将与我们共事的合伙人能有

这样的举动。

The Star transaction closed on July 1. In the months since, we've

watched Star's already-excellent sales and earnings growth accelerate

further. Melvyn and Shirley will be at the annual meeting, and I hope you

get a chance to meet them.

星辰家具的交易案在七月一日正式定案，而在之后的几个月，星辰家具本来已经

表现相当不错的营收又继续大幅成长，Melvyn与Shirley将会出席今年的股东

年会，届时希望大家能够前来与他们见见面。

Next acquisition: International Dairy Queen. There are 5,792 Dairy

Queen stores operating in 23 countries -- all but a handful run by

franchisees -- and in addition IDQ franchises 409 Orange Julius

operations and 43 Karmelkorn operations. In 190 locations, "treat

centers" provide some combination of the three products.

另一个购并案：国际乳品皇后，简称乳品皇后IDQ，总共有5,792个营业据点，

分布在全球的23个国家，除了少数系加盟店外，其余皆为自营，此外还有409

家Orange Julius加盟店与43家Karmelkorn，其中有190个据点同时提供三

种选择。

For many years IDQ had a bumpy history. Then, in 1970, a

Minneapolis group led by John Mooty and Rudy Luther took control. The

new managers inherited a jumble of different franchising agreements,

along with some unwise financing arrangements that had left the

company in a precarious condition. In the years that followed,

management rationalized the operation, extended food service to many

more locations, and, in general, built a strong organization.

早期乳品皇后的命运多舛，在1970年代当时，由来自明尼拿波里斯的John

Mooty与Rudy Luther接手经营，新的经营阶层面对的是由前手遗留下来混乱

的加盟合约以及不合理的融资计画所造成岌岌可危的窘况，所幸在接下来的几年

内，新经营阶层导正这种乱象，并且对外扩张新增了许多营业据点，让公司经营

逐渐步入坦途。

Last summer Mr. Luther died, which meant his estate needed to sell

stock. A year earlier, Dick Kiphart of William Blair & Co., had introduced

me to John Mooty and Mike Sullivan, IDQ's CEO, and I had been

impressed with both men. So, when we got the chance to merge with

IDQ, we offered a proposition patterned on our FlightSafety acquisition,

extending selling shareholders the option of choosing either cash or

Berkshire shares having a slightly lower immediate value. By tilting the

consideration as we did, we encouraged holders to opt for cash, the

type of payment we by far prefer. Even then, only 45% of IDQ shares

elected cash.

去年夏天Luther先生过世，他的股份因而必须对外出售，而在这之前经由

William Blair公司的总裁Dick Kiphart的介绍，使我得以结识John Mooty与

乳品皇后的总裁Mike Sullivan，且这两人让我印象相当深刻，也因此Berkshire

可以趁此机会与乳品皇后合并，而我们也提出与之前购并国际飞安公司时相同的

条件，提供乳品皇后股东换成现金或股票两种不同的选择，其中换成Berkshire

股份的条件略低于现金，主要是因为大家尽量选择换成现金，不过即便如此，总

共也只有45%的股东决定领取现金。

Charlie and I bring a modicum of product expertise to this

transaction: He has been patronizing the Dairy Queens in Cass Lake and

Bemidji, Minnesota, for decades, and I have been a regular in Omaha.

We have put our money where our mouth is.

在这次的交易中，查理跟我稍微发挥了一下对于产品的知识，查理他几十年来固

定光顾位于明尼苏达州凯斯湖与Bemidji的乳品皇后，而我则是奥玛哈地区乳品

皇后的常客，我们等于是"把钱花在嘴巴上"。

A Confession

自我检讨

I've mentioned that we strongly prefer to use cash rather than

Berkshire stock in acquisitions. A study of the record will tell you why: If

you aggregate all of our stock-only mergers (excluding those we did

with two affiliated companies, Diversified Retailing and Blue Chip

Stamps), you will find that our shareholders are slightly worse off than

they would have been had I not done the transactions. Though it hurts

me to say it, when I've issued stock, I've cost you money.

我之所以会一再强调倾向利用现金而非Berkshire股票进行购并的原因在于，记

录显示我们所有利用股票并购的合并案(扣除早期的多元零售与蓝筹邮票两个案

子不算)，大家会发现所得的结果可能比不购并还差，虽然这样子讲对我很伤，

不过我还是必须承认，每当我发行股票，就等于是让股东们亏钱。

Be clear about one thing: This cost has not occurred because we

were misled in any way by sellers or because they thereafter failed to

manage with diligence and skill. On the contrary, the sellers were

completely candid when we were negotiating our deals and have been

energetic and effective ever since.

不过有一点要澄清的是，之所以会如此绝对不是因为我们遭到卖方的误导或是在

被买下后不用心经营，相反的，这些卖方在交易谈判当时皆坦诚布公，同时也很

努力经营事业。

Instead, our problem has been that we own a truly marvelous

collection of businesses, which means that trading away a portion of

them for something new almost never makes sense. When we issue

shares in a merger, we reduce your ownership in all of our businesses

-- partly-owned companies such as Coca-Cola, Gillette and American

Express, and all of our terrific operating companies as well. An example

from sports will illustrate the difficulty we face: For a baseball team,

acquiring a player who can be expected to bat .350 is almost always a

wonderful event -- except when the team must trade a .380 hitter to

make the deal.

主要的问题在于，我们原本就已经拥有的绝佳企业组合，因此不论拿什么新的东

西来换都不划算，也就是说每当我们发行新股用来购并新的企业时，就等于是间

接减少我们原本拥有的绝佳企业的股权比例，不论是只有部份股权的可口可乐、

吉列刮胡刀及美国运通，或者是旗下所有营利事业皆是如此，在运动场上有一个

例子可以充分说明我们所面临的难题，对一只棒球队来说，挖到一位打击率高达

三成五的选手肯定是件令人欣喜的事，除非是你必须被迫用一个打击率高达三成

八的球员去交换。

Because our roster is filled with .380 hitters, we have tried to pay

cash for acquisitions, and here our record has been far better. Starting

with National Indemnity in 1967, and continuing with, among others,

See's, Buffalo News, Scott Fetzer and GEICO, we have acquired -- for

cash -- a number of large businesses that have performed incredibly

well since we bought them. These acquisitions have delivered Berkshire

tremendous value -- indeed, far more than I anticipated when we made

our purchases.

正因为目前我们的球员名单已布满了打击率三成八的高手，所以我们总是希望尽

量用现金来进行购并，而事实证明我们的成绩远高于预期，从1967年的国家产

险开始，接着是喜斯糖果、水牛城新闻报、史考特飞兹以及盖可保险等等，这些

企业在我们用现金买下之后的表现再再令人激赏，它们也为Berkshire增添了无

数的价值，这实在是远高于我们当初的预期。

We believe that it is almost impossible for us to "trade up" from our

present businesses and managements. Our situation is the opposite of

Camelot's Mordred, of whom Guenevere commented, "The one thing I

can say for him is that he is bound to marry well. Everybody is above

him." Marrying well is extremely difficult for Berkshire.

我们相信实在是很难将我们现在拥有的事业与其经营阶层交换出去，我们现在的

处境与Camelot Mordred刚好相反，Guenevere说他一定可以找到理想的伴

侣，因为世上所有人的条件都比他还要好，但是对Berkshire来说，要找到足以

匹配的伴侣实在是难上加难。

So you can be sure that Charlie and I will be very reluctant to issue

shares in the future. In those cases when we simply must do so -- when

certain shareholders of a desirable acquiree insist on getting stock --

we will include an attractive cash option in order to tempt as many of

the sellers to take cash as is possible.

所以大家可以预见的是在未来查理跟我将会越来越不愿意以发行新股的方式进

行购并，要是遇到非如此不可的情况时，也就是被购并者坚持要拿股票的时候，

我们也会附带提供一个比较优渥的现金价格，以促使更多的股东选择领取现金。

Merging with public companies presents a special problem for us.

If we are to offer any premium to the acquiree, one of two conditions

must be present: Either our own stock must be overvalued relative to the

acquiree's, or the two companies together must be expected to earn

more than they would if operated separately. Historically, Berkshire has

seldom been overvalued. In this market, moreover, undervalued

acquirees are almost impossible to find. That other possibility --

synergy gains -- is usually unrealistic, since we expect acquirees to

operate after we've bought them just as they did before. Joining with

Berkshire does not normally raise their revenues nor cut their costs.

此外当我们购并已公开发行的公司还会遇到另一项问题，那就是如果我们提供被

购并者任何溢价的话，必须要能够符合以下两项条件其中之一，要嘛就是相对于

对方，Berkshire的股价被高估；要嘛就是两家公司合并后所赚得的利益高于两

家独立营运时的利益。关于这个问题，就过去的经验，Berkshire的股价很少被

高估，相对地以目前的市场状况，实在很难再找到其它股价相对被低估的公司，

至于另外一个可能性，也就是所谓的合并综效，通常都很不切实际，我们顶多能

期望被购并的事业在被买下之后的表现跟之前一样好就不错了，因为加入

Berkshire不代表营收就能够自动增加或成本就能够自动地减少。

Indeed, their reported costs (but not their true ones) will rise after

they are bought by Berkshire if the acquiree has been granting options

as part of its compensation packages. In these cases, "earnings" of the

acquiree have been overstated because they have followed the standard

-- but, in our view, dead wrong -- accounting practice of ignoring the

cost to a business of issuing options. When Berkshire acquires an

option-issuing company, we promptly substitute a cash compensation

plan having an economic value equivalent to that of the previous option

plan. The acquiree's true compensation cost is thereby brought out of

the closet and charged, as it should be, against earnings.

而其中还有一些以选择权充当薪资酬劳配套措施的公司，在我们买下之后，其帐

列成本往往会暴增(但并不会影响实际真实的成本)，事实上应该说是这些公司过

去的获利状况被高估，因为他们所采取的是在我们看来典型的，完全忽略发行选

择权潜藏企业成本的不当会计手法，也因此当Berkshire买下一家有发行选择权

的公司时，我们会立刻将之更换成以现金报酬为主，但却与原来认股权同样优惠

的奖励计画，如此一来，被购并的这家公司其实际的薪资酬劳成本方能摊开在阳

光底下，具体反应公司的获利状况。

The reasoning that Berkshire applies to the merger of public

companies should be the calculus for all buyers. Paying a takeover

premium does not make sense for any acquirer unless a) its stock is

overvalued relative to the acquiree's or b) the two enterprises will earn

more combined than they would separately. Predictably, acquirers

normally hew to the second argument because very few are willing to

acknowledge that their stock is overvalued. However, voracious buyers

-- the ones that issue shares as fast as they can print them -- are tacitly

conceding that point. (Often, also, they are running Wall Street's version

of a chain-letter scheme.)

Berkshire在购并公开公司所采用的原则也是所有买家必修的学分，买方没有理

由以溢价进行购并，除非在以下特殊的情况下，a)相对于被购并者，其股价被高

估，或者是b)两家原本独立的企业在合并之后所赚取的利润高于原先的总和，

而显而易见的买方通常会采取第一个理由，因为很少有公司会公开承认自己的股

价被高估，然而贪得无厌的买家，以比印钞票还快的速度印股票的这群人，最后

却不得不默认自己的股价确实被高估，通常他们玩的宛如华尔街版的连锁信游

戏。

In some mergers there truly are major synergies -- though

oftentimes the acquirer pays too much to obtain them -- but at other

times the cost and revenue benefits that are projected prove illusory. Of

one thing, however, be certain: If a CEO is enthused about a particularly

foolish acquisition, both his internal staff and his outside advisors will

come up with whatever projections are needed to justify his stance. Only

in fairy tales are emperors told that they are naked.

虽然有些合并案确实可以发挥综合效益，但通常买家所付出的代价过高，且通常

成本节省与营收增加的预期效益最后都会成一场空，不过有一点可以确定的是，

不管这个购并案多么的不合理，只要老板有强烈的意愿，其内部的同僚与外部的

专家顾问都能够提出一份看似合理的评估报告来支持其立场，只要在童话中才有

人敢大胆地告诉国王他没有穿衣服。

Common Stock Investments

股票投资

Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a

market value of more than $750 million are itemized.

下表是Berkshire市价超过七亿五千万美元以上的股票投资。

12/31/97

Shares Company Cost* Market

(dollars in millions)

49,456,900 American Express Company $1,392.7 $ 4,414.0

200,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company 1,298.9 13,337.5

21,563,414 The Walt Disney Company 381.2 2,134.8

63,977,600 Freddie Mac329.4 2,683.1

48,000,000 The Gillette Company 600.0 4,821.0

23,733,198 Travelers Group Inc. 604.4 1,278.6

1,727,765 The Washington Post Company 10.6 840.6

6,690,218 Wells Fargo & Company 412.6 2,270.9

Others 2,177.1 4,467.2

-------- ----------

Total Common Stocks $7,206.9 $ 36,247.7

======== ========

　　　* Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.8 billion less than GAAP cost.

*系以税务为基础的成本，比一般公认会计原则的帐面成本少18亿美元。

We made net sales during the year that amounted to about 5% of

our beginning portfolio. In these, we significantly reduced a few of our

holdings that are below the $750 million threshold for itemization, and

we also modestly trimmed a few of the larger positions that we detail.

Some of the sales we made during 1997 were aimed at changing our

bond-stock ratio moderately in response to the relative values that we

saw in each market, a realignment we have continued in 1998.

今年我们大概处分了5%左右的投资部位，其中包含一些市价未达七亿五千万表

列门槛的股票被大幅地处分掉，此外也有一部份超过七亿五千万的股票被小幅的

调整，主要是为了调整债券与股票投资部位间的比例，以因应我们认为市场相对

价值的认知，这个动作一直到1998年仍在持续进行。

Our reported positions, we should add, sometimes reflect the

investment decisions of GEICO's Lou Simpson. Lou independently runs

an equity portfolio of nearly $2 billion that may at times overlap the

portfolio that I manage, and occasionally he makes moves that differ

from mine.

不过有一点必须强调的是，报表上显示的投资部位，有时反应的是GEICO保险

公司Lou Simpson所做的决策，Lou独自管理将近20亿美元的股票投资组合，

当然其中有些部位与我重叠，但通常他的投资动作与我有别。

Though we don't attempt to predict the movements of the stock

market, we do try, in a very rough way, to value it. At the annual meeting

last year, with the Dow at 7,071 and long-term Treasury yields at 6.89%,

Charlie and I stated that we did not consider the market overvalued if 1)

interest rates remained where they were or fell, and 2) American

business continued to earn the remarkable returns on equity that it had

recently recorded. So far, interest rates have fallen -- that's one

requisite satisfied -- and returns on equity still remain exceptionally

high. If they stay there -- and if interest rates hold near recent levels -

- there is no reason to think of stocks as generally overvalued. On the

other hand, returns on equity are not a sure thing to remain at, or even

near, their present levels.

虽然我们从来不愿尝试去预测股市的动向，不过我们却试着大约评估其合理价

位，记得在去年的股东会时，道琼指数约为7,071点，长期公债的殖利率为

6.89%，查理跟我就曾公开表示，如果符合以下两点条件，则股市并未高估，1)

利率维持不变或继续下滑，以及2)美国企业继续维持现有的高股东权益报酬率。

现在看起来，利率确实又继续下滑，这一点算是符合条件，另一方面，股东权益

报酬率仍旧维持在高档，换句话说，若这种情况继续维持下去，同时利率也能够

维持现状，则一般来说没有理由认为现在的股市过于高估，不过从保守角度来

看，股东权益报酬率实在很能永远维持在现有的这种荣景。

In the summer of 1979, when equities looked cheap to me, I wrote

a Forbes article entitled "You pay a very high price in the stock market

for a cheery consensus." At that time skepticism and disappointment

prevailed, and my point was that investors should be glad of the fact,

since pessimism drives down prices to truly attractive levels. Now,

however, we have a very cheery consensus. That does not necessarily

mean this is the wrong time to buy stocks: Corporate America is now

earning far more money than it was just a few years ago, and in the

presence of lower interest rates, every dollar of earnings becomes more

valuable. Today's price levels, though, have materially eroded the

"margin of safety" that Ben Graham identified as the cornerstone of

intelligent investing.

记得1979年的夏天，在当时的股票市场当中，便宜的股票垂手可得，为此我特

地在富比士写了一篇文章，名为"在股票市场中，想让大家有乐观的共识是要付

出相当大的代价的"，当时市场弥漫着怀疑与悲观的情绪，不过当时我力排众议

认为对于这种现象投资人应该要感到高兴，因为悲观的情绪使得许多公司的股价

跌到相当吸引人的价位，不过现在看来我们似乎已经快要达到乐观的共识了，当

然这不代表现在就不能买股票，近年来美国企业的获利大增，搭配现在的利率水

准，企业赚取的每一块盈余比起过去来说要珍贵的许多，虽然以现在的股票价

位，已经严重地脱离的葛拉汉一再强调的安全边际，这是智能型投资哲学的基

石。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In last year's annual report, I discussed Coca-Cola, our largest

holding. Coke continues to increase its market dominance throughout

the world, but, tragically, it has lost the leader responsible for its

outstanding performance. Roberto Goizueta, Coke's CEO since 1981,

died in October. After his death, I read every one of the more than 100

letters and notes he had written me during the past nine years. Those

messages could well serve as a guidebook for success in both business

and life.

去年年报我花了相当多的篇幅谈到我们现有最大的投资部位-可口可乐，虽然目

前可口可乐仍然继续扩大其在全世界饮料市场的霸主地位，不过很不幸的是，该

公司总裁Roberto Goizueta却在去年十月过世，在他死后，我再一度阅读过去

九年来，我与Goizueta超过上百篇的往来书信，这些讯息确实可以做为如何成

功经营企业与人生的最佳教材。

In these communications, Roberto displayed a brilliant and clear

strategic vision that was always aimed at advancing the well-being of

Coke shareholders. Roberto knew where he was leading the company,

how he was going to get there, and why this path made the most sense

for his owners -- and, equally important, he had a burning sense of

urgency about reaching his goals. An excerpt from one handwritten

note he sent to me illustrates his mind-set: "By the way, I have told

Olguita that what she refers to as an obsession, you call focus. I like

your term much better." Like all who knew Roberto, I will miss him

enormously.

在这些书信中，Roberto展现出高瞻远瞩的识见，总是将重点摆在如何增进可口

可乐股东的权益，Roberto很清楚他要将公司带往何处，以及要如何才能到达目

的地，同时了解为何这样的方法最适合所有的股东，当然更重要的是他对于达成

这样目标抱持着强烈的渴望，有一张他手写给我的字条最能充分说明当时他的心

境，"对了，我跟Olguita提到有关于她常常讲的"着魔"，我个人比较喜欢巴菲

特的说法"专注"，就像是所有认识Roberto的人一样，我会永远怀念他!

Consistent with his concern for the company, Roberto prepared for

a seamless succession long before it seemed necessary. Roberto knew

that Doug Ivester was the right man to take over and worked with Doug

over the years to ensure that no momentum would be lost when the

time for change arrived. The Coca-Cola Company will be the same

steamroller under Doug as it was under Roberto.

一如他对于公司的关心，Roberto早就安排好接班的问题，他认为Doug Ivester

正是最佳的人选，与他共事多年的经验足以确保在公司领导高层更迭的同时，公

司的运作不致受到任何的影响，相信在Doug的领导之下，可口可乐仍能一本初

衷勇往直前。

Convertible Preferreds

可转换特别股

Two years ago, I gave you an update on the five convertible

preferreds that we purchased through private placements in the 1987-

1991 period. At the time of that earlier report, we had realized a small

profit on the sale of our Champion International holding. The four

remaining preferred commitments included two, Gillette and First

Empire State, that we had converted into common stock in which we had

large unrealized gains, and two others, USAir and Salomon, that had

been trouble-prone. At times, the last two had me mouthing a line from

a country song: "How can I miss you if you won't go away?"

两年前，我曾经就1987到1991年间进行的五项可转换特别股投资做了一番现

况报告，在报告出具的当时，我们出脱了冠军国际部份的持股实现小部份的获

利，剩下的四项投资中，吉列与第一帝国早已转换成普通股，并享有高额的未实

现获利，而美国航空与所罗门兄弟则发生严重的经营问题，这两项投资让我不得

不哼起一首乡村歌曲的歌词，"要是你不离开，我又怎么会想念你呢?"

Since I delivered that report, all four holdings have grown

significantly in value. The common stocks of both Gillette and First

Empire have risen substantially, in line with the companies' excellent

performance. At yearend, the $600 million we put into Gillette in 1989

had appreciated to $4.8 billion, and the $40 million we committed to

First Empire in 1991 had risen to $236 million.

而就在报告发布之后，所有四项投资的价值皆大幅增加，吉列与第一帝国的普通

股股价飙涨，与公司的经营基本面一致，截至年底，当初我们在1989年投入吉

列的6亿美元已经增值为48亿美元，而在1991年投入第一帝国的4,000万

美元，则已增值至2.36亿美元。

Our two laggards, meanwhile, have come to life in a very major

way. In a transaction that finally rewarded its long-suffering

shareholders, Salomon recently merged into Travelers Group. All of

Berkshire's shareholders -- including me, very personally -- owe a huge

debt to Deryck Maughan and Bob Denham for, first, playing key roles in

saving Salomon from extinction following its 1991 scandal and, second,

restoring the vitality of the company to a level that made it an attractive

acquisition for Travelers. I have often said that I wish to work with

executives that I like, trust and admire. No two fit that description better

than Deryck and Bob.

在此同时另外两个后段班，也已起死回生，其中所罗门最近决定并入旅行家集团

的举动，终于让长久以来饱受苦难的股东获得的回报，Berkshire所有的股东，

包含我个人在内，实在是亏欠Deryck Maughan跟Bob Denham太多了，首

先要感谢他们在1991年所罗门爆发丑闻时，拯救公司免于倒闭，之后更让公司

恢复以往的活力，使得公司得以风光地嫁给旅行家集团，我常常说，我渴望与我

喜爱、信任与崇拜的经理人共事，Deryck与Bob正是这样绝佳的组合。

Berkshire's final results from its Salomon investment won't be

tallied for some time, but it is safe to say that they will be far better than

I anticipated two years ago. Looking back, I think of my Salomon

experience as having been both fascinating and instructional, though

for a time in 1991-92 I felt like the drama critic who wrote: "I would

have enjoyed the play except that I had an unfortunate seat. It faced the

stage."

虽然Berkshire投资所罗门的最终成果到目前仍未定案，所幸目前的情况要比我

两年前预期要好得多，回顾过去，我觉得投资所罗门的经验令人感到刺激有趣同

时又具教化意义，虽然我在1991到1992年间的感觉就好象是一个戏迷曾这样

写到"要是因为坐到一个不幸的位子，我可能就能够好好地欣赏表演，因为它正

对着台上"。

The resuscitation of US Airways borders on the miraculous. Those

who have watched my moves in this investment know that I have

compiled a record that is unblemished by success. I was wrong in

originally purchasing the stock, and I was wrong later, in repeatedly

trying to unload our holdings at 50 cents on the dollar.

另一方面美国航空的重生过程近乎奇迹，熟悉整个投资过程的朋友都知道，个人

在这项投资上获得了前所未有的胜利，一开始买进这家公司的股票就是一项错

误，后来又反悔打算以半价出售再度犯了第二次的错误。

Two changes at the company coincided with its remarkable

rebound: 1) Charlie and I left the board of directors and 2) Stephen Wolf

became CEO. Fortunately for our egos, the second event was the key:

Stephen Wolf's accomplishments at the airline have been phenomenal.

两项改变促使该公司得以东山再起，1)查理跟我辞去该公司董事的职位，2)

Stephen Wolf接任成为该公司总裁，还好后者才是公司真正能够重生的主因，

否则我们的脸可就丢大了，Stephen Wolf的表现对整个航空业而言，可说是意

义非凡。

There still is much to do at US Airways, but survival is no longer an

issue. Consequently, the company made up the dividend arrearages on

our preferred during 1997, adding extra payments to compensate us

for the delay we suffered. The company's common stock, furthermore,

has risen from a low of $4 to a recent high of $73.

当然美国航空还有很长的一段路要走，不过存活下来应该不是问题，也因此该公

司在1997年顺利地偿还积欠我们的特别股股息，还包含延迟支付的赔偿损失，

该公司的普通股股价更从原来的4块钱，一举涨到目前73块钱的新高。

Our preferred has been called for redemption on March 15. But the

rise in the company's stock has given our conversion rights, which we

thought worthless not long ago, great value. It is now almost certain

that our US Airways shares will produce a decent profit -- that is, if my

cost for Maalox is excluded -- and the gain could even prove indecent.

我们持有的特别股已在三月15日被赎回，不过受惠于该公司股价大涨，原本一

文不值的转换权现在却变得价值不菲，可以肯定的是我们现在持有的美国航空普

通股将为我们创造极高的获利，当然还要先把我买胃药的钱给算进去。

Next time I make a big, dumb decision, Berkshire shareholders will

know what to do: Phone Mr. Wolf.

我想哪天要是我再度干下什么愚蠢的投资决策，Berkshire的股东肯定知道该怎

么做了，没错，记得打电话给Wolf先生。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In addition to the convertible preferreds, we purchased one other

private placement in 1991, $300 million of American Express Percs.

This security was essentially a common stock that featured a tradeoff in

its first three years: We received extra dividend payments during that

period, but we were also capped in the price appreciation we could

realize. Despite the cap, this holding has proved extraordinarily

profitable thanks to a move by your Chairman that combined luck and

skill -- 110% luck, the balance skill.

除了可转换特别股，我们在1991年还透过私募的方式投资了三亿美元的美国运

通俗称"Percs"的股票，这种证券基本上算是一种普通股，只不过在投资的前三

年我们可以领取一笔特别的股利，条件是在同时间我们因为股价上涨所带来的资

本利得将受到限制，然而即便如此，这笔投资还是因为本人的英明决策而获利不

菲，当然其中也包含一些运气的成份，比例约是110%(剩下的才是本人的能力)。

Our Percs were due to convert into common stock in August 1994,

and in the month before I was mulling whether to sell upon conversion.

One reason to hold was Amex's outstanding CEO, Harvey Golub, who

seemed likely to maximize whatever potential the company had (a

supposition that has since been proved -- in spades). But the size of

that potential was in question: Amex faced relentless competition from

a multitude of card-issuers, led by Visa. Weighing the arguments, I

leaned toward sale.

根据约定我们的Percs必须在1994年八月以前转换成普通股，而就在前一个月

我还一直在考虑是否应该在转换期限到期以前把这项投资给处分掉，当时考量的

是虽然美国运通总裁Harvey Golub表现相当优异，他总是有办法将公司的潜力

发挥到极致(这点从一开始便不断地获得证明)，只是这种潜能还是面临严重的挑

战，那就是美国运通来自于以Visa为首的其它发卡单位激烈的竞争，在衡量各

种利弊得失之后，我还是倾向于把这笔投资提前给处分掉。

Here's where I got lucky. During that month of decision, I played

golf at Prouts Neck, Maine with Frank Olson, CEO of Hertz. Frank is a

brilliant manager, with intimate knowledge of the card business. So

from the first tee on I was quizzing him about the industry. By the time

we reached the second green, Frank had convinced me that Amex's

corporate card was a terrific franchise, and I had decided not to sell. On

the back nine I turned buyer, and in a few months Berkshire owned 10%

of the company.

还好我走狗运，就在要做决定的那个月，我正好到缅因州和Hertz租车公司总

裁Frank Olson一起打高尔夫球，Frank是一位相当优秀的经理人，因为业务

的关系相当熟悉信用卡的行业，所以打从第一洞开始我就一直追问他有关这行业

的种种问题，到了第二洞的果岭时，Frank已经让我完全相信美国运通的企业卡

是一项绝佳的生意，所以当下我就决定不卖了，等到后九洞时，我更决定加码投

资，于是在回来的几个月后，Berkshire已经拥有该公司10%的股权。

We now have a $3 billion gain in our Amex shares, and I naturally

feel very grateful to Frank. But George Gillespie, our mutual friend, says

that I am confused about where my gratitude should go. After all, he

points out, it was he who arranged the game and assigned me to Frank's

foursome.

现在我们光是在美国运通的投资潜在利益就有30亿美元，当然这一切都要感谢

Frank，不过我们俩人共同的好友-George Gillspie却直说我搞错应该要感恩的

对象了，他强调要不是因为他安排这次的球会，并且把我跟Frank摆在同一组

的话，也不会有今天这样的成果。

Quarterly Reports to Shareholders

给股东的季报

In last year's letter, I described the growing costs we incur in

mailing quarterly reports and the problems we have encountered in

delivering them to "street-name" shareholders. I asked for your opinion

about the desirability of our continuing to print reports, given that we

now publish our quarterly and annual communications on the Internet,

at our site, www.berkshirehathaway.com. Relatively few shareholders

responded, but it is clear that at least a small number who want the

quarterly information have no interest in getting it off the Internet.

Being a life-long sufferer from technophobia, I can empathize with this

group.

在去年的年报中，我曾经向各位透露由于邮寄季报的费用大幅增加，同时要将季

报寄给那些不是用本名登记的股东有其困难性，所以征询大家是否可以接受直接

将季报与年报公布在公司网站上，取代原先印制与邮寄报告的做法，虽然只有少

数的股东响应，但长期以来具有科技恐惧症的我很明白还是有少数想要年报信息

的股东，不习惯透过网络取得相关的信息，我完全能够体会他们的想法。

The cost of publishing quarterlies, however, continues to balloon,

and we have therefore decided to send printed versions only to

shareholders who request them. If you wish the quarterlies, please

complete the reply card that is bound into this report. In the meantime,

be assured that all shareholders will continue to receive the annual

report in printed form.

惟考量大幅增加的印刷费用，最后我们还是决定除非股东有特别要求，我们才邮

寄印好的季报，所以若你也有意要一份书面的季报，请填妥年报上所附的申请表

格，同时在此也提醒所有的股东，我们还是会继续邮寄年报给所有的股东。

Those of you who enjoy the computer should check out our home

page. It contains a large amount of current information about Berkshire

and also all of our annual letters since 1977. In addition, our website

includes links to the home pages of many Berkshire subsidiaries. On

these sites you can learn more about our subsidiaries' products and --

yes -- even place orders for them.

至于喜欢利用计算机上网的股东们，一定要到我们公司网站的首页看看，里面包含

大量有关Berkshire现况的信息，同时还有1977年到现在为止的公司年报，此

外网站上还有对旗下其它子公司的网站连结，经由这些网站大家可以更了解子公

司的产品信息，有的甚至可以透过网络直接下单购买。

We are required to file our quarterly information with the SEC no

later than 45 days after the end of each quarter. One of our goals in

posting communications on the Internet is to make this material

information -- in full detail and in a form unfiltered by the media --

simultaneously available to all interested parties at a time when markets

are closed. Accordingly, we plan to send our 1998 quarterly information

to the SEC on three Fridays, May 15, August 14, and November 13, and

on those nights to post the same information on the Internet. This

procedure will put all of our shareholders, whether they be direct or

"street-name," on an equal footing. Similarly, we will post our 1998

annual report on the Internet on Saturday, March 13, 1999, and mail it

at about the same time.

根据证管会法令的规定，我们必须在每季结束后45天内申报季报，而透过网络

公开信息的主要原因之一是我们希望如此重大的讯息可以以完整而不经过媒体

消化过滤的方式，在股市收盘后实时地传达给所有关心本公司状况的人士，因此

我们决定在往后每季的最后一个星期五，今年分别是5/15、8/14及11/13将

季报对证管会做申报的动作，并在当天晚上将相同的信息同步公布在公司的网站

上，此举将能够使得Berkshire所有股东，不管是以本人或挂名的方式持有，皆

站在同等的地位之上，另外，我们也预计在1999年3月13日星期六将年报公

布在网站上，并在同一时间将年报邮寄出去给所有的股东。

Shareholder-Designated Contributions

股东指定捐赠计划

About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1997

shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made

were $15.4 million, and 3,830 charities were recipients. A full

description of the program appears on pages 52 - 53.

大约有97.7%的有效股权参与1997年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,540万

美元捐出的款项分配给3,830家慈善机构，详细的名单参阅附录。

Cumulatively, over the 17 years of the program, Berkshire has

made contributions of $113.1 million pursuant to the instructions of

our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our

subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed

before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves

take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our

subsidiaries made contributions of $8.1 million in 1997, including inkind

donations of $4.4 million.

累计过去17年以来，Berkshire总计已按照股东意愿捐赠高达1.131亿美元的

款项，除了之外，Berkshire还透过旗下的子公司进行捐赠，而这些慈善活动都

是早在他们被我们购并以前就行之有年的(除了先前的老板自行本身负责的个人

捐赠计画之外)，总的来说，我们旗下的关系企业在1997年总计捐出810万美

元，其中包含440万美元等值的物品。

Every year a few shareholders miss out on our contributions

program because they don't have their shares registered in their own

names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the

designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. Charlie

and I regret this. But if replies are received late, we have to reject them

because we can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing

to make them for others.

每年都有一小部份的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天

的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计画，

对此查理跟我感到相当头痛，不过我们必须忍痛将这些指定捐赠剔除，因为我不

可能在拒绝其它不符合规定股东的同时，还破例让这些人参与。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares

that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee

name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on

August 31, 1998, will be ineligible for the 1998 program. When you get

the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not

get put aside or forgotten.

想要参加这项计画者，必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自己

而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1998年8月31日之前完成登

记，才有权利参与1998年的捐赠计画，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，

以免被丢在一旁给忘记了。

The Annual Meeting

年度股东会

Woodstock Weekend at Berkshire will be May 2-4 this year. The

finale will be the annual meeting, which will begin at 9:30 a.m. on

Monday, May 4. Last year we met at Aksarben Coliseum, and both our

staff and the crowd were delighted with the venue. There was only one

crisis: The night before the meeting, I lost my voice, thereby fulfilling

Charlie's wildest fantasy. He was crushed when I showed up the next

morning with my speech restored.

今年Berkshire的伍斯达克将在五月2号到4号举行，整个大会将在五月4号

星期一的年度会议召开后落幕，去年的年会在Aksarben体育馆召开，所有的工

作人员及参与的来宾对于当天的会场都相当满意，唯一美中不足的是，在年会的

前一天，我的嗓子沙哑了，当时几乎要如了查理的愿，只不过隔天当我恢复原本

的声音时，在一旁的查理几乎要崩溃。

Last year about 7,500 attended the meeting. They represented all

50 states, as well as 16 countries, including Australia, Brazil, Israel,

Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Greece. Taking into account several

overflow rooms, we believe that we can handle more than 11,000

people, and that should put us in good shape this year even though our

shareholder count has risen significantly. Parking is ample at Aksarben;

acoustics are excellent; and seats are comfortable.

去年的股东会总共有7,500位股东出席，分别来自全美50州以及包含澳洲、巴

西、以色列、沙特阿拉伯、新加坡与希腊等在内的16个国家，我想即使今年

我们的股东人数又大幅增加，加上其它几个备用的房间，应该可以容纳超过

11,000名以上的人员参加，会场备有足够的停车位，音效也不错，就连座椅坐

起来也很舒服。

The doors will open at 7 a.m. on Monday and at 8:30 we will again

feature the world premiere of a movie epic produced by Marc Hamburg,

our CFO. The meeting will last until 3:30, with a short break at noon.

This interval will permit the exhausted to leave unnoticed and allow time

for the hardcore to lunch at Aksarben's concession stands. Charlie and I

enjoy questions from owners, so bring up whatever is on your mind.

大门会在星期一早上七点开放，同时照例在八点半会播放由我们财务长Marc

Hamburg精心制作具世界级水准的Berkshire电影短片供大家欣赏，扣除中午

短暂的休息时间，让精疲力尽的人可以偷偷离开到阿肯萨本中心的小吃摊吃点东

西，整个会议将一直进行到下午三点半，查理跟我很喜欢老板们提出的各种问

题，所以记得准备好你要问什么。

Berkshire products will again be for sale in the halls outside the

meeting room. Last year -- not that I pay attention to this sort of thing

-- we again set sales records, moving 2,500 pounds of See's candy,

1,350 pairs of Dexter shoes, $75,000 of World Books and related

publications, and 888 sets of Quikut knives. We also took orders for a

new line of apparel, featuring our Berkshire logo, and sold about 1,000

polo, sweat, and T-shirts. At this year's meeting, we will unveil our 1998

collection.

再一次我们在会场外大厅备有Berkshire各式各样的产品供大家选购，虽然我不

是特别的用心，去年我们再度打破记录，总共搬走了2,500磅的糖果、1,350

双的鞋子以及价值超过75,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品，外加888

组由旗下子公司Quikut所生产的小刀，同时我们也接受预订一种新款的服装，

上面印有Berkshire的Logo，结果总计卖出1,000件各式polo衫、毛衣与T

恤，在今年的股东会，我们还将推出1998年全新系列产品。

GEICO will again be on hand with a booth staffed by star associates

from its regional offices. Find out whether you can save money by

shifting your auto insurance to GEICO. About 40% of those who check us

out learn that savings are possible. The proportion is not 100% because

insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with some favoring

drivers who live in certain geographical areas and work at certain

occupations more than we do. We believe, however, that we more

frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier

selling insurance to all comers. In the GEICO informational material that

accompanies this report, you will see that in 38 states we now offer a

special discount of as much as 8% to our shareholders. We also have

applications pending that would extend this discount to drivers in other

states.

GEICO公司再度会派出地区最优秀的业务员，在会场设立摊位，接受股东询问

有关汽车保险的信息，记得去看看你是否能在汽车保险费上省一笔钱，我们估计

至少有40%的股东可以因此而节省不少保费(我只所以没说100%的原因在于，

每家保险业者对于风险的估计都不同，有些保险公司对于居住于某些特定地区的

居民与从事某些特定职业的客户有偏好，不过我仍然坚信我们提供给一般民众的

费率通常都低于其它全国性的业者，在随年报附赠的GEICO资料中，大家将可

以看到我们提供给来自全美38州股东最高8%的折扣费率，至于其它州的股东

也接受开放申请取得不等的折扣。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this

report explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission

to the meeting. We expect a large crowd, so get plane, hotel and car

reservations promptly. American Express (800-799-6634) will be

happy to help you with arrangements. As usual, we will have buses at

the larger hotels that will take you to and from the meeting and also

deliver you to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport after

its conclusion. You are likely, however, to find a car handy.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通

(电话800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会

安排巴士接送大家往返各大旅馆与会场之间，并在会后接送大家到内布拉斯加家

具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，当然你可能会觉得如何有一辆车就更方便

了。

NFM's main store, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from

Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to

6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. During the period

from May 1 to May 5, shareholders who present NFM with the coupon

that will accompany their meeting ticket will be entitled to a discount

that is otherwise restricted to its employees.

占地75英亩的NFM主馆距离会场约1英哩远，营业时间平日从早上10点到

下午9点，星期六从早上10点到下午6点，星期日则从中午开到下午6点，

在五月1日到5日期间，股东持随股东开会通知单附赠的点券到NFM购买各类

商品，将可获得员工价的优惠。

Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for

shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 3rd. Last year was our

second-best shareholder's day, exceeded only by 1996's. I regard this

slippage as an anomaly and hope that you will prove me right this year.

Charlie will be available for autographs. He smiles, however, only if the

paper he signs is a Borsheim's sales ticket. Shareholders who wish to

visit on Saturday (10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.-8 p.m.)

should be sure to identify themselves as Berkshire owners so that Susan

Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, can make you especially welcome. Susan, I

should add, had a fabulous year in 1997. As a manager, she is

everything that an owner hopes for.

平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在五月三日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开

放，从中午开到下午6点，去年在星期六股东会前一天，我们缔造了历史次佳

的记录，仅次于1996年，我认为去年的下滑有点反常，所以希望大家都能前来

共襄盛举，证明我的看法的对的，查理会在现场接受大家的签名，当然大家如果

拿波仙的发票给他签，他会更高兴，另外选择在前一天或后一天前往参观的人，

记得表明Berkshire股东的身分，相信波仙的总裁-Susan Jacques会给各位最

热情的接待，有一点我必须特别说明的是，Susan在1997年表现相当优异，

她实在是所有老板心目中最理想的专业经理人。

On Sunday afternoon we will also have a special treat for bridge

players in the mall outside of Borsheim's. There, Bob Hamman -- a

legend of the game for more than three decades -- will take on all

comers. Join in and dazzle Bob with your skill.

另外在星期天下午我们也会在波仙珠宝店外面的大厅举办一场桥牌大赛，现场

Bob Hamman 桥牌界的传奇性人物也将出席，接受各路英雄好汉的挑战，记得

来参加，秀秀你的牌技给Bob看看。

My favorite steakhouse, Gorat's, opens one Sunday a year -- for

Berkshire shareholders on the night before the annual meeting. Last

year the restaurant started serving at 4 p.m. and finished about 1:30

a.m, an endurance trial that was the result of taking 1,100 reservations

vs. a seating capacity of 235. If you make a reservation and then can't

attend, be sure to let Gorat's know promptly, since it goes to great effort

to help us and we want to reciprocate. You can make reservations

beginning on April 1st (but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. Last

year I had to leave Gorat's a little early because of my voice problem, but

this year I plan to leisurely savor every bite of my rare T-bone and

double order of hash browns.

我个人最爱的牛排馆-Gorat's为了Berkshire股东年会破例在星期天开门营

业，去年为了消化1,100位预订的席次，只有235个座位的Gorat's牛排馆从

下午四点开始营业，一直到半夜一点半，所以已经预订座位的人，要是临时无法

光临，请记得一定要打电话取消订位，因为Gorat's如此尽心尽力的为我们服

务，这是我们可以给他们最起码的回报，今年该餐厅从四月一号开始接受预订(电

话402-551-3733)，去年由于我的喉咙有问题，所以必须提早离开，但今年我

一定会到Gorat's好好享用我最喜爱的丁骨\牛排加上双份的牛肉丸。

After this warmup, Charlie and I will head for the Dairy Queen on

114th, just south of Dodge. There are 12 great Dairy Queens in

metropolitan Omaha, but the 114th Street location is the best suited to

handle the large crowd that we expect. South of the property, there are

hundreds of parking spaces on both sides of the street. Also, this Dairy

Queen will extend its Sunday hours to 11 p.m. in order to accommodate

our shareholders.

吃完牛排后，查理跟我还会赶到位于道奇街114号的乳品皇后冰淇淋摊，在整

个奥玛哈地区总计有12家乳品皇后，但是114街却是最适合接待大量群众的

地点，在店的两旁有好几百个停车场供大家使用，同时该店也会延长假日营业时

间到晚上11点，以接待所有前往光顾的Berkshire股东。

The 114th Street operation is now run by two sisters, Coni Birge

and Deb Novotny, whose grandfather put up the building in 1962 at

what was then the outer edge of the city. Their mother, Jan Noble, took

over in 1972, and Coni and Deb continue as third generation ownermanagers.

Jan, Coni and Deb will all be on hand Sunday evening, and I

hope that you meet them. Enjoy one of their hamburgers if you can't get

into Gorat's. And then, around eight o'clock, join me in having a Dusty

Sundae for dessert. This item is a personal specialty -- the Dairy Queen

will furnish you a copy of my recipe -- and will be offered only on

Shareholder Sunday.

114街的分店目前由Coni Birge与Deb Novotny两姊妹所经营，系由她们的

祖父于1962年在当时还是市中心外围的现址创立，在1972年由她们的母亲接

手经营，Coni与Deb则是第三代的经营者，Jan、Coni及Deb在星期天晚上

将会在现场为大家服务，希望大家可以去和她们见见面，若是大家挤不进Gorat's

的话，也可以尝尝两姊妹亲手做的汉堡，八点整我将会出现享用我的喜欢的冰风

暴圣代，这是个人特调的秘方，当然你也可以要求乳品皇后照我的配方给你来一

份，这可是只有在股东会当天才对外提供独家秘方。

The Omaha Royals and Albuquerque Dukes will play baseball on

Saturday evening, May 2nd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. As usual, your

Chairman, shamelessly exploiting his 25% ownership of the team, will

take the mound. But this year you will see something new.

在前一天5月2日，星期六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥玛哈皇家队

对Albuquerque Dukes队的比赛，一如往年厚颜无耻的我会利用拥有该球队

25%的特权，站上投手丘担任先发，不过今年我保证各位一定会有新的感受。

In past games, much to the bafflement of the crowd, I have shaken

off the catcher's first call. He has consistently asked for my sweeping

curve, and I have just as regularly resisted. Instead, I have served up a

pathetic fast ball, which on my best day was clocked at eight miles per

hour (with a following wind).

过去几年，可能是受到现场观众喧闹声所影响，我总是不顾捕手对我所做出的暗

号，虽然他一直要求我投出拿手的变化曲球，但我总是极力反抗，结果总是投出

软趴趴的快速球，最快的球速也不过是每小时8英哩(这还是在顺风的情况下)。

There's a story behind my unwillingness to throw the curve ball. As

some of you may know, Candy Cummings invented the curve in 1867

and used it to great effect in the National Association, where he never

won less than 28 games in a season. The pitch, however, drew

immediate criticism from the very highest of authorities, namely Charles

Elliott, then president of Harvard University, who declared, "I have heard

that this year we at Harvard won the baseball championship because we

have a pitcher who has a fine curve ball. I am further instructed that the

purpose of the curve ball is to deliberately deceive the batter. Harvard is

not in the business of teaching deception." (I'm not making this up.)

其实我之所以不愿意投曲球背后有极大的隐情，大家或许知道，Candy

Cummings在1867年发明曲球的时候，曾在国家联盟引起极大的效应，这种

球路使得他每个球季至少可以赢得28场胜投，但是这样的投球方式也立刻引起

最高当局的严厉批评，当时的哈佛校长Charles Elliott对外宣称，我听说今年

哈佛棒球队靠着一位专门投曲球的投手赢得冠军，有人还告诉我，这种曲球基本

上是一种欺骗打者的行为，我必须说的是，哈佛从来不教人这种骗人的勾当。

Ever since I learned of President Elliott's moral teachings on this

subject, I have scrupulously refrained from using my curve, however

devastating its effect might have been on hapless batters. Now,

however, it is time for my karma to run over Elliott's dogma and for me

to quit holding back. Visit the park on Saturday night and marvel at the

majestic arc of my breaking ball.

而自从我知道Elliott校长的教诲之后，我就一直小心翼翼地避免使用到我这种

杀人无数拿手的曲球，不过现在已经到了忍无可忍的地步了，我决定再度使出我

的杀手戬，星期六晚上大家记得光临球场，让你们见识一下我这魔球的威力。

Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining tickets

to the game. We will also provide an information packet describing the

local hot spots, including, of course, those 12 Dairy Queens.

股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，里面同时包含一本旅行小手

册，介绍本地热门的旅游景点，当然也包括12家乳品皇后在内。

Come to Omaha -- the cradle of capitalism -- in May and enjoy

yourself.

欢迎大家在五月莅临奥玛哈-资本主义的摇篮，也预祝大家玩得愉快。

Warren E. Buffett

February 27, 1998 Chairman of the Board

华伦．巴菲特

董事会主席

1998年2月27日

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致所有股东:

　　　　　　Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, whic

increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B

stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present

management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to

$37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*

1998年本公司的净值增加了259亿美元，每股帐面净值不管是A级股或B级

股皆成长了48.3%，总计过去34年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，

每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的37,801美元，年复合成长率约为

24.7%*。

* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only

stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic

interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在

外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股则拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。

　　　　　　Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings -- but no

this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better

than it sounds? Well, Berkshire's progress in 1998 -- though more than

satisfactory -- was not as good as it looks. That's because most of that

48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.

通常当公司的净值一年能够成长48.3%时，大家应该要高兴的手舞足蹈，不过

今年却不行，还记得德国音乐天才华格纳吗? 他的音乐曾被形容为没有想象中好

听，嗯! 我想Berkshire在1998年的进展，虽然已经相当令人满意了，但还是

没有表面上看起来那么好，主要的原因在于在增加的48.3%净值当中，有绝大

部份系来自于因购并交易所发行的新股。

　　　　　　To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value

which means that any issuing of shares we do -- whether for cash or as

consideration in a merger -- instantly increases our per-share bookvalue

figure, even though we've earned not a dime. What happens is that

we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up.

These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in

per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what

we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice

Chairman and my partner, and I can't tell you too often (though you may

feel that we try), it's the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts

rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire's

intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of

the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far

exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms,

and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our

Owner's Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our ownerrelated

business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and

62.)

再进一步说明，由于我们公司目前的股价远高于帐面价值，这意思代表每当我们

发行新股，不管是现金增资或者是合并发行新股，都会立即大幅拉高我们每股的

帐面净值，但实际上我们没有因此多赚进半毛钱，而真实的情况是，这类交易对

我们每股实质价值并不会产生立即的效果，主要是由于我们所得到的跟我们所付

出的只能算是相当，而就像我与合伙人查理孟格不厌其烦，但却一再强调的真正

重要的是实质的价值的增加而非帐面净值的增加，虽然Berkshire 1998年的实

质价值大幅成长，但绝不到帐面净值增加48.3%的那种幅度，不过尽管如此，

我还是必须强调，目前的实质价值仍远高于帐面净值，(有关这些名词的说明，

请大家参阅股东手册，在里头我们揭示了与股东相关的经营原则)。

　　　　　　We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses an

managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998,

General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way -- more about

both later -- and the performance of our operating businesses last year

exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On

the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major

investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither

they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity

portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The

problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and

Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.

展望1999年，我们拥有有史以来最佳企业与经理人的黄金组合，我们在1998

年买下的两家公司，分别是通用再保与Executive Jet在各方面的条件皆是一时

之选(后面还会详加说明)，而原有拥有的企业表现更是超乎我个人的预期，

GEICO保险再一次令人瞠目结舌，当然也有不好的消息，几家我们拥有大笔投

资的大型上市公司经营纷传缺失，这也是当初我们没有预期到的，也因此使得我

们股票投资组合的绩效表现低于同期S&P 500指数，还好这些公司所发生的问

题都只是暂时的，查理跟我都相信他们长期发展的远景还是相当的乐观。

　　　　　　In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a tablehat we

regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the

updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key

components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if

we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our pershare

ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but

excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the

second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's

operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting

adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and

corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest

and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the

first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it

were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and

the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate

costs.

在最近三年的年报中，我们提供了我们认为可以最能够估计Berkshire实质价值

的一张表，在今年刚刚更新资料的表中，我们以拟制的方式将通用再保的数字加

入其中，也就是假设该公司自年度一开始就为我们所拥有，第一栏的数字代表我

们拥有每股的投资金额(包括现金与约当现金，但扣除财务金融单位持有的证

券)，第二栏则是每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，Berkshire来自本业的营业利

益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏

投资所贡献的股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，从这张表可以看出若是

把Berkshire分拆成两部份的话会变成怎样，其结果就等于是一家持有我们投资

部位的控股公司，以及另一家经营旗下所有事业负担全部成本盈亏的营利事业。

Investments

Per Share

Pre-tax Earnings Per

With All Income from

Investments Excluded

Year

1968 .................. $ 53 $ 2.87

1978 ...... 465 12.85

1988 ..... 4,876 145.77

1998 . 47,647 474.45

Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

Investments Per

Pre-tax Earnings Per

Share With All

Income from

Investments Excluded

Decade Ending

1978 ...... 24.2% 16.2%

1988 ...... 26.5% 27.5%

1998 ...... 25.6% 12.5%

Annual Growth Rate,

1968-

1998 ...................

25.4% 18.6%

　　　　　　During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, o

25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re

(included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This

company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our

per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting

loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired

General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest

gain.

回顾1998年，我们每股的投资金额增加了9,604美元，约25.2%，不过每股

营业盈余却减少33.9%，主要的原因缘自于通用再保(如先前所说，在今年以拟

制的方式并入Berkshire)，这家公司拥有相当大的投资部位，这使得我们每股的

投资金额大幅增加，不过另一方面，该公司在1998年也产生承保损失，这又拖

累了我们的每股营业盈余表现，事实上，要是我们没有买下通用再保，我们当年

的每股营业盈余可能还能维持小幅增加。

　　　　　　Though certain of our acquisitionand operating strategies may

from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually

work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future

rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire's

capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized

returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales

but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only

three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who

can't).

虽然某些特定的购并案与经营策略会影响到其中某一栏数字，但我们还是尽量让

两栏数字能够均衡发展，不过有一点可以确定的是，我们未来的成长率将远不及

过去所创造的水准，Berkshire现在的规模实在是大到我们很难再做出任何重大

的突破，若是你不这样认为，你应该去从事业务员的工作，而不是去教数学(请

永远记住，世界上只有三种人，一种会算术，另一种不会算术)。

　　　　　　Currently we are woing to compound a net worth of $57.4

billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will

be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course,

our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other

businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General

Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three

times Berkshire's. Net worth, though, measures the capital that

managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become

huge.

净值代表着一家公司经理人可以运用的资金，就这方面而言，Berkshire的规模

无疑是相当可观的，现在我们可以掌控的净值高达574亿美元，这数字居所有

美国公司之冠，(虽然如果艾克森和Mobil石油合并案成功的话，我们必须让出

宝座)，当然这并不代表Berkshire实际的价值，对于股东来说，公司总市值才

是最重要的，就这点而言，通用电气与微软的市值就是Berkshire的三倍以上。

　　　　　　Nonetheless, Charlie a I will do our best to increase intrinsic

value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be

at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we

exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far

short of that -- including years showing negative returns -- and those

will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand

just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It

means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this

daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands

just won't do. Today's markets are not friendly to our search for

"elephants," but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.

不过说归说，查理跟我还是希望能够尽力让公司的价值在未来以每年15%的平

均速度成长，这是我们认为可能达到的极限，在往后的日子，有时我们可能可以

超过15%，但也很有可能远不如这个标准，甚至可能会变成负的，而使得我们

平均成长率往下拉，另外大家要知道，所谓每年平均15%的成长率代表在往后

的五年之内，我们的净值必须要成长580亿美元，如果没有几个轰轰烈烈的大

案子的话，是绝对不可能办的到的，像爆米花摊这种小玩意可不行，而现在的市

场环境也不利于我们寻找合适的大象猎物，不过我们可以向大家保证一定会全神

贯注。

　　　　　　Whever the future holds, I make you one promise: I'll keep at

least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How

long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who

asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party.

To that end, I've already selected a "power spot" at the office for my urn.

不管未来会如何，有一点我可以向各位保证的是，只要我还在，我都会将我个人

99%以上的身家摆在Berkshire，至于能够维持多久? 我则是希望能够效法Fort

Wayne忠诚的民主党员，临终时还表示希望死后能够葬在芝加哥，好就近参加

党的活动，所以我也在办公室事先选好的一个好位置，以后可以用来摆我的骨灰

坛。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　　Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth

We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998

bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another

2,500. To balance this gain of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have

enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8

doesn't refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting,

working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward

corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5

million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the

assets we manage.

随着经济实力的增长，我们雇用员工的人数也同步增加，我们现在拥有47,566

位员工，其中包含1998年购并通用再保后并进来的7,074人，以及内部增聘

的2,500人，而未了服务新增加的9,500个人手，我们的总部人员也从原来的

12人扩编为12.8人(0.8指的不是查理或是我本人，而是我们新请的一位会计

人员，一个礼拜工作四天)，尽管这是组织浮滥的警讯，但是我们去年税后总部

开支却只有区区350万美元，大概占我们管理总资产的一个基本点(万分之一)

还不到。

Taxes

租税

　　　　　　One beneficiary of our increased size has been the U.S. Treasury

The federal income taxes that Berkshire and General Re have paid, or

will soon pay, in respect to 1998 earnings total $2.7 billion. That means

we shouldered all of the U.S. Government's expenses for more than a

half-day.

我们规模扩大最直接的受惠者之一就是美国国库，今年光是Berkshire与通用再

保已经支付或即将支付的联邦所得税就有27亿美元之谱，这笔钱足够供美国政

府支应半天以上的开销。

　　　　　　Follow that thought a little further: If only 625 other U.S

taxpayers had paid the Treasury as much as we and General Re did last

year, no one else -- neither corporations nor 270 million citizens --

would have had to pay federal income taxes or any other kind of federal

tax (for example, social security or estate taxes). Our shareholders can

truly say that they "gave at the office."

也就是说，全美国只要有625个像Berkshire及通用再保这样的纳税人的话，

其它所有的美国公司或二亿七千万的美国公民都可以不必再支付任何的联邦所

得税或其它任何形式的联邦税(包含社会福利或房地产税)，所以Berkshire的股

东可以说是"功在国家"。

　　　　　　Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does no

bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals,

have prospered in America as we would have in no other country.

Indeed, if we lived in some other part of the world and completely

escaped taxes, I'm sure we would be worse off financially (and in many

other ways as well). Overall, we feel extraordinarily lucky to have been

dealt a hand in life that enables us to write large checks to the

government rather than one requiring the government to regularly write

checks to us -- say, because we are disabled or unemployed.

对于查理跟我来说，签发后面有一长串"零"的大额支票一点都不会感到困扰，

Berkshire身为一家美国企业，以及我们身为美国公民，得以在美国这个伟大的

国家繁荣发展，这是在其它国家所不可能达到的，我想要是我们生在世界上的别

的角落，那么就算是我们再怎么努力的逃避税负，我们也不可能像现在这么富有

(也包含生活上其它层面)，从另一个角度来说，我们感到很幸运能够支付一大笔

钱给政府，而非因为我们残障或失业，要靠政府三不五时来救济我们。

　　　　　　Berkshire's tax situation isometimes misunderstood. First,

capital gains have no special attraction for us: A corporation pays a 35%

rate on taxable income, whether it comes from capital gains or from

ordinary operations. This means that Berkshire's tax on a long-term

capital gain is fully 75% higher than what an individual would pay on an

identical gain.

Berkshire的租税负担常常引起外界的误解，首先资本利得对我们并不太有利，

企业不论是资本利得或是其它正常的营利都必须支付35%的所得税，这也就是

说面对相同的长期资本利得，Berkshire的租税负担要比一般个人要高出75%

以上。

　　　　　　Some people harbor another misconception, believing that w

can exclude 70% of all dividends we receive from our taxable income.

Indeed, the 70% rate applies to most corporations and also applies to

Berkshire in cases where we hold stocks in non-insurance subsidiaries.

However, almost all of our equity investments are owned by our

insurance companies, and in that case the exclusion is 59.5%. That still

means a dollar of dividends is considerably more valuable to us than a

dollar of ordinary income, but not to the degree often assumed.

另外有些人还抱有一个不正确的观念，以为我们可以将70%以上的股利收入列

为免税收入，事实上这种适用于大部分美国企业的优惠，仅适用于Berkshire旗

下非保险事业所持有的股票，可惜我们大部分的股份都是由保险事业所持有，这

部份的免税比例就只有59.5%，当然这仍然代表每一块钱的股利收入比起其它

一般的应税收入来得有价值。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　　Berkshire truly went all out for the Treasury last year.

connection with the General Re merger, we wrote a $30 million check to

the government to pay an SEC fee tied to the new shares created by the

deal. We understand that this payment set an SEC record. Charlie and I

are enormous admirers of what the Commission has accomplished for

American investors. We would rather, however, have found another way

to show our admiration.

Berkshire去年真的是卯起来贡献国库，像是去年的通用再保合并案，我们就付

了3,000万美元给美国证管会作为发行新股的手续费，这金额创下了证管会有

史以来的新纪录，查理跟我对于证管会为所有投资人所做的努力感到崇敬，只是

如果能用其它方法来表示敬意就更好了。

GEICO (1-800-847-7536)

GEICO保险

　　　　　　Combine a great idea with a great manager and you're certain t

obtain a great result. That mix is alive and well at GEICO. The idea is

low-cost auto insurance, made possible by direct-to-customer

marketing, and the manager is Tony Nicely. Quite simply, there is no

one in the business world who could run GEICO better than Tony does.

His instincts are unerring, his energy is boundless, and his execution is

flawless. While maintaining underwriting discipline, Tony is building an

organization that is gaining market share at an accelerating rate.

好的理念加上好的经理人，最后一定可以获得好的成果，这样的完美组合在

GEICO身上获得最佳的印证，透过直效行销大幅降低成本的汽车保险搭配像

Tony Nicely这样优秀的经理人，很显然的全世界再没有其它人可以像Tony可

以把GEICO经营的这样好，他的直觉毫无偏差、他的能量没有上限，而他的行

动完美无暇，在严守承保纪律的同时，Tony所带领的团队正以超高的速度攻占

市场占有率。

　　　　　　This pace has been encouraged by our compensation picies.

The direct writing of insurance -- that is, without there being an agent

or broker between the insurer and its policyholder -- involves a

substantial front-end investment. First-year business is therefore

unprofitable in a major way. At GEICO, we do not wish this cost to deter

our associates from the aggressive pursuit of new business -- which, as

it renews, will deliver significant profits -- so we leave it out of our

compensation formulas. What's included then? We base 50% of our

associates' bonuses and profit sharing on the earnings of our

"seasoned" book, meaning policies that have been with us for more than

a year. The other 50% is tied to growth in policyholders -- and here we

have stepped on the gas.

这样的速度更因为受到我们特殊的奖励计画激励而加快，通常保单直接销售-也

就是不透过代理或中介，直接由保险公司与客户接洽的业务，需要一笔相当大的

前置投资，也因此第一年刚接到的保单通常都没有什么利润，不过要是客户在接

下来年度能够继续续约的话，公司将享有极高的获利，在GEICO我们为了不希

望公司的同仁因而降低争取新业务的企图心，所以我们特别将第一年的数字排除

在关乎员工奖金与分红的奖金计算公式之外，其中有50%是基于每季的帐上获

利-代表投保期间超过一年以上的保单，另外的50%则是视公司保单数量的成长

情况，这也是我们正加紧油门全力冲刺的。

　　　　　　I1995, the year prior to its acquisition by Berkshire, GEICO

spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last

year the company spent $143 million, and the counselor count grew to

2,162. The effects that these efforts had at the company are shown by

the new business and in-force figures below:

1995年当Berkshire还没有完全买下GEICO时，该公司每年的行销预算是

3,300万美元，并有652位电话咨询员，到了去年，公司的行销预算增加为1.43

亿美元，电话咨询员的人数也增加至2,162位，这些努力所得到的成果可以从

下表该公司新接保单与有效保单数字中看出端倪。

　　 New Auto Auto Policies

Years 　 Policies* In-Force*

1993 354,882 2,011,055

1994 396,217 2,147,549

1995 461,608 2,310,037

1996 617,669 2,543,699

1997 913,176 2,949,439

1998 1,317,761 3,562,644

* "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.

　　　　　　In 1999, we will again increase our marketing budget, spendin

at least $190 million. In fact, there is no limit to what Berkshire is willing

to invest in GEICO's new-business activity, as long as we can

concurrently build the infrastructure the company needs to properly

serve its policyholders.

展望1999年我们将继续增加行销预算到至少1.9亿美元，事实上Berkshire

对于GEICO在新业务取得上的投资是没有上限的，只要我们可以帮公司建立起

能够客户更好服务的各种措施。

　　　　　　Because of the first-year costs, companies that are concerne

about quarterly or annual earnings would shy from similar investments,

no matter how intelligent these might be in terms of building long-term

value. Our calculus is different: We simply measure whether we are

creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent -- and if that

calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.

而也由于第一年的成本负担，许多关心短期利益的公司都吝啬于从事相同的投

资，不管这些动作对公司长期的利益而言，是如何的有助益，但是我们的盘算就

不一样了，我们只是很简单的去评量现在所投入的每一块钱在未来是否能产生高

于一块钱的效益，如果估算出来确实有利，那么就算是花再多的钱我也开心。

　　　　　　There is far more to GEICO's success, of course, than low price

and a torrent of advertising. The handling of claims must also be fair,

fast and friendly -- and ours is. Here's an impartial scorecard on how we

shape up: In New York, our largest-volume state, the Insurance

Department recently reported that GEICO's complaint ratio in 1997 was

not only the lowest of the five largest auto insurers but was also less

than half the average of the other four.

当然GEICO成功的原因决不仅于低价与强势的行销，申诉的处理也要合理、快

速、亲切，这里有一个客观的数据可说明这点，在业务量居我们首位的纽约地区，

保险主管机关最近公布GEICO在1997年前五大汽车保险公司当中，其申诉比

率是最低的，其比例甚至远低于其它四家同业平均数的一半。

　　　　　　GEICO's 1998 profit margin of 6.7% was better than we ha

anticipated -- and, indeed, better than we wished. Our results reflect an

industry-wide phenomenon: In recent years, both the frequency of auto

accidents and their severity have unexpectedly declined. We responded

by reducing rates 3.3% in 1998, and we will reduce them still more in

1999. These moves will soon bring profit margins down -- at the least

to 4%, which is our target, and perhaps considerably lower. Whatever

the case, we believe that our margins will continue to be much better

than those of the industry.

GEICO 1998年的获利率达到6.7%，超过我们当初的预期，事实上是远高于我

们所能想象的程度，我们的成绩反映出产业间普遍存在的一种现象，近几年来，

汽车意外发生的频率与程度都比以往减轻许多，也因此我们立刻反应调降3.3%

的费率，预计在1999年还会降得更多，虽然这个举动马上使得我们的获利率下

降，但我们的目标至少是4%或甚至更低，不过不论如何，我们相信GEICO的获

利率还是远比同业的数字来得好的许多。

　　　　　　With GEICO's growth and profitability both outanding in 1998,

so also were its profit-sharing and bonus payments. Indeed, the

profit-sharing payment of $103 million or 32.3% of salary -- which

went to all 9,313 associates who had been with us for more than a year

-- may well have been the highest percentage payment at any large

company in the country. (In addition, associates benefit from a

company-funded pension plan.)

由于GEICO 1998年优异的绩效与获利能力，该公司的分红数字亦跟着水涨船

高，总计1.03亿美元，约占薪资的32.3%，由公司全体年资超过一年以上的

9,313位同仁共同来分享，这个数字在全美所有公司当中比例可以说是最高的，

(此外同仁还可经由公司提拨的退休金持股计画间接受惠)。

　　　　　　The 32.3% may turn out to be a high-water mark, given that th

profitability component in our profit-sharing calculation is almost

certain to come down in the future. The growth component, though,

may well increase. Overall, we expect the two benchmarks together to

dictate very significant profit-sharing payments for decades to come.

For our associates, growth pays off in other ways as well: Last year we

promoted 4,612 people.

虽然公司分红计画中的成长因子应该还会继续维持，但考量到获利因子在未来几

乎可以肯定会逐渐下降，所以32.3%的比例可以说是破天荒的新高，当然我们

预期这两项因子在未来的十年内仍然会是分红计画中扮演极为重要的角色，不过

对于我们的同仁来说，成长还代表着另一个意义，去年总计有4,612位同仁获

得升迁。

　　　　　　Impressive as the GEICO figures are, we have far more to do. Ou

market share improved significantly in 1998 -- but only from 3% to 3?

%. For every policyholder we now have, there are another ten who should

be giving us their business.

虽然GEICO的绩效数字是如此的令人印象深刻，但是我们仍然还有相当大的成

长空间，没错! GEICO1998年的市场占有率确实大幅提升，但也只不过从3%

增加为3.5%而已，换句话说相较于我们现在服务的每一个保单客户，等于还有

十个在外面等待我们去给他们提供服务。

　　　　　　Some of you who are reading this may be in that category. Abou

40% of those who check our rates find that they can save money by

doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers

differ in their underwriting judgements, with some giving more credit

than we do to drivers who live in certain geographical areas or work at

certain occupations. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer

the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all

comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount --

usually 8% -- to our shareholders. So give us a call and check us out.

有些正在读我们年报的人很可能就属于这类的人，在每个来征询GEICO保单费

率的人当中，平均有40%的人会发现向我们投保能为他们省下一笔钱，而之所

以不是百分之百的原因在于每家保险业者对于风险的判断估计都有所不同，有些

保险公司对于居住于某些特定地区的居民或从事某些特定职业的客户有偏好，不

过我仍然坚信我们提供给一般民众的费率通常都低于其它全国性的业者，在随年

报附赠的GEICO资料中，大家将可以看到我们提供给来自全美40州股东最高

8%的折扣费率，所以记得打电话给我们试一试。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　　You may think that one commercial in this section is enough. Bu

I have another to present, this one directed at managers of publiclyowned

companies.

在这段我还有一个广告要打，这广告主要是要写给上市公司的经理人看的。

　　　　　　At Berkshire we feel that telling outanding CEOs, such as Tony,

how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness. Most of

our managers wouldn't work for us if they got a lot of backseat driving.

(Generally, they don't have to work for anyone, since 75% or so are

independently wealthy.) Besides, they are the Mark McGwires of the

business world and need no advice from us as to how to hold the bat or

when to swing.

在Berkshire我们一直认为要教像Tony这样杰出的经理人如何经营公司是一件

相当愚蠢的事，事实上要是我们一直在背后指指点点的话，大部份的经理人可能

早就干不下去了，(坦白说他们大多根本就可以不必要再靠工作过活，75%以上

的人都已经相当有钱)，他们可以说是商场上的强打麦奎尔，根本就不需要我们

去指导他如何拿棒子或何时挥棒。

　　　　　　Nevertheless, Berkshire's ownership may make even the best o

managers more effective. First, we eliminate all of the ritualistic and

nonproductive activities that normally go with the job of CEO. Our

managers are totally in charge of their personal schedules. Second, we

give each a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own

100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family

have or will ever have; and 3) you can't sell or merge it for at least a

century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their

decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We

want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be

counted.

但是由Berkshire掌控企业所有权，却能够让这些经理人有更好的发挥，首先我

们去除掉所有一般总裁必须面对所有的繁文缛节与没有生产力的活动，我们的经

理人可以全心全意的安排自己个人的行程，第二，我们给予相当明确简单的任务

指示，那就是一、像自己拥有公司一样的心态来经营，二、把它当作是你跟你家

人在全世界仅有的资产来看待，第三、在有生之年内，你没办法将它卖掉或是让

别人给并走，我们告诉他们完全不要被会计帐面方面的考量来影响到其实际经营

上的决策，我们希望经理人了解什么才是最关键紧要的事。

　　　　　　Very few CEOs of public companies operate under a simila

mandate, mainly because they have owners who focus on short-term

prospects and reported earnings. Berkshire, however, has a shareholder

base -- which it will have for decades to come -- that has the longest

investment horizon to be found in the public-company universe.

Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die

still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs to manage for

maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter's earnings. We

certainly don't ignore the current results of our businesses -- in most

cases, they are of great importance -- but we never want them to be

achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive

strengths.

很少有上市公司的经理人可以如此自在的经营公司，这是因为大部分公司背后的

股东往往只着重短期的利益，相较之下，Berkshire背后有几十年来一直相当稳

定的股东群，拥有其它上市公司少见的长期投资眼光，事实上，这些股东打算一

直持有Berkshire至死方休，也因此旗下的经理人可以用一辈子的时间来经营公

司，而不用为了下一季的获利情况来烦恼，当然这绝不代表我们就不关心公司经

营的现况，事实上，这点也相当的重要，只是我们不希望只因为一昧追求短期的

获利而被迫牺牲掉公司长远发展的竞争优势。

　　　　　　I believe the GEICO story demonstrates the benefits of Berkshire'

approach. Charlie and I haven't taught Tony a thing -- and never will -

- but we have created an environment that allows him to apply all of his

talents to what's important. He does not have to devote his time or

energy to board meetings, press interviews, presentations by

investment bankers or talks with financial analysts. Furthermore, he

need never spend a moment thinking about financing, credit ratings or

"Street" expectations for earnings per share. Because of our ownership

structure, he also knows that this operational framework will endure for

decades to come. In this environment of freedom, both Tony and his

company can convert their almost limitless potential into matching

achievements.

我想GEICO成功的经验再再显示出Berkshire经营模式的优越性，查理跟我从

来就没有指示Tony该怎么做事，我想以后也不会，我们的工作就是提供他一个

绝佳的环境，让他能够彻底发挥才能去做该做的事，他不需要把时间耗费在无意

义的董事会、记者会或分析师与投资银行业者的演示文稿上，此外他也不必担心公司

的资金问题、信用评等或坊间对于公司获利的预期，而更因为我们特殊的股权结

构，他更了解这样的营运模式至少可以继续维持长达数十年以上，在这样自由的

环境之下，Tony跟他所带领的团队就可以将百分百的心思花在应付外在多变的

环境。

　　　　　　If you are running a large, profitable business that will thrive in

GEICO-like environment, check our acquisition criteria on page 21 and

give me a call. I promise a fast answer and will mention your inquiry to

no one except Charlie.

所以如果你同样也在管理一家获利稳定的大型企业，并且向往在像GEICO一样

的经营环境下大展鸿图的话，建议你先看看我们报告后段的购并标准，然后打个

电话给我，我保证一定会很快可以回复，而且除了查理之外，我不会把这件事告

诉其它任何人。

Executive Jet Aviation (1-800-848-6436)

企业主管飞行计画

　　　　　　To understand the huge potential at Executive Jet Aviation (EJA)

you need some understanding of its business, which is selling fractional

shares of jets and operating the fleet for its many owners. Rich Santulli,

CEO of EJA, created the fractional ownership industry in 1986, by

visualizing an important new way of using planes. Then he combined

guts and talent to turn his idea into a major business.

想要了解企业主管飞行计画(EJA)的无限潜力，你必须要先了解这个产业的特

性，它专门出售专机部份所有权给客户并且帮所有权人维护保养机队，EJA的总

裁-Rich Stantulli预视到飞机使用的革命新方法，于是在1986年发挥其个人

绝佳的胆识与才能让其创意成真，开创了专机部份所有权这个新兴行业。

　　　　　　In a fractional ownership plan, you purchase a portion -- sa

1/8th -- of any of a wide variety of jets that EJA offers. That purchase

entitles you to 100 hours of flying time annually. ("Dead-head" hours

don't count against your allotment, and you are also allowed to average

your hours over five years.) In addition, you pay both a monthly

management fee and a fee for hours actually flown.

按照部份所有权计画，你可以买下，由EJA提供各种系列的飞机，比如说八分之

一的部份所有权，如此你便可获得该架飞机每年100个小时的飞行时数，(不包

含飞机停机的时间，而且你还有权利将这些时数自由分配到五年内)，不过每个

月你还必须支付一些管理费以及真正搭乘时的钟点费。

　　　　　　Then, on a few hours notice, EJA makes your plane, or another a

least as good, available to you at your choice of the 5500 airports in the

U.S. In effect, calling up your plane is like phoning for a taxi.

然后，你只要在几个小时前通知我们，EJA就可以在全美指定的5,500座机场

安排好飞机，换言之，这种便利性跟你打电话叫出租车一样的方便。

　　　　　I first heard about the NetJetsR program, as it is called, about

four years ago from Frank Rooney, our manager at H.H. Brown. Frank

had used and been delighted with the service and suggested that I meet

Rich to investigate signing up for my family's use. It took Rich about 15

minutes to sell me a quarter (200 hours annually) of a Hawker 1000.

Since then, my family has learned firsthand -- through flying 900 hours

on 300 trips -- what a friendly, efficient, and safe operation EJA runs.

Quite simply, they love this service. In fact, they quickly grew so

enthusiastic that I did a testimonial ad for EJA long before I knew there

was any possibility of our purchasing the business. I did, however, ask

Rich to give me a call if he ever got interested in selling. Luckily, he

phoned me last May, and we quickly made a $725 million deal, paying

equal amounts of cash and stock.

我是在四年前头一次知道它的存在，当时它叫做Netjets计画，经由我们旗下

H.H. Brown鞋业的经理人Frank Roony的介绍，Frank本身就常利用该公司

所提供的服务，而且觉得相当满意，于是他建议我可以和Rich碰个面研究看看

是否可以让我的家族加入，结果Rich前后只花了15分钟的时间就说服我买下

四分之一的(也就是每年200小时)的霍克1000型飞机的所有权，从此之后，我

的家族在经过900个飞行小时，300次旅程的亲身体验之后，渐渐了解这种服

务为客人所带来的亲切、方便与安全性，毫无疑问地就爱上它，而我本人也在家

族成员热心的督促下，为该公司的服务在广告中做了见证，而事实上，在当时我

还没有想到有可能能够买下这家公司，不过我还是跟Rich提到，如果他有意愿

记得随时打电话给我，而幸运的是，Rich真的在去年五月份打电话给我，我们

很快就达成这笔7.25亿美元的交易，其中现金与股票各半。

　　　　　　EJA, which is by far the largest operator in its industry, has mor

than 1,000 customers and 163 aircraft (including 23 "core" aircraft that

are owned or leased by EJA itself, so that it can make sure that service is

first-class even during the times when demand is heaviest). Safety, of

course, is the paramount issue in any flight operation, and Rich's pilots

-- now numbering about 650 -- receive extensive training at least twice

a year from FlightSafety International, another Berkshire subsidiary and

the world leader in pilot training. The bottom line on our pilots: I've sold

the Berkshire plane and will now do all of my business flying, as well as

my personal flying, with NetJets' crews.

EJA目前已是这个产业规模最大的业者，拥有超过1,000位的客户以及163架

的飞机，(其中包含23架由EJA本身拥有或出租的核心飞机，用来确保在订位

需求最强劲时还能保持最高品质的服务)，安全性当然是任何飞行单位最重要的

考量，而Rich旗下650位的飞行驾驶每年都要到国际飞安公司(另一家由我们

转投资全世界最大的飞行员训练公司)接受至少两次广泛的训练课程，对我来说

我能做的都做了，我已经把Berkshire原来的专机给卖掉，并把我的事业与家庭

连同Netjets的同僚一起飞上天际。

　　　　　　Being the leader in this industry is a major advantage for al

concerned. Our customers gain because we have an armada of planes

positioned throughout the country at all times, a blanketing that allows

us to provide unmatched service. Meanwhile, we gain from the

blanketing because it reduces dead-head costs. Another compelling

attraction for our clients is that we offer products from Boeing,

Gulfstream, Falcon, Cessna, and Raytheon, whereas our two

competitors are owned by manufacturers that offer only their own

planes. In effect, NetJets is like a physician who can recommend

whatever medicine best fits the needs of each patient; our competitors,

in contrast, are producers of a "house" brand that they must prescribe

for one and all.

在这个产业成为领导品牌是最重要的一件事，我们的客户因为我们遍布全美各地

的机队而受惠，因为我们可以提供别家公司比不上的服务，所以我们也可大幅降

低飞机停在地面的时间，另一个令客户无法抵挡的致命吸引力是我们提供了各式

各样的飞机，从波音、湾流、Falcon、Cessna到雷神，相较之下我们其它两个

由飞机制造商经营的竞争对手就只能提供自家生产的飞机，事实上，Netjets就

好象是一位医生一样，可以为个别的病人量身订做，依其所需提供不同的配方，

不像另外两家业者，都是千篇一律的开出家传的狗皮膏药。

　　　　　　In many cases our clients, both corporate and individual, ow

fractions of several different planes and can therefore match specific

planes to specific missions. For example, a client might own 1/16th of

three different jets (each giving it 50 hours of flying time), which in total

give it a virtual fleet, obtained for a small fraction of the cost of a single

plane.

实际上我们有许多客户，包含企业与一般个人，同时拥有不同种类的飞机部份所

有权，以应付不同场合所需不同的机型，举列来说，一个客户可以拥有三种飞机

各16分之一的所有权(也就是每年各50小时的飞行时数)，这等于只要花一笔

为数不多的钱，就拥有一群机队一般。

　　　　　　Significantly, it is not only small businesses that can benefit fro

fractional ownership. Already, some of America's largest companies use

NetJets as a supplement to their own fleet. This saves them big money in

both meeting peak requirements and in flying missions that would

require their wholly-owned planes to log a disproportionate amount of

dead-head hours.

更重要的是，并不是中小企业才可以利用到这种服务，目前已经有一些大企业利

用Netjets来补充本身机队调度的不足，这让他们可以不必因为应付尖峰时间与

避免必须长期间停留地面的任务而省下一大笔开支。

　　　　　　When a plane is slated for personal use, the clinching argumen

is that either the client signs up now or his children likely will later.

That's an equation I explained to my wonderful Aunt Alice 40 years ago

when she asked me whether she could afford a fur coat. My reply settled

the issue: "Alice, you aren't buying it; your heirs are."

当一架飞机被用来当作私人使用，有一个很大的争议那就是不是由现在的客户买

单，就是由后辈的子孙来买单，这也是我最敬爱的阿姨Alice在40年前，问我

是否应该买一件貂皮大衣时，我回答她的话:"阿姨，你花的不是自己的钱，而是

你的继承人的"。

　　　　　　EJA's growth has been explosive: In 1997, it accounted for 31% o

all corporate jets ordered in the world. Nonetheless, Rich and I believe

that the potential of fractional ownership has barely been scratched. If

many thousands of owners find it sensible to own 100% of a plane --

which must be used 350-400 hours annually if it's to make economic

sense -- there must be a large multiple of that number for whom

fractional ownership works.

EJA正以爆炸性的速度成长，1997年31%以上的企业专机订单是由它所下，不

过Rice与我都认为飞机部份所有权的潜力根本还未充分的被挖掘，如果目前有

成千上万的人认为值得花一整架飞机的钱(也就是每年花350-400个小时飞

行)，那么我们认为就应该有更多人需要拥有部份飞机的所有权。

　　　　　　In addition to being a terrific executive, Rich is fun. Like most o

our managers, he has no economic need whatsoever to work. Rich

spends his time at EJA because it's his baby -- and he wants to see how

far he can take it. We both already know the answer, both literally and

figuratively: to the ends of the earth.

Rich除了身为一位杰出的经理人之外，本人也非常风趣幽默，就像是我们旗下

大多数的经理人一样，Rich根本就不需要靠工作来过活，Rich之所以愿意全心

全力地投入在EJA，完全因为这是他一手催生带大的孩子，他只想要看自己能够

做到怎样的地步，当然我们都已经知道最后的答案，不论是从文字上或是从数字

上皆是如此。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　　　　And now a small hint to Berkshire directors: Last year I spen

more than nine times my salary at Borsheim's and EJA. Just think how

Berkshire's business would boom if you'd only spring for a raise.

另外给Berkshire董事会们一个小暗示，去年我光是在波仙珠宝与EJA的花费就

是我个人薪水收入的九倍以上，所以大家可以想象到只有给我一点小小的加薪，

保证会对Berkshire集团企业的生意有大大的提升。

General Re

通用再保

　　　　　　On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition o

General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance

Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company

also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the

oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two

companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124

countries.

12月21号我们完成对通用再保公司220亿美金的购并案，除了拥有这家全美

国最大的产物险再保险公司之外，这家公司亦拥有世界上历史最悠久的再保公司

-科隆再保82%的股权(包含预计准备要买进的股份)，两家公司合起来将可接受

所有保险险种的再保险，并在全世界124个国家设有营业据点。

　　　　　　For many decades, General Re's name has stood for quality

integrity and professionalism in reinsurance -- and under Ron

Ferguson's leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more.

Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re's and

Cologne Re's managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can

teach us.

几十年来，通用再保代表的是再保业界品质、正直与专业的保证，而在Ron

Ferguson的领导之下，这个招牌更加获得肯定，关于通用再保的专业，

Berkshire实在没有太多的东西可以给他们，反倒是他们应该有很多的东西可以

教我们。

　　　　　　Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire's ownership will benefi

General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now

will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the

merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re's

management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow

the company to exploit its strengths.

不过我们仍然相信Berkshire的所有权可以让通用再保在许多方面受益，而在往

后的十年内，通用再保的获利情况应该可以比合并之前要好的许多，而我们的自

信心完全建立在我们能够提供通用再保一个可以完全自由发挥的经营环境。

　　　　　　Let's look for a moment at the reinsurance business t

understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under

Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary

insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result

from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for

absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.

让我们花一点时间来了解为何通用再保自己在再保险业没有办法像在

Berkshire之下那样的发挥，再保险的需求大部分来自于第一线保险公司想要规

避大型的意外损失所造成获利状况大幅波动的风险，事实上，再保险业者就是因

为吸收保险业客户想要规避的变动性而存在。

　　　　　　Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by bot

its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its

own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e

ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an

expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality

sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying

off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are

called "retrocessions") or rejecting good business simply because it

threatens to bring on too much volatility.

讽刺的是一家上市的再保险公司必须要同时接受股东以及外界评估其获利稳定

的检验，因此盈余变动过大将会影响其债信评等与本益比，就算就长期而言，这

家公司或许可以获得更有利的平均报酬，市场的现实有时却可能导致再保公司因

此犯下重大的错误，包含被迫放弃原先接下的一大部分业务(业界一般称之为倒

退)或放弃上门的好生意，只因为要避免带来获利的不稳定性。

　　　　　　Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as i

carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time.

Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile

earnings can't impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the

perfect structure for writing -- and retaining -- reinsurance in virtually

any amount. In fact, we've used this strength over the past decade to

build a powerful super-cat business.

不过Berkshire却很能够接受这样的不确定性，只要就长期而言，它的预期报酬

能够有好的表现，更重要的是，Berkshire可以说是资金的诺克斯金库，也就是

说任何盈余的剧烈变动一点也不会影响到我们的债信评等，也因此我们有能力也

有意愿签下并自留没有任何上限的再保金额，事实上，过去十年来，我们早已运

用这个优势建立起强大的巨灾保险业务。

　　　　　　What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force

technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our

structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General

Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international

markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost

certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire

also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most

compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re's

outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by

the constraints that have limited its growth.

而通用再保可以给我们的是行销通路、技术背景与管理技能，让我们得以将原本

拥有的财务优势更充分运用到保险业的每一个层面，尤其是通用再保与科隆再保

现在可以加速投入国际市场，这块大家看好将呈现高成长的处女地，而就像合并

案的公开说明书中所强调的，Berkshire将为通用再保带来租税与投资上的优

势，但是更重要的原因还在于通用再保的优秀经营阶层将可以在既有的基础上，

摆脱原有的种种束缚，尽情地发挥其潜能。

　　　　　　Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re's investmen

portfolio, though not for Cologne Re's. We will not, however, be involved

in General Re's underwriting. We will simply ask the company to

exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its

business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its

geographical coverage -- making these moves in recognition of

Berkshire's financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings.

As we've long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.

Berkshire将会承担管理通用再保投资组合的工作(但科隆再保部份不包含在

内)，除此之外我们并不会干涉通用再保的承保业务，我们只算很简单地要求他

们继续维持原有的原则，同时利用Berkshire强大的财务实力以及盈余变动的超

强忍受力，增加自留业务的比例、扩大现有产品线、增加业务区域，就像是我们

一再强调的，我们宁可接受变动剧烈的15%，也不要稳健平顺的12%。

　　　　　　Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re's ne

potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of

our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured

with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation

of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.

相信只要给他们一点时间，Ron跟他的团队一定能够将通用再保的潜力发挥到

极致，我跟他已经结识好几年了，彼此之间也一直维持有再保业务上的往来，事

实上，通用再保在1976年GEICO当初东山再起的过程中，扮演极为重要的角

色。

　　　　　　Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, an

I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.

Ron跟Rich两人都将出席今年的股东会，希望届时大家可以过来跟他们两位打

声招呼。

The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance

产物意外险的经营

　　　　　　With the acquisition of General Re -- and with GEICO's busines

mushrooming -- it becomes more important than ever that you

understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key

determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates;

(2) its cost; and (3) most important of all, the long-term outlook for

both of these factors.

随着通用再保的加入以及GEICO业务的突飞猛进，大家越来越有必要对如何评

估保险业有更多的了解，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这个行业所能产生的浮存金

数量(2)以及它的成本(3)最重要的是这些因素长期的展望。

　　　　　　To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In a